

الجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية
الشعبية

People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

وزارة التعليم العالي والبحث العلمي

Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research

جامعة أبي بكر بلقايد - تلمسان

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Department of English**

« UK 'Special Relationship' with USA and its Impact on the European Union (1945-2015) »

**A Thesis submitted to the Department of English in Candidacy for the Doctorate Degree
in Civilisation**

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Academic Year: 2021-2022

Declaration:

I hereby declare that the current Doctorate thesis is my own independent work. All content from external sources is cited.

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Dedication:

...To my dear beloved mother for supporting me throughout my life, a queen of my heart for teaching me to never give up the fight, to my dear sisters, two stars shining in my sky so bright, to my grandmother for her prayers for me and for raising me straight, to my fiancée D. Khaldi who suddenly passed away recently too young leaving a huge void in my life, may her soul rest in peace, to all my friends, in the largest sense of the word for believing in me, to all my teachers, my source of inspiration and light...

Acknowledgments:

First of all, I offer my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Senouci Meberbeche F. for her patience, meticulous orientation, and for having faith in me despite all the hard times I was going through. I attribute the completion of this research work to her encouragement and effort, and guidance even at the expense of her private time. Without her mental support, this work would never be accomplished.

Great thanks also to all the members of the jury for taking time to read my work and enrich it with their constructive criticism.

My gratitude goes to Dr. Saadia Ouldyeou for her constant encouragement, counselling, and moral support during my hard times.

Abstract:

In 1946, in one of his speeches, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill introduced the expression “Special Relationship” that entails the exceptional close political, diplomatic, economic, and military relations between the United Kingdom and the United States of America. These two nations enjoyed what was described as ‘unparalleled’ relationship at variant levels, namely, economic activity, military planning and execution of operations, and nuclear technology and intelligence sharing. However, albeit this relationship refers to a ‘special cooperation between two different states, it did not remain stable; it witnessed many ups and downs through different periods of time, and nearly ended after the end of the Cold War during the twentieth century then was resurrected after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. In this regard, adopting the chronological narration analysis, the present thesis explores the evolvement of this relationship from 1945 till 2015, accentuating the most crucial turning points that contributed in shaping it. To this end, the dynamics of this relationship were focused on, shedding light on the different levels of cooperation between the two nations through a close study of some case studies to extract the whys and wherefores that enhanced the survival of this relationship. The results revealed that besides some setbacks, the special relationship witnessed its golden ages during Thatcher premiership and President Reagan, and survived the end of the cold war during Tony Blair premiership and President Bush due their close personal relationship, and it becomes nowadays a need to be resurrected again to face the rise of the Chinese red dragon.

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List of Acronyms:

ABM: Anti-Ballistic Missile

ABMT: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

AFHQ: Allied Force Headquarters

ANF: Atlantic Nuclear Force

ANZUS: Australia, New Zealand, USA (military alliance 1951)

BIS: British Information Service

BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation

BP: British Petroleum

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency (USA)

CND: Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

COCOM: Coordinating Committee

CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

EEC: European Economic Community

EC: European Community

ECD: European Community of Defence

EU: European Union

EXCOM: Executive committee of the National Security (US)

EFTA: European Free Trade Area

FBI: Federal Bureau of investigation (USA)

FRG: Federal Republic of Germany

GDR: German Democratic Republic

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IRA: Irish Republican Army

MI5: Military Intelligence section 5 (UK counterespionage)

MI6: Military Intelligence section 6 (UK espionage services)

MLF: Multilateral nuclear force

NAS: National Health Service

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NSA: National Security Agency

NSC: National Security Council

NMD: National Missile Defence

OSS: the Office of Strategic Services

PIRA: Provisional Irish Republican Army

RAF: Royal Air Force (UK)

SALT: Strategic arms limitation talks

SDI: Strategic Defence Initiative

SIS: Secret Intelligence Services (UK)

SNF: short-range nuclear force

SR: Special Relationship

UAR: United Arab Republic

UK: the United Kingdom

USA: the United States of America.

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

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General Introduction:

To comprehend the dimensions of any international phenomenon, one needs to examine all the surrounding factors that impact it through history. The “Special Relationship” between the United Kingdom and the United States of America did not come out of the blue or out of nowhere, but it was the fruit of historical, cultural, and sentimental elements which linked the two countries together through the years, and which went through variant phases and stages in its intensity. Needless to say that it is a natural thing to do for countries in the world to come together in an attempt to form alliances between them for the purpose to get more power, dominance, and hegemony, as well as achieve considerable benefits and gains. In fact, this is exactly what motivated the United Kingdom to work hand in hand with its former colony, the United States of America, during and after the Second World War (1939-45).

The relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States of America has been an essential element in the British foreign policy during the twentieth century. On the American side, this relation was crucial, but it was relative and subject to constant change due to Britain loss of power and influence worldwide. Despite of this, Britain proved to be the most trustworthy ally for the United States of America in hard times or periods of crisis, and it was more essential for the Americans to set foot in the world and establish a new world order under the lead of U.S.A. . Indeed, the “special relationship” between the two countries started in 1945, and was intensified through different periods of time and events. However, it knew many ups and downs through different administrations.

In fact, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (1940-45) was the first one to use this term “Special Relationship” when The United Kingdom was the only European country to continue the fight against Nazi Germany in WWII (1939-45), and that was almost

impossible without the massive help of the United States of America. To that respect, the implementation of the ‘Marshal Plan’ (1948-51) to rebuild the devastated European countries, and more importantly, the American military bases in the United Kingdom (almost 250); transformed the latter to an advanced military station to defend the United States of America and Europe with the UK-USA troops based in Germany. Indeed, all of this sustains the importance of the “special relationship” after the end of the Second World War and during the Cold War (1946-90).

Nevertheless, from the end of the 1940’s, some politicians and university scholars started to question the existence of a “special relationship”, whether it was a reality, or a myth to reconcile the decline of the English Empire. So, does this ‘special relationship’ really exist between the two countries or was it just a myth exaggerated in the British literatures? How did the special relationship start and develop? What factors did help this relationship to become special? And what elements did make the ‘special relationship’ persist through time and how did it impact the relationship with the EU?

To answer the aforementioned questions, a historical analytical approach and a methodology of a case study was implemented, based primarily on the history of the “Special Relationship” at various times before and after the Cold War, as well as its impact on various levels. The first part is divided into sections according to the following Ministers: Atlee, Churchill and Eden, Macmillan and Douglas Home, Wilson, Heath, second term of Wilson, Callaghan and Thatcher.

As for the second part, it is divided into five sections according to five ministries in that era: John Major (1990-97), Tony Blair (1997-2007), Brown Gordon (2007-2010), and David Cameron (2010-2016) with presidents Clinton (1993-2001), G.W. Bush (2001-2009),

and Obama (2009-2017). The last part is related to the impact of the special relationship on the EU.

As for the tools of analysis, the first part is devoted to the theoretical framework which was about the dynamics of the relationship and its development to better understand its existence and continuity over time. Most of the data used are qualitative, for example: government documents, memos and speeches of political leaders, presidents, and the online sources.

Through this thesis different historical events are analysed as case studies in the context of the special relationship to show clearly its existence and how it does help both countries the UK and the USA manage these turning points in the history. Also, with this research one of the primary aims and motivation is to help in the development and enrichment of the Algerian library, especially that the subject of the “Special Relationship” has not been raised in Algeria before according to my preliminary research for sources. Since the literature is limited in Algeria in particular that has been a barrier to the smooth development of research as the search for relevant references and sources took me a long time and effort.

The Topics discussed in chapter I are the basis and the development of the “Special Relationship”, as well as the theories related to that phenomenon and the factors that contributed to its consolidation. Chapter II was devoted to discussing the “Special Relationship” during the Cold War, from the time of the British Prime Minister Churchill to Margaret Thatcher. How the “Special Relationship” knew some ups and downs during variant periods of time and how it survived the end of the Cold War, which was the reason for its existence. That chapter itself included a study of the different levels of cooperation between the two countries as part of the “Special Relationship” during the different periods of governments. Chapter III continued the discussion of the events related to the “Special

Relationship” of the post Cold War era. As well as the factors which have helped that relation to persist through time. On the other hand, an analysis was conducted of the most important events of this era, such as the War of Iraq and Afghanistan and the levels of cooperation between America and Britain in this area and other important factors that have a direct impact on the special relation.

In more details, a special relationship is an expression of economic, diplomatic, military, intelligence, etc... between two countries, the United States of America and Britain. This term was used by the British Prime Minister Churchill in a famous speech when he described the strong relationship between the two countries, USA and UK given emphasis on the historical and cultural ties between them which turned into a strategic alliance that various presidents and ministers sought to preserve. This relationship encountered difficulties such as the incompatibility of some presidents and conflicts of interest with the British ministers.

The second chapter is devoted to discussing the relationship during the Cold War (1945-1990). In the era of Atlee from 1945 to 1951, the relationship was characterized by some tensions that are represented in some events such as the Loan agreement of December 1945, The McMahon Act of August 1946 and Palestine issue. Tensions and disagreements have also negatively affected the nuclear alliance. But, even though the two countries' cooperation was tense, this did not prevent the conclusion of some positive agreements, such as the Anglo-American agreement of March 1946, which had a positive reflection on the value of the sterling. The Marshall Plan in 1947, another example of the alliance is the establishment of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) in April 1949. Also, The Soviet blockade of Berlin in June 1948, and finally the Korean War in June 1950 when Atlee allied with Truman.

The second part of the second chapter was devoted to the relationship between the British Prime Minister Churchill and the American Presidents Truman and Eisenhower from 1951 to 1957. At first, the United States did not pursue British policy toward China, which led to the emergence of a critical relationship. It was followed by many other problems over the Chinese islands of Quemoy in 1954, China, Indochina, China Taiwan, and Matsu in 1955. On the other hand, in the Middle East, The United States and the United Kingdom have quarrelled over Iran, to be more precise and concise the crisis of the Iranian Oil Company in 1951 in which the CIA and the British intelligence agency overthrew the Mossadeg government.

One of the most important examples of the devastating turning points in the special relationship between the two countries under the rule of Eden is the Suez crisis in 1956. But one should notice that in the midst of all this tension, cooperation in the field of security did not stop. In 1950 the two states' aviation systems worked very closely in the development of helicopters and military weapons. Moreover, Cooperation in intelligence had developed significantly through the creation of new institutions and the sharing of secrets.

The third part of the second chapter is about the British Prime Ministers Macmillan and Douglas Home from 1957 to 1967. Starting from the Bermuda meeting in 1957 which was seen as a conciliatory gesture, and a clever attempt in the process of the Special Relationship's recovery after it was characterized by fervour. The revival and strengthening of the British-American nuclear energy cooperation through the establishment of the Joint Defence Agreement in 1958, the work on joint weapons such as the SkyBolt missile, the alliance in the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Indeed all these events worked to strengthen the links of this close cooperation. As for the US President Kennedy, he cancelled the SkyBolt in 1962, and that was known as the SkyBolt Crisis, which strained the relationship again. Kennedy also, despite the opposition of his advisers, provided

Britain with a Polaris submarine during The Nassaw Conference. On the other hand, British Prime Minister Douglass Home focused on economic cooperation in the light of the “Special Relationship”. Moreover, he had a position on trade with Cuba in defiance of US trade. He also advocated the independence of nuclear deterrence. His personal relationship with the American President Lyndon Johnson was not good at all which was not in favour of the special relationship.

In the Wilson era, many events led to a negative impact on the special relationship, a point in case was when the British Prime Minister Wilson decided to withdraw all British troops from the Suez Canal. The British Prime Minister Wilson did not act with Lyndon Johnson like Macmillan and Eisenhower, who were quick to fix the “Special relationship” and get away from tensions. Among the noteworthy events that had a direct impact was the Sterling Crisis of 1964-1967. Wilson pulled British troops out of Singapore for Britain was facing some economic difficulties, and that latter did anger Johnson who was in a serious need of the British support and existence there. The Vietnam War (1955) made matters worse after the British Prime Minister refused to support the US military with inland troops. Not to forget the variant visions of both countries concerning Indochina.

The fifth part of the same chapter deals with the special relationship during the British Prime Ministers: Heath, Wilson and Callaghan. Heath and the US President Nixon had a few attachments to the “Special Relationship”. Indeed, this was translated into the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, which would have determined the future of Britain in Europe. Britain served as a link between USA and European countries. Moreover, Britain refused to allow the United States to use its military bases in Cyprus to assist Israel and carry out reconnaissance flights in the Middle East.

From 1974 to 1979, Prime Minister Wilson tried to reform the situation; and Prime Minister Callaghan who followed the same approach, was able to maintain good relations with US presidents by preaching a strong cooperation in the field of nuclear weapons and the acquisition of Trident. Worth Mentioning is the fact that Callaghan succeeded in securing the Trident during Carter presidency.

The last section of the same chapter was devoted to the events that Thatcher underwent during her dealings with US President Regan. These two leaders were able to consolidate and strengthen the relationship and benefit from it through the activation of the nuclear partnership and the nuclear exchanges and their Coalition during the Falklands War in 1982. Events such as the Siberian Gas Crisis in 1982 and the US occupation of the Commonwealth island of Grenada in 1983 were almost about to break the “Special Relationship”, but cooperation soon returned to normal in 1986 and Britain used US warplanes to strike Libya. Also, important to mention here was The Reykjavik Summit in 1986, when they tried to cancel or decrease all nuclear weapons, but problems returned to threaten the relationship. In 1989, the US President Bush decision to renew short-range nuclear weapons, the disagreement over the future of NATO, the reunification of Germany also threatened the special relationship, but this did not prevent the alliance to properly function in the Gulf Wars.

The third chapter is divided into five parts, starting with Prime Minister John Major with the US President Clinton from 1990 to 1997, where it was not a successful start even before the election of President Clinton because of the support of Prime Minister Major to Bush, which some saw as interference in US internal affairs. The alliance on nuclear power was weak after Clinton banned nuclear testing in the Nevada desert in 1993 and pushed Major to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which prevented the development of the British Defence Force and the D-5 missiles. The biggest crisis was the crisis of Bosnia; Britain was against the

arming of Muslims in Bosnia unlike America which encouraged this, in addition to the imposition of the blockade. The Copenhagen Crisis followed in June 1993 where Clinton allied with the German Chancellor to group the countries of the European Union against the lifting of the embargo on Bosnia and the following months America voted in the United Nations with the rest of the European Union against Britain and France.

The second part of the third chapter discussed the relationship between Prime Minister Blair and US President Bush from 1997 to 2007. The “Special Relationship” was at its height as Bush and Blair's personal relationship helped revive it from the previous sour events of September 11. After this crisis, the two presidents represented their efforts to root out the new threat that threatened global peace. This new enemy is terrorism. Blair then played a key role and stood shoulder to shoulder with Bush in the Iraq War and the Lebanon War in 2006.

The last section of Chapter three detailed the “Special Relationship” under the leadership of Prime Ministers Gordon Brown (2007-2010), David Cameron (2010-2016), and the US President Barrack Obama. Indeed, David Cameron relationship with Obama was not very good compared to the relationship between Blair and George Bush, but this does not negate that it resulted in some agreements and positive alliances, despite the tension.

The fourth chapter revolves around the impact of the special relationship on the EU. At first Britain's sceptic relationship with the European Economic Community (EEC) from 1950 to 1970, The American influence regarding the UK integration into the EU, and the struggle of Britain to hold on to the special relationship with USA after becoming a member in the EU. This chapter also includes Atlantic relations represented in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, and the impact of the special relationship in that transatlantic context.

Chapter one:

Background to the Anglo-American “Special Relationship”

Definition and Related Theories

1. Introduction:

The ‘special relationship’ was indeed a controversial topic between scholars during the twentieth century for they quarreled between its existence as a reality or myth. Throughout this chapter the terms special and relationship should be defined, shed light on the scholars’ debates and the theories related to that, discuss its creation and development through time, and the elements and factors that contributed to its consolidation and persistence.

2. Definition and Related Theories:

A clear definition will be provided at first as well as a summary of the theories related to the ‘special relationship’ between the UK and its American counterpart.

2.1. Definition of the ‘Special Relationship’:

The conceptual meaning will be set first of both words special and relationship, and then discuss the political meaning of the term ‘special relationship’.

The word ‘Special’ refers to someone or something that is special which is better or more important than other people or things. Moreover, the term ‘Relationship’ refers to the relationship between two people or groups which is the way in which they feel and behave towards each other.

Moving to its political definition, William Wallace, a British scholar and the writer of his famous book in diplomacy and foreign policy entitled *‘the Foreign Policy Process in Britain’* (1975), defines it as follow: “‘the special relationship’ was built on economic, social, and cultural, as well as on common interests forged during the War (World War2)”.¹

The American Scholar Russett, who is Dean Acheson Research Professor of International Relations and Political Science at Yale, described the special relationship in

¹ William Wallace, “The Foreign Policy Process in Britain”, (London: RHA, 1975), 217.

terms of “the capacity of feeling sympathy, confidence, mutual consideration, and the will to accept the other’s demands, which serves to fix differences in a friendly manner, and collaborate in domains of common interest, and helping each other whenever needed.”²

Max Beloff (Lord Beloff), remarked in 1966 that ‘the special relationship’ from an American perspective was not always perceived in a positive way during the 1950’s. Meanwhile, it was exaggerated from the British side:

On the one hand you have the American historians who account for the entry of the United States into two World Wars by pointing to British intrigues designed to force upon the United States the burden of defending the British Empire. On the other hand there are British historians who appear to justify De Gaulle’s suspicions by recounting the history of Anglo-American relations in terms that suggest that a growing intimacy of action between Britain and the United States has been the great continuing theme of world history for the past sixty years.”³

Beloff reviewed the main events of the century to determine the real importance of this relationship. He first noted that Britain’s strategic position as an advanced US defence platform tends to fade away with the development of long-range ballistic missiles. Unlike those who think that Britain tendency to strengthen its relations with the United States of America was due to the realisation that British and American interests in international affairs would eventually prove to be complementary; Beloff thinks that it is the sense of its weakness that pushed Britain to seek the American support to fail its competitors. Moreover, according to him, the British rulers had the conviction from 1890 that the world order which allowed the extraordinary growth of the Western economy could no longer be assured by Britain alone. In these conditions, it was US duty and destiny to assure an increasing share of this responsibility.

² Bruce Russett, “Community and Contention: Britain and America in the twentieth century”, (Cambridge, MA,: MIT Press, 1963), 25-27. These two authors are cited in J. Rasmussen, “British Mass Perceptions of the Anglo-American Relationship”, *Political Science Quarterly*, vol.108 n°3(1993), 516.

³ Max Beloff, “the Special Relationship: An Anglo-American Myth” in Martin Gilbert ed., *A Century of Conflict, 1850-1950*(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966)., 159.

'The Special relationship' becomes an idea that a number of British politicians have interest in adopting it to convince themselves that the transfer of power to the United States of America does not harm their country, and that its influence on Washington would still allow Britain to preserve some of its prestige in the international scene. Moreover, Beloff insists on the fact that the British were illusioned about the persistence of a cultural community between the two countries, since the American administration was invested by Irish, German, or Slavic origins, which had nothing in common with them, and quite often, they have feelings of hostility towards them. He also focuses on the traditional hostility of the Americans to British colonialism and its protectionist system damaging their commercial interest. He quoted Summer Welles who said in 1943: "the whole history of British Imperial preference is a history of economic aggression".⁴ Still sceptical of the 'special relationship', he mentions the Suez Crisis, as an example of betrayal, when Eden chose not to tell the Americans about his intentions, knowing that they would never be accepted by them. It always is for Beloff, a relationship of dependence with no real counterpart.⁵

In addition, William Wallace and Tugendhat, for example, estimated in 1989 as far as the 'special relation is concerned' that: "the assumptions and the personal relationship on which (the special relationship) rested in the post-war years have faded". They urged Britain to "abandon the illusion that the special relationship is more than a set of limited arrangements, and (to) approach the UK-US link with a more hard-headed calculation of the costs and benefits to Britain".⁶ It is important to mention here that Christopher Tugendhat was for a long time one of the two British delegates in the European commission at Brussels. Thus, it is very natural for him to reinforce the links between his country and Europe, rather than the United States. Michael Smith and his co-authors share the same opinion that Britain

⁴ Max Beloff, p.159.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ C. Tugendhat and W. Wallace, "British Foreign Policy in the 1990s", (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1989), 275.

has less profit with its relation with the United States of America, and denounce the enslavement of their country to the American interests.⁷

However, David Reynolds has a balance position regarding ‘the special relationship’; he does not deny it, but rather looks to define it according to its different aspects. Nevertheless, he saw a “need for Britain to reassess fundamentally the diplomatic traditions Britain has inherited from the 1940’s and 1950’s”, and wondered whether “the bonds of the ‘the special relationship’ now are a restraint on Britain’s diplomacy”.⁸

Indeed, the relations between the two countries were too long and strong to the extent that it is not certain that the links between them can easily be broken.

2.2. The American View of the S. Relationship:

The American view and attitudes about the special relationship will be examined, and one must be careful not to neglect that US viewpoint regarding the special relationship for it is somehow distinct from the British one.

Kissinger, the secretary of states in Nixon administration (1969-1974), estimated in his memoirs that:

For the ‘Special relationship with Britain was peculiarly impervious to abstract theories. I did not depend on formal arrangements; it derived in part from the memory of Britain’s heroic wartime effort; it reflected the common language and culture of two sister peoples. It owed no little to superb self-discipline by which Britain had succeeded in maintaining political influence after its physical power had waned [...]. It was an extraordinary relationship because it rested on no legal claims ; it was formalised by no document; it was carried forward by succeeding British governments as if no alternative were conceivable. The influence exerted by the United Kingdom was great precisely because it mentioned it as little as

⁷ M. Smith, S. Smith and B. White, “British Foreign Policy: Tradition, change, and Transformation”, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 40-41.

⁸ D. Reynolds, “A Special Relationship’ ? America, Britain, and the International Order since the Second World War”, *International Affairs*, vol.62 n°1(Winter 1985-86), 19-20.

possible; the special relationship is, in itself, the evidence of the importance of intangibles.⁹

Kissinger words show clearly that ‘Special Relationship’ is not a British illusion, but a reality that carries weight on the other side of the Atlantic.

Ernest May and George Treverton¹⁰ focus on the argument of the common language and culture. They insist on the fact that many American leaders conducted some of their studies in Great Britain. Certainly, the interests of both countries were well served under the umbrella of the ‘Special Relationship’, but one should not limit that only to the material domain.

It is a fact that the American Presidents have always been more sensitive to criticism and praise coming from Great Britain than from France, Germany, or another country. Eisenhower devoted a significant part of his press conferences to the English pacifists’ questions of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND2) on the radioactivity dangers released by the American nuclear tests on the world. However, the most dramatic example was the official visit to London which President Nixon, who was in a desperate situation, was trying to organise to boost his prestige. His memoirs offer a series of quotes from “The Times” in an attempt to prove that until the end, he had the support of the public opinion in Great Britain.

Indeed, the US Presidents hold on the British opinion because the latter has an impact on their authority in their own country. Following the same line of thoughts, the US politicians’ reputation in London, has often affected their position at home. The good opinion that the British Prime Minister had for a ‘Harry Hopkins’, or ‘Averell Harriman’, has served their careers. Callaghan support for Brzezinski did much to strengthen his position. Also,

⁹ H. Kissinger, “the White House Years”, (London: Weindenfeld and Nicholson, 1979) , 90.

¹⁰ E. May and G. Treverton, “Defence Relations: American Perspective”, in W.M.Roger Louis and Hedley Bull ed., “Anglo-American Relations since 1945”, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1986), 161-162.

London esteem for the General 'Alexander Haig' when he was on the head of NATO was a determining factor in his appointment as secretary of state. However, the British irritation over his mediation efforts during "the Falklands" conflict, contributed in losing his position.

2.3. Related Theories about the Special Relationship:

Three factors are crucial to mention before presenting the principal theories regarding the 'special relationship'. The first factor is the importance of the 'special relationship' between the two countries at an international level, and this has evolved considerably over the last sixty years. The second factor corresponds to the central role 'the special relationship' plays in the representation of Great Britain in the world. Indeed, whether myth or reality, this relation is a determining feature of the perception that Britain has of its own identity. The third factor is the personal element which serves as a compass to this 'special relationship'. Needless to say that the British influence over the American administration depends on the nature and intensity of the links between the American Presidents, and the British Prime Ministers, the more close they are on a personal level, the more they influence decision making process in both countries. These three factors always interact in a way that the specialist viewpoints depend on the place they attribute to each feature at a given time in the history of the two countries.

The first factor is the most evident and more simple to study. In fact, between 1945 and 1990, it was obvious that the importance of Great Britain in the world changed radically. Thus, America's interest and impact in the 'special relationship' changed accordingly and in the same direction. The second economic power - way before Germany and France - , a financial power close to the one of the United States, head of a colonial empire which becomes the Commonwealth that gives it influence over the five continents, its army is almost equivalent to the US army, and possessing bases all around the world, and the second

strongest navy policing all the Oceans and Seas in the world; Great Britain of the 1950's was very influential and had its place in the international arena. However, its economic crisis made it more dependent on the United States of America, weakened it, and made its grandeur somehow illusory. The 1960's witnessed a big German and a French economic development over Britain, and also the British withdrawal from East Suez. All of these weakened Britain's position in the world. From then on, the inactivity or pause of the 'special relationship' by the Americans between 1945 and 1950, 1964 and 1975, in 1989, and more durably since 1991, despite Tony Blair's efforts; could be interpreted as a logical result of its decline. However, the reactivation of the 'special relationship' since 1975, and between 1980 and 1988, could only be explained with the introduction of the two other factors.

One important thing which is related to the first factor is that the 'special relationship' until 1960's was exercised at an international level. The United States of America in all foreign affairs aspects was dealing with Britain, even during the period which was marked by the anti-colonialism principle of the past, the Americans came to the conclusion that they need to let some important regions in the world under the British control to contain communism¹¹, namely, the Middle East, South-East Asia, and even Europe. Starting from mid 1960's, even before British withdrawal from East Suez, the scope of the countries where the Anglo-American alliance was implemented started to diminish. Thus, it is somehow easy to understand President Johnson's anger against Harold Wilson in 1954 when the latter tried to mediate between the USA and its enemy in The Vietnam War 1955, i.e. the United States was left alone in different parts of the world at that time which made them angry, and apart from that Wilson was trying to mediate between the United States and its enemy in The Vietnam

¹¹ Communism is a philosophical, social, political, and economic ideology and movement whose goal is the establishment of a communist society, namely a socioeconomic order structured upon the ideas of common ownership of the means of production and the absence of social classes, money, and the state. Britannica.com

War (1955) without providing any concrete help in form of troops in the field. So, one can easily comprehend the anger of the US President.

The second factor should take more importance for the British influence in the world diminished. When Churchill was back to power in 1951, his will to restore and reinforce the 'special relationship' lies on the fact that he wanted to preserve British status as a supreme power in the world which was gradually losing it. Thus, this link with the United States was more important to the British rather the other way around. It became more vital with Macmillan to preserve the British power worldwide through its nuclear deterrent which was dependent on the American technology. Moreover, the failure of the two British attempts to join the EEC showed more clearly the critical character of the 'special relationship' for the status of Britain in the world. Indeed, a country which has a privileged relation with the first powerful nation on earth, and has the capacity to influence its policy should be an important country. Even more, the prestige of the United States of America reflected on the United Kingdom and helped it achieve an important position in the international scene. What is related to the myth part according to some observers is the exaggeration of Churchill and Macmillan of the grandeur given to the 'special relationship' in comparison with the reality of the US leaders and public opinion standing at the opposite side of this. In fact, the Thatcher period, for instance, showed the reality part of the 'special relationship' without exaggerations. Similarities and agreements upon applying the same economic policy on both sides of the Atlantic gave more weight to Thatcher against her haters. Indeed, the image of her country able to influence US policy allowed her to oppose freely her European partners.¹²

¹² Reynoldes, Opcit, 20.

Thatcher commented in 1996 on the impact of the ‘special relationship on her country and what it achieved through its alliance with their American partners:

The North Atlantic Alliance, the IMF, the World Bank, splitting the atom, victory in two World Wars and in Korea and the Gulf, the defeat of fascism and communism and the triumph of freedom –these are the fruits of the Anglo-American alliance through this century. It is the story of that remarkable achievement and the enduring friendship between two great peoples.¹³

The third factor played a decisive role in two cases, at least; the one of the strong relation established between “Kennedy and Macmillan”, and the exceptional solid complicity and friendship between “Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher”. One can easily deduce that economic and military power in alliances count more than human relations. However, the ‘Nassau Conference’ in 1962, and the USA support in the “Falkland War” in 1982, are two evidences that human relations have their own weight in the ‘special relationship’. Indeed, without the esteem and the sympathy President Kennedy holds for Macmillan, Great Britain would never obtain ‘Polaris’ and lose its nuclear force. Moreover, during the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ in 1962, Macmillan and his ambassador’s advice and suggestions were taken seriously into consideration, i.e. President Kennedy not only inform his British partners, but rather consulted them and made Macmillan as a partner in the decision making process.

In addition, Thatcher influence on President Reagan was too real to the extent that the Americans deemed excessive, or sometimes saluted, for she was the only one able to convince President Reagan to change his mind regarding some critical matters like “the Star Wars’ project¹⁴. More important to mention is the convergence of both leaders’ views regarding an important number of fundamental questions like liberating the economy, the war against communism, and the military reinforcement of both countries to face the communist threat, which are conditions rarely to happen in history. Despite the massive British participation in

¹³ Ritchie Owendale, “Anglo-American Relation in the Twentieth Century”, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998),162.

¹⁴ The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), derisively nicknamed the "Star Wars program", was a proposed missile defense system intended to protect the United States from attack by ballistic strategic nuclear weapons (intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles). Britannica.com

the 'Gulf War' in 1990/91, the relation between President Bush and Bill Clinton with John Major was not really good for the latter's support for Bush in the US presidential elections which affected the 'special relationship' and suffered from hard setbacks. Indeed, from the Arrival of Thatcher to government in 1980, the 'special relationship' with the United States of America served the British to counter balance the grandeur of the European community. However, Michael Smith published an article in '*The Guardian*' written on May 18, 1980, which he remarked that:

The problem for Britain...is where to place the main emphasis-in our foreign and defence policy and in our economic and financial diplomacy-between an America which has lost the capacity to respond sensitively and sympathetically to its transatlantic partners, and a Europe which neither fully shares British conceptions of international order nor offers us a comfortable basis for economic co-operation.¹⁵

Indeed, that is a crucial question which is related to the future of Great Britain in the world, what circle the British leaders would choose the one of 'the special relationship' or 'Europe'.

In fact, it was always difficult for Britain to combine both approaches. A good example to illustrate that would be the one of Tony Blair when he introduced to the Commons on September 24, 2004, the so called 'evidence' of the production of Massive Destruction Arms in Iraq, evidences apparently given by the United States in which George Bush the son, did not dare to use while addressing NATO two weeks before. The Prime Minister did not only stand by the reserved position of the European community, but rather confirmed his solidarity and support to the American administration in an insolent manner.

¹⁵Michael Smith, "Britain and the United States: Beyond the 'Special Relationship'", London, 1980, 33.

3. Factors that Helped the Anglo-American Relations to be Special:

‘The special relationship’ was founded upon a myriad of factors. From historical and cultural ties to security and military aspects. That relationship was basically shaped upon the identical values and ethics, in which democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of rights and the rule of law stand at the peak.

3.1. The Historical and Cultural Ties:

The shared history and cultural heritage has always been playing an important role in bringing nations into reconciliation. Thus, it can be said that the historical and cultural background of the United States and United Kingdom were a main factor, which rendered the relation between the two countries special.

The relation between the UK and USA goes almost back to two hundred years ago before the United States was established. From 1600, several Europeans attempted to immigrate to North America. However, the most prevalent population was the British one, for they established the thirteen colonies and controlled the most lucrative seaports on the east coast. Later on, as the British crown grew increasingly repressive, the thirteen colonies revolted against the UK. They declared a revolution in 1775, which lingered for more than ten years. The revolt, which witnessed various disagreements and ups and downs, was brought eventually to an end in 1785 by the UK signing the treaty of Paris. The thirteen colonies thus declared their independence and established what is called now the United States. This succession of events, hence, bound both nations historically and culturally. For now the United States and the United Kingdom have a shared history, an overlap religion, a common language, and a common legacy.

3.2. The Political and Legal Structure of the UK and the USA:

The second factor that boasted the Anglo-American relation to be special is the political and legal system of the two nations, for both countries embraces the conception of individual freedom, the concept of a law based state¹⁶, and the common law¹⁷.

The most crucial documents of the American legal and political structures, the Declaration of Independence, the US constitution, and the Bill of Rights, are said to be deeply rooted in the British constitutional history, political philosophy, and jurisprudence. In these terms Churchill quoted: “the United States constitution are not only American documents, they follow on the Magna Carta and the English Bill of rights as the great titles in which the liberties of the English-speaking people are found.”¹⁸

The English declaration of rights in 1689 was issued to bring the reign of King James to an end, and declare William and his wife, Mary Stuart, as the new rulers of Britain. This document was the essence and the source of inspiration to the 13 colonies to revolt against the tyrannical reign of George the third, on the other hand, It enlightened Jefferson to come up with the American Declaration of Independence, in which he justify bringing the reign of George to an end. Jefferson seemed as well to be influenced by English thinkers for “Jefferson relied heavily on two of the leading thinkers of the 18th century Scottish Enlightenment, David Hume and Francis Hutcheson, for many of his ideas. Hutcheson, for example, wrote that human rights included the right of a people to oppose tyranny and the right of colonies to secede if their mother country treated them unjustly. English philosopher John Locke argued that sovereignty derived from the

¹⁶ The authority and influence of law in society, especially when viewed as a constraint on individual and institutional behavior. Britanica.com.

¹⁷ also known as judicial precedent or judge-made law, or case law is that body of law derived from judicial decisions of courts and similar tribunals. Britannica.com

¹⁸ Rebekah Brown, “A History of the Anglo-American Special Relationship”, Ashbrook Scholar programme 2012, 4.

people, who have a right to remove an unjust monarch. Indeed, this argument clearly shaped Jefferson's thinking.¹⁹

Jefferson relied, as well, on the English Declaration of rights when writing the constitution for Virginia "... one of the two texts we know he had with him in his lodging in Philadelphia that summer of 1776. The other was George Mason's declaration of rights for Virginia, which was even more closely modeled on the English declaration of Rights."

The United States Bill of Right proposed in 1778 is another significant document in the legal and political structures. It added to the constitution a specific guarantee of personal freedom, Individual rights clear limitations of the government's power in judicial and other proceedings, and an explicit declaration that all powers not specifically delegated to the congress by the constitution are reserved for the states or the people. It was proved that the American Bill of right was shaped upon the values found in earlier English documents including the bill of right of 1689, or much earlier documents such as the Magna Carta (1215).²⁰

These resemblances in the political and legal history paved the way for the two nations to have similar values and ideals including: freedom of speech, the limitation of governmental powers by judicial system, and Individual right. Accordingly, it led them to share identical perspectives when dealing with International issues.

3.3. Mutual Interests:

The mutual interests are considered as another fundamental factor that helped the Anglo-American relation to be special. In 1783 the treaty of Paris was signed. This latter marked formally the end of the American Revolution, and the British recognition of the

¹⁹ <https://www.history.com/news/magna-carta-influence-us-constitution-bill-of-rights>.

²⁰ <https://www.aclu.org/other/bill-rights-brief-history>.

Independence of the United States. Although the United States was officially independent, it was still being targeted by European powers. The US expressed its rage on the territorial ambitions of the European countries through declaring the Monroe Doctrine. This latter was developed by John Quincy Adams and issued by president James Monroe In 1823. It sought to halt the European expansion in the United States. However, this doctrine was not really effective, since America lacked a powerful navy. Fortunately, the UK disdained the European countries policy, and wished to prevent it. Therefore, the British ships policed the Atlantic and protected the Americas from further Settlement by European empires .Hence this mutual interests to guarantee the security of their regimes against the threat of French and Spanish absolutism) led both countries to maintain the same foreign policy, and boasted the possibility of having more collaborations and cooperation. Later on, the same mutual interest led them to shoulder each other against a common enemy which was the Soviet Union.

3.4. Security and Military Aspects:

The security and military aspects and facets are vital pillars of the Anglo-American relation for both US and UK have been allies for each other in the course of history. Additionally, they supported each other in acquiring nuclear weapons.

As a consequence of the mutual interests mentioned before, Britain supported the establishment of the American hegemony over the New world, and explored the growing power of the US to put an end to the European dynastical ambitions in the North and South America .The USA, on the other hand, maintained the policy of neutrality, and shelved the suggestions of explicitly supporting the UK or any other country. However, the advent of the 19th century showed a great alternation in the US policy, since it became more involved in international issues, especially, those of the European continent. This policy re-suggested the possibility of having tight Anglo-American relations.

The most obvious sign that backed the improvement of the Anglo-American relations is Britain action in the Spanish American War (1898) when the UK helped the United States of America military and stood by its side. After it had made sure that the US would grant Cuba its independence, which means no harm would occur in the British trade and commercial interests in West Indies, Britain sided with the United States, unlike most European countries. The US gave similar support to the United Kingdom in its conflict with the Boers in South Africa in 1880.²¹ This diplomatic support and these two foreign policy crises led them away from early antipathy marked in the revolutionary war and the war of 1812.

In the 20th century, the US and UK sought to establish closer relationships. This manifested clearly in the alliances and collaborations in the world wars. An illustration of this idea is the cash and carry policy. This policy was issued by the US president Franklin Donald Roosevelt (1940-1945) to grant non-military support for other countries. However, this doctrine was merely reformulated in order to allow the purchase of military goods. Accordingly, enabling the allies' nations, mainly Britain, to obtain war supplies if they were paid for in cash and were not transported in American ships.

3.5. Nuclear Weapons Development: (1943)

The US and UK developed atomic bombs simultaneously in the late 40's during the Cold War to protect themselves from Russia and keep a balance of power in the world.. The mutual interests and similar views on the post world war II led the US to include UK in the atomic bomb project and discussion about the bomb's potential .the US even helped the UK to develop its own nuclear weapons through the UK-US mutual defense agreement of 1943, the bilateral agreement between the United states and united

²¹ John Moser, "Twisting the Lion's Tail: American Anglophobia between the World Wars", (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 3.

Kingdom on nuclear weapons cooperation, as Britain was unable to develop its own delivery system. The United States thus supplies to UK a delivery system, designs and nuclear materials.

3.6. Common Threat:

Common threat is another important factor that helped the Anglo American relations to be characterized with the term “special” or “unique”. During the Second World War, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union created what is called the Grand Alliance. This latter, was a military alliance between the two greatest capitalist powers and the great communist power against the axis powers, German, Italy, and Japan which threatened the British colonies in North Africa and Asia. The ideological differences created ambivalence in views and interests on international matters. Therefore tensions grew between the members of the grand alliance especially among the three big leaders, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin.

These tensions came to existence due the ideological contradiction and the sore history of the United States and the Soviet Union, for the soviet leaders seemed not to forget the American participation unarmed intervention against the Bolsheviks in the Russian civil war (1917-1923) as well as its refusal of recognizing the Soviet Union’s existence as a state. These issues led the Soviet Union to seek to establish its own sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. As such, it represented a common threat for the US and UK, which sought in return to establish a second front in Europe, and tighten their relationship.

During the Cold War, the UK was inflicted by a financial crisis; consequently, it accelerated the grant of independence to India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. The United States’ economy was in its peak. Being aware of the communist threat in those areas, the United

States declared the Truman doctrine in 1947 to push away the communist. The doctrine includes granting financial and military aid to Greece and Turkey, the former colonies of the UK. Similarly, the US Marshall Plan (1947)²² which granted 13 billion dollars to Eastern Europe, of which 3 went to the United Kingdom in order to renew its manufactures and business practices. This aid helped Britain to balance its budget, control its tariffs, and maintain adequate currency reserves.

The communist threat led even both powers to unite and cooperates to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with their European allies. NATO is an Intergovernmental military alliance between 29 North American and European countries, whereby an attack on one country is deemed an attack on all members. They are considered, as well, as founders of the United Nations, which is an Intergovernmental organization to promote peace and create order. The UK and USA fought both under this organization in the Korean War (1950-1953), a war between North Korea with the support of the Soviet Union and China, and South Korea with aid of the United States allies. US air bases in the United Kingdom that served as “staging posts to resupply American forces in Germany as well as for conventional and nuclear bombers to deter a Soviet advance across Germany, made the United Kingdom a crucial factor in maintaining a link between the North American continent and the renewed US commitment to European defence. The United Kingdom provided the geographic as well as political ‘bridge’ between the American and European continents, holding the newly-imagined Atlantic Community together.

²² The central idea was a promise that the United States would help rebuild Western Europe if the European nations could jointly develop a plan to make it happen. The US had two primary goals: boosting industrial production in (what would soon be) West Germany and finding a way to increase economic integration among Western European nations. The hope was that this would stimulate trade, consumption, and economic growth. Britannica.com

3.7. The Related Institutions:

The related institutions are another factor that backed the relation between the UK and the USA to be special. Both countries are members, if not founders or hosts, of various military, diplomatic and economic organizations and institutions. Therefore, it led both countries to follow same foreign policy, military and economic strategies. The United States and the United Kingdom are the founders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the United Nations. In addition to that, they are members of the trade organization, and the group of seven (which represents 62% of the global net wealth and 46% of the global domestic product). They remain as two of only five members of the United Nations Security Council with permanent seats. As such, institutions and organizations can be considered as a vital factor which supports the diplomatic economic and military reconciliation and constant coordination of both countries.

4. The Start and the Development of the Special Relationship:

The special relationship between both nations went through twists and turns during the Great War (1914-1918), and was full of competition, doubts, and mistrust during the interwar period. It was until the United States of America got involved in the Second World War with its outstanding military cooperation with the United Kingdom that gave birth to the Special Relationship which was intensified during the Cold War period.²³ Through this title insight into the development of the special relationship between World War I and World War II, and before the beginning of the Cold War will be provided.

4.1. The Relationship during the Interwar Period:

In 1914, the balance of power system crumbled down when the Germans became allies with the Austro-Hungarian Empire against other European nations, and the first signs of the Great War were altered. That war led the United States of America to become a major player in the international scene and that its special relationship with the United Kingdom

²³ Ibid.

would be a cornerstone and a shoulder to lean on as the American role was expanding. However, many events helped undermine the previously established trust between Great Britain and the United States and thus affected the state of their close relationship.

One of these events was 'The Johnson Act' in 1934 which prevented any more loans to previous indebted allies. Besides, the harsh decisions of the Versailles Treaty (1920) with its wicked reparation announcements, and the big amount of Europeans debts held by the Americans as well as Wilson Churchill attempt and insistence to found new basis for European foreign relations, all of these factors resulted in stagnation in the Anglo-American relations. In addition to the financial troubles in the interwar period which added more tension to the international context.²⁴

Moreover, a strong competition between the United States and the United Kingdom took place during Warren G. Harding administration as far as the naval power was concerned. The United States of America was trying to strengthen its presence at the international level through its dominance in the seas. That step from the United States was seen as a challenge for Great Britain as the ruling power of the oceans, and trying to surpass Great Britain's might of military excellence drove them mad and affected their relations.

Furthermore, a strong economic competition made their relations icy, especially for raw materials which most of them were inside British territories. That latter made the situation full of tensions and such a tough nut to crack, to the degree where the British ambassador to Washington declared that "American policy was aimed at becoming the sole leader among the English-Speaking peoples", and that "American politicians wanted to turn the indebted England into a vassal state".²⁵

²⁴ Martin Horn, "Britain, France, and the Financing of the First World War" (Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 183-185.

²⁵ Frank C. Costigliola, "Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 1920s," *The Journal of Economic History*, 37, no. 4 (1977): 911-934.

More important to mention, the big number of the Irish and the German Americans fed more the anti-British sentiment. That fact which helped the progressives in the American government, who share a strong anti-imperialist feelings, made pressures to distance the United States of America from a very close interwar partnership with the United Kingdom.²⁶ All of these facts showed that during the interwar period, the Special Relationship was like an icy competition between the two rather than the cooperation of close partners.

In fact, for a better understanding of the constant conflictual relations between the United Kingdom and the United States of America before the outbreak of World War II in 1939, one has to go back in time bearing in mind three important elements, The financial and commercial factor, American hatred and hostility against British imperialism, and the state of the American public opinion.

The United Kingdom was indebted (4.000 million Dollars) to the Americans after the World War I. In April 1922, the United States of America issued the 'Debt Funding Act' in which they invited their debtors countries to pay their war time debts. On August 1 of the same year, UK via its foreign minister (Balfour) suggested the cancelation of the reparation debts. The American administration refused, and Britain had to accept to pay over 62 years with 3.3 percent of annual interest. In 1931, the United Kingdom had paid (1.911 million Dollars), almost half of the loan without interest, Britain never paid all its debts and that created tensions on both sides of the Atlantic.²⁷ The American administration and its public opinion felt like the British tricked them to get into a war which they had to fund all alone.

In 1922, the 'Fordney-McCumber Tariff'²⁸, imposed high import tariffs, and made the situation worse for the debtors to pay. After the crash of 1929, the Americans increased these

²⁶ Moser, "Twisting the Lion's Tail...", 11

²⁷ Ritche Ovendale, "Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth century", (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1998), 20.

²⁸ The Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922 was a law that raised American tariffs on many imported goods to protect factories and farms. The US Congress displayed a pro-business attitude in passing the tariff and in

import tariffs more with 'Hawley-Smooth Act' of 1930, in this situation; one could comprehend why the British stopped to pay for an aggressive partner in terms of commerce. In 1932, and during the Imperial Conference of Ottawa, the former British colonies – which became what is called 'the commonwealth' by the Westminster Status of 1931- implemented the 'imperial preference', in which these countries should maintain almost no import tariffs between them apart from other countries. That latter remained as a serious and conflictual subject in the Anglo-American relations.

Between 1934 and 1938, serious commercial negotiations took place between the two countries to reduce the import tariffs, and it was in vain. The United States of America decided to stop all kinds of cooperation with Britain, until they sign a commercial agreement. That was really dangerous for the British in time of a huge threat which were looming in the horizon. Until 17 November 1938, a commercial agreement was signed between USA, UK, and Canada. The US public opinion and the media were so sensitive towards this agreement, and accused Britain to be an imperialist power trying to keep its colonies under its umbrella and benefit from them.

This sentiment, and the desire to overcome the economic crisis without being related to a troublesome Europe which costed them so much, in terms of money and souls, pushed the United States of America to lean more towards isolationism. To that respect, "The Neutrality Act" of 1935, declined and banned all commercial activities with countries in war to never fall in the trap of the British experience again. In short, this was the state of the Anglo-American relations right before the Second World War.

4.2. The S. Relationship during World War II:

The status of the special relationship during WWII should be examined through different American and British administrations while analyzing some turning points events which influenced the status of the special relationship during that period.

4.2.1. Prime Minister Churchill and President F. D. Roosevelt (1939-1945):

As the war bursts out, the British Prime Minister Winston who predicted that conflict long time before, started to advocate for the American assistance with the war effort, and the necessity of its involvement in the battles itself. It was a difficult task for Winston Churchill to convince the US president Roosevelt to engage in another European war for the American system based on the separation of powers created a block for him in the sense that it was different from the system in Great Britain. The Republican Congress at that time was against engaging in another World War. Thus, Wilson Churchill had to look for a democratic president for assistance despite the fact that their foreign policy and political beliefs were absolutely different.²⁹

Needless to say that the close relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States of America during the Second World War was considered by many historians as the birth of the “Special Relationship”, that alliance which brought the two nations into the closest and most practical coalition which was a decisive factor in winning the war.

To showcase the strategic cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States of America during World War II, one may refer to the huge number of secret wartime letters between President Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to keep each other aware about what is going on. This action, paved the way for both leaders to set up a solid ground of trust and collaboration. In 1940, Churchill asked Roosevelt to get some

²⁹ Rebekah Brown, “A History of the Anglo-American Special Relationship”, Ashbrook Scholar programme 2012, 7-8.

older US destroyers, but the latter had to refuse for he was not absolutely free under the US system of government to take this kind of decisions on his own especially at that time. Indeed, he vowed a promise not to send any American soldier to Europe as a clever move in his campaign of 1940.³⁰ ‘The Lend-Lease Act’, which permitted the United States of America to give military aids to foreign nations, this crucial strategic wartime cooperation, was a strong cornerstone and a solid block of ‘the special relationship’ during the Second World War. Even though, both countries had some differences in dealing with national and international issues, they were able to manage that to get to win the war in 1945. Roosevelt put it clear in his Four Freedom’s speech that both nations share a common vision of freedom and a shared duty to defend it:

We Americans are vitally concerned in your defence of freedom. We are putting forth our energies, our resources, and our organizing powers to give you the strength to regain and maintain a free world. We shall send you, in ever-increasing numbers, ships, planes, tanks, guns. This is our purpose and our pledge.³¹

That was exactly what Churchill was looking for to march together to win that war for freedom regardless the degrees of threats to USA. All these events paved the way for a new world order to secure all nations rights through a cooperative supranational organization. Churchill stated: “What we have to consider here today while time remains is the permanent establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries.”³² The vision of all free nations were at war against all forms of tyranny was gaining much weight on both sides of the Atlantic.

More important to mention, Roosevelt seized the opportunity during the war to implement his new agenda which ought to make the British influence in the world dwindle. Indeed, it was a revealing move which unfolds the anti-imperialist American sentiments of the

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Rebekah Brown, “A History of the Anglo-American Special Relationship”, 9.

³² Winston S. Churchill, “Sinews of Peace,” in *Never Give In! The Best of Winston Churchill's Speeches* ed. Winston S. Churchill, (New York: Hyperion, 2003), 413-414.

time. In the seventh article of the “Lend-Lease” agreement, USA made it clear to lend its allies nations, especially Britain, all what is necessary for them in the war under one condition that Britain should eliminate imperial preferences i.e. : a step forward to get rid of the British empire. The strong resentment towards any imperial system made it difficult to unite UK and the US for one similar purpose, Americans believed that former European empires were major responsible of the war, Roosevelt stated that: “ It almost seems that the japs were a necessary evil in order to break down the old colonial system.”³³

The varying visions for the post war world affected the state of the ‘Special Relationship’ and created a gap between leaders of countries, Churchill, Roosevelt, and later on Truman. One may notice that the personal relationships between the leaders of the two states could affect the Special Relationship whether positively, strengthening it, or negatively through neglecting it, and this is what happened between Churchill and Roosevelt when they had different viewpoints. The Prime Minister Churchill wanted to keep Britain as a major power in foreign affairs. On the side of the Atlantic, President Roosevelt was seeking a new international order. Because of the ever going political transitions, the ‘Special Relationship’ knew many ups and downs for the two countries’ leaders sometimes did not share similar visions and thus their personal relationship would not be that strong which affected the alliance negatively.

The Special Relationship was not a mere temporary strategic cooperation, and was facing the challenge of survival through the next years. Many disagreements were brought out between the United Kingdom and the United States concerning what form of democracy should be implemented and how to do that. At that time, Churchill was convinced that the Soviet Union represents a crucial threat, while his American counterpart Roosevelt believed

³³ David M. Kennedy, “Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945”, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 428.

that they could work out a good relation with the USSR, and this latter would help in the concept of a collective security.³⁴

As a matter of fact, this differing vision created a clash between the United Kingdom and the United States of America and distanced the two countries later on. Churchill made a clever move when he privately met with Roosevelt trying to convince the latter to represent a united front, he wanted for UK and USA to speak as one voice. However, Roosevelt wanted multiple nations to be involved to achieve the same goal, and his intention was to avoid failed past experiences of the secret deals during World War I. As a fact, that was his aim when he brought with him Chiang Kai-Shek of China and some Russian peers in Cairo meeting, he did not want any secret deals or play behind the scene with some nations, but rather he wanted to involve every powerful nation at that time. That choice or misjudgment from the part of Roosevelt paved the way for the USSR to quickly become a primary adversary for the United States of America and Great Britain in the 20 the century.

4.2.2. From Munich to the Fall of France:

Britain of the 1930's was somehow impotent to keep a severe political attitude which helps stop any potential war. Its navy, the main instrument of its defence and protection of its immense empire, was too weak due to the decrease of defence funds during the 1920's and the economic crisis. Needless to say, it was impossible for Britain to face menaces in different parts of the world at the same time. To that respect, the United Kingdom adopted a policy of appeasement with dictator European countries. However, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in March 1939 by Germany, Britain and its allies switched to a firm political attitude. The United States remained officially neutral, even after the invasion of Poland and the declaration of war.

³⁴ Francis L. Lowenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, "Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence", (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1975), 48.

In 1937, 'the neutrality act', was amended allowing America to engage in commercial activities with countries in war, with the exception of armaments. In November 1939, Roosevelt so willing for more engagement of his country to help the British, succeeded in convincing Congress to amend the act for a second time allowing the United States of America to deliver arms to the United Kingdom without really being engaged in war. Britain had to pay for weaponry, and it was its duty to secure the transport of its merchandise. No loan was allowed again to Britain.³⁵

In 1940, Churchill tried hard to convince the American administration to lend its fifty destroyers which were at the East Coast. Roosevelt hesitated at first, and finally, in August, decided to lend them the fifty destroyers in exchange with eight sites in its American colonies where the American aviation and navy could install military bases. After a strong reticence, the British signed the agreement called "Destroyers for bases deal", on September 2, 1940. The beginning of December 1940, Churchill addressed a dramatical letter to its American counterpart, explaining that without a financial aid from the United States, Britain is really helpless, lost ,and could not pay for its armaments. In response to his letter, the Americans approved "the Lend-Lease Act" on January 10, 1941.³⁶

In this act, the Americans needed a token of good will from the British to pay, since they have a huge empire and thus, paying their debts should be easy for them. Roosevelt asked the British to fix the situation, and Britain responded to that by sending its Gold reserves in South Africa (equal to 200 Billion Dollars) to the United States of America to serve as a guarantee for the loan. The Congress finally approved the Bill on March 11, 1941; the act clearly forced the British to refund their debts.

³⁵ Rebekah Brown, "A History of the Anglo-American Special Relationship", 8-9.

³⁶ Ritchie Owendale, "Anglo-American Relations...", 43.

4.2.3. Privileged Relation and Suspicion:

Before the fall of France in May-June 1940, the Anglo-American relationship was cold and distant. Chamberlain was not sure to depend on the Americans in case of any aggression due to their isolation policy applied from 1919. The policy of appeasement from the British was based on these convictions.³⁷ In 1939-1940, the United Kingdom was more close to France than to the United States and no country was looking for a closer association. It was until the victory of Roosevelt in his third elections that the Anglo-American Alliance started to be shaped. After a big suspicion on the part of Churchill, he came to realise that Roosevelt is the best friend for Britain, and that was after Roosevelt proposed the Lend-Lease Act to the congress, and the visit of “Harry Hopkins”, the president confidant to London.

In summer 1940, both Churchill and Roosevelt signed the “Atlantic Chart” in Newfoundland in which it was stated that Britain should give up its colonies and give the people the autonomy of governance, and abolish “the Imperial preference”³⁸. There were a lot of disagreements on which strategy to follow against the German, the United States favoured a rapid direct attack on Germany and avoid peripheral battles. On the opposite, the British preferred to attack the Germans forces in North Africa and Italy with a maritime blockade, which leads to the fall of Hitler from the inside through an economic destruction paralleled by a political imbalance.

After the approval of this strategy from Roosevelt, the Americans explained that the British plans were introduced just for the sake of preserving their imperial colonies.³⁹ Along the war, there was a climate of a huge suspicion between the two countries especially about the Middle East oil. Britain did not like the development of the United States oil interest in Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and even in Iraq. Americans were sure that one of the main

³⁷ W. M. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, “Anglo-American Relations since 1945”, (Oxford: Clarendon press 1986), 21.

³⁸ D. Dimbleby and Reynolds, “An Ocean Apart”, (London: Hodder and Stoghton, 1988), 129.

³⁹ Dimbleby and Reynolds, “An Ocean Apart”, 142.

objectives of Churchill was to preserve the Suez Canal, and the majority of the Middle East countries under the British control. The Americans were so hostile against the British imperialism attitude, an example to that was demonstrated in an open letter in October 1942, in *“Life magazine”* which cited “one thing we are sure we are not fighting for, is to hold the British Empire together.”⁴⁰

4.2.4. From a Relationship of Equals to a Dominant-to-Dominated Relationship:

The American administration was furious because of the British capacity to impose their opinions in 1942-1943 and that was shown in the Casablanca Conference⁴¹ in January 1943 where the British succeeded in delaying the landing in France until 1944. “Teheran Conference”⁴² in 1943 marked a turning point in the Anglo-American relations; until that date Britain was always the dominant partner for its superior war experience, and even the deployed number of its soldiers. After that Conference, things changed, the Americans reinforced their troops in Europe and Asia, and without their financial aids and armaments, all efforts would be in vain.

Moreover, In Cairo, the British and the Americans were preparing to meet the Russians, and it was really difficult for them to come to good terms for the Americans remained suspicious about the will of the British to use them to maintain their empire and influence on the Balkans. In addition, In Teheran, Roosevelt found in Stalin a very good ally, and refused any talk with Churchill. Both shared the same opinion of the dissolution of the empire colonies, and keep Germany weak. The British were really afraid from the Russian

⁴⁰ Ibid, 146.

⁴¹ This when the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met with the US President Franklin D. Roosevelt at Casablanca, Morocco to discuss strategic plans against the Axis powers and the policy of “unconditional surrender”. The Soviet leader Joseph Stalin did not attend this conference due to the war front in the Soviet Union. <http://www.history.navy.mil>.

⁴² The “Teheran Conference” was a meeting between the US President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in Tegeran, Iran, between November 28 and December 1, 1943. They discussed the terms under which the Americans and the British invade Northern France in May 1944. The Russians, also, agreed in that Conference to open a second front in the East to divert the German troops away from the Allied campaign in Northern France. <http://www.history.state.gov.milestones>.

becoming stronger and spread their power over Europe. On the way to the Conference, Churchill told Harold Macmillan: “Germany is finished, though it may take some time to clean up the mess. The real problem now is Russia. I can’t get the Americans to see it.”⁴³

Great Britain favoured a Danube Confederation for Central European countries. Stalin opposed this and Roosevelt too, preferring small independent countries. Ian Jacob, a military assistant of Churchill wrote:

Our strength was declining, and the Russians were rising. Roosevelt wanted to be in a position where he could deal with Stalin by himself, not tied by anyone else. So, he was going to keep the British at arm’s length. Increasingly, as the war went on, The Americans paid no attention to anything we said, unless it happened to coincide with something they wanted to do.⁴⁴

Churchill wanted for the British and America to threaten the Soviet Union by keeping the Anglo-American troops in Europe, in case, USSR did not respect the engagements agreed on in the ‘Yalta Conference’, but Roosevelt trusted Stalin blindly, and refused to do so, thinking that the United Nations will succeed in keeping the peace all over the world. Eisenhower, chief Commander of the occidental army refused to take over Berlin and Prague after the British advice and he kept them for the red army to do so and push forward .On February 16, 1944, Churchill wrote:

It is my deepest conviction that unless Britain and the United States of America are joined together in a ‘special relationship’, including the Combined Staff organisation and a wide measure of reciprocity in the use of military bases-all within the ambit of a world organisation- another destructive war will come to pass .⁴⁵

Reynolds commented that this idea of ‘a special relationship’ was purely a British invention, and would have no equal significance for Washington and the American public opinion.

⁴³ R. Owendale, “Anglo-American Relations...” , 50.

⁴⁴ Dimpleby and Reynolds , “An Ocean Apart”, 153.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 34.

Churchill vision allowed the creation of a privileged relationship between the two countries especially in Intelligence, and between ‘The American Office of Strategic Services’ (OSS), and the British ‘Secret Intelligence Services’ (SIS), as well as the nuclear cooperation which will take place later. In summer 1945, Churchill sent many telegrams urging the Americans to take serious measures against Russia before moving the troops out of Europe and losing control.

4.2.5. Secret Service Cooperation:

During the beginning of World War II, the United States of America did not practically have any secret services office. On the other hand, Britain had a very developed one especially in collecting information and deciphering coded messages. The British agreed on sharing their expertise with the Americans, and Churchill appointed his confidant man, William Stephenson, for this mission in Washington, who had to work with Roosevelt’s consultant in this domain, William Donovan. In November 1940, they signed an agreement which focused on information exchange and Anglo-American cooperation in this field. Donovan became in charge of (OSS), and the ‘Central Information Agency’, (CIA). He confessed that: “Stephenson taught us things we did not use to know concerning the functions of the secret services.”⁴⁶

Later in 1943, both countries reinforced their collaboration in this field in terms of sharing with the Americans, the British system ultra secret of deciphering the encoding German machine ENIGMA.⁴⁷ At the beginning, collaboration in this domain was unilateral for the Americans had to learn all related things from the basis. Thus, the American system

⁴⁶ Alan P. Dobson, “Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth century”, (London: Routledge, 1995), 74.

⁴⁷ The Enigma machine is a cipher device developed and used in the early- to mid-20th century to protect commercial, diplomatic, and military communication. It was employed extensively by Nazi Germany during World War II, in all branches of the German military. The Germans believed, erroneously, that use of the Enigma machine enabled them to communicate securely and thus enjoy a huge advantage in World War II. The Enigma machine was considered so secure that it was used to encipher even the most top-secret messages.

was somehow a copy of the British secret services organisation. Later, the Americans had come a long way in this field which kept the British as a privileged minority partner. For this data, no one could deny the cooperation, so real, between the (OSS, CIA), and the (SIS, MI6 or MI5).⁴⁸

4.3. The Relationship in the Immediate Post-War:

The state of the special relationship right after the end of World War II and before the start of the Cold War will be examined from different angles and turning points events.

4.3.1. Wilson Churchill /Atlee (1945/51) – President Harry S. Truman (1945-1947):

After the end of the Second World War, Roosevelt had the belief that USA, UK, The Soviet Union, and China could work together as police powers to secure and maintain peace around the world. In fact, he dismissed the balance of power system since it did not work and it did not prevent wars as was planned, and he preached for a collective security through the League of Nations to avoid wars. Sooner, he rejected that view, and he wished to get rid of smaller powers, for one reason, that they would not be able to keep peace after the war. Put differently, weaker European powers would not be allowed to rearm. That plan did not work out for Russia could not help UK and USA to spread democracy because of its despotic regime, and China because of its civil war. Churchill sought to solve this problem keeping the faith that the ‘special relationship’ between UK and USA was prominent and he considered it as a stabilizing force.⁴⁹

Churchill vision was to bring the European powers in a close relationship with USA to stand as a solid block against the Russian threat, and that way America would help the United Kingdom to preserve its traditional role as the international and continental police power.

⁴⁸ MI6: espionage services / MI5: counterespionage. The difference is like the FBI and CIA in the USA - one is for domestic intelligence and one is for international intelligence. MI5 deals with threats inside the UK, and MI6 combats overseas threats. <https://www.theguardian.com/notesandqueries/query/0,5753,-20949,00.html>.

⁴⁹ Keith Sainsbury, “Churchill and Roosevelt at War: The War they fought and the Peace they hoped to Make”, (Washington Square: New York University Press, 1994), 183.

However, the United States government had variant visions and other ideas. Despite their different views, the ‘Special Relationship’ remained at the heart of their bilateral and multilateral relations while attempting to structure the post World War.

Churchill used the term “Special Relationship” in 1946, in his famous speech “Sinews of Peace”. This latter was considered according to historians as the unofficial birth of the Cold War. He advocated for unity between all the English speaking peoples on the basis of:

The great principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world and which through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, and the English common law find their most famous expression in the American Declaration of Independence.⁵⁰

According to historians, that speech was the birth of the 20th century “Anglo-American Special Relationship”. In this speech, Churchill set a mission to that special alliance which is to be a stabilizing feature in the international sphere, and that it was a necessity to develop strong bonds with Europe to face common threats, and spread freedom around the world. He believed that:

Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relationship between our military advisers, leading to common study of potential dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions, and to the interchange of officers.⁵¹

“The Sinews of Peace” speech laid the basis upon which the “special relationship” was formed between the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and showed clearly that similar political principles, history, culture, and language brought the two nations closely and into a strong brotherhood and a specialness of their relation in which neither nations would deviate from its foundations.

⁵⁰ Churchill, “Sinews of Peace...” quoted in Rebekah Brown, “A History of Anglo-American S.R”, 12.

⁵¹ Ibid.

4.3. 2.Immediate Post-War Strained Relations:

One week after Japan's surrender, on August 22, 1945, the US President Truman put an end to the 'Lend-Lease Act'. The British did not like this decision and sent Lord Keynes to Washington to explain the outcomes of that decision. Intense talks took place after to refund the British debts and negotiating conditions for a new loan which helps Britain get over the destructions of the war. The Americans dismissed a great part of the previous loan for the British, but they were so harsh about the new loan. The British were furious, and they thought they have lost lot, and the Americans were seizing the opportunity to get richer on the extent of the United Kingdom, and that created tensions and mistrusts.

Earnest Bevin, the British secretary of foreign affairs (1945-51), was for the revival of the Anglo-American Alliance and bringing both countries closer again. He cited: "Britain has to exercise a sufficient control over the inexperienced US partner, for our salvation depends on our collaboration with them."⁵² That perception for the British role was not new for two years before, Harold Macmillan explained to Richard Crossman, future secretary in Wilson's government, the role of the British when they were both serving in North Africa in 1943:

We, my dear Crossman, are the Greeks in the American empire. You will find the Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans-great, big, vulgar bustling people, more vigorous than we are and also more idle, with more unspoiled virtues, but also more corrupt, we must run Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) as the Greek slaves ran the operations of the Emperor Claudius.⁵³

Macmillan created the analogy that the British were to the Americans as the Greeks were to the Romans, an intellectual guidance upon a young superpower. In fact, this placed the United Kingdom in an inferior position, but somehow implied that the Americans and the British were not morally equals. It is important to notice, 25 years after, Macmillan wrote this in his memoirs and he followed that philosophy with Kennedy in 1960's.

⁵² R. Owendale, "Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth century", 61.

⁵³ D. Reynolds., "From World war to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940's", (New York: Oxford university press, 2006), 65.

The American attitude towards Britain during Truman presidency (1945-1953), regarding the ‘special relationship’ was characterised as a relation between none equal partners. It is true that Great Britain occupied a special position among the partners of America, but its special relationship with the USA was not a relationship between equals for during the Second World War, the Americans became aware of their power, a deserved power in their eyes which made them look superior to the British. On the whole, despite the isolationist criticism, they considered it is their right, their duty, and their turn to rule the world. No ally, even the closest, could hope to modify the orientations of the American Policy. President Truman, according to the British, was too soft with the Soviets, and the British hated that and could not be able to make the Americans see the danger coming from them. Indeed, Truman was too focused on signing the United Nations Chart, and did not want any tensions with the Soviets which could make them refrain from signing. The latter was successfully done on June 26, 1945.

It is only in the ‘Potsdam Conference’⁵⁴, in July 1945, and due to the late arrival of Stalin that the Americans come closer to the British opinion, and started to measure the Soviet danger. At this time, Stalin occupied most Central Europe and refused to organise any free elections in these countries. Moreover, despite the Turkish warning to Bevin that the Russians wanted to turn their country to a Soviet orbit, and they are already supporting the nationalists in Iran, the United States of America did not take any move or action. However, things changed on January 5, 1946, when Truman wrote to his secretary of State’s James Byrnes “I

⁵⁴ The Big Three—Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (replaced on July 26 by Prime Minister Clement Attlee), and U.S. President Harry Truman—met in Potsdam, Germany, from July 17 to August 2, 1945, to negotiate terms for the end of World War II. After the Yalta Conference of February 1945, Stalin, Churchill, and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had agreed to meet following the surrender of Germany to determine the post-war borders in Europe. Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945, and the Allied leaders agreed to meet over the summer at Potsdam to continue the discussions that had begun at Yalta. Although the Allies remained committed to fighting a joint war in the Pacific, the lack of a common enemy in Europe led to difficulties reaching consensus concerning post-war reconstruction on the European continent. Britannica.com

[Truman] do not think we have to continue on the path of compromise...I am tired of being the nanny of the Soviets.”⁵⁵

In March 1946, Churchill decided to make a conference tour to educate the American public opinion about the communist danger. In Fulton, Missouri, he used that statement “an iron curtain fell over Europe”, which cut it in two distinct parts, he meant. The American press and the political class were too hostile in reaction to his speech, to the extent that President Truman publicly left the place leaving Churchill alone. These Anglophobic and isolationist tendencies paved the way for the Republicans to win in 1946 elections, took over the senates and the representatives, and among their programme was a protectionist economy, reducing foreign aids, and bringing back home American troops in Europe and other parts of the world.

Against that background, it was difficult for President Truman to engage vis-à-vis Europe, and more particularly Britain which had a very bad reputation regarding its colonial policies. The Truman administration depicted the Soviets as a threat to the Christian civilisation just like they did with Hitler before to change the public opinion, and get the consent from Congress to implement its policy in aiding Europe. It was to Churchill to influence both the British and the American public opinions, and present the Anglo-American Alliance as the only force which could stop the Soviets, he cited: “Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States, where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilisation.”⁵⁶

It was until 1950, and during the Korean War (1950-1953) that the public opinion became more aware about the necessity to develop a defence policy against the Soviet military, and Communism in general. In September 1946, during the visit of Marshal

⁵⁵ R. Owendale, “Anglo-American Relations...”, 63.

⁵⁶ Diane Kirby, “Divinely Sanctioned: The Anglo-American Cold War Alliance and the Defence of Western Civilisation and Christianity, 1945-1948”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol 35, n°3, (Spring 2000), 391.

Montgomery from the British Imperial Army to the United States of America, he got consent from his American counterpart to prepare an Anglo-American military cooperation for a third war which was at the doors. Despite the important loan given to the British, Truman had no intention in restoring neither British economy nor its military power. It was, Earnest Bevin who was the architecture of the Anglo-American Alliance to resist the Soviet advance. It was a British duty to educate the Americans about the Soviet menace, and communism in general, not only in Europe, but also in the whole world.

4.3.3. The End of Nuclear Cooperation:

The ‘special relationship’ had got a strong hit when Congress voted for the “McMahon Act” in August 1946, which banned the delivery of information regarding the nuclear domain to foreign countries. The British felt angry for they were the first to help develop nuclear arms and they had many joined agreements with the United States of America. As a matter of fact, the first steps to develop the atomic bomb was made in Britain, in Birmingham with the two physicians (Rudolf Peierls and Otto Frisch) who fled Nazi Germany, and they explained how to obtain a bomb through the Uranium or even the Plutonium.⁵⁷

The British government launched the project “Tube Alloys” to develop the atomic bomb, and later two French Scientists joined the programme. The British sent a copy of the ongoing research to their American counterpart. In 1941 and after reading the report, they became interested, and suggested to join the team and continue their research on the American soil away from the German threat. The British refused that proposal, and agreed to share only information.⁵⁸

After six months, the Americans were heading up in their research, and at that time, it was the British turn to ask and for the Americans to refuse even the sharing of information. It

⁵⁷ Alan P. Dobson, “Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth century”, (London: Routledge, 1995), 75.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

took Churchill huge efforts and consistence to convince Roosevelt to sign a pact on August 19, 1943 in Quebec, in which the British researchers were given the right to participate in certain domains in the “Manhattan Project”, and both countries, helped each other to control the uranium resources in the World. It is important to notice that the most important clause in this agreement was the one which indicated that no country is authorised to use atomic arms without the consent of the second country. While Americans rejected the French scientists, the British researchers started to work in the United States of America, at Los Alamos, under the Supervision of Professor James Chadwick, But they were allowed to get access only to a smaller part of the project.⁵⁹

In September 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill signed ‘the Hyde Park’⁶⁰ which guaranteed the continuity of the nuclear cooperation between both countries after the Japanese defeat, as agreed on in Quebec, and with mutual engagement. During Truman administration, Churchill had to send a copy of the ‘Hyde Park’ again. In fact, possessing a nuclear power was a sign of a great might during that period of time. That fact actually arose a huge fear for nations to use it which might trigger a destructive new war. Nations were diplomatically and military very cautious for one mistake may lead to a disastrous outcome with the existence of nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, and though it was fearful, it was at the same time tempting to possess nuclear weaponry, and that was the drive for a more close relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States of America . In that respect, on November 16, 1945, Truman, Atlee, and Mackenzie (the Canadian prime minister)⁶¹ signed a document which indicated an entire and effective cooperation between the two countries in the domain

⁵⁹ Ibid, 76.

⁶⁰ The short agreement between President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, dubbed the Hyde Park Aide-Mémoire, was an attempt to ensure nuclear weapons would remain only in the U.S. and Great Britain's possession. Written in 1944, the agreement also reveals the plans of the two leaders to use the bomb against Japan. <https://www.atomicheritage.org/key-documents/hyde-park-aide-m%C3%A9moire>

⁶¹ Canada used the two French Scientists, who helped it get the atomic technologies.

of atomic energy.⁶² Indeed, a nuclear partnership between them is a mere sign of a healthy relationship. That latter could also be seen in Atlee's action which gave permission to place US Bombers bases on the British soil in 1948 without a formal declaration, as well as many 29 bombers were moved to England in the heart of the Berlin Crisis. On the other hand, USA helped Britain to develop its own autonomous nuclear weapons to maintain an independent deterrent after the war. However, Truman rejected the last two pacts, and Atlee tried to remind him that America is bound by them. Truman answered that it is only in exchanging scientific information rather the construction and function of the atomic reactors.

The United States faced hard moments concerning the lack of the Uranium, which forced her to sign an agreement with the British on January 7, 1948 which involved exchange for information about the production of nuclear energy, but not the construction the atomic arms. In return, Britain gives up on its part of Congo Uranium extraction to the United States of America. The British when they felt like they were excluded from the American nuclear programme, they decide to continue their research to develop their own atomic bomb, this latter, which became a distinct sign of great powers in the world.⁶³

4.3.4. The Palestinian Issue: the Beginning of Britain Disengagement in the World

The divergent opinions of Britain and America over the Middle East were a real threat to the 'special relationship'. The Truman administration forced by the Jewish lobbies in the United States of America, took a massive Jew immigration to Palestine from 1945 to 1951, especially those fleeing Central Europe and Germany. The British knew that this policy would create more conflicts between the Arabs and the Jews and make things difficult for its troops to control the situation, and they believed that Palestine is a vital area for their interests. The British officers made it clear that Palestine is the key for the Middle East, and vital to ensure

⁶² F.S Northedge, "British Foreign Policy: The Process of Readjustment", (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962), 171.

⁶³ F.S.Northedge, "British Foreign Policy..", 171-175.

communication between Britain and its colonies, and their oil interests, and to serve as defence and offence lines against the Soviet Union.

President Truman wrote a letter to Atlee on August 31, 1946 urging him to open immigration doors wide open for the Jews for he is in need for their voices in New York to win the upcoming presidential elections. Bevin was against this, but needed US support in the Middle East. Thus, he suggested a joined commission to study the issue. After reading the conclusions of this commission in April 1946, Truman took from it only the authorisation to give 100,000 Jews the right to enter Palestine. The British opinion was outrageous because of this and very hostile against the Zionists who killed many British soldiers.

On October 4, 1947, Truman declared the division of Palestine, half Arab, and half Jew, and that would be supported by the American public opinion.⁶⁴ The British hoped that this proposal would not reach the two thirds in the United Nations. Bevin announced to Marshal that Britain would not be for this vision. However, the majority was achieved on November 29, 1947 with the surprising support of the Russians. Therefore, in May 1948, Britain totally withdrew from Palestine. The Palestine issue became from that date a matter of the United Nations.

Moreover, India was promised independence in June 1948, and Britain withdrew its financial aid for Greece and Turkey in March 1947 to reduce its defence budget, and focus more on domestic affairs. Thus, it became an obligation for the Americans to fulfil this gap to avoid any communist annexation. Against this conflictual situation, President Truman proposed a project on Congress on March 12, 1947, what became to be known as 'Truman Doctrine', which urged the Americans to help, support, and shoulder democratic countries threatened by communism.

⁶⁴ R. Owendale, "Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth century", 71.

5. Britain Trying to Fit into Europe: Macmillan to Heath (1957-74):

The attempts of the British to join the EEC⁶⁵ will be thoroughly examined during the premiership of both Prime Ministers Macmillan and Heath.

5.1. Accession in the EEC during Macmillan Premiership (1957-63):

The British started to change their attitude towards the EU from ‘cooperation without commitment’ to a more constructive strategy when they realised that the Western European integration was getting stronger without Britain. The new Prime Minister, Macmillan who took the lead at the time of hardship for British prestige in the world due to the Suez Crisis of 1957⁶⁶, was interested in getting that prestige back worldwide and looking for new gates to raise its status and influence on a global stage.⁶⁷

In May 1959, Macmillan thought of creating an independent European association with the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and Austria in an attempt not to let Britain stand alone in the world stage. In fact, it was about creating a free trade zone with the countries which are not part of the common market. It was mainly based on the reduction of tariffs for industrial goods. However, that plan did not provide anything expected by the British.

Stockholm Convention signed in January 1960 by the following seven states Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom envisaged a gradual reduction of tariffs on industrial goods among member states during 10 years.

⁶⁵ The European Economic Community (EEC) or ‘Common Market’, created by the Treaties of Rome (25 March 1957), included Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. The term European Community (EC) entered into use from July 1967 when the three existing communities merged - the EEC, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy (EURATOM). Britain made its first application to join the EC under Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1961 and its second application under Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1967. Edward Heath revived the second application in July 1970. [Britannica.com/event/treaty of Rome](https://www.britannica.com/event/treaty-of-Rome).

⁶⁶ Check pages (75-84).

⁶⁷ May, A. (Ed.), “Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe: the Commonwealth and Britain's applications to join the European communities”, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 39.

However, since the very steps of the existence the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Britain began to ponder about all the options of association with the Common Market considering the European Free Trade Association as the 'first line of defence' and a temporary solution to ensure interests in Western Europe. The Free Trade Area reflected the switch of political and economic attitude of London to Europe and a reassessment of British foreign policy.⁶⁸

In autumn 1960 Macmillan finished the writing of the program memorandum called the "Great Project". He honestly stated in his paper to be discussed within the cabinet that Great Britain was the "power of the second rank." He stated that:

Britain, with all its experience, has neither economic nor military power to play a leading role in the world. We face countless challenges: our economy is teetering on the razor's edge, we have a difficult task of transforming the empire into the Commonwealth (with special problems posed by colonies inhabited by both Europeans and the local population), there is uncertainty of our relations with the new economic and perhaps political entity that is being created by the six countries of Western Europe; uncertainty in relations with the United States that regard us sometimes as any other country, sometimes as an ally having special and unique status.⁶⁹

A British scholar commented on that statement stating that: "the memorandum testified that a significant part of the British ruling circles was increasingly inclined to a realistic assessment of the situation."⁷⁰

Macmillan confessed the fact that Britain entered the 1960s with weakened positions in all the three circles, the relationship with the new US administration was uncertain, Western Europe proved the "Common Market" successful without Britain, and the Commonwealth was shredded by internal conflicts.

⁶⁸ Wilkes, G. (ed.), "Britain's failure to enter the European community, 1961-63: the enlargement negotiations and crises in European, Atlantic, and Commonwealth relations", (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 108.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 112

⁷⁰ Young, John W, "Britain and European Unity, 1945-199", (New York: Macmillan, 2000), 132.

The political urgent need for close association with the EEC was convincingly considered in 1959 in the working paper of the section on planning in the British Foreign Office. Its suggestions indicated that the economic, political and possibly military power of the EEC would increase among a relative decline of Britain and therefore for the U.S. more tempting would be the countries of the "Common Market", and London would possibly lose its "special relationship" with the United States of America.⁷¹ The successes of the European Community reinforced the feeling that Britain can "miss the train."⁷²

As a matter of fact a prominent role belonged to Frank Lee, who headed the Economic 'European' steering committee in spring 1960, composed of senior officials to study the future of relations of Britain with the "Common Market." In his report to the cabinet, while considering all the possible options for Britain, two effective ones were suggested and proposed by him: entry into the EEC and some form of association. At the same time, the report emphasized that none of the options would be realised without some sacrifices from the British government.⁷³

The same report stated that from a purely economic view point, the entry into the EEC would be "almost certainly" the best solution to boost British economy.⁷⁴ However, the real problem was outside Europe, where a weak British economy would not ease the path to keep a leading position in the commonwealth, and by joining the EEC that probably if not sure makes Great Britain loses its special position as far as trade is concerned with its former dominions. Besides, UK would have to become part of a federal European state, as Frank Lee believed. The report concluded that the best solution for Britain is the associative status in case its full membership to the EEC was doomed impossible. Frank Lee believed that any

⁷¹ Gowland, D., Turner, A., Wright, A, "Britain and European integration since 1945: on the sidelines", (New York:Routledge, 2009), 167.

⁷² Thatcher, M., "Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World", (London: HarperCollins, 2002), 391.

⁷³ Kaiser, W. "Using Europe, abusing the Europeans: Britain and European integration, 1945-63", (London: Macmillan, 1996), 41.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

possible form to join the EEC would help maintain the British status worldwide. Thus, that would help Britain preserve its leading position in the commonwealth and its special relationship with USA, as well as to avoid the rise of a third force in Europe under the French leadership.⁷⁵ In London, that possible scenario of France leading the six countries created some fears for that would seriously damage the British interest. Kaiser, the author of the book entitled *'Using Europe, abusing the Europeans: Britain and European (1945-63)'* Integration believed that the merit of Frank Lee was that he described very clearly and rationally all the pros and cons of joining the EEC separating them from the illusions that existed within the British cabinet at the end of the 1950s.⁷⁶

In fact, uniting the West in the face of the communist was indeed the ultimate objective. "The communist threat - in its various forms - is so significant and centred that it cannot be faced without the maximum possible unity of purpose and management"⁷⁷, said by Macmillan. He further stated stressing the importance to develop European economic policies that:

Today the real struggle luckily occurs not on the battlefield, but in the market, however it also requires greater unity. We must work on creating the greatest free-trade zone, which we are able to create for the sake of benefits that give us the scale, large areas stretching outside the national borders, free movement of capital, labour and goods ... This can be done without prejudice to the Commonwealth and any other free nation or a group of nations.⁷⁸

It became evident during the 1950s that Europe must unite or perish, and Britain should not stay on the sideline. Indeed, that line of thought becomes the main argument in Parliament for the necessity for Britain to join EEC.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 42.

⁷⁷ Young, John W. "Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999", (New York: Macmillan, 2000), 64

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ May, op.cit., p, 41.

Indeed, by joining the EEC Britain meant to modernize its economy. The British wanted to raise tariffs in some sectors (such as textiles) and to update the system of preferences with the Commonwealth. The entry was also to compensate some unpopular decisions such as rejecting protectionism in agriculture. Moreover, the EEC created a new gate to promote British interests. Europe became the main element in the British foreign policy. Now the position of Britain in the Commonwealth and with USA depended on it. The British believe that they will continue to exercise their influence internationally and find a world role through joining the EEC by any form.

In 1961, the conservative Harold Macmillan deeply influenced by the American pressure came to realise that it could be a very good idea to join the EEC. It was clear for Macmillan now that there would be no escape from the idea of a new British foreign policy towards the third Churchill's circle which is the one of a 'European future' or a European 'grand design' as described by the Americans, but still articulated in terms of the "special relationship"⁸⁰.

On February 27, 1961, at the meeting of the Western European Union (WEU), E. Heath, the British Prime Minister, made it clear that Britain was ready to undertake "fundamental changes on principled positions" in its approach to the Common Market.⁸¹

On July 31, 1961 H. Macmillan declared the intention of Britain to apply for EEC membership as a full member on some particular conditions which would serve maintain the sovereignty of the UK as Winston Churchill once said that "we [the British] are with Europe, but not of it."⁸² Means we are part of Europe for Europe, but at the same time we are autonomous and we will never surrender our sovereignty to a federal Europe.

⁸⁰ IBid, 178.

⁸¹ Young H. "This blessed plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair", (London: Macmillan, 1998), 118.

⁸² Thatcher, M., "Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World", (London: HarperCollins, 2002), 393

For the British keeping the national sovereignty and preserving their identity was an obligation which determines European cooperation, as well as keeping an intergovernmental approach. The British government stated that it is for and with the goals of the Treaty of Rome; however it is against any steps which lead the way for the establishment of the federation. Indeed, that vision opposed the philosophy which led the six Western European states to found the EEC. As a matter of fact, Britain's need and offer to the Western European countries was limited to the creation of the free-trade zone.

As it became evident for Great Britain that the six founding countries were not in their intention to favour UK, the late comer, with a special treatment in the EEC, the British started to switch their attitude from 'cooperation without commitments' for a more constructive policy. It is worth mentioning here that the political drive behind the change of mind of H. Macmillan was the fear of German hegemony in Europe after the successful development of Western European integration.⁸³

On August 10, 1961 the application was sent officially to Brussels. In relation to the European integration all the ruling circles under H. Macmillan administration could be presented as three groups:

1. Tory - Traditionalists
2. Liberals - supporters of the European integration as long as it was limited to the principles of free-trade zone.
3. Pragmatics-modernizers (also - realists-modernizers), supporters of EEC membership like Edward Heath. They even to a certain extent were ready to put up with the centralized economic policy of Brussels for the sake of the revival of the British economy.⁸⁴

⁸³ May, *op.cit.*, p, 64.

⁸⁴ Baker, D. and Seawright, D. (Eds.), "Britain for and against Europe: British politics and the question of European integration.", (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 71

In this domestic political landscape, Macmillan had to deal and take all the groups' visions and suggestions into consideration.⁸⁵ Macmillan in his public speeches in the country presented the entry into the ECC as a profitable business deal. In all the speeches of the members of government, within the party, in the parliament, and in the media, the talks were only about the conditions of the British membership, a tactic which diverted attention from the basic question of whether or not to join the EEC.

The British government received the approval of the leader's party, that is the conservative, during their conference in the fall of 1962, and also the vote of confidence from parliamentarians-conservatives which paved the way for Macmillan and the Europeanists inside to enact a bill on the "Common Market".⁸⁶

However, the first British application to join the EEC was faced by a rejection and a veto from the French president Charles De Gaulle (1890-1970). The latter, justified his position as follow: "Their [British] strong link to the USA as well as the British Commonwealth could hinder the British in their dedication to the EEC".⁸⁷ And perhaps that was exactly what Ormsby predicted and was afraid of when he said the Americans "Know as well, if not better than, ourselves how difficult the French can be."⁸⁸

During the 1960s, pressure was applied by the Americans on the six founding members (West-Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and Netherlands) to accept Britain entry but that was in vain. Indeed, when De Gaulle vetoed British entry, he clearly was motivated by the idea "not to admit the American's front man".⁸⁹ He was clearly against the idea to accept Britain for he believed that it would play the role of US loyal servant in Europe.

⁸⁵ Gowland, D. , "Reluctant Europeans: Britain and European integration, 1945-1998", (London: Longman, 2000), 146

⁸⁶ Ibid, 147.

⁸⁷ Sarah Picard, "Civilisation Britannique", (Paris : Pocket, 2003), 320

⁸⁸ J.Dumbrell, "A Special Relationship...", 179.

⁸⁹ Costigliola F, "The failed Design: Kennedy, De Gaulle and the struggle for Europe", 238, quoted in J. Dumbrell, "A Special Relationship...", 180.

Another thing is that, according to the US ambassador to the UK David Bruce letters to the US Secretary of State's Rusk, on January 17; the French were profoundly affected by the Polaris Deal.⁹⁰ It was evident that the "special relationship" both Britain and American enjoy, was the reason for the rejection of the British application as De Gaulle's words and arguments showed.

In fact, the long list of conditions of the British membership led to difficult negotiations. The new Labour government, which came to power in 1964 under the leadership of H. Wilson⁹¹ (1964-1970) also, did not succeed in its attempt to join the Community and again failed with the rejection of de Gaulle in 1967.

Later, Edward Heath⁹² headed a British Opposition and advocated for an unconditional accession of Britain to the European Economic Community. In the *'Time and Tide'* press of April 8, 1966 E. Heath stated: "By joining the 'Common Market', Britain will be able to enjoy a great influence both within Europe and worldwide. Cooperation with the six member states will expand the market for British goods 3-4 times."⁹³

The position of the Conservative Party in the opposition was clearly formulated in March 1965 as follow:

Our basic policy remains achieving the entry into the European Common Market on acceptable terms. Obviously, it cannot be achieved within some time. Nevertheless, our political objective should be to demonstrate a more progressive and positive attitude than the government has with respect to European unity.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ A. P. Dobson, "the Special Relationship and European Integration", (1991), 85-86.

⁹¹ A British Politician who was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom twice, from October 1964 to June 1970, and again from March 1974 to April 1976. He was the leader of the Labour party from 1963 to 1976, and was a member of parliament from 1945 to 1983. Britannica.com.

⁹² A British Politician who served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1970 to 1974 and leader of the Conservative party from 1965 to 1975. Heath also served for 51 years as a member of parliament from 1950 to 2001. Britannica.com

⁹³ Geddes, A., "The European Union and British politics", (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), 87

⁹⁴ Ibid.

In general, the motto of the British government at that period of time regarding the matter of European integration was "interdependence," that is to say no for the creation of a federal state in Europe, or a creation of one European army, and thus the rejection of national forces, but rather a pragmatic way, in other words, interchange in economic policy of Western states in the interests of British economy.⁹⁵

The leaders of the labour party at this time were against the idea of integration, namely Harold Wilson. In 1963, Richard Crossman wrote addressing the Americans: "surely it is a good thing that one of Britain's two great parties is still passionately convinced that this country has a future-outside the common market."⁹⁶

Later, after the re-election of Wilson as Prime Minister in 1966, he completely changed his mind regarding the integration due to American pressure as the comment introduced by Hugo Young 'cringing submission to Lyndon Johnson'⁹⁷ showed clearly. Not to forget what Ziegler mentioned concerning George Ball still urging Britain to 'sign the treaty of Rome with no ifs and buts'⁹⁸. He continued that President Johnson told Wilson "your entry would certainly help to strengthen the west"⁹⁹, and he provided all kinds of support to him to ease the path for their entrance in the European Economic Community.¹⁰⁰ That was really evident that Wilson's new attitude concerning the integration of his country to EEC was due to constant US pressure on the British leaders to fit into their grand design for Europe.

Prime Minister Wilson during his first premiership (1964-1970) was going through hard moments with the United States of America regarding many matters, namely, The

⁹⁵ Gowland, D., Turner, A., Wright, A., "Britain and European integration since 1945: on the sidelines", (New York:Routledge , 2009), 158

⁹⁶ J. Dumbrell, "A Special Relationship...", 181.

⁹⁷ H. Young, "One of Us", 222.

⁹⁸ Ziegler P. "Wilson: the Authorized Life", (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993), 241, in J. Dumbrell, "A Special Relationship..." 181.

⁹⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 332.

Vietnam War (1955)¹⁰¹, the EEC entrance, Rhodesia crisis¹⁰², and the devaluation of the sterling. Against that background of issues, Wilson made his mind to try for a second time to join the EEC urged, namely, by economic motivations. Indeed, he realised that British economic future would rest more on Europe in the years to come. Following that respect, in January 1967, Brown and Wilson visited the six founding members to prepare the ground for Britain to be accepted in the EEC, and they convinced the members that Britain is moving away from the USA. However, and once again, in May 1967, De Gaulle vetoed for the second time the British application as mentioned before for he disliked the Anglo-American monetary cooperation which showed and emphasised the special treatments and operations between the two countries, the United Kingdom and the US. In other words, the 'special relationship' played again as an obstacle for Britain to be integrated in a united Europe.

It seemed now that Britain had to wait for De Gaulle's departure to try again and have more chances to be accepted, and that actually happened later in January 1973, under the leadership of the conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath who was a pro-European, and in his term, it was the turn for 'the special relationship' to go through hard times for the relation between the United Kingdom and the United States of America was at its worst status ever.

5.2. Accession in the EEC during E. Heath Premiership (1970-1974):

In 1970, Edward Heath, a well known Europeist who held the accession negotiations in 1961, became head of the British government. His main aim, indeed, was to secure a seat for Great Britain in the common market. In his European policy he rejected the doctrine of the three circles advocated by Winston Churchill in the past. In fact, European interests of London became a priority for him at the expense of the special links with the Commonwealth, as well as the special relationship with the United States of America.

¹⁰¹ check pages (104-110).

¹⁰² check pages (110-112).

E. Heath made a clever step towards Europe never done before him, and he believed that the relation of Britain with the United States was indeed 'natural' while avoiding giving further comments or explanations on that term. As he explained in 1969, the rejection of the "special relationship" with the United States meant that Britain henceforth increasingly associated itself with Europe leaving in the past the stereotypes of the "union of democratic English-speaking countries".¹⁰³

Most of Edward Heath's speeches at that time were intended to prove the necessity and importance of the British participation in the EEC basing his arguments on the fear to surrender to the hegemony of the two superpowers and the threat of China and Japan as new powers in the world. He believed that western European countries should act collectively to response to that rather than acting in isolation to play an important role in world stage and exercise influence in the course of events, as well as being able to defend their national interests among these powers for the world bears no place for the weak.¹⁰⁴

The real drive behind Joining the EEC was not only to strengthen its European policy, but also to boost its economic, military and political weight in the world. As E. Heath said in 1969:

There are some people who believe that the European policy for Britain would mean abandoning all the commitments outside of Europe. Actually, I have never shared this view. I have always believed that participation in the EEC would give us more strength to carry out these obligations...¹⁰⁵

Indeed, the foreign policy program of E. Heath was based on the idea that it was high time to review the old approaches towards British foreign policy to serve national interests,

¹⁰³ George, S. "An awkward partner: Britain in the European Community.", (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1990), 83

¹⁰⁴ Geddes, A. , "The European Union and British politics.", (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), 119

¹⁰⁵ George, S. , "An awkward partner: Britain in the European Community. ", (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1990), 84

rather than emotional links. That means being ready to abandon the individual role in international relations in favour of the integration with the European Community. E. Heath wrote in 1969:

Understanding the relativity of the power of Great Britain in the modern world is now more realistic than ever before ... there is no doubt that the belief in interdependence so skilfully nurtured by Macmillan and the recognition that Britain is able to achieve its goals in the modern world as a member of a larger association is now supported by the majority of the British.¹⁰⁶

The British Political consideration to lean towards Europe is based on the fact that "it will give us and our European neighbours force to protect our national interests and will also allow us to work together to achieve our common goals." said by Young.¹⁰⁷ For Britain, this situation meant to sacrifice a bit of its national independence to gain benefits which are unattainable elsewhere.

After the resignation of President de Gaulle in France on April 27, 1969 who has been replaced by the new President G. Pompidou¹⁰⁸ on June 20, 1969 a new opportunity came to the surface for Great Britain to join the EEC. Now, the relationship between both countries took a positive attitude which helped pave the way for the British access into the EU.

At Hague during the summit meeting in December 1969, it was decided by the founding members of the EEC that Britain should be then welcomed after its adoption of the fundamental treaties, the cornerstone of integration. The British Government uttered its consent during the negotiations on the terms of accession and they came to good terms with the founding members on the difficult issues such as the preservation of special relations of

¹⁰⁶ Young, John W. , " Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999", (New York: Macmillan, 2000), 248

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ A French Politician who served as president of France from 1969 until his death in 1974. He previously was prime minister of France from 1962 to 1968.

Great Britain with the countries of the Commonwealth, participation in the common agricultural policy and the duration of the transition period.¹⁰⁹

In May 1971, E. Heath met the French President Georges Pompidou, and they both reached an agreement on the conditions of admission into the Community, putting an end to the tense negotiations with Paris. During the negotiations, the talks focused on addressing the specific conditions of the British membership in the European Community. Both countries were on the same page regarding the future role of the pound sterling. E. Heath agreed to abandon in the future the role of the pound sterling as a reserve currency and clearly showed his intention to set limit for the official sterling reserves in Commonwealth countries as a first step to reduce the overseas financial obligations.

According to the government's White Paper "The United Kingdom and the European Community", Great Britain showed its readiness to start discussing the necessary measures for the harmonization of external characteristics between pound sterling and other currencies of the countries of the Community to create a single economic and monetary union immediately after the entry into the EEC. G. Pompidou, on his side, lifted the requirement of a fixed annual reduction in official reserves of the pound sterling by the overseas countries.¹¹⁰

Moreover, during the May summit 1971, other agreements were reached regarding providing a five-year transitional period for British industry and agriculture. The deal was on a gradual reduction of industrial tariffs by 20% per year until July 1977. To adapt British agricultural policy to the standards of the "Common Market" six stages were created,

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ The United Kingdom and the European Communities. Retrieved from: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1971/jul/26/united-kingdom-and-european-communities>. accessed by 30 December 2020.

envisaged also for a five-year transition period. During that period, it was expected to finish the fiscal harmonization between Britain and the EEC.¹¹¹

The secret behind the close relationship between France and Britain in May 1971 was mainly due to the fact that both countries were highly concerned by neutralizing the economic and the growing political influence of Germany in Europe.¹¹² Indeed, by the end of June all the most important issues were settled including the problem of a financial contribution into the budget of the EEC, and the third round of talks were successfully completed to join the EEC.

Politically speaking, the UK secured the system of representation in EEC organs, which gave it equal rights along with France, Germany and Italy. Thus, time is ripe for Britain to claim a leading role in the EU.

The British switch from an independent policy in world affairs towards joining the one united voice of the European community was due to many reasons: first, London was unable to ensure the safety and prosperity of the Commonwealth, and its trade with the white dominions was obviously decreasing. Second, the country needed foreign investments and more foreign markets. Last, Germany and Japan became the main trading allies of the U.S.

Indeed, the membership in the EEC was to free Britain from the imbalance between the grown commitments and reduced possibilities, and its inability to make other major powers accept its role which has been claimed in the post- World War II.¹¹³

The treaty on accession of Britain to the EEC was signed on 22 January 1972 and entered into force on January 1, 1973. The event which marked the beginning of a new era in the British foreign policy as E. Heath emphasized at the signing ceremony in Brussels that the

¹¹¹ Moore, L. , "Britain's trade and economic structure: the impact of the European Union.", (London: Routledge, 1999), 243

¹¹² Larsen, H . , "Foreign policy and discourse analysis: France, Britain and Europe", (London: Routledge, 1997), 58

¹¹³ Díez Medrano, J. , " Framing Europe: attitudes to European integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom", (Princeton: Princeton University Press,2003), 67

negotiations on Britain's entry in the EEC was the main task of the government in foreign policy. The success of these negotiations is the most important event in the British foreign policy since the days of Hitler's defeat. This proved the success of Heath's Government in achieving its primary foreign policy objective which is to make Great Britain part of the EU.

The entry of Britain to the EEC meant the Europeanization of foreign policy of London, that latter which coincided with the decisions of France or Germany and at times differ from its American ally. In fact, two phases can be distinguished in Heath's European policy, before the signature of the accession treaty in the winter of 1972 and since the spring of 1972 till the resignation of the conservative cabinet in February 1974.

During the first phase, Heath's cabinet focused on conducting negotiations between London and the six founding countries of the EEC from 30 June, 1970 to 24, June, 1972. On July 23, 1972, the government presented the results in a form of the white paper "the United Kingdom and the European Communities", then followed the debates in parliaments and the voting on entering into the EEC. At the end, they finished the remaining legal formalities which were approved by the House of Commons on July 13, 1972.¹¹⁴

The second phase was characterized by an active autonomous political participation of Britain in the EEC in 1972, and then to a cautious policy at the end of 1973, due to the lack of understanding between the member -states of the EEC, on one hand, and the undermining British foreign policy positions due to the increased economic and social problems at the local level which were intensified by the Irish Problem and the international crises during that year, on the other hand.

¹¹⁴ George, S. , "An awkward partner: Britain in the European Community.", (Oxford : Oxford University Press,1990), 106

Also worth mentioning, Heath was, indeed, unable to cope with internal political hardship and prepare a solid economic base necessary for the success of his foreign policy plans. The main reason was the ongoing troubles with trade unions. Their opposition to the domestic and foreign policy of his government was evident through the negative attitudes of the Labour Party which led to failure and weakened the European position of the Conservative Party. With that being said, Britain switched by the end of the 1973 to a cautious policy within the community.¹¹⁵

As a matter of fact, the enlargement of the EEC led to the growth of internal contradictions between the interests of its individual member states during the second phase. That was manifested in the conflict between Britain and both France and Germany on the nature of relations with the United States of America. Also, the issue of the regional policy in the EEC between Germany and Great Britain, as well as the disagreements of Britain, Germany, France, and the Netherlands regarding the common energy policy of the EU.

Indeed, by joining the EEC, Heath's cabinet had in mind to strengthen the position of his party and boost his image in the domestic political elite, also raise the international prestige of his country, as well as give it the necessary tools for a tremendous social and political reform.¹¹⁶ Without this tacit move to join the EEC, Great Britain was about to lose its influence within Europe, as well as the two other component of the 'three circles'. However, London had always in mind to keep and develop its former relations with the Commonwealth countries and its special ally the United States of America. Thus, it was no wonder that Britain was acting as a 'reluctant partner' from the beginning of joining the EU.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Young H. , "This blessed plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair.", (London: Macmillan, 1998), 252

¹¹⁶ Greenwood, S. (Ed.) , "Britain and European integration since the Second World War.", Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 34

¹¹⁷ Gowland, D. , "Reluctant Europeans: Britain and European integration, 1945-1998.",(London: Longman, 2000) , 163

The accession of Britain to the EU occurred 16 years after the establishment of the EEC, that delay which resulted in a difficult relation, mainly between London, France, and Germany. Britain's role within the EU was to wait and see and then obstruct the decisions made by the other members, what was called as 'the obstructionist policy towards Europe', and that became more evident during the ruling period of M. Thatcher (1979-1990).

7. Conclusion:

The seed of the Anglo-American relations are nurtured by several factors including: the historical and the cultural ties, in which common language and colonization played an important role, Mutual interests and sentiments, in which the foreign policy stands at the peak, the legal and political structures, in which similar documents and shared values are prominent, Security and military aspects, in which alliances and nuclear weapon development have a vital role, and finally the common threat, in which anti-communism was the major theme. "The Anglo-American special relation" had a significant role especially in the twenties century, for it navigated two World Wars and the multilateral conflict that was the Cold War.

The status of the special relationship was at its best after the end of WWII. However, it went through some difficult times due to some conflicts and tensions over some issues, like the Palestinian one. Nevertheless, the intelligence and military cooperation between the two nations, the UK and the USA, never seized even through hard times, as well as their nuclear collaboration. That was the status of the special relationship at the doorsteps of the cold war.

In fact, the alliance between the United Kingdom and the United States of America was due to their political principles similarities which helped the two countries ended WWII on the winning side. Yet, the UK had endured an everlasting struggle after

joining the EU to keep a balance between being pro American or pro European which made things more complicated for Britain regarding the status of the special relationship with its American counterpart. However the huge and opposed political and ideological principles between the Anglo-Americans and the Soviet ones created a serious clash between the two powerful poles. What comes later will be an analysis of the special relationship into the Cold War.

CHAPTER: 2:

Emergence and Manifestations of “the Special Relationship”

During The Cold War (1946-1990)

1. Introduction:

This phase (1946-1990) of the special relationship was characterized by disappointments and tensions especially after the end of the Second World War where Atlee's main concern was on reconstructions and rebuilding the country. However, he faced many challenges such as the hasty end of the Lend-Lease Act (1941-45)¹¹⁸, the Loan Agreement (1946)¹¹⁹, the McMahon Act of August 1946, and the Palestinian issue (1948). Taking that into consideration, one can easily deduce that the special relationship, at that point in time, became rockier. Thus, it was such a tough nut to crack for Atlee to make Britain stand on its own feet again without the help of USA, and how to maintain Britain as a supreme power in the world through the acquisition of nuclear weapons which he witnessed its birth and came to realize that it was a "must" to achieve for his country.

Throughout this chapter, the events which affected negatively the status of the special relationship and was about to jeopardize it from the start of the Cold War in 1946 to the end of it in 1990 will be analyzed. These turning points are mainly the China and the Korean War (1950-1953), The Iran Crisis (1951), The Indochina War (1954-1955), The Suez Crisis (1956), The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and The Vietnam War (1954/55).

In 1946-47, the special relationship was resurrected between the two nations, USA and UK, and cemented through the UK-USA Agreement of 1946, the Marshal Plan (1948), which was a Cold War tactic to rebuild Europe, and the formation of NATO. Nevertheless, with the exalting Soviet aggression, the close coordination between USA and UK became a

¹¹⁸ The Lend-Lease policy, formally titled An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States, was a program under which the United States supplied the United Kingdom, Free France, the Republic of China, and later the Soviet Union and other Allied nations with food, oil, and materiel between 1941 and 1945.

¹¹⁹ It was a post-World War II loan made to the United Kingdom by the United States on 15 July 1946, enabling its battered economy to keep afloat.

necessity, and thus too intimate. The following events would show that the special relationship was still alive and kicking.

2. The S. Relationship into the Cold War: (1946-1947):

The special relation will be studied and analysed from the start of the Cold War right after the end of WWI to the end of it in 1990.

2.1. The Marshal Plan:

William Clayton, undersecretary of state, reported in May 1947 to the American government after his tour in Europe that the situation was terribly catastrophic, and without an immediate help from the States, Europe would fall to a complete economic, social, and political destruction.¹²⁰

On June 5, 1947 at Harvard, the American secretary of state, George Marshal, advocated based on the previous report for an urgent massive economic help for Europe. He urged the Europeans to estimate the number needed for their help and communicate it to Washington. Ernest Bevin seized the opportunity to meet with Georges Bidault, the French secretary of Foreign Affairs, and after the Russian rejection to be part of this plan; Britain and France succeeded to gather sixteen European countries in Paris in July 1947 to discuss the amount of the USA help needed for the reconstruction of Europe. The latter proposed 29 billion dollars, but the American Congress at the end accepted to give them only 12 billion dollars in March 1948, in a period from April 1, 1948 to December 31, 1950.¹²¹

The Czechoslovakia coup in February, and the journey through Europe organised for the American Congress members helped a lot to convince the Americans to approve 'the Marshal Plan'. More important to notice here is that the British negotiations played a huge

¹²⁰ Dimpleby and Reynolds , "An Ocean Apart", 173.

¹²¹ Ibid.

role to come to this point, they got 2.7 billion dollars, the principle beneficiary before France. At that time, it seemed that ‘the special relationship’ forged in time of war between the United Kingdom and the United States of America was restored.

Moreover, the Americans set on conditions for this aid which was to accelerate the process of creating a united Europe, the idea which the British did not like much. The American ambassador to Britain, William Douglas, wrote to Washington in 1948:

Anglo-American unity today is more firmly established today than ever before in peacetime. Yet, Britain has never been before in a position where her national security and economic fate are so completely dependent on and at the mercy of another country’s decisions. Almost every day brings new evidence of her weakness and dependence on the United States of America. This a better pill for a country accustomed to full control of her national destiny.¹²²

The years and events to come are going to give more importance to the ‘special relationship’, and show more collaboration between the two nations during the Cold War events and conflicts.

2.2. From Berlin Blockade to the North Atlantic Treaty (1949):

The American foreign policy after the end of World War II was characterized by the principle of ‘containment’ that means, USA could not destroy communism, but certainly will do whatever it takes to stop it from spreading.

The Berlin Blockade and airlift were the main and major episodes of containment. One of the main purposes behind the Marshall plan in western Germany was to make communism less attractive to make sure that the eastern society will bounce back very quick. Stalin, of course, felt threatened that the Marshall Plan was a step to spread American influence into Europe. The Berlin Block (1948-49) was a response to that pressure.

¹²² Dimpleby and Reynolds, “An Ocean Apart”, 180-81.

Germany was divided into four sectors after W.W.II, the one sector in the East under the control of the Soviet Union, and the other sector in the west under the control of western allies (USA, UK, France), these allies had the control over half of the city of Berlin too. Stalin decided to shut down the roads in 1948, which mean no trade, no goods, no electricity, and no medical supplies. So; he thought the west would soon leave Berlin for its unbearable conditions.

Truman, the American president, was aware that Stalin wanted to spread his influence all over Berlin, so he was determined to find a clever way to remain there with his allies and save West Berlin from communist expansion. So, from June 1948 to May 1949, the United States and Great Britain carried out a joint airlift and succeeded in providing supplies to Berlin. That latter destroy Stalin's dreams which envisioned Berlin under the control of USSR, and turn them into ashes. USA, UK, and their allies secured that western part of Berlin and stopped the spread of communism. As a result, the Soviets built a wall in Berlin, on the eastern German side to make sure that West Berlin would not influence East Germany, and people of East Berlin would not seek refuge in West Berlin.

According to Burk that airlift was" the first substantial Anglo-American military mission since the war". Moreover, Dickie argued that the airlift "re-established Anglo-American air forces links with the same closeness they enjoyed in the War time".¹²³


Indeed, the western countries wanted to create a new Democratic Germany from the line where their armies were stationed, and decide to create also 'the Deutsche Mark' in June 1948. In fact, President Truman and the British government activated their 'special relationship' to aid the Western part of Berlin using their air forces. That incident showed clearly that the US forces still needed to secure the Democratic European countries; and this is

¹²³ Ruike Xu, "Alliance Persistence within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era",(Palgrave, Mcmillan,2017) , 7.

what Bevin tried to convince the Americans about, supported by many other European countries. Against that background, Marshal asked Bevin to use the British Bases for the American bombers (B29) ready to intervene in Europe which was accorded in June 1948.

The following map shows the four sectors Germany was divided into, the red zone which represents the Soviet territory, and the Blue zones represent the Allies, USA, UK, and FR.

Map: 1: Germany divided into 4 sectors (Soviet Sector / US-UK-FR Sectors).



[https://www.britannica.com/event/Germany Divided.](https://www.britannica.com/event/Germany%20Divided)

The second map represents the city of Berlin divided into two sectors, the Eastern part under the control of the Soviets, and the Western part under the allies' forces control.

Map: 2: Berlin Division during the Blockade.



[https://www.britannica.com/event/Berlin-Division-During the Blockade.](https://www.britannica.com/event/Berlin-Division-During-the-Blockade)

The third map represents the German Democratic Republic in the East founded by the Soviets, and the Federal Republic of Germany in the west founded by the allies' forces.

Map: 3: Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) / German Democratic Republic (GDR)



[https://www.britannica.com/event/FRG-GDR.](https://www.britannica.com/event/FRG-GDR)

In January 1948, Bevin proposed to Marshal to found an association of Western Democracies, including the United States of America, and the Dominions,¹²⁴ “a source of a federation based on military power, money, and a resolute action.”¹²⁵ to form a front against the Soviet advancements in Europe. France and the Benelux¹²⁶ were informed about that too.

The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia which took place on February 25, 1948, helped the United States to make up her mind after her reticence, and seriously discussed an Atlantic security system, as Marshal informed Bevin despite some oppositions in the state department, and urged him to send sooner the British delegates to further discuss the matter.

In March 1948, Britain, France, and the Benelux countries signed ‘the Brussels Treaty’ which guaranteed mutual support, and fighting side by side in any military aggression. According to Richard J. Barnet, this gesture was in Bevin’s eyes only a stratagem to secure an American engagement.¹²⁷

After a series of negotiations between Britain, America, and Canada, they succeeded to sign ‘the North Atlantic Treaty’ on April 4, 1949. After all, the Americans remained reticent even after the second election of Truman (1949/53), they still preferred to stay on the margin of any European crisis and provide material help only. Moreover, the American opinion in the state department was divided in two different trends , on one hand, the state department saw the Soviets as being far away from home, and therefore, they would not risk attacking the democratic countries. They were against sending more troops to Europe not to provoke a war with Russia, and believed it is Europe’s duty to secure their defence.

On the other hand, the National Security Council (NSC) was in favour of a military engagement in Europe and judged it necessary. This opinion was motivated by the

¹²⁴ The British White former colonies ‘Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa).

¹²⁵ John Baylis, “Anglo-American Defence Relations “,(London, Macmillan : 1981), 38.

¹²⁶ Benelux countries : Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

¹²⁷ Richard J. Barnet, “The Alliance...”, (New York : 1983), 129.

intelligence from the American secret services which showed that the Soviets had 175 divisions stationed in Europe at the end of 1948, in comparison with only 12 divisions of the whole Western countries. In 1950, they published a report urging for sending massive American troops abroad.¹²⁸

Bevin negotiated with the dominions, the commonwealth, and other European countries a defence pact which joined them all together in any emergency, but always keeping in mind what ‘Strang commission’ focused on before, that is to keep always the Anglo-American alliance as a priority for it is the only one capable of stopping the Soviets.

During the same period, Lewis Douglas, the US Ambassador to London, stressed the same idea and explained to fellow US ambassadors in Washington:

There is no country on earth whose interests are so wrapped around the world as the UK. . . .She is in more vitally strategic areas than any other nation among the community of Western nations. She is the centre of a great Commonwealth. . . . She is the centre of the sterling area. . . .Held together . . . by an intricate and complicated system of commercial and financial arrangements built up tediously by the British. . . . There is no substitute for the sterling area and none can be erected in any short period of time. But beyond all these considerations the UK is the only power, in addition to ourselves, west of the Iron Curtain capable of wielding substantial military strength. This assembly of facts . . . makes a special relationship between the US and the UK as inescapable as the facts themselves.¹²⁹

In ‘the Korean Crisis’ in 1951, the ‘special relationship’ was at stake, and Bevin tried to defend it to the last breath. From the American side, after President Truman meeting Atlee in December 1950 at Washington, Dean Acheson, the American secretary of state, declared to the national security council that it is important to keep a closer relationship with the United Kingdom for the American power could not be exercised without the cooperation of the

¹²⁸ David Sander, “Losing an Empire, Finding a Role”, (Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1989), 62.

¹²⁹ Diane Kirby, “Divinely Sanctioned : The Anglo-American Cold War Alliance..”, 386.

British, and that the president already explained that this fact is evident both in the Pacific and the Atlantic.¹³⁰

2.3. China and the Korean War: (1950-1953):

Mao Zedong and its communist army destroyed the nationalist Chiang Kai-shek and his army, who was supported by the Americans from 1937; took over Beijing and Shanghai and proclaimed the People's Republic of China in October 1949. With a huge fury and resentment against communism, President Truman refused to give recognition to the new regime which signed a friendly treaty with Stalin in February 1950. However, The British had another vision different from its American counterpart regarding the new China. This vision was driven by a will to preserve Hong-Kong and secure their important investments in China. To that respect, they decided to recognise the new Republic of China in January 1950.

This divergence in opinion between the United Kingdom and the United States of America regarding China rapidly changed after the invasion of South Korea by the communist army of North Korea who were fighting with the Chinese communists during China civil war against the nationalists in 24 June 1950. Indeed, that was another episode of the special relationship during the Cold War. In fact, Korea was divided into spheres of influence, the Northern sphere under USSR and the Southern sphere under the control of USA (all the Pacific and Japan). After the Russian boycott in the United Nations against the Americans for not recognising the Republic of China, this latter seized the opportunity of the absence of the Russians, and passed a resolution condemning the North Korean aggression, and engaged a multinational force of the United Nations to defend South Korea under the leadership of the US General Douglas Arthur McCarthy in a war of containment which exalted to become a

¹³⁰ Alan P. Dobson, "Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth century", (London: Routledge, 1995), 99.

battle ground between communism and democracy. Thus, it became clear at that point to the US that People's Republic of China is the real enemy in Asia.¹³¹

The biggest part of the UN Army was American under the leadership of MacArthur, the governor of the occupied Japan. He succeeded at first and caused a catastrophic rout for the communist army, and uniting Korea again was only a matter of weeks. At that moment, China did not tolerate the fact that an American army is at its doors. Thus, decided to send a huge Chinese army in 25-26 November and almost 300.000 soldiers crossed the Yalu River and hustle the American army to retreat.

Against this background, and afraid of the potential of declaring a new world war, The American President Truman delivered a press conference in which he was asked by a journalist about the probability to use an atomic bomb, and his answer was that this depends on the decision of the army under MacArthur leadership. That declaration created a big hustle at an international level. In fact, The Chinese intervention in Korea shocked the Americans, and proved that the shadow of communism is sneaking in darkness. Thus, the Americans had in mind that drastic measures should be taken. On the other hand, the British army was the second important majority after America in the United Nations forces demonstrating Anglo-American solidarity. The latter feared that a nuclear bomb might be used especially after the previous declaration of President Truman. Therefore, they believed that diplomacy to contain this situation is favoured over rushing and trigger a nuclear world war. Atlee traveled to meet with Truman in Washington and discuss the matter that it is not to the American army to decide to use the atomic bomb without the consent of the allies, and the idea of using a

¹³¹ The Communists gained control of mainland China and established the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, forcing the leadership of the Republic of China to retreat to the island of Taiwan. Starting in the 1950s, a lasting political and military standoff between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has ensued, with the ROC in Taiwan and the PRC in mainland China both officially claiming to be the legitimate government of all China. Alan P. Dobson, "Anglo-American Relations ...", 110.

nuclear bomb would never be an option to be supported by the United Nations. Finally, he got back home assured that the scenario of using a nuclear bomb would not exist.

Moreover, Some historians thought that this meeting was important to calm down the British deutes temperament, restore somehow the status of the United Kingdom as a world power, and revive the ‘special relationship’ with the United States of America. Some said, it was a comprehensive reaction from the British because the American Bombers (B-29) were stationed on the British soil, and they would fire from there. Therefore, the Soviets reaction would be disastrous on the United Kingdom, since they have also the atomic bomb which could destroy Britain in one single shot.¹³²

Furthermore, the United States asked for four other bases on the British soil to send their B-29. Later, they sent their bombers, but without the atomic bomb on them. In fact, that was a strategy or a tactic to scare the Russians. The British knew about that trick later on and they decide to shut an eye on it. Some critics saw that as a humiliating gesture and that the ‘special relationship’ was not a relationship between equals at all. However, during Atlee’s visit to Washington, his intention was to get an engagement from the Americans not to use the atomic bomb without the consent of the British, and President Truman finally promised him that on December 7, 1950.

More important to notice is that, this was not the only conflictual situation between the United Kingdom and the United States regarding the use of the atomic bomb, but there was also the matter of which policy to follow with China, and the importance to negotiate cease-fire in Korea. The British, in this war, were preoccupied by finding a diplomatic solution rather than a military victory. They feared that the arrogance of MacArthur would provoke a third world war. Bevin informed the Americans about the conditions to cease-fire,

¹³² Ibid, 111.

which were to give up on protecting Taiwan, recognising the Communist China, and accepting her admission in the United Nations replacing Taiwan. However, President refused that firmly and furiously.

Later, Acheson was asked by Bevin to make a declaration in which he invites China to negotiate the future of Korea and to reassure the Chinese about the American intentions after the victorious counterattack of MacArthur. Acheson was also convinced that the threats of the Chinese intervention concerning the crossing of 'the 38th Parallel'¹³³ by the Americans were only words without any action. The 11th October, MacArthur was supposed to meet President Truman, and during this day, Bevin wrote to the latter and insisted on the fact that:

the American government should have no doubts about the serious consequences of a Chinese intervention in Korea...I believe that it is vital that General MacArthur should not carry out retaliatory actions outside the territory of Korea without express instructions from the President Truman.¹³⁴

That was exactly what General MacArthur was planning and thinking to cut off the supply routes of the communists. However, in January 1951, when the Americans announced their will to introduce a resolution to the United Nations in which they consider China as the aggressor, a majority of the assembly voted against it. Washington modified the resolution later to a new moderate one, and that way the conflict between the allies was avoided. Nevertheless, some documents of that time became public and showed a new aspect of the British behaviour during the Korean War. On September 6, 1950, a report of the Air vice-Marshall C.A. Bouchier informed London about his feeling that the defeat of the North Korean

¹³³ 38th parallel: Borders dividing Korea into two parts. It is a popular name given to latitude 38° N that in East Asia roughly demarcates North Korea and South Korea. The line was chosen by U.S. military planners at the Potsdam Conference (July 1945) near the end of World War II as an army boundary, north of which the U.S.S.R. was to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces in Korea and south of which the Americans were to accept the Japanese surrender. The line was intended as a temporary division of the country, but the onset of the Cold War led to the establishment of a separate U.S.-oriented regime in South Korea under Syngman Rhee and a communist regime in North Korea under Kim Il-sung. Britannica.com.

¹³⁴ M.L. Dokrill, "The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean War", *International Affairs*, vol.62 n° 3 (Summer 1985), 463.

army would push the United Nations forces to cross the 38th parallel, and this to prevent the Chinese, and the Soviet forces to progress from Manchuria and reach the 38th parallel without any opposition. However, the principle goal of the UN was the reunification of Korea, and the possibility for the Koreans to choose the government of their choice, the vision which the British adopted.

At the end of September, the prime minister gave instructions to Bevin who wrote a resolution text that he wanted to propose to the UN General Assembly. This text was supposed to allow the international troops to cross the 38th parallel to assure a reunification in the country and to establish a democratic, independent state of all Korea. The Americans supported the British initiative and proposed to modify only few things in Bevin's text before sending it to nine allies.¹³⁵ The British were also motivated by the fact that they could not stay longer in Korea on the extent of their responsibilities in South –East Asia.

Britain took the initiative in the absence of any American policy regarding the matter, and switched the objectives from merely repelling the aggressor North of the 38th parallel to the reunification of Korea. At the end, the United Kingdom organised the United Nations resolution and endorsed their vision. At that time the attack on Korea by China seemed to be the beginning of a Soviet offensive in Europe. In that context, it was crucial to assure the protection of the American military power needed by the Europeans, and merely that should be done through NATO. However, this latter was only a military alliance, and not a real defensive organisation which needed to be more developed to take on more constituency. A real Headquarter and elaborated logistics were established, and the first American troops came into Europe at the beginning of 1951. The British allocated Defence a bigger part in their budget, and they had with the French to accept the rearmament of Germany.

¹³⁵ R. Owendale, "Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth century", 94-95.

On August 1, 1950, the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to increase the military expenditure to 11 billion dollars for the period (1951-1954), which can be considered as an important sum of money for a country with a struggling economy. This sum was increased in January 1951 by the new minister Hugh Gaitskell to 14 billion dollars. Therefore, the country was plunged into a serious economic crisis. The priority shift in the economic policy of the government brought up some disagreements. Indeed, to finance the military programme, in the budget of April 1951, important participation was suggested from the people's social security, that fact which pushed the British health minister, Aneurin Bevan to resign with two of his colleagues. He said: "we have allowed ourselves to be dragged too far behind the wheels of American diplomacy."¹³⁶ In his few words Bevan advocated a foreign policy less dependent on the United States of America, in a time that Anti-Americanism was increasing day after day in the British public opinion.

The coming map shows the Korean War movements and attacks of the Allies's forces, and the famous 38th parallel chosen by US military planners which strategically divided Korea into two parts North Korea, and South Korea

¹³⁶ Dimpleby and Reynolds, "An Ocean Apart...", 190.

Map: 4: Korean War (June-August 1950) and the 38th parallel.



<https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War>.

This map actually shows the famous 38th parallel which divides Korea into two parts. The line was chosen by U.S. military planners at the Potsdam Conference (July 1945) near the end of World War II as an army boundary, north of which the U.S.S.R. was to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces in Korea and south of which the Americans were to accept the Japanese surrender. The line was intended as a temporary division of the country, but the onset of the Cold War led to the establishment of a separate U.S.-oriented regime in South Korea under Syngman Rhee and a communist regime in North Korea under Kim Il-sung.

2.4. Churchill Back (1951-55) – Truman and Dwight T. Eisenhower (1951-1955):

October 1951 marked the return of the conservative Prime Minister Churchill, with Eden this time leading British foreign policy and trying to restore the very close relationship they had with the United States of America during the War. However, the lack of enthusiasm for that characterised the American side through President Truman, and President Eisenhower after him. Indeed, the relationship was full of tensions for US decision makers were irritated by the British policy towards China which recognized it as a communist nation in 1950. So, when Churchill was back to power, he was facing the remaining friction between his country and USA over China and the Korean War in which they had different visions on how to end the war, UK favored a peaceful diplomatic solution, whereas USA preferred a forceful way to end it.

Later, Churchill blamed the labour party to give up on their right which is the British veto in the use of the atomic arms. Then he met with President Truman in January 1952, and found himself obliged to accept the previous agreement with Atlee two years before. At the end of their meeting, they agreed on “the use of the American bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by his Majesty’s government and the United States government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.”¹³⁷

The return of the conservatives to power meant that the British Empire dissolution would either happen, stop, or slow down in process. This new orientation led to more tensions with the Americans again. However, the British economic situation was too bad to the point one cannot imagine that Britain would be able to preserve its empire and influence in the world scene. Richard A. Butler chancellor of Ex Chequer, announced in 1952 to the council of ministers that:

¹³⁷ Dimpleby and Reynolds, “An Ocean Apart”, 192-193.

We were all agreed when we took office that the defence programme which we inherited was beyond the nation's means. It was based on assumptions about American aid and the strength of our economy, which have since proved false...we are attempting to do too much...anything more than the current level of expenditure means moving towards a war economy with radical revision of our social and economic policies.¹³⁸

The British economic situation was in decline which made things worse for her to keep its commitments around the world, not to forget that the Korean War took them a huge financial engagement asked by the Americans.

Moreover, the independence of India meant that this country is not bound anymore to provide soldiers to protect the British interests in the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific like they were used to do under the Empire rule. In addition to that, the dominions created an economic, political, and military alliance with the Americans in their sphere which bound them together away from the British. The foundation of the military alliance ANZUS in 1951 between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States in which Britain was not invited is a good illustration of that.

2.5. The Iran Crisis: (1951):

Under the prominent vision of anti-communist cooperation hide different national interests that sometimes trigger sharp Anglo-American tensions. In fact, Anglo-American relations in the Middle East generally, and in Iran specifically, were indicative of this competitive cooperation.

Britain oil provision was entirely dependent on foreign countries, especially the Middle East area. The British invested a lot in that, so that keeping their influence in this area was really vital. The Americans based themselves in Saudi Arabia for their internal oil sources are not sufficient any more. After the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil

¹³⁸ Anthony Adamthwaite, "Overstretched and Overstrung: Eden the Foreign Office and the Making of Policy, 1951-55", *International affairs*, vol.64 n°2(April1987), 243.

Company by Dr. Mosadegh in April 1951, the British protested against that furiously. Iran was a strategic zone in which the British were afraid to be overtaken by the Soviets. The Americans somehow understood the nationalisation of this company, and the hostility of the Iranian people against the British imperialism. Moreover, Washington did not succeed in its attempt to bring Britain and Iran to good terms and fix things. The United Kingdom refused all kinds of endeavours and took its entire citizen back home, and all the Oil vessels remained closed which caused a huge economic disaster for Iran.

With the coming of President Dwight D. Eisenhower to presidency, the American administration engaged directly in a new policy to fix the matter fearing that the situation might have wrong turns and push Iran to approach the Russians seeking for their support. The British secret services predicted that the strong opposition of people against Dr. Mosadegh could be used against him. They coordinated with the Americans for a secret operation called 'Boot Operation' to prepare and support a coup d'état. The CIA and the MI6 succeeded in making a military overturn in August 1953. A year later, a pact was signed in which cited out an important compensation for the British government, and its share raised to 40 percent. The American companies also 40 percent of their share, and the remaining 20 percent was shared between France, and the Netherlands.

The British production of oil in the Middle East moved from 53 percent to 24 percent with the American domination which increased its production from 44 percent to 58 percent.¹³⁹ Indeed, The Americans took over the oil companies with a bigger share, and replaced the British there. That, in fact, disappointed the British and in this context, Sir Roger Makin, the British ambassador to Washington wrote:

¹³⁹ William R. Louis, "American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire", *International Affairs*, vol.61 n°3(Summer 1984), 397.

There is on our side a very understandable suspicion that the Americans are out to take our place in the Middle East. Their influence has greatly expanded there since the end of the Second World War, and they are now firmly established in Turkey and in Saudi Arabia. They are gaining a similar ascendancy in Persia, and now it seems that Pakistan might to some extent be drawn into their orbit...Are the Americans consciously trying to substitute their influence for ours in the Middle East?¹⁴⁰

Furthermore, the British started a series of negotiations which ended up signing “The treaty of Bagdad”, a military assistance between Britain, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. The Americans refused the British proposal to include the United States of America as a part of that treaty. Foster Dulles explained the United States’ refusal to Congress in April 1956 as follow: “The British have made a number of mistakes in the region and we are most reluctant to identify publicly with their (Middle East) politics”.¹⁴¹

That conflict between the two partners, indeed, paved the way for another harsh episode in the history of the special relationship which is the Indochina War.

2.6. The Indochina War (1954-55):

What got things worse between the two nations and strained their special relationship after the Iran Crisis of 1951, was their variant policies towards Indochina. More details will come in this part to shed light on that episode.

The communist China and the Korean War (1950-1953) triggered a radical change in the attitude of the American administration and public opinion towards European colonialism. The Americans became afraid that the dissolution of European Empires would create a void that could be fulfilled by the soviets, that is why they somehow helped them defend their empires, namely, Britain and France. That was the case with Indochina, in which France was engaged in a difficult war against the Communist forces of Viet-minh supported and armed by

¹⁴⁰ William R. Louis, “American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire”, *International Affairs*, vol.61 n°3(Summer 1984), 397.

¹⁴¹ Geoffrey Warner, “The United States and the Suez Crisis”, *International Affairs*, vol.67n°2(April 1991), 305.

China. Basically, the United Kingdom helped France not to let Indochina for the communists for that would threaten Thailand and Burma.

In case of losing these countries for the communists, that would threaten the British interests of caoutchouc in Malaysia. However, the economic problems Britain was facing would be a rock on its way to defend South-East Africa. Thus, the British government tried to convince the Americans about the strategic and economic importance of the region to get them involved in securing the area. Following that line of thought, Malcolm McDonald, the governor of Malaysia, wrote to the foreign office on September 2, 1949:

The problem is clearly that the Americans must be persuaded to play the role they are able to play. If something really reassuring is not done early enough, we could end up with Indochina and Thailand virtually lost. This would probably make the balance in favour of the Communists in Burma and move the front to the borders of Malaysia.¹⁴²

At that time (1949), the United States of America was not interested in that area, knowing that it was under the control and protection of France, and Britain. It was the proclamation of the Popular Republic of China in October 1949 which made the Americans aware of threats in that particular area and, thus, became more interested and engaged there. Furthermore, during the same month, a CIA report assumed that a communist victory in Indochina would be the key to control all South-East Asia, threatening Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia.¹⁴³

The Americans finally decided to help the French Indochina financially, and a British diplomat of the foreign office wrote to that respect; “we have worked hard for a long time to stimulate American interest in Indochina, and I think we can take some of the credit (for the US decision)”.¹⁴⁴ The American decision could also be motivated and explained differently

¹⁴² Andrew J. Rotter, “The Triangular Route to Vietnam”, *The International Historical Review*, vol.n°3(August1984), 415-16.

¹⁴³ Andrew Rotter, “he Triangular Rout...”, 420.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 421.

for they know the exportation of tin of Malaysia was vital to keep the United Kingdom economically strong and be able to fund the defence of Europe and other regions in the World.

On the other hand, France used the money received through the Marshal Plan in a colonial war in vain, and that could make it vulnerable or subject to a communist coup d'état or a military invasion by the Russians. Therefore, an American financial aid was crucial to the French, and it was estimated in 1954 that America was financing 50 % of the war in Indochina. In March 1954, 12.000 French soldiers were ambushed in Den Bien Phu, and they faced a difficult situation to retreat. For the Americans, it was out of the question to let Indochina fall between the hands of the Communists, and immediately they started discussions concerning an atomic air strike. However, the American Congress made it clear to the president that they do not want a second Korean War.

On April 5, 1954, Eisenhower contacted Churchill urging him for a military action to stop the Chinese plans there. At the beginning, the British accepted to discuss the matter with the Americans. However, after a deep contemplation, they refused to be part of a military action before trying all the solutions to negotiate in a diplomatic way an agreement for the future of Indochina. The Americans disliked what they called 'British defeatism', saying that this kind of behaviours would threaten South-East Asia to fall under the communist control. Later, it turned out that the British policy was wise and efficient. Dien Bien Phu fell down without any American intervention, and a conference was announced for summer 1954 gathering all the big powers.

Anthony Eden, who was not in a good relationship with the American secretary of state, Foster Dulles, affirmed to his collaborates that: "all the Americans want to do is replace the French and run Indo-china themselves. They want to replace us in Egypt too. They want

to run the world.”¹⁴⁵ Eden publically announced his plans concerning Indochina, without any previous discussions with his American counterpart. Laos and Cambodia will get their independence; Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China) will be divided into two states, in which the North will be Communist.

Foster Dulles went to Geneva in 1954 with a huge reluctance on his side, and there he refused to shake hands with Chou En-Lai, the Chinese foreign minister. Because of this incident, the Chinese decided to leave. In Geneva, the British this time imposed their vision with the French help. Eden plan was implemented, and it was agreed that free elections would be organised and take place in 1956 to unify the country.

This put the ‘special relationship’ between the United Kingdom and the United States at stake, when the British were head on achieving their goals in Vietnam, their relationship with the USA was at a dangerous stage. However, the British press cherished their prudence against American adventurism, and the fact that the country is still powerful and influential in the world affairs, and can exercise their decisive pressure on the United States. Everyone had the feeling that due British wisdom and expertise in world affairs, a new world war was avoided.

2.7. The E.C.D Failure and German Rearmament:

The United States of America tried hard from the end of the Second World War to convince the Europeans to unify themselves in a united states of Europe. But this idea was always facing a strong British opposition. After the Korean War, the British changed their mind completely, and their first priority became more military than economic or political through a European body to avoid the Soviet military attacks. The Americans believed that the only way to do so would be through rearming Germany. The French opposed this idea for

¹⁴⁵ Dimpleby and Reynolds , “An Ocean Apart...”, 200.

they were still afraid from Germany and the outcome and consequences of this decision on them. To assure them, the American suggested forming a “European Community of Defence” (ECD), in which Germany would be part of, rearmed, but bound and controlled. However, this suggestion failed at the National Assembly level due to a strong Soviet and French (mostly the Gaullists, those supporting Charles De Gaulle), opposition and rejection.

The British got scared from the fact that the Americans may retreat and get back to their isolationist policy, after seeing uncooperative European countries for the British counted to a huge extent on the Americans in the process of protecting Europe. Eden immediately started a European tour to revive the alliance with the Americans. In September 1954 and during ‘the London Conference’, he proposed that Germany would be allowed to be rearmed in the context on NATO, in which it would be a member in, but with one condition which was to never try to get the atomic arms. On the Other hand, Britain would engage to station permanently four British divisions on the German soil with a substantial air support. That idea helped the French to accept the British plan, and Germany joined NATO in May 1955.

It seemed that the balance in the ‘special relationship’ with the US was restored. The British would like to believe after these events that they are equal partners in that ‘special relation’ for both previous victories helped them shape that. The first one was the diplomatic victory in Indochina, and the second was fixing the stubborn German problem of rearmament. This latter, crowned them as leaders of a new Europe which is able to counterbalance the American power.

2.8. The Suez Crisis: Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan-Eisenhower (1955-1961):

It was the most devastating moment in the Anglo-American relations after the Second World War which threatened their special relationship and almost cut it off. The aggression of the two fading colonial powers, Britain and France, with Israel on Egypt in 1956 trying to get

the control back over the Suez Canal which was nationalized by Gamal Abdel Nasser, was seen by the USA as an act of colonialism, and a stupid move to make which would open the door wide to the Arabic states to run to the USSR arms. Britain did not consult its US counterpart and engaged in a solo secret move which seriously damaged its reputation and relation with USA. Warner argued that this moment was a critical one and “the special relationship seemed to reach its nadir”. Eisenhower was mad, and USA imposed economic and political pressure on UK to retrieve its forces. No two can disagree that UK remained a trustworthy military partner to the US against the USSR. Their military and intelligence cooperation continued without being stopped after this crisis.

2.8.1. The Context of the Crisis:

Foster Dulles never forgot Eden attitude concerning Indochina, and his intentions to dominate world affairs, and that really made the relationship between them really tense.¹⁴⁶ That latter which really affected the management of this conflict. Some other historians affirmed the opposite that their relationship was restored, and some said that Foster was sick at that time, and it was President Eisenhower directly in charge of this crisis, with very hostile assistants towards the British.¹⁴⁷

The Suez Canal was built by a Franco-British company and inaugurated in 1869. The majority share used to belong to the French. However, at the end of the century, it became under the British control. Meanwhile, Egypt became a British protectorate, and the canal area became a vital military zone for the British to defend the Mediterranean and the whole Middle East. Moreover, that area was an important passage for the British oil in the Middle East; almost the two thirds were transferred from this canal.

¹⁴⁶ Dimpleby and Reynolds, “An Ocean Apart...”, 204-205.

¹⁴⁷ R. Ovendale, “Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth century”, 114-115.

More important to mention, before World War II, the Egyptian nationalists fought against the British domination in the area, and the latter suffered a lot there from the beginning of the 1950. In September 1952, a coup took place and brought the nationalist figure Colonel Jamal Abdel Nasser to power. At that time, Eden was the foreign secretary of Churchill, and later Prime Minister. Variant opinions came to the surface between Churchill and his secretary. Churchill did not accept to negotiate with the Nationalists, Whereas Eden wanted to come to a compromise with the new regime, and retreat from the Canal Zone. The latter succeeded in imposing his vision, and the British announced in 1954 their withdrawal from the canal before June 1956. However, that did not imply that the Anglo-French company would be ceded to the Egyptians.

The Americans joined their ally decision in 1955, and borrowed Egypt 70 million dollars necessary to build a new reservoir in Aswan which would help get electric energy to develop the country. However, Foster Dulles conditioned this loan with the necessity to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Nasser accepted the loan, but made the Westerners furious for he used it to buy arms from the Russians and support every nationalist movement in the Middle East and Maghreb which wanted to liberate their countries from the French and the British. At the same time, he rejected the Anglo-American plan to fix the Arab-Israeli conflict despite the Israeli acceptance for territorial concessions and participation in the reintegration of Palestinian refugees under the supervision of the United Kingdom and America. According to the American emissary who met with Nasser in March 1956, he reported that Nasser was afraid to be assassinated like the king Abdullah of Jordan who secretly negotiated with Israel.

Eden after hearing this compared Nasser to Mussolini and proclaimed that the new tyrant wants to rule over an empire extended from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. The Americans shared the same opinion, in fact, and the CIA with the British secret services

started to prepare a plan like they did with Dr. Mosadegh in Iran, and Eden had his heart set on realising this idea.

2.8.2. Diplomacy and Military Preparation:

It was not the British government who started hostility against Nasser, but, indeed, the Americans. On July 19, 1956, Foster Dulles invited the Egyptian Ambassador to tell him it is impossible now for the Americans to finance the construction of Aswan reservoir.¹⁴⁸ Eden was surprised with the American reaction, and even the President Eisenhower, thought that the action of his secretary was awkward. That behaviour pushed Nasser to announce one week later, on July 26, 1956, the nationalisation of the canal of Suez. That way, profits gained by the Egyptian exploitation now will make Egypt autonomous to fund the construction of Aswan barrage.

Eden became furious that his policy with the Egyptians led to a disaster, as the British press described, and his enemies in the conservative party. The situation was critical for the British for they were dependant on the Oil of the Middle East. Thus, besides the British economic sanctions against Egypt, they moved towards planning a military intervention. On July 27, Eden wrote to Eisenhower, “my colleagues and I are convinced now that we should be ready, as a last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to reason”.¹⁴⁹

Nevertheless, Herbert Hoover, Dulles’ assistant, wrote to inform him about a discussion with the president:

I pointed out (to the president) grave dangers of engaging in military intervention on grounds outlined by Eden and that while strong position to be undertaken to preserve Western status in Middle East, I did not believe confiscation of (Suez Canal) company was in itself sufficient reason for military invasion. Some other overt act would be necessary before we would be justified in adopting such

¹⁴⁸ Geoffrey Warner, “The United States and the Suez Crisis”, *International Affairs*, vol.67 n°2(April 1991), 308.

¹⁴⁹ G. Warner, “the United States and the Suez Crisis”, 309

measures. Otherwise our entire posture would be compromised. President agreed.¹⁵⁰

During summer 1956, Eden focused more on convincing the Americans to get rid of Nasser through force and replace him by a government which will be in the favour of the West. However, The Americans preferred a diplomatic way rather than aggression. Dulles convinced the British to invite for a conference all the countries which use the canal. But, Eden reinforced the troops in the Mediterranean and called some reserves.

The conference took place in August and suggested that the canal should be exploited by an international organism under the supervision of the United Nations, but Nasser refused sharply. Dulles suggested then that only users of the canal should manage it themselves. On October 2, he added that this suggestion is not to be imposed by the United States of America on the Egyptians. Time passed by, and Egypt proved that it could alone exploit the canal and any military intervention seemed not possible.¹⁵¹

Against this background, on October 14, The French General Maurice Challe suggested to Eden a joint military action with the Israeli against Egypt, but Eden refused any action which includes the Israeli. Later, The British met with the French at Paris, to discuss further actions. France proposed to use an Israeli attack which paves the way for them to start a military action in the Canal, and the British should use their bombers stationed in Malta, and Cyprus. Moreover, the three met secretly in Sevres on October 22-24, the Israeli were informed to push the attack from Sinai until the canal to justify the Anglo-French intervention to satisfy the Americans somehow. In fact, a diplomatic solution was not an option for them for it would keep Nasser as head of government.

The Israeli agreed on a British air strike on the Egyptian airports to avoid any attack from the enemy on their exposed cities like Tel-Aviv. However, this idea was impossible for

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 310.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

the British to accept because it may destroy the excuse used by the British for their intervention with the French, which is an Israeli threat on the Canal. The situation was fixed in 24 when the Israeli accepted to attack first, and give the British 36 hours to intervene. They signed what was called “Sevres Protocol”. For caution, Eden suggested to destroy the copy of their protocol, in case of any disclosure. However, The Israelis did not and they published it later in 1991.¹⁵²

From the British side, Eden hid from the cabinet everything which indicates any planning for the operation with Israel. As a matter of fact, The United States of America was not informed by anything and they totally ignored what would happen. Eden thought, once the attack starts, the Americans will have no other choice just to join their allies. Indeed, He was illusioned thinking to achieve what he did in Indochina, German rearmament and the coup d'état against Mosadegh.

2.8.3. American Attitudes and Hostilities:

On October 29, 1956, the Israelis started the attack in Sinai trying to get to the Canal as an objective. The next day, France and Britain warned both the Israelis and the Egyptians, and gave them 12 hours to free the Canal Zone to be occupied by them. The Israelis accepted that, as planned secretly, whereas the Egyptians refused. On October 31, the British air forces bombed the Egyptian military airports. The fact which drove Eisenhower furious and he called Eden telling him that he completely lost his mind.¹⁵³

On October 30, the American representative in the United Nations reached out to the Russians and asked the Security Council to stop immediately the conflict there. However, the British and the French vetoed that request. The next day Eisenhower met up with the National

¹⁵² Avi Shlaim, “the Protocol of Sevres, 1956: Anatomy of a War Plot”, *International Affairs*, vol.73 n°3(July 1997), 509-530.

¹⁵³ A. Shlaim, “the Protocol of Sevres”, 211.

Security Council to explain his position. Dulles clearly cited out that if the United States of America stands against the Franco-British intervention, every single nation which recently had got independence would rush to the Russians arms, and accusing us that we support the French and British imperialism. Eisenhower concluded that it is out of the question to support the French and the British position, and lose the whole Arabic world.¹⁵⁴

On November 2, Dulles himself intervened in the General Assembly of the United Nations and got the majority of voices (64) against (5) to condemn his allies. More important to mention in the American reaction context, is that, a liberal government was placed in communist Hungary which announced the retrieval from the Warsaw Pact.¹⁵⁵ It was at the same time when the Franco-British attacked Egypt; Russia entered Budapest facing a huge popular resistance. The Americans were too focus with the Western countries on the Russian aggression to make it look bad internationally, and seemed forgetting about the Suez Crisis which was going to get a wrong turn. Now, the situation took them to dissociate themselves publicly from their allies not to be accused by supporting an imperialist action, or get to be associated with the Russians.¹⁵⁶

An important fact we should shed light on here is that it was obvious that the American had a double-standard policy regarding this crisis. At the beginning of August 1956, the Americans doubted about a military intervention, and Eisenhower sent Dulles to London to gain time for his next election, and he did not want to look like someone who supports a colonial war. On August 2, Dulles mentioned that he understands their allies' position, and he said that they can count on the moral support and sympathy of the Americans. When Eden wanted to show him the British plan and preparations, he seemed to prefer not to get in touch with their plans. Dulles seemed at ease to get the British promise

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Warsaw Pact was the equivalent of NATO for countries under the control of Russia.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid

that he would be invited to attend the conference of the countries which use the canal on August 21-23. Later, a delegation, under the leadership of Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister got to Egypt to get Nasser's approval regarding the conference.

Dulles declared to the national Security Council on August 30, that if Nasser refuses the delegation proposals, it would be difficult for them to stand against the British and the French will to use force because if they could not succeed with that, it would make them lose their status as great powers. However, the same day, he did confide to Eisenhower that he is against a military action which would drive the Middle East and Africa against us, and push them to approach the Soviets. Eisenhower totally agreed with this view. The next month while Macmillan, chancellor of EX-Chequer, visited the United States of America, he was told by Dulles that nothing should be done which would affect the next election. Macmillan did not give too much attention to his recommendation and he barely mentioned it to the cabinet. According to Ovendale, perhaps Macmillan did that on purpose to get Eden's place.¹⁵⁷

Moreover, at the beginning of October, the CIA delivered Eisenhower a plan to get rid of Nasser similar to what they did in Iran for Mosadegh. However, the president refused it thinking that the situation would be different in the Arabic world, and they would never be against the Western countries. Against that background, one could easily deduce that the Americans were on the same page with the allies and that was shown in the previous American encouragements, but it seemed like they were trying to gain more time for their benefit, the fact which explains their warnings not to do anything before the elections.

¹⁵⁷ R. Ovendale, "Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth century", 118.

2.8.4. End of Crisis:

On November 4, 1956, both the Egyptians and the Israelis accepted cease-fire, before the Franco-British forces got to the canal. The next day, British and French parachutes landed on Port Said, the Northern entry of the canal. This move got the Russians threaten to intervene there, the Americans exercised severe pressure, and the United Nations followed with sanctions against both countries. At that moment, on November 6, Eden informed his French ally that his country would accept cease-fire. That decision was really surprising, even more for the Americans which deep inside, they wished their allies got rid of Nasser forever.

Eisenhower felt relieved for the British decision, and he invited Eden to Washington to inform him that the United States would not restore its contact with Britain and France until they retrieve from Egypt to be replaced by a United Nations' force to maintain peace and order in the area. Furthermore, the Suez Crisis caused the loss of British currency value in the market, and the British became in need, once again, for an American loan. The latter made it clear that no aid would be given if Britain and France disobey the United Nations orders.

We can say that the failure of the Franco-British operation (called the musketeers) was due to the American blockade, from the beginning, of the British money at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which put them in a helpless situation to defend their currency. At the end of the month, the cabinet broke down, and before the end of this year, the last British soldier left the Canal.

2.8.5. A Lesson not to be forgotten:

The Suez crisis was kind of a big shock for politicians and public opinions for it showed the American dominance and that there was no relationship between equal countries. . It somehow, marked the end of the British illusions and pretentions. Until that crisis, Britain believed it is a great power equal to the United States and Russia. It is certain that it had a

huge sphere of influence throughout the world, the Commonwealth, Africa, Asia, and the Middle-East, but this crisis showed that all of this was for nothing. The lack of financial means, and the weak status of its currency, put that country under the mercy of the United States of America. The British were disillusioned concerning ‘the special relationship’ they enjoyed with America. Through time, they managed to keep it going and their conflict were never public, and they always succeeded to find a way out to solve their disputes secretly (China, Korea, Indochina, and Iran), and presented a united front, but not this time. In the Suez Crisis, the Americans went public opposing their ally, exercising control on it for its financial dependence, and imposing its will in world affairs.

Some scholars- Dimpleby and Reynolds – considered this humiliation as a fuel for the British to look more for a continental Europe. On January 8, 1957, a memorandum was introduced to the cabinet by high delegates in the foreign office, in which they cited out:

Two great powers, America and Russia, now immeasurably outstrip all the others ... We should pool our resources with our European allies so that Western Europe as a whole might become a third nuclear power comparable with the United States and the Soviet Union [...].¹⁵⁸

That clearly showed that Britain was disappointed from its American ally to the point they started to think to lean towards Europe and develop a nuclear power equal to the American and the Russian ones to negotiate on international affairs from the same level. The memorandum also focused on other matters apart from the nuclear domain, it was mentioned that:

The Suez crisis has made it plain that there must be some change in the basis of Anglo-American relations. It was doubtful whether the United States would now be willing to accord to us alone the special position which we had held as their principal ally during the war. We might therefore be better able to influence them if we were part of an association of Powers which had greater political, economic and military strength than we alone could command.¹⁵⁹


¹⁵⁸ Dimpleby and Reynolds , “An Ocean Apart”, 219-220.

¹⁵⁹ Dimpleby and Reynolds , “An Ocean Apart”, 219-220.

The future of Great Britain lies neither in its commonwealth, nor in the 'special relationship' it enjoyed with the United States of America, but in the role it can play in a united Europe, and that was the harsh lesson they learnt from the Suez Crisis. Eden resigned directly for health problems, and Macmillan succeeded him to lead a country going through hard times.

The following map shows how the attacks of the coalition were implanted on Egypt to seize the canal of Suez.

Map: 5: Suez Crisis (the Anglo-French-Israeli plan).



<https://www.britannica.com/event/Suez-Crisis-Anglo-French-Israeli-plan>.

That incident almost damaged fully the special relationship between the UK and the USA. However, that friction did not stop both countries to carry on their military intelligence and nuclear collaboration in the years to come.

3. Restoring the Special Relationship: Military and Financial Dependence:

What follows is an explanation of the process of restoring the special relationship between the UK and the USA through their continuous military and nuclear collaboration.

3.1. Reconnection and Restoration of Nuclear Cooperation (1957-58):

Macmillan enjoyed a very good personal relationship with Eisenhower. He was a son of an American mother, the fact which helped him keep tight relations with his second country. In fact, his good relation with the American President dated back to 1943-1944 when he was a representative of the British General Headquarter of allies in North Africa. Indeed, Eisenhower liked in Macmillan “his competence, perspicacity, intelligence, and his aptitude to guess complex questions and to give advice on how to settle them which Eisenhower valued greatly”¹⁶⁰

As a matter of fact, fixing the ‘special relationship’ was a priority in Macmillan’s agenda, and it was indispensable, at least for the United Kingdom. In that sense, President Eisenhower made a clever move to restore the special relationship by suggesting a meeting with the new coming prime minister in Bermuda. This conciliatory gesture known in the special relationship literature as the Bermuda Meeting of 1957, which paved the way for both countries to closely reestablish their nuclear partnership, soon after it, they signed the Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) in 1958 which solidified their nuclear partnership.

Dickie argued that “the special relationship seemed to quickly rebound from the Suez Crisis”¹⁶¹. At that point of time, the Suez Crisis was part of history. Dobson also observed that

¹⁶⁰ Dimpleby and Reynolds, “An Ocean Apart”, 222.

¹⁶¹ Ruike Xu, “Alliance Persistence...”, 09.

“the rapid post crisis healing of Anglo-American relations transformed Suez into part of the special relationship’s mythology¹⁶²

The first meetings helped initiate and develop a confident and an open dialogue between the two leaders which continued until the end of Eisenhower presidency. One of the crucial elements of success of the Bermuda meetings was reaching an agreement between the two countries regarding nuclear cooperation.

Indeed, as a reaction to the ‘McMahon Act of 1946, the British succeeded in developing their own atomic bomb in October 1952, and the thermonuclear bomb in May 1957. However, British bombers were not well equipped and developed to transport such bombs, and getting the new adequate generation of bombers would start in 1957-1958. Following that respect, Eisenhower, who was once against the McMahon Act, wanted to seize this opportunity to give back a lost privilege to his British ally, meanwhile, serving the interests on his nation and NATO. As a first step, he proposed sixty Thor missiles (range: 2000-2500 kilometres) to be installed in Great Britain which gave the latter the opportunity to reach to Russia, and with the British right of veto concerning the use of these arms, just like the Americans.

Few months later, on October 4, 1957 the Soviets succeeded in launching ‘Sputnik’, the first artificial satellite to space. This news created panic among the American public opinion, scared from a nuclear attack from space by the Russians. It was these circumstances which pushed Eisenhower to make his administration vote necessary texts for the exemption of clauses from the McMahon Act in favour of the United Kingdom to continue cooperation in research and exchange of information regarding the development of atomic weapons starting from summer 1958.

¹⁶² Ibid.

3.2. Collaboration in the Middle East and US Support for British Nuclear Power:

Years later, Eisenhower confessed regarding his attitudes vis-à-vis the French-British alliance and the Suez Crisis, that it was one of the biggest mistakes in his presidency.”¹⁶³ In fact, the failure of the allies in the Suez conflict paved the way for Nasser to achieve his dream which is to govern the Arabic world around his country. In January 1958, both Egypt and Syria founded the United Arab Republic (UAR) under the leadership of Nasser. In July, the King of Iraq, a British ally, was subject to a coup d'état which brought to power officers favourable to Nasser and in which their main goal was to join the United Arab Republic. The same scenario happened later in Yemen.

Against that background, the Americans started to become scared from the big influence of these events on the Soviets for they would make the Russians stronger and occupy the Arabic world and bring it to their soviet orbit, the ally of these Arabic anti-imperialist regimes. The king Hussein of Jordan asked the British to come back with their forces, afraid from facing the same fate of King Faisal of Iraq who was overthrown. For Lebanon, they asked for the help of the Americans after a hard civil war between Christians, and Muslims who supported Nasser. Without any hesitation Eisenhower sent 10.000 American Marines, and the British put their military bases in Cyprus at US disposal to secure life there and provide necessary materials for British parachutes (RAF) to intervene in Jordan.¹⁶⁴

Important thing to mention here is that the ‘special relationship’ was restored during these events, communication and concrete aids were tangible between the two countries, and their coordinate actions were efficient. However, another episode will mark again the British inferiority in this relationship. When the British received the American bombers (B52) to

¹⁶³ R. Owendale, “Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth century”, 117.

¹⁶⁴ <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v11/ch3?start=31>.

transport their bombs, they realised that these modest equipment are not sufficient and not up to date. Thus, to keep up with nuclear developments, they needed missiles. Therefore, they launched a programme called 'Blue Strike' which integrated huge portion of the American technologies. However, facing a difficult economic situation, they found themselves obliged to stop funding this programme, but before shutting this down, they consulted their American counterpart to see if they would offer suggestions or help regarding the matter. Macmillan travelled to Washington in March 1960, and agreed with Eisenhower to receive the American missiles 'Skybolt' on a cheaper price in comparison with their programme 'Blue Strike'. In return, Macmillan accepted to give access to 'Holy Loch' in Scotland for the US Marines where they could base their nuclear missiles "Polaris", as well as the site of 'Flyingdales' in which to be used as an advanced station to detect nuclear attacks. Nevertheless, they did not have the right to veto the use of Polaris or the promise to be consulted.¹⁶⁵

In this respect, Macmillan commented in his memoirs that this agreement "does not limit our hope of preserving ... the independence of our nuclear deterrent force."¹⁶⁶ Obviously, that was not the opinion of everyone, and that created a heated debate in Great Britain along the labour party, the British press, and some conservatives, as well as a huge portion of the British people who marched for unilateral nuclear disarmament. Hostility against this agreement became tenser after Macmillan revealed the secret clauses concerning the American nuclear submarines.

3.3. The New Berlin Crisis and the American Spy Affair (1958-1962):

This is another episode which is the New Berlin Crisis (1958-1962) that helped make the special relationship even stronger after the Suez Crisis (1956) when corporate successfully against Khrushchev desire to unite the whole Berlin under his control.

¹⁶⁵ <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1362369042000314547>.

¹⁶⁶ Harold Macmillan, "Pointing the Way, 1959-1961", (London: Macmillan, 1972), 252.

It is important to mention at this point the role Macmillan was trying to fulfil, according to Dimbleby and Reynolds:

Churchill, who was nostalgic for his wartime partnership with Roosevelt, tended to exaggerate the supposed harmony in Anglo-American relations. Eden overestimated the autonomy of Great Britain and paid the price for it in Suez. Macmillan was looking for a just medium. Unlike Eden, he never failed to consult the Americans, which did not prevent him from standing out from them when British interests required it. Macmillan was no less determined than Eden not to become Washington's lackey but, in his eyes, the lesson of Suez was clear: British initiatives could only be based on trust between the two countries. Once that trust was restored Macmillan tried, like his two predecessors, to use British influence in the service of an appeasement of the Cold War.¹⁶⁷

At the end of 1958, tensions were at the extremes between the United States of America and Russia. In a speech given by the new Kremlin leader Nikita Khrushchev, he announced his will to integrate the whole Berlin to Eastern Germany under his control. Eisenhower, supported by Macmillan and De Gaulle, totally refused that. Some historians believe that this passage from Nikita's speech was improvised, and he certainly did not want to take the risk to confront the Westerners in a war.¹⁶⁸

In November 20, a Russian ultimatum fixed a period of six months for the Western world to come to an agreement regarding Berlin. Otherwise, Berlin would be joined fully to an Eastern Germany state. As a matter of fact, another episode which made the special relationship more strong at that time was the Berlin Crisis of 1961, when Stalin decided to build a wall which split Berlin, yet Germany, into two parts, the East under his control, and the west under the Western allies' control, namely USA and UK.

That move came as a first try to kick USA and its allies out of Germany after the Berlin Blockade when Stalin blocked all the roads and cut off electricity for the hope that the allies would give up on Berlin and retreat, but his efforts were in vain for USA and UK

¹⁶⁷ Dimbleby and Reynolds , "An Ocean Apart", 227.

¹⁶⁸ Elizabeth Baker, "The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962", *International Affairs*, vol.39 n°1(January 1963), 59-73

cooperated in 'the Berlin Airlift' with their planes to maintain the west and provide them with the necessary supplies.¹⁶⁹

However, Stalin came up with the idea of building a wall in 1961 to avoid any influence of the Marshal Plan from the west and not to allow any citizen in the East to seek refuge in the West. That wall somehow was a mere physical manifestation of the iron curtain. At that moment, Britain and USA continued to work closely together carrying out the policy on containment i.e: it was out of the question for them to let communism spread in the region, and they would do all what it takes to reach that goal.

When the crisis got a very disturbing twist, Macmillan decided to travel to Russia. He landed in Moscow aiming to make from this first visit of a westerner head of state a big success. He succeeded to convince the Russians to adopt a conciliatory attitude, and made Khrushchev give up on his ultimatum concerning Berlin. The latter decided to send his foreign minister to a meeting to be prepared for a next summit of the big powers which would take place from 11 May to 5 August 1959, without coming to any other results with Macmillan.¹⁷⁰

Despite Eisenhower reticence, he finally decided to meet up with Khrushchev in September 1959 in Camp David. The two leaders came to good terms, Khrushchev denounced his warning, and Eisenhower accepted a summed of the 'Big Four' in May 1960 in Paris. However, fifteen days before the summit, an American spying plane got caught in the Soviet air space. Gary Powers, the pilot was captured and introduced with the rest of his plane to the international media. The Americans tried to justify this incident, but their excuses did not convince anyone. Khrushchev decided to come to the Paris summit despite the strong soviet

¹⁶⁹ Dimpleby and Reynolds , "An Ocean Apart", 228.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

leaders' opposition. In fact, he wanted to get American official excuses, and the punishment for those responsible members of the operation in the Pentagon.

Eisenhower did not surrender to Khrushchev to give him what he wanted, and despite the British and the French mediation, the summit ended up before the conversations started.

The period of Eisenhower and Macmillan came to an end opening the gate for Kennedy who was seen as a symbol of a new generation, and who has nothing in common with the British Prime Minister.¹⁷¹

4. A Tormented Special Relationship:

Another episode which proved the strength of the special relationship between the USA and the UK when Kennedy became President of the USA in 1961 was their collaboration during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). That incident which was the stroke that was about to break the young US president's back at the beginning of his presidency.

4.1. Kennedy's Confidant in a Difficult Beginning:

In fact, nothing was in common between the young president Kennedy of 43 years old, and Macmillan the experienced British Prime Minister who was 66 years old for they were from two different generations. However, one month after his presidency, Kennedy succeeded in building a strong personal link with Macmillan. In fact, President Kennedy spent a big deal of time in Great Britain when his father was the American ambassador to London, which allowed him to get acquainted with the aristocratic British mind in which the British Prime Minister was a typical representative. Thus, the gap between the two statesmen was not big as it appeared to be.

¹⁷¹ Dimpleby and Reynolds , "An Ocean Apart", 229.

As a matter of fact, his first test¹⁷² as a president was a big failure. From 1959 and after becoming head of state of Cuba, Fidel Castro became a real problem and a threat for the American administration. Indeed, the Americans did not forget Cuba's seizure of the American funds and properties in the island, and even more, they could not accept the idea that this little island which exists in their sphere of influence would create an open door for their Soviet enemy, and create a constant threat for the United States of America.

In April 1961, the CIA proposed a project for President Kennedy to overthrow Castro. That plan was already approved by President Eisenhower, and without giving it a second thought, Kennedy accepted the project. It was directly implemented, and some Cuban exiles well equipped and trained by the Americans landed on the 'bay of pigs' in the Southern part of the island. Unfortunately, and contrarily to what the CIA predicted, the Cuban citizens stood by their leader Castro and they were fighting against this invasion. That incident harmed so bad the American image in the eyes of the international community and made it look weak vis-à-vis Russia.¹⁷³

The disaster of the 'bay of pigs'¹⁷⁴ was regarded as the American equivalent of the 'Suez crisis', and it made them look like another imperialist country. That fact, which would make it lose credits and credibility in the eyes of third world countries, and the Russians were clever to play on this nerve. Against this back ground, President Kennedy would meet for the first time with the Russian leader Khrushchev in June 1961. Macmillan had his own fears and doubts that the young, inexperienced president, Kennedy, would be charmed and overshadowed by the Russian politician in front of him. Indeed, Macmillan was right in his guess, and Khrushchev intimidated the young president, and once again he brought out the subject of Berlin and made things really hard for him. Kennedy, somehow, overcame this

¹⁷² The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962.

¹⁷³ John Baylis, "Anglo-American Defence Relations", (London: Macmillan, 1981), 75-76.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

psychological war against him, and he did not agree on anything with Khrushchev in this meeting.

His next visit was to Paris, in which the success and the presence of his wife overshadowed him, and he was almost unseen there. It was obvious this time that President Kennedy was facing hard times from different fronts. The wise Macmillan noticed that and he delayed the meeting of London between ministers, which was held on June 5, 1961, and he preferred to sit alone with President Kennedy for some hours. This gesture was really appreciated by Kennedy and made him feel at ease, and he started to talk about his meeting with Khrushchev. Macmillan listened carefully to the young president and he provided him with some advice, and established a more close, confident, and tight relation between them from that date on.

4.2. The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962):

On October 16, 1962, the (U2) American spying flights discovered the construction of missiles launching sites in Cuba. Two days later, they succeeded in taking some pictures which showed Soviet Ships full of missiles approaching the Cuban island. In fact, it was out of the question for the Americans to accept such a threat close to their lands by 150 kilometres. Therefore, President Kennedy summoned the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOM), which is a committee of crisis in which they had a heated debate about the present emergency.¹⁷⁵ The military chiefs favoured an air strike to destroy the sites. Other suggestions were to use extreme measures without a direct confrontation with the Russians. This latter was the solution to be implemented and agreed on in the Council.

¹⁷⁵ John Dumbrell, "A Special Relationship...", 62-63.

On October 20, Kennedy decided to impose a blockade against Cuba, a step which may give the Russians time to call their ships back and ponder about the upcoming risks. The next morning, Kennedy informed ‘Ormsby Gore’, the British ambassador to Washington, and one of his best friends¹⁷⁶. He asked for his opinion while introducing him four options they had concerning this situation. The latter chose the same option the US president implemented without any previous knowledge of his decision. Kennedy then rushed to call Macmillan to inform him and get his support and approval; he ended up his conversation by:

We shall have to act most closely together. I have found it absolutely essential, in the interest of security and speed, to make my first decision on my own responsibility, but from now on I expect that we can and should be in the closest touch, and I know that together with our other friends we will resolutely meet this challenge.¹⁷⁷

Until that moment everything was kept secret. On October 22, the President informed the world about the situation and made his decision public, and made the world live its worst nightmare this week afraid from a nuclear apocalypse for the Russian and American nuclear arms were on a maximum alert for almost three days along the crisis.¹⁷⁸

During this crisis, Kennedy and Macmillan had constant communications and exchanges to make one front against the Russians. Important to mention is that ‘Gore’ was the only foreigner who was invited to attend all the (EXCOM) meetings. During this time, the European media, namely in Britain and France, was too harsh and cruel against the Americans who, in trying to preserve their hegemony, are plunging the world into a nuclear war which probably if not sure ends up the human life on earth. ‘Gore’ advised Kennedy to send the photos of the missiles sites in Cuba and the Russian ships to the British media in an attempt to stop their attacks and the president accepted that, as well as his advice concerning fixing the

¹⁷⁶ Ormsby Gore was Macmillan’s nephew, and his cousin was the husband of one of Kennedy’s sisters. Kennedy suggested him as an ambassador for his country to Washington, and Macmillan smartly accepted that. Britannica.com.

¹⁷⁷ Harold Macmillan, “At the End of the Day, 1961-1963”, (London: Macmillan, 1973), 182.

¹⁷⁸ Len Scott and Steve Smith, “Lessons of October, the Cuban Missile Crisis”, *International Affairs*, vol.70 n°4, (October 1994), 672.

embargo to 500 miles rather than 800 miles in the Ocean.¹⁷⁹ The British foreign office was against this blockade, and it was out of the question for them to help the Americans to apply a total blockade on Cuba, their viewpoint was to apply a blockade regarding arms that's all.

The Russians, somehow, wanted to seize this opportunity to be in Cuba to make a balance regarding nuclear threats because the Americans were already installing their bombers in the United Kingdom and Turkey which is at the Russian borders. Recent opened archives showed that the Russian argument for their actions was that Cuba was an independent country seeking refuge and help against an American aggression. In fact, real preparations were put on place to invade the Island in 1961 -1962, and Kennedy already approved the operation "Mongoose" in October 1962. The Cuban secret services infiltrated the army of Cuban exiles who were trained by the United States of America and engaged in the operation. They succeeded in getting necessary proves and send them to the Russians. Some documents showed even more that McNamara, the defence secretary set the October 20, 1962, as a potential date for the invasion.¹⁸⁰

The following map will show the Soviet military build up and sites on the Cuban soil during this Crisis.

Map: 6: Soviet Military build up in Cuba.1962



<https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/DODCMCBM/009/DODCMCBM-009-008>

¹⁷⁹ Scott and Smith, "Lessons of October", 659-684.

¹⁸⁰ Len Scott and Steve Smith, "Lessons of October", 670-671.

The following map will give an idea about the location of the Bay of Pigs in the Cuban island where this crisis took place.

Map: 7: the Bay of Pigs.1962



<https://quotesgram.com/bay-of-pigs-quotes/>

The world witnessed a tough thirteen day of political and military standoff in 1962 between the Russians and the Americans which threatened the universe by a lurking nuclear war. Hopefully, a third party, that is the NATO got in between to ease things and find an urgent solution for this crisis and restore peace in the world.

4.3. End of Crisis and Debates over the Special Relationship:

On October 24, 1962, the United Nations through its secretary general U. Thant demanded from Russia to stop sending arms to Cuba, and the Americans should also stop the blockade for two weeks, the time for negotiations. The two leaders, Both Kennedy and Khrushchev, needed serious guarantees before accepting U. Thant's proposition. The next morning Macmillan suggested to Kennedy to refrain from any action against Cuba, and to better follow the United Nations' path and propositions. He also advised him to end the blockade, and ask for an efficient inspection from the United Nations to block the way in front of the Russians to seize this opportunity. A second condition was that the UN has to send a

group of observers to assure that the construction of the platforms are stopped during the negotiations. Indeed, this is exactly what President Kennedy did, and during the same evening he called Macmillan to inform him that fourteen Russian ships which were carrying sensitive materials turned back home.

On October 26, the president announced that the construction of many sites have been stopped, which meant that the threat against his country somehow disappeared.¹⁸¹ Therefore, Macmillan proposed to Kennedy to deactivate the sixty Thor missiles based in Great Britain to assure the Russians during the negotiations. Kennedy replied: “we [the Americans] will bring that into the negotiations and I [Kennedy] will keep you posted ... we prefer not to have too many sites to dismantle, but it is possible that your proposal will move things forward.”¹⁸² However, on October 27, the Russians asked the Americans to dismantle the fifteen missiles ‘Jupiter’ installed in Turkey , and to promise to never attack Cuba in exchange of Russian withdrawal of their missiles from Cuba. Two days later, both leaders agreed on the Russian terms to end up the crisis.

Debates followed after that in Great Britain regarding the role of their country in this conflict. The majority of observers believed that the United States of America succeeded alone in managing this crisis, and the United Kingdom provided only the moral support. As a matter of fact, Macmillan was informed like any other leader of western countries, with the exception that his ambassador was admitted to the meetings of the committee of this crisis. However, the British influence on the United States decisions was not present, and they were never consulted, but informed. Obviously, both the Russians and the Americans were not in need on any intermediary.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, 672-674.

¹⁸² Macmillan, “At the end of the Day...”, 210.

Following that respect, Macmillan tried in the last volume of his memoirs “At the End of the Day” to show that his country’s role was decisive in fixing this conflict, and the American president not only informed, but consulted him and adopted his suggestions. In fact, the transcription of their phone calls, and Macmillan notes of his journey as a prime minister showed clearly that Kennedy consulted him and took his advice into consideration two or three times.

The open access of the British and the American archives revealed a lot about this period. Gary Rawnsley wrote in 1995:

Although the British government was not a passive spectator, it did not play a crucial role in resolving the crisisGreat Britain was therefore well consulted, but it was only a simple formality, and the British government was not actively involved in any decision-making process to find a solution to the crisis acceptable to the Americans ... reading the conversations (between Macmillan and Kennedy), we realize that the ‘special relationship’ was limited to London relaying information from Washington.¹⁸³

A year later, in the same journal, Peter Boyle got back to the same subject leaning to Macmillan’s view and citing that the British influence was really important, and the endless British support to the Americans plays a crucial role in the final success.¹⁸⁴ In the same stream of thoughts, The British ambassador to Moscow noticed that Khrushchev was expecting something for the Americans like it happened to the British and the French in the Suez Crisis where they were without a friend in the United Nations, and publicly humiliated.¹⁸⁵ Boyle concluded that the firm British public support to the Americans contributed without any doubts in stopping Khrushchev.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ Gary D. Rawnsley, “How Special is Special? The Anglo-American Alliance during the Cuban Missile Crisis”, *Contemporary Record*, vol.9 n°3(winter 1995), 587-590.

¹⁸⁴ Peter G. Boyle, “The British Government’s view of the Cuban Missile Crisis”, *Contemporary Record*, vol.10, n°3(autumn 1996), 34.

¹⁸⁵ Boyle, “ the British Government’s View...”, 34-35.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

5. The Nassau Agreement (December 1962):

The decision made by Eisenhower in March 1960 to deliver the 'Skybolt' to the British was not actually a matter of consent in Washington. The state department was against British nuclear autonomy and its officials were known by 'the Europeanists' who preferred to develop more close relations with France and Germany. Thus, for them, the privilege status of the United Kingdom was a rock on their way to realise their project. Others, especially in the Pentagon, were for the disarmament of nuclear powers from the British and the French too, and restraining the possession of nuclear arms for both the United States of America and Russia.

Robert McNamara, Kennedy's defence minister caused a huge anger among the British by his discourse on June 16, 1962, in Michigan, in which he suggested Multilateral Force which replaces the British and French nuclear programmes, which would lead to nuclear proliferation in the world. The Multilateral Force should be composed by military units of member countries in NATO, armed with nuclear arms which could not be used only with the American consent and decision. Macmillan and De Gaulle were strongly against this kind of project, each one wanted to keep nuclear autonomy of their countries respectfully.

Media and some members of the labour party never believed in the nuclear autonomy of their country for it was still dependent on the American missiles. Thus, Macmillan explained to them that Britain had the exclusivity in using them in case they judged the interests of the country are at stake. On December 11, 1962, and during McNamara visit to London, he directly announced that 'the Skybolt' programme has been compromised. That decision created a fury among the British Public Opinion and the government towards the United States of America.

To put that into its context, one has to know that the British government was undergoing serious and difficult times. Its economy was collapsing, and the number of jobless people was too high. Macmillan was losing his popularity, and the conservatives lost two decisive elections in a row. Moreover, and at an external level, troubles burst out in Yemen, Aden, Brunei, Rhodesia, and Congo which were under the British influence. In addition, the situation got worse in Berlin. When East Germany built the wall in August 1961, many people died from West Germany while trying to cross it. Besides, China attacked India at that time, and the straw that broke the camel's back was the British refusal to join the European community because of De Gaulle veto. The latter on December 15-16, he argued that Britain is closer and linked to the United States of America, and accepting it into the EEC would change the nature of the latter.

Acheson made things worse and caused a rise once again of Anti-Americanism among the British public opinion by his speech on December 5, when he cited out that:

Great Britain has lost an empire but and has not yet found a role. They attempt to play a separate role - that is apart from Europe, a role based on a 'special relationship' with the United States, a role based on being head of a 'Commonwealth' which has no political structure or unity or strength and enjoys a fragile and precarious relationship by means of the sterling area and preferences in the British market – this role is about played out.¹⁸⁷

That really describes the situation in which Britain was going through, as if lost after being a supreme power, broken from the inside, and without any role on the international scene. Indeed, it was considered as an insult from the British part. Kennedy, to fix the situation, authorised the following official American reply:

US-UK relations are not based only on a power calculus, but also on deep community of purpose and long practice of close cooperation. Examples are legion: nuclear affairs, Sino-Indian crisis, in which Sandys and Harriman missions would have been ineffective without each other, Berlin and also Cuba, where British Government backed US strongly on short notice and where President and Prime Minister were in daily intimate consultation to a degree not publicly

¹⁸⁷ R. Ovendale, "Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth century", 130.

known. 'Special relationship' may not be a perfect phrase, but sneers at Anglo-American reality would be equally foolish.¹⁸⁸

Needless to say that Macmillan at that time needed a victory in his negotiations with the Americans for him, and for his party. It is in this context, the Nassau Meeting took place in the Bahamas between Kennedy and Macmillan. Both leaders met on December 18, and started official negotiations on December 19. Macmillan initiated the talking reminiscing all the past events both countries went through in an attempt to make the Americans sympathise with him. That was a smart move to make by Macmillan which convinced Kennedy to carry on the 'skybolt' programme exclusively with the United Kingdom, and to share the funds needed for that. However, Macmillan wanted more for he was aiming for the 'Polaris'.

At that moment, 'George Ball', the US under secretary of state, an Europeanist, introduced the idea of the Multilateral Forces under NATO supervision, and the US control over the nuclear arms assigned to this force, in which Macmillan replied to that sarcastically. With a great reticence, Kennedy was finally convinced, and they agreed on December 21, 1962, to deliver the 'Polaris' missile through the Multilateral Force under the supervision of NATO to please, somehow, the Europeanists, i.e: not to create a friction within the same government. This agreement implied that the British have the right to use them without the allies' consent if they judge the situation needs that or their national interests is at stake. Macmillan was very satisfied. Besides, the deal was very good for the British in terms of money, it seemed like the Americans offered them a financial gift. On January 14, 1963, De Gaulle used the Nassau Agreement to justify his veto, once again, concerning the United Kingdom entry to the EEC.

¹⁸⁸ R. Ovendale, "Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth century", 131.

One can easily deduce that the strength of the special relationship rested, once again, on the relations of sympathy and confidence between an American president, Kennedy, and a British Prime Minister, Macmillan, wise to take advantage of it skilfully.

6. First Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963):

After the Cuban missile Crisis, on November 27, 1962, Khrushchev wrote to Macmillan a letter in which he proposed to ban all nuclear tests, including underground tests. Kennedy received the same letter during the Nassau Meeting. Khrushchev accepted two to three inspections per year for well defined sites.

On March 8, 1963, it came to be known for western leaders that the general negotiations for disarmament were then at stake. Both the United States of America and the United Kingdom were not sure about the real Russians' intentions. Thus, Macmillan suggested sending Robert Kennedy or Averell Harriman from the United States part for preliminary negotiations. Kennedy hesitated a bit, and suggested to send a common letter to the Russians. They worked together on a joined letter which was delivered to the Russian president Khrushchev on April 24. The latter responded that the real intentions to send the inspectors were for espionage reasons, not to assure the respect of the agreements. The only blocking point which remained was The United States insisting on sending regular inspections for all the sites, and the Russian refusal for that.

McMillan convinced the Americans that it was important to come to agreements to stop nuclear essays regardless underground essays which were less important and dangerous. Averell Harriman and Lord Hailsham were assigned for conducting the negotiations in Moscow on July, 15-25. On July 16, Kennedy surprised the British by his marginal proposal for sharing more than the secret for nuclear technologies with the French too. That latter, which was seen by the British as an act which would empty "the Special relationship" from an

important element of it. That offer which Macmillan approved Kennedy for while opposing his advisory.

The Russians demanded that a non-aggression pact should be signed too. On the other hand, westerns wanted to add a clause which bans nuclear armaments, to stop them from spreading, and to stop countries like China and others to develop their own nuclear bomb. Finally, on August 5, 1962, they signed the agreement in Moscow. It was about a Partial Test Ban Treaty. It was a great joined victory of both The United kingdom and the United States of America working together to come to good terms with the Russians concerning nuclear tests ban. Clearly, that was one of the best periods in the history of the 'Special relationship'. Unfortunately, that moment did not live longer after things got complicated between both countries in The Vietnam War (1954).

During the brief period of Alec Douglass Home as a British Prime Minister, the Anglo-American Special Relationship started to break-down. When Home announced on January 7, 1964 that London sold four hundreds auto bus for Cuba, that news drove the American president crazy. In fact, London reduced to a great extend its Commerce with Cuba, but the British dislike to be given instructions from the United States to do or not do commerce with any country. In fact, the American President Johnson saw Britain as helping their enemy. Things got really worse between the two countries after Douglas-Home announced on TV in 1963 that people like Castro were not brought down by economic boycott and sanctions.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁹ R. Ovendale, "Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth century", 136.

7. The Special Relationship Compromised by the Vietnam War (1955):

Another disastrous episode which was about to turn the special relationship to ashes was the Vietnam War (1955) in which the USA felt betrayed and failed by the UK.

7.1. A Difficult Beginning for the British Prime Minister H. Wilson:

The labour party in Great Britain won the election in June 1964 under the leadership of Harold Wilson who became the British prime minister. As a matter of fact, no effort was made during his period to maintain the status of the ‘special relationship’ neither from the British nor from the Americans. Nevertheless, Wilson tried to play the mediator in the Vietnam conflict where the United Kingdom was co-chairman with the Soviet Union of the Geneva Conference, was unwelcome to the president Johnson who said: «I [President Lyndon J.] Won’t tell you how to run Malaysia and you don't tell us how to run Vietnam”¹⁹⁰, in 1965. Indeed, it was too late to restore the confidence between the two old partners, and Wilson’s effort was in vain.

In December 1964, Wilson and his Cabinet travelled to Washington seeking to renegotiate the Nassau accords which seemed that it was putting their country in the mercy of the United States, and intolerably dependent on them. Meanwhile, The Americans’ intention was to give up on their generous offer¹⁹¹ given to McMillan before which they judged excessive. In fact, The American administration wanted to focus more on its project, the Multilateral Force of NATO (MLF), but The British as well as the French and the Germans were against the American ideas.

Indeed, Wilson lost another opportunity for his country to restore the ‘Special Relationship’ with the United States. He knew that a project was on study to bomb the North

¹⁹⁰ Britannica.com, accessed on 30/12/2020.

¹⁹¹ The funding of the Skybolt.

of Vietnam by the Americans to help their partners in the South who were caught in difficulties by the communist guerrilla. When the United States' President asked Wilson to send British troops to help there, the latter politely refused. From this first contact, Johnson disliked Wilson and he believed he lacks Macmillan's class and qualities, and this negative perception worsened through time.¹⁹²

As a matter of fact, the 'special relationship' always relied on the very good contact and confidence between the president and the Prime Minister. Thus, in this case, the 'Special relationship' would not stand its ground through such beginnings. Indeed, that bad personal relationship between the two leaders doesn't explain everything and was not the only factor that was about to put an end to the 'Special Relationship' at that period.

After the end of the World War II and until the 1950's, Great Britain was the most powerful country in Europe, the most influential and engaged country in Asia, Africa, Oceania, and also in the Americas. Its economy was the third in the world, way from France and Germany. Its army was dispatched all around the world. London was the first financial place in the world, similar to New York, and its port was the second in the world after New York port. Thus, the 'Special Relationship' was not only a sentimental relationship or a historical heritage. The British ally represents a strong support to the Americans. Moreover, through Britain, the United States of America could guarantee the support of the other Western European countries.

The Americans came to understand that it is their anti-colonialist sentiment which drove them hostile towards the British Empire and its links with the Commonwealth nations. These sentiments, indeed did not serve their interests. As a matter of fact, the British presence in different parts of the globe could help the Americans reduce their troops and expenses in a

¹⁹² Britannica.com, accessed on 30/12/2020.

context of a Cold War, in which every territory which is not protected, risks to be overtaken by communism. That created the idea of sharing responsibilities in the Pacific, Middle East, and even in Europe where more British troops were stationed in Germany than the American ones. However, British economy was in decline, and France and Germany became stronger in terms of economy and military power. In this context, one could explain the Europeanist tendency in the state department which suggested giving up on the 'special relationship' with the British, and treated it like 'just another ally' like France and Germany.¹⁹³

When the labour party came to government, the economic situation was actually disastrous which pushed the government to ask for a devaluation of the Sterling putting the blame on the conservative's bad management, but Wilson and his cabinet was against this view. The British government reached the American administration for a loan, and it surprised them that the Americans were against the devaluation of the Sterling. Thus, Wilson succeeded then to get a financial aid in 1965, but rumours were circling around about a secret accord between Wilson and Johnson. Clive Ponting wrote:

Britain's relations with the United States had an important influence on the policy of the labour government in its first three years. American documents, which remained secret, revealed that the 1965 Labour government concluded a series of agreements with the United States. The reality of these arrangements was never revealed, yet these oral agreements determined the internal policy and the British strategy of this period.¹⁹⁴

In exchange of the loan, Johnson wanted Wilson to do his best not to devalue the Sterling which risked destabilising the fragile balance of the International Monetary System. Moreover, the Americans also asked the British to maintain their bases in South Asia, and South Egypt too, to make them focus more on Vietnam. In February 1966, Richard Crossman reported in his journal a cabinet meeting in which its subject was related to defence, and foreign relations of the country also were discussed in this meeting. He said when talking

¹⁹³ Clive Ponting, "Breach of Promise: Labour in power 1964-1970", (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989), 47.

¹⁹⁴ Clive Ponting, "Breach of Promise: Labour in power 1964-1970", (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989), 48.

about the American financial aid, Wilson's speech implied that there was an engagement in return:

First of all, he only repeated over and over again that the Americans had never subordinated the financial aid they gave to their political support in Vietnam. Then, ten minutes later, he said to us: "However, let us never forget that their financial support is not unrelated to our way of behaving in the Far East: for example, the announcement of a withdrawal would not fail to have a devastating effect on my personal relationship with LBJ (Lyndon B. Johnson) and the way Americans will treat us."¹⁹⁵

It was indeed a very difficult time for the British prime minister H. Wilson when he refused to help his American ally with inland troops during the Vietnam War, and the fact that the British retreat its forces from different parts of the world which terribly worsened his relation with the US president and thus, making the special relationship going through one of its worst episodes after the Suez crisis (1956).

7.2. The US Intervention in Vietnam: The Bone of Contention:

After France's withdrawal from Indochina in 1955, this latter was divided into different states, the Neutralist Cambodia, Laos torn between rival groups, the Communist North of Vietnam, and the South of Vietnam shouldered by the Americans. In fact, the North and the South was supposed to be reunited in 1956, and free elections were supposed to take place. However, Ngo Dinh Diem, the South "dictator" was driven by fear that the communist president of the North, HO Chi Minh, may win the elections. This latter did not accept this reality, and seized the fact that Diem had a strong opposition because of his corrupted ruling, and organised a guerrilla movement backed by the communist of the South, the Vietcong. At the beginning of 1960, Diem felt threatened and reached for the Americans to help him.

¹⁹⁵ Richard Crossman, "The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol.1-Minister of Housing 1964-1966", (London: Hamish Hamilton & Jonathan Cape, 1975), 180.

Indeed, the latter responded and helped him financially and through military advisers in charge of training his army, anti-guerrilla and psychological war strategies.

Kennedy believed that the American prestige lied on the victory of the Southern army. However, this regime was not a democracy model, and faced a strong opposition from the religious as well as the Buddhists for his corruption and Americanisation (that latter had a negative connotation in this Asian culture and milieu). Indeed, the situation was at stake even after getting the American help and the country witnessed a long period of political instability and coups d'états, until the arrival of General 'Thieu' supported by the strong ally.

After the coming of Johnson to power in 1963, the situation in Vietnam was really disastrous. At first, the American president was not really interested in that and preferred to focus more on his vast social programme 'the Great Society'. In fact, it was the first time in the United States where an administration elaborated a great social programme which aims to fight poverty and focus on giving the African Americans the same rights as the whites and abolish all types of radical discrimination. Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1965, he abandoned his programme which could mark his presidency, and put the stress on The Vietnam War 1955, going against the advice of the state department, and persuaded by his military chiefs that a communist victory in the South of Vietnam would create a 'Dominos effect', i.e. all the other countries would fall apart in South- East Asia, Japan, and even Europe.

Moreover, in February 1965, President Johnson decided to proceed to air bombing of North Vietnam. Then, he sent many divisions to the South to support the local troops. Before the end of the year, there was 200.000 US soldiers in Vietnam. When the first US bombing started, Wilson phoned the president to show his worries and proposed a meeting to discuss the situation. Wilson would not dare to engage in that war bearing in mind that the American

intervention was a subject of a huge hostile public opinion. Also, his attitude towards the United States of America was very ambiguous. In reality, he supported the American policy in Vietnam, but at the same time criticised some actions he deemed excessive or inhumane, therefore he refused tenaciously to send British troops there.

Richard Crossman commented:

The Labour left was increasingly furious over Vietnam where the Americans were pursuing, it said, a colonial policy. Since early February, the United States had been bombing North Vietnam and on March 4, more than 50 Labour MPs had appealed to Wilson to state unequivocally that Great Britain could not support the American policy. It was a difficult way for the first minister who had made good relations with Washington, the keystone of his foreign policy. He also realized how much the country depended on the support of the United States to defend the pound sterling.¹⁹⁶

The Prime Minister found himself in a crossroad, the majority of his party and parliament were against the American policy in Vietnam and they wanted him to declare publicly and clearly that London does not support that, but he could not do that for he was depending on the Americans as far as foreign policy and economy are concerned, and that is what explained his ambiguous attitude.

Anthony Wedgewood Benn, a member of the labour left, who became a minister later(1960's and 1970's), commented on Harold Wilson's speech in which he was trying to justify his attitude, and his words were not convincing, he said;

To the National Executive this morning which was held at the House of Commons. Only two things of interest came up. One was the statement on Vietnam which did nothing more than to explain the Government's policy, including the reasons why we have supported the bombing of North Vietnam by the Americans, which I found and find hard to take. Harold explained the position and his general argument is of course that public declarations are less effective than private pressure. I didn't feel it was the time to say anything but I'm sure that a lot of people there, like myself, are extremely unhappy about the way in which things are going.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ Richard Crossman, "The Diaries...", vol. 1, 178.

¹⁹⁷ Anthony Wedgewood Benn, "Out of the Wilderness", (London: Hutchinson, 1987), 261-62.

Wilson was trying to convince the members that even it looked like they were supporting the Americans publicly, but their secret pressures were more efficient and in which they showed that they were against their policy in Vietnam, but that was not up to the members' aspirations at all.

7.3. First British initiative in Vietnam and Rhodesia crisis (1965):

Harold Wilson wanted to prove that the 'Special Relationship' was not damaged and still there, and at the same time he felt the need to justify the constant support of the British government to the Americans. Thus, he needed concrete results. So, he tried hard to play the mediator between the two camps in The Vietnam War¹⁹⁵⁵ during the Commonwealth Conference held in London, on June 17-20, 1965, Crossman said that :

His trump card, Crossman tells us, was to propose a peace initiative in Vietnam. The turn that the war was taking now horrified, not only the working left, but also the informed public [...]. Harold Wilson's plan was to send a peace mission to Vietnam made up of the heads of government of Great Britain, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, Ghana and Ceylon [...]. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers, surprised, nodded.¹⁹⁸

On June 27, Hanoi, Moscow and Beijing rejected this proposition i.e.: the visit of the Mission of Peace. However, the Prime minister tried again, and this time, would send a special envoy Harold Davies to Hanoi to probe the intentions of North Vietnam. The result was not as expected. Probably, Wilson wanted only to cool down the public opinion temper trying to play the role of the peace maker.

During this period, the British government faced a new issue on the table. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland broke right before its independence. North Rhodesia became Zambia with a coloured democratic government. Nyasaland became Malawi, also ruled by a coloured government. South Rhodesia which was a British colony was still waiting for an agreement between the white strong minority, and the black majority to decide on who

¹⁹⁸ Richard Crossman, "the Diaries...", vol. 1, 237-38

should rule the country. On November 11, 1965, the whites, supported by South Africa declared unilaterally the independence of the country, which they call it “Rhodesia” ruled by a white government, and that provoked consent of the whole continent against it.

On December 9, 1965, Richard Crossman noticed:

The major preoccupation of the British government at the moment is to get the Americans on our side because without their full support we have no way of imposing effective sanctions on the Smith regime, let alone to conquer it. At this morning's Cabinet meeting, the Foreign Minister indicated that the Americans had taken an entirely negative attitude to our first attempt (to gain their cooperation against Rhodesia). They dryly reminded us that we haven't helped much in Cuba and asked us when the first British battalion would arrive in Vietnam. It is obvious that Harold Wilson is hoping to report something substantial from his visit to Washington next week.¹⁹⁹

It was clear that the British realised that they could do nothing to fix Rhodesia problem without the help of the Americans. However, the latter were too harsh regarding this matter for they were still expecting that Britain could help in Vietnam with soldiers, and they did not forget their lack of support in the Cuban Crisis. Against that background, Wilson decided to visit the United States of America looking for their support.

During Wilson's visit to Washington in 1966, he asked Johnson to stop bombing North Vietnam to show a good faith to Ho Chi Minh. The bombing stopped for 40 days, without any result which made the Americans start bombing again. Then, Wilson decided to travel to Moscow on February 21-24, 1966 seeking for their influence on North Vietnam and help to push them negotiate with the Americans, but the Soviets refused to intervene. At that moment, the British economic situation was really at stake to the extent which pushed the government to reduce its overseas engagements which was considered as a burden. Aden would be evacuated, and the number of some bases in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific would be reduced. However, in general, the British present in the East of Suez would remain. Some

¹⁹⁹ Richard Crossman, “the Diaries....”, vol.1, 407

deputies were against this costly policy, and against the fact that this latter made them dependent on the Americans. In that respect, Anthony Benn noticed:

I think most people realise now that a continuation of permanent British bases East of Suez is bunk, or at any rate a declining policy. Harold is afraid of admitting this partly because he still believes in it and partly because he is afraid that to cut our world commitments would be a preamble to our admission into the Common Market which he does not favour.²⁰⁰

On June 29, 1966, Wilson declared British government disapproval of Bombing Hanoi and Haiphong. Moreover, on July 7, 113 deputies from the labour party signed a petition asking the government to completely disassociate from the American policy in Vietnam. The day after, Anthony Benn noticed that Brown, the second man in government, and who was advocating for the EEC entrance, declared that:

After the dissociation from the Vietnam bombing the time had come when we had to reassess our entire foreign policy and look again at the close relations with America. As it was, we were getting separated from the United States without really establishing any close relations with Europe.²⁰¹

The British government disapproved its ally policy in the Vietnam War, and they believed that Things could be arranged wisely and diplomatically without the use of power, and that was their main aim in their second initiative in 1967.

7.4. Last British Initiative in Vietnam and British Withdrawal from East Suez (1967):

In 1967, Wilson was almost close to accomplish a deal and an agreement between the two adversaries. The United States contacted secretly Hanoi proposing the stop of bombing; in return, they should stop the infiltration of the North Forces to the South. As a token of good will, the air strikes were stopped during the period of the festival of the new Vietnam year. At that time, the Russian Prime Minister, Alexis Kosygin, was in London, and Wilson kept him updated about the new situation in which he was positive. However and suddenly, the Americans turned back on their proposal without informing anyone. Wilson sent a message to

²⁰⁰ Benn, "Out of the Wilderness", 392.

²⁰¹ Ibid, 449.

Johnson urging him to make an effort just to guarantee the Russian support. The latter gathered the NSC, National Security Committee, to study the reply to the British quest. During this time Wilson was trying to gain time and prolonged the last night for the Russian delegation in London, but the Americans did not call, and his guests were gone. The Americans decided to stop the bombing if Hanoi was ready to engage in negotiations before the end of the festival, the day after. It was already too late for North Vietnam to respond in time. Wilson became so furious because of this.

In that regard, the American attitude was a mark of the falling apart state of the 'Special relationship'. The Atlantic partner had no confidence, and a lack of esteem for a country which was no longer powerful and was no longer the necessary intermediate between the United States and Europe. Germany and France were more favoured at that time and stronger, and that was the sentiment of the Johnson administration. The latter would probably have been accepted to reactivate the 'Special relationship' if only Britain accepted to send its troops to Vietnam, like Australia, and New Zealand did. Johnson, himself believed that the British refusal was a real betrayal, this same sentiment was shared among the American media which kept reminding the British that without their massive help in the war, Britain would not stand against Hitler, and the sacrifice of their soldiers to liberate Europe. The British attitude looked like a disgraceful ingratitude.

However, more important to notice that despite the conflictual situation over Vietnam, and the difficult personal relationship between the two leaders, the United States of America still appreciated the competence and efficiency of the British diplomats. Thanks to them, they succeeded to introduce the vote for the resolution 242 of NATO, after the six days war between Israel and the Arab countries in 1967. Indeed, they first refused the draft which was too favourable to Israel. It was the diplomats of the British delegation which elaborated that resolution which became the cornerstone in upcoming negotiations to solve this issue.

During this time, the British economic crisis, and the falling of the sterling, made the need for the Americans really crucial. At the end of 1964, the Johnson administration provided a loan of 3 billion dollars for the British, in which the American part was 1 billion dollars, and later in 1965, another 925 million dollars from federal Banks of different countries. Despite the American aid, the British government was faced by the fact of devaluating the Sterling by 14% on November 18, 1967 and the austerity measures which followed affected Social Security, the National Health Service (NAS), means an important participation by the people in terms of medicine and medical care. Against this background, Wilson announced to the Commons, on January 16, 1968, the end of the British presence in the east of Suez and the Middle East before march 1971. Only, the nuclear programme, the British troops stationed in Germany (British army of the Rhine, four divisions, and an Air Force, almost 20 000 men); and Hong Kong too, should remain.

The decision surprised the Americans, and Johnson used all methods, even economic menace, to make Wilson go back on that decision, but all was in vain. Sanders commented on this situation as follow:

In a world still fraught (in American eyes) with communist danger, the British withdrawal from east of Suez was a serious abdication of responsibility. If the British were no longer available to patrol the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf [...] then the Americans would be obliged to undertake the task themselves. By reducing the potential for Anglo-American collaboration in out-of (NATO) area operations, the British withdrawal from east of Suez had further weakened the 'Special Relationship' [...] In essence, therefore, the withdrawal from east of Suez weakened Britain's ties with the residue of Empire and with the United States.²⁰²

Then, and after being stuck in a costly war in Vietnam, the Americans were left alone to contain the communist progression without the huge role the United Kingdom was playing, and they had to think about an alternative. Since, they could not do it alone, they called Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific, to replace

²⁰² Sanders, "Losing an Empire...", 176.

their British ally. Now, for Britain to find a role in the international scene, they have to turn to Europe. Wilson introduced economic and commercial motives to join the EEC, but was faced once again by the French president De Gaulle veto against British entry, which was the straw that broke the camel's back, and was hard to swallow the fact that this could indicate the end of its international role.

8. The Special Relationship and Europe:

The special relationship got a bit complicated due to the British Foreign Policy switch to Europe rather than the USA, and that actually had a tremendous impact on the status of the special relationship especially when Heath became the British prime minister in 1970.

8.1. The Time of Indifference:

During this time, the British under the leadership of Prime Minister Heath turned their compass to Europe rather than the USA. That switched in the British foreign policy marked the time of disputes between the UK and the USA as we will detail in this title and the fourth chapter.

In January 1969, Richard Nixon got to power in the United States of America, and he started his presidency by writing a very warm-hearted letter to Harold Wilson citing:

For many decades one of the great sources of strength in the cause of freedom has been the close relationship between Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and Presidents of the United States. This is as it should be, for it but reflects the depth of feeling and kinship existing between our two nations.

I intend, in the years ahead, to see that this tradition is upheld and nourished.²⁰³

To that respect, one can say that if Wilson remained in power, a great personal relationship should probably be developed between the two leaders. However, the labour party lost the elections in 1970, and Edward Heath, the pro-European became Prime Minister, became prime minister. Henry Kissinger, president of the NSC, secretary of state of President Nixon, and President Ford (1968-1976), described the situation as follow:

²⁰³ Alan P. Dobson, "Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century", 138.

Personally, I [President Kissinger] liked and admired Heath immensely; in many ways I have had a longer friendship with him than with any other leading British political figure. Yet this did not keep him from being the most difficult British head of government we encountered. The intimate consultation through which British and American policies had been coordinated during the post war period was reduced to formal diplomatic exchanges. Heath disdained the occasional telephone calls I urged upon the British Ambassadors to establish the personal relationship that Nixon craved, lest he be accused by France, as his predecessor Harold Macmillan had been, of being an American “Trojan horse.”²⁰⁴

Heath’s conception of the future of Great Britain holds no place for the ‘special relationship’ with the United States of America. Now, it is the time of America to be treated like ‘any other ally’, and not a privilege one. Heath wanted to create a relationship of equals between the United States and the EEC. This vision implies that the United Kingdom should be treated like any other European country in the EEC. However, the secretary of state Kissinger had another vision he proposed to President Nixon as follow:

My own personal view on this issue is that we do not suffer in the world from such an excess of friends that we should discourage those who feel that they have a special friendship for us. I would think that the answer to the special relationship of Britain would be to raise other countries to the same status, rather than to discourage Britain into a less warm relationship with the United States.²⁰⁵

Heath’s vision was so different from his predecessors regarding the special relationship with the United States of America; he somehow deserted it for a good relationship with his new partner that is Europe. the coming title will detail what was known in history as ‘the year of Europe’.

8.2. Detente between the East and the West: ‘the Year of Europe’:

After the Cuban Crisis in 1962, the arm race heated up between the United States and Russia, and that was the time for Strategic Armament Limitation Treaty (SALT Agreement), and the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) to be signed in 1972 which freeze the long-

²⁰⁴ Henry Kissinger, “Years of Upheaval “, (London : Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1982), 141.

²⁰⁵ Henry Kissinger, “The White House Years”, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1979), 91.

range nuclear missiles of both countries, the USA and Russia. In that respect, President Nixon decided to travel to Moscow as a first American president to visit Russia since the World War II. In all of these treaties, the United Kingdom did not play any role. However, from the moment Russia took the first step towards detente in July-August 1972, Kissinger reached for Thomas Brimelow's help, expert in the Soviet affairs at the foreign office. His group of advisers were in charge to prepare answers to the Soviet propositions regarding the renunciation of nuclear weapons. Thanks to his tact, Brimelow and his group succeeded in turning everything to an agreement which dismissed the threat to use force in any diplomatic negotiations. Kissinger described Brimelow's role as an example of 'the Anglo-American special relationship' "at its peak, in a time when the Prime Minister was not partisan." He continued: "there is no other government in which we can deal with so frankly, exchange ideas freely, or would have allowed taking part effectively in the shaping of our policy."²⁰⁶

Ovendale noticed that even during the time of ups and downs of the 'special relationship', both in charge of defence of the two countries did not stop their close and tight collaborations. Between the years 1970 and 1975, the British defence minister had seventy five high officials in Washington, but he sent only ten to Paris, and seven to Bonn. Both British and American higher defence officials visited each other at regular basis, and the secret services of both countries worked in harmony between them and in a close collaboration.²⁰⁷

During that period, some US officials in London commented:

We need the support and sympathy of the British. If they are unable, in their relative weakness, to fend for themselves, we can hardly do so much... We consult each other more frequently and in more fields than with any other country. Many

²⁰⁶ Henry Kissinger, "Years of Upheaval", 281-282.

²⁰⁷ R. Ovendale, "Anglo-American Relations...", 134.

issues and in the most diverse circumstances, our policies are so made that they correspond to lines of conduct on which we have long agreed.²⁰⁸

On April 23, 1973, President Nixon announced in a very important speech in New York, the start of ‘the Year of Europe’. Actually, it was about reactivating the cooperation between both sides of the Atlantic according to the principles previously stated by the president in July 1969 in Guam. These principles constituted what had been called ‘the Nixon Doctrine’, based on demanding the countries the United States helped, a more important participation in their defence, mainly financially.

Before informing the Europeans, the US President let Heath know that he needed his consultancy in the matter. However, the latter refused and sent a message to Nixon on July 25, 1973 informing him that every discussion should be carried out with the nine members of the EEC at the same time. The secretary of state told Sir Burke Trend, cabinet director, and a man of influence, that “the Atlantic relations, particularly between the United States and Great Britain were prosperous due to mutual confidence, and through permanent canals of communication”, and he warned if the Europeanist tendencies of the United Kingdom continued, “we would be in a turning point of the Atlantic relations.”²⁰⁹

Moreover, the other European countries were not too happy of the paternalist tone of Washington as well as the fact that the United States link between their military engagement in Europe and economic concessions. The American initiative did not see the light due to the lack of enthusiasm of Europeans as well as the ‘Water Gate Scandal’²¹⁰ which weakened the

²⁰⁸ R.M. Hathaway, “Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War Two”, (Boston 1990), 86-87.

²⁰⁹ H. Kissinger, “Years of Upheaval”, 181.

²¹⁰ Water Gate Scandal: The Watergate scandal began early in the morning of June 17, 1972, when several burglars were arrested in the office of the Democratic National Committee, located in the Watergate complex of buildings in Washington, D.C. This was no ordinary robbery: The prowlers were connected to President Richard Nixon’s reelection campaign, and they had been caught wiretapping phones and stealing documents. Nixon took aggressive steps to cover up the crimes, but when *Washington Post* reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein revealed his role in the conspiracy, Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974. The Watergate scandal changed American politics forever, leading many Americans to question their leaders and think more critically about the presidency. <https://www.history.com/topics/1970s/watergate>.

president, not to forget the ‘Kippur War’ on October 6, 1973 between Israel and Egypt assisted by Syria. In this occasion, the Americans asked the Europeans to let them use NATO bases to facilitate providing aid to Israel. Only the Netherlands and Portugal accepted, and the other European countries refused for they were afraid of the Oil supply in which they were dependent on the Arabic countries, and they justify their refusal to the Americans by stating that this operation is out of the scope of NATO. Besides, for the British, it was out of the question to ask them for the use of their bases, namely, in Cyprus which is too close to the conflict zone.

Nevertheless, the events carried out in the Middle East almost helped damage ‘the Anglo-American special relationship’. At the end of October 1973, the military and economic power of Egypt was almost destroyed, and the Soviets seemed to prepare themselves to engage in the conflict. On October 24, the Americans decided to stop the Russians to act by placing all their military forces around the world on alert: status3, the highest level in peace time. The British were treated with ‘a special’ consideration regarding this emergency, since their ambassador in Washington, Lord Cromer, was informed two hours later about the new measures and procedures. Kissinger commented that: “We [the Americans] communicate the information as if it was to ourselves, even though; Heath government does its best to distance themselves from us.”²¹¹ The Americans thought, as it was the custom, that the British would inform their European partners, but, they did not. In fact, there was a huge discontent in Britain for they were informed and not consulted.

Douglas-Home, Foreign Minister, explained that the Americans should consult only in case of the effective use of the American bases on the British soil, and not in other cases. However, Heath was against, especially when it comes to put the risk on the US partners in which the United Kingdom would be naturally target number one for the Soviet nuclear

²¹¹ Kissinger, “Years of Upheaval”, 590.

missiles. Kissinger commented on the fact that the United States did not consult its allies that “it is not here the real explanation, but after all, the Europeans were disassociated from us [Americans] ...along the crisis.”²¹² At that time, Douglas-Home succeeded to get the Russian assurance not to be engaged in that war between Israel and Egypt, and meanwhile assured the Americans, and put an end to that crisis. Thanks to Douglas-Home again for calming his European partners in the EEC for not being consulted at first. In fact, Douglas-Home was the opposite of Heath, he strongly believed in the ‘special relationship’ and he was making all his effort for the favour of Kissinger, in an attempt to restore the Anglo-American relations.

8.3. Better Days Back:

On February 1974, the Labour Party engaged in restoring the ‘special relationship’ with the United States of America. Military and nuclear collaboration were back, as well as close consultations between the two governments. An American document preparing the visit of Wilson to Washington in 1975 cited out:

With the advent of the Wilson Administration relations between our two governments have been particularly warm and cordial. This is in large part to do with Wilson’s determination to ease the strain and tension which developed between us during the latter months of the term of his predecessor.²¹³

Wilson got back from the United States satisfied, even without achieving any concrete thing. It was a big step he did in the endeavour of restoring the broken strings with the United States.

James Callaghan, in March 1976 became Prime Minister. He explained that: “Heath’s total and irreversible commitment to Europe had weakened our relations with the USA. A firm supporter of the Atlantic alliance, I was determined to strengthen them.”²¹⁴ Moreover, Callaghan succeeded in establishing a good personal relation with the American President

²¹² Dimbleby and Reynolds, “An Ocean Apart”, 265.

²¹³ P. Dobson, “Anglo-American Relation...”, 143.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 288.

'Ford'; this initiated a real restoration of the 'special relationship' between both countries. In fact, there are many reasons to explain the American rapprochement again.

The British public opinion was disappointed regarding the EEC. After two or three years of membership, the British economic situation was still not good, and they were convinced that the prices got increased due to the joining of the EEC. The majority of the labour party was hostile to Europe, to the extent they hoped Britain would withdraw from the EEC. Its leaders looked more forward the United States of America.

Another reason is that Britain was more and more dependent on the United States of America for saving its money and economy. Its relation with the United States was, in fact, more advantageous in terms of economic aids. However, one could not say that the 'special relationship' was completely restored at that moment. Two incidents showed that more clearly.

The first one, in April 1975, Alan Greenspan, president of the council of economic advisers of the President, explained how terrible the British economic situation was dependent on another country, and less performing, and he told president 'Ford', this is exactly what the USA should not do. According to *the New York Times (1975)*, President Ford cited in a speech given to the annual congress of American Mayors: "horrible example of a government that spends itself sick was Britain's with its Labour Government and its welfare state."²¹⁵ The British ambassador protested against that, and the situation was considered as very serious to the extent that the president of the National Security Council was appointed to respond to that, and he claimed that the text of the speech was not available. In fact, he could not deny nor confirm the remarks which were attributed to the president.

²¹⁵ P. Dobson, "Anglo-American Relation, 144.

The second event was the American reaction to the new Sterling crisis in summer 1976. Callaghan hoped that the United States would help by a long term loan. In June, the United States guaranteed 5.3 billion dollars for the British by a group of Central Banks, and the International Settlements Bank. America participated by two billion dollars. However, on June 5, the Americans explained to Britain that the loan should be reimbursed in a period of six months. In fact, this short period was unusual. Nevertheless, William Simon, a US financial minister, and Arthur Burns, president of the American Central Bank, who were liberals, did not want to support a socialist policy government, and believed that Britain should be subject to the Market laws. The Americans acted the same when the United Kingdom was obliged to resort to the assistance of the IMF which imposed a brutal austerity policy.

8.4. Carter Administration (1977-81) and the Reinforcement of ‘the S.R.’:

The arrival of Jimmy Carter as a president of the United States of America (1977-1981) marked an end to the recriminations made by the Europeans not to be consulted, and mainly the United Kingdom among them. Callaghan established a very good personal and confident relation with the US president Carter, and better days of the ‘special relationship’ seemed to be back again. In 1977 president Carter visited London, and it was a successful visit where he showed a great sympathy to the British people. Indeed, two examples would demonstrate clearly the recovery of the ‘special relation’ between the two countries.

A treaty was concluded about commercial air navigation in 1946 in Bermuda between the United States and the United Kingdom. In 1976, Britain denounced this treaty for it was too favourable to the Americans. After a series of difficult negotiations, they replaced it by a new agreement ‘Bermuda 2’ which was, this time, exceptionally favourable to the British, and President Carter insisted and made sure that this treaty should not embarrass Callaghan.

The British initiated a costly programme to renew their nuclear weapons (Polaris), in 1974, and they started a series of experimental explosions in Nevada. However, Callaghan asked president Carter in the 'Jamaica Summit' in January 1979 if the United States is willing to provide Britain with up to date and modern submarines 'Trident' equipped with (C4) missiles. The president agreed on that and he informed Callaghan that they would find, even more, a better deal for Britain in terms of funds.²¹⁶

While the Americans were negotiating a new treaty with the Soviets about the long-range missile limitation (SALT II, 1979), too radical than the first ones of 1972; the Europeans were afraid to be left alone in the face of the Russian threat and military power. They started a series of difficult negotiations with Washington in the scope of NATO. The results, announced on December 12, 1979, revealed that the Americans accepted to install 108 'Pershing II' missiles in Germany, 464 Cruise missiles in Western Europe, in which 160 in Great Britain. Ironically, this gesture from the Americans provoked a strong opposition and an Americano-phobia sentiment like never before. However, it was never about an American imperialist initiative, but rather a concession for Europe which requested that.²¹⁷

²¹⁶ John Dumbrell, "A Special Relationship...", 102-103.

²¹⁷ John Dumbrell, "A Special Relationship...", 103.

9. Conclusion:

The special relationship during the Cold War period suffered many setbacks which were about to destroy the specialness of UK collaboration with USA and turn it into ashes. Tensions raised and opinions diverged between the two countries during the China and the Korean War (1950-1953), the Iran Crisis (1951), and the Indochina War (1954-1955).

Moreover, the Suez Crisis (1956) was, indeed, a hard episode in the history of the special relationship between Great Britain and the United States of America which marked the decline of the British Empire and a transition of power to the US hegemony, and proved that that relationship was not a relation between equals indeed. Furthermore, The Vietnam War (1954) was also a hard hit not to be forgotten the special relationship received. The frictions that followed when the UK refused to help its American counterpart with in land troops were about to end the special relationship for good.

After these series of events which were about to break the bone of the “Special Relationship between the United States of America and the United Kingdom, namely the Suez Crisis (1956) and The Vietnam War (1954), Britain seemed to manoeuvre again this relationship and paved the way for Margaret Thatcher to bridge the gap and fix what was about to tear both countries apart; during her premiership with Reagan the “special relationship” witnessed its golden age.

CHAPTER: 3:

The State of the S. R. at the End and Post Cold War Period (1990-2015)

1. Introduction:

During that period discussed in this chapter the ‘special relationship’ witnessed its golden ages, especially during Margaret Thatcher premiership and President Reagan, as well as Tony Blair and his American counterparts, despite some tensions and conflicts which arose from time to time. Throughout this chapter we will unfold the curtains on how the special relationship survived the end of the Cold War and being resurrected in the war against terror despite the predictions that it could come to an end after the end of the Cold War which it perfectly served.

2. Reagan - Thatcher Axe (1980-1990):

It was during Margaret Thatcher and president Regan ruling that the special relationship was resurrected due to their close personal relationship and marked its golden ages. Turning events in history will be examined during that period which helped shape and revive the triumphs of the special relationship.

2.1. The Special Relationship Revived:

Many factors contributed to the reactivation of the Special Relationship between (1980-1990). The first one was the decline of relations between the East and the West. The American president Jimmy Carter seizing the opportunity of detente between the two camps, wanted to deepen the relationship with the Soviets for the sake of more peace in the World. Thus, he started the negotiations with the Russians regarding “SALT II”, the heritage of President Gerard Ford. However, the Soviet aggression, namely their invasion of Afghanistan and the development of new category of efficient (SS20) missiles in the East of Europe, made him change his mind completely in 1979, in which he refused and rejected “SALT II” which was facing a strong opposition in the American Congress. When President Ronald Reagan replaced him in 1981, the Cold War was there again and nothing could change the situation.

However, the full support of the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to resist the Soviets contributed to preserve and nourish the close links between the two countries.

The second factor was related to monetary and economics. When Reagan and Thatcher came to power, they implemented a new economic vision based on the idea that the state should not interfere in the economic sector, to liberate the space for the forces of the market.²¹⁸ On one hand, The British Prime Minister advocated the disengagement of the state from the economic sector, and a monetary policy which is founded on the strict control the money supply to attend zero inflation and a budget balance. On the other hand, The American President Reagan adopted the same policy of state disengagement from both economic and social sectors, decrease taxes in a spectacular manner, regardless the gigantic deficit which permanently shook the world's economy.

Michael Smith commented that Margaret Thatcher:

Stood ready to present herself as Washington's best friend in the international arena, and eager to respond to kindred spirits in the white house. The unleashing of national energies and the liberation of market forces was seen as closely connected to (Perhaps unattainable without) similar priorities in the United States.²¹⁹

The next essential factor was the friendship and the complicity established between Margaret Thatcher and President Reagan. It was never like the paternalistic relationship of Macmillan towards Kennedy, but rather a very strong complicity, a mutual admiration, loyalty towards each other, and agreement over the essential matters which survived stormy passages and events. Between 1981 and 1988, during the two terms Reagan served as a president, fifteen summits were organised between the president and the Prime Minister, a fact which never happened in the history of both countries. On the international level, President Reagan was

²¹⁸ Different from what was applied in the Roosevelt « New Deal », where the state intervenes in the economic and social sectors.

²¹⁹ Michael Smith, "Britain and the United States: Beyond the Special Relationship?", quoted in Peter Byrd ed., *British Foreign Policy under Thatcher*, (Oxford: Philip Allen/St Martin's Press 1988), 11.

strongly convinced that the Evil Empire, i.e., Russia as he named it, should be faced by an accelerated arm race which allows the Americans to negotiate from a strong position. That means increased military funding which was only accessible by the Americans, yet, always needing the British support in their confrontation with the Russians.

Churchill described earlier the cornerstone of British foreign policy as based on “three circles”²²⁰, Heath already chose Europe. Whilst, Margaret Thatcher deliberately gave priority to the ‘Special Relationship’ with the United States of America. Meanwhile, it was out of the question for her country to leave the EEC. However, she wanted to limit as best as she could the financial participation, and preserve the sovereignty of the country with the European Community. Sir Anthony Parsons, Thatcher’s adviser for foreign affairs said that she:

Believes very strongly that the United States is absolutely vital to us, and that obviously one of the cardinal planks of our policy must be the best possible relations with the United States. By the same token, I think she believes that we can only hope to influence the United States in private and affect their judgments over various issues where we may disagree, if the basic relationship is extremely good.²²¹

It was obvious that Thatcher chose the ‘special relationship’ with America over Europe which, in her eyes, best serves her country. However, in many occasions, Britain aligned with Europe in many positions rather than with the Americans trying to avoid the risk of any breach with the Europeans.

Two examples illustrate this kind of reaction clearly. When President Carter took a firm decision against the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the British government genuinely supported that. However, when the President Carter wanted the European countries to implement economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia, the British seemed not enthusiastic towards this idea, that same feeling which was shared among the European partners.

²²⁰ The three circles are: Europe, Anglo-American Special Relationship, and the Commonwealth.

²²¹ Dimpleby and, “An Ocean Apart”, 310.

The second example is when the martial law was announced in Poland, on December 13, 1981, Great Britain joined the protest of the American administration. However, when the United States asked the British and its European partners to suspend their participation in the Trans-Siberian gas pipelines, which was supposed to provide them with an important source of energy; the British government changed its mind and did not agree. Ironically, when the Americans were asking sacrifices like this from the Europeans, they themselves continued to sell Cereals to the Russians, to protect their Middle West agriculture. When in summer 1982, the White house threatened Britain with economic sanctions if they would not follow the American vision; Thatcher was determined to take retaliatory measures which stopped Washington. In that respect, Michael Smith commented on Thatcher's attitude as follow:

The episode had demonstrated two vital features of Thatcherism policy. First, the British government after 1979 consistently opposed the use of economic measures by themselves as a means of punishing the Soviets or other transgressors (the Falklands Crisis was no exception to this). Second, when the fighting of the "new Cold War" or other conflicts threatened concrete British interests, the government was prepared, despite the Prime Minister's instinctive pro-Americanism, to fight tooth and nail to prevent them being damaged.²²²

Britain indeed supported the United States of America in its stance against Russia regarding the latter's invasion of Afghanistan and was ready to support it military. However, it was autonomous and stood against the US economic sanctions on Russia, the opinion that was shared with its European partners. Nevertheless, the UK continued and never stopped to shoulder the USA and work hand in hand when it comes to military development and operations.

²²² Michael Smith, "Britain and the United States: Beyond the 'Special Relationship'?", 16.

2.2. Military Relations:

Following President Carter's promise to provide Britain with "Trident" equipped with (C4) missiles, negotiations continued between the two countries and ended up successfully in July 1980. However, Regan decided later to develop (D5) missiles, more powerful ones. Thus, both countries worked together on a new agreement very favourable to the British in March 1982. More important to mention, like all the previous agreements (Trident I, Polaris), these arms were at the disposal of NATO, but Britain had the right to use them in any kind of emergencies. Indeed, what the Americans did for the British would never be done to any other country in the world, and they finally seemed not hostile against their ally nuclear independence any more. After "Trident II" deal, President Reagan confirmed that to Thatcher in a letter in 1982 stating:

The United States readiness to provide these systems is a demonstration of the great importance which the United States government attach to the maintenance by the united kingdom of an independent nuclear deterrent capability. I can assure you of the United States' willingness to cooperate closely with the United Kingdom Government in maintaining and modernising that capability²²³.

Between 1981 and 1983, the British position in terms of the atomic arms took two forms. On one hand, Britain gave a firm support to the deployment of (Cruise) missiles and to NATO strategy in general. On the other hand, the British put constant pressure on the Americans to restart the negotiations with the Soviets regarding the limitations of nuclear armaments. When the Westerns asked for the installation of intermediate range missiles to face the threat of the Russian (SS20), this accompanied a new series of negotiations with the Russians concerning armaments' limitations. Indeed, that was actually a dual track policy. However, the Reagan administration rejected that many times thinking that the Soviet endeavours in that sense was a Russian trick to make them lower their guards.

²²³ J. Baylis, "Anglo-American Defence Relations", 203.

Finally, the negotiations restarted in 1983. However, this time, the Russians wanted to include the British, and the French nuclear arsenals in the negotiations. Following that respect, Margaret Thatcher travelled to Washington in September 1983 to convince President Reagan that he should dissociate the nuclear forces of the two European allies from any treaty with the Russians, and she did succeed in that in which the French were very grateful to her, and to that ‘special relationship’ her country enjoys with the United States of America. However, more difficult were about to come, indeed, the withdrawal of ‘Cruise’ and ‘Pershing II’ missiles which implied the treaty with the Russians risks to dissociate the American defence from the one of Europe. Time was ripe for Margaret Thatcher to act as the spokesmen for the European countries to deliver their fear to the Americans, and she actually succeeded to get a firm engagement from Washington to defend Europe.²²⁴

On March 23, 1983 President Reagan presented his project “the Strategic Defence Initiative” (SDI), a space shield against missiles which he named it ‘Star Wars’, which was about destroying the Soviet nuclear missiles in space before getting to their targets. The American propaganda introduced the programme as a total disarmament since it would make the missiles useless. Few scientists and many experts from the Pentagon were convinced about that. In fact, the least one could say about this project is that it could protect only the American nuclear arsenal. Against that background, the Europeans were reserved towards this project which would make them lose their position as a first line for the American defence, and they would be open and easy target for the Russians. Moreover, this fact made the British afraid that President Reagan attitude would abolish all the efforts made before in the Russian negotiations regarding the limitations of atomic arms.²²⁵

²²⁴ John Dumbrell, “A Special Relationship...”, 110.

²²⁵ Ibid, 110-111.

During Thatcher visit to Camp David on December 22, 1984, she obtained a common declaration about the SDI, in which she introduced an important part of it in her Memoirs citing out:

We agreed on four points: (1) the US, and Western, aim was not to achieve superiority, but to maintain a balance, taking account of Soviet developments; (2) SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligation²²⁶, have to be a matter for negotiation; (3) the overall aim is to enhance, not to undercut deterrence; (4) East-West negotiation should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides. This will be the purpose of the resumed US-Soviet negotiations on arms control, which I warmly welcome.²²⁷

The SDI project, indeed, was sacrificed in the negotiations for the limitations of arms. The state department believed that President Reagan was too committed to the degree he allowed Thatcher to act, and influence. The next year (1985), Britain and Germany joined the American programme in an attempt to be part in the process of developing higher technologies. However, after a promising beginning, Regan's project was abolished due to Congress reticence to provide him with the necessary funds. In fact, that event marked Thatcher as someone of influence in the American administration.

In December 1984, the new Soviet leader 'Mikhail Gorbachev' visited London accompanied with an important delegation. Such a visit, the first since 1967, was an honour contributed to the Prime Minister Thatcher. This latter was considered in Moscow as head of government capable of influencing an American President, the task which was very difficult for them to accomplish. Indeed, Thatcher was really impressed by Gorbachev, and declared to the press that: "I like Mister Gorbachev, we can do business together". Hugo Young commented on that relationship between Thatcher and Gorbachev in this way:

In one important area of operation, the Gorbachev visit was the beginning of something quite big, which endured until the end of the Reagan presidency. It inaugurated a relationship which, while obviously never close as the Reagan connection, enabled the prime minister to act as an interlocutor between the super-

²²⁶ Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

²²⁷ Margaret Thatcher, "10 Downing Street-Memoirs", (Paris: Albin Michel 1993), 395.

powers. Reagan, an obtuse and waffling character, provided little stimulus to Gorbachev. Gorbachev, from the outer darkness of Soviet Russia, aroused no empathy in Reagan. Mrs Thatcher politically on Reagan's wavelength and intellectually on Gorbachev's, had some of the qualities required to interpret the one to the other-which, for a second-division European power, was not a role entirely to be despised.²²⁸

In October 1986, in Reykjavik Summit, President Reagan was about to make a huge mistake, and destroy the most important element in the defence of Europe, that is, the American atomic shield. As a matter of fact, President Reagan felt excited to hear that Gorbachev was for the destruction of all nuclear armaments (long, short, and intermediate). President Reagan was ready to conclude a treaty in that sense, neglecting the fact that Russia would remain a huge threat to Europe and the world through its powerful conventional arms and troops. However, Gorbachev wanted Reagan to give up on his project 'Star Wars' and the latter did not accept that. The Europeans were anxious about the fact that the Americans might forget about them while negotiating with the Russians, and for them, there was always a fear that both leaders may agree on option zero in the future i.e. a total nuclear disarmament, which would keep Europe without any defence against a conventional powerful Russia.

In mid-November, Thatcher declared in London concerning that matter that: "the fact is that nuclear weapons have prevented not only nuclear war but conventional war in Europe for forty years. That is why we depend and will continue to depend on nuclear weapons for our defence".²²⁹ Right after, she travelled to Washington to ask for the firm American engagement in protecting and defending Europe. Reagan without any hesitation gave her what she wanted and travelled for. Michael Smith remarked that when the British interest is neglected or damaged by the Americans, the government reacts to that using two tactics which sometimes are employed together. The first one is to defend its position and put pressure on the American administration. The second is a European reaction, which consists

²²⁸ Hugo Young, "One of Us: a biography of Margaret Thatcher", (London: Pan Books & Macmillan 1990), 394.

²²⁹ H. Young, "One of Us", 480.

on confirming the British solidarity with its European partners, even being their spokesperson with the Americans.²³⁰

More surprising was the fact that even the president collaborators, particularly from Pentagon and the department state, were happy for the visit of Margaret Thatcher and the concluding results achieved through her. As a matter of fact, The Reykjavik Summit threw panic on the American administration. Richard Perle, deputy secretary of state for defence, conveyed the relief of members of the Reagan administration when they heard that M. Thatcher was announced in Washington in 1986:

Some of us, learning that M. Thatcher was coming, were rather pleased at the prospect that some of the more intemperate and visionary views of the President might be modified, as indeed they were. So many of us regarded her as a voice of calm reason, and a much needed one, in particular on this issue of a world without nuclear weapons, which is dangerous nonsense. The president gives expressions to it too frequently, but never in close proximity to a visit from Mrs Thatcher. So, we get a brief respite from that rubbish when she comes.²³¹

Thatcher was indeed a voice needed to cool president's Reagan temper down and to wisely guide him in his propositions which seemed to be sometimes unrealistic ones in a dynamic world and ever evolving during the Cold War. Her propositions were warmly welcomed by all the members of the American administration for they really trust her insights and influence on President Reagan.

2.3. The Falklands War (1982):

On April 2, 1982, the Argentinian General Galtieri sent 5000 men to occupy the Falkland Islands, seizing the opportunity of British army withdrawal from that area due to economic cuts in the defence budget, which was there to protect the British people inhabiting the island²³². The British reaction was so firm and decided to send its army on April 5 to intervene there for this aggression. The United States of America decided to stay neutral in

²³⁰ Michael Smith, "Britain and the United States...", 19.

²³¹ Dimpleby and Reynolds, "An Ocean Apart", 328.

²³² There were almost 1800 originally British people living there, called: the Kelpers. Britannica.com.

this conflict, three days after the invasion, President Reagan declared to the press: “we are friends with both countries in the conflict”, he continued that “we can be an intermediate between the two countries, and do our best to find a peaceful solution to what it seems to us a futile dispute”.²³³

This American attitude, made the British furious. However, one could deduce that their attitude is justified since Argentine was their ally in the Organisation of the American States (OAS), and a country with a strategic position to hold back communism expansion in Latin America. Alexander Haig, the US secretary of state, was in charge for the mediation between the two countries. On April 24, Haig sent a text to London proposing British forces withdrawal from the area, in return of the Argentinian withdrawal from the Islands. Clearly, Tensions were high between the British and the Americans. British had no trust in the Argentinian military promises, and felt betrayal by their US friends. Whereas, the United States of America was stuck in the middle, and accused for leaning towards the British, by South America. Margaret Thatcher messaged Haig saying:

This whole story began with an Argentinian aggression. Since then, our common goal has been to ensure the withdrawal of the Argentines in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council. We therefore believe that the next step should be for you to share your latest ideas with them. I hope that you will be able to get the Argentinian opinion tomorrow and that you can quickly tell us if they accept. Their reaction will be very important in the assessment of your proposals by the British Cabinet.²³⁴

This move put the ball in the Argentina camp now, and forced the Americans to lean with the British if Argentina refused Haig proposals delivered by the British showing them that it is impossible to come to a compromise with Argentina. The British move was wise for on April 29, Argentina refused Haig Plan, and the United States openly declared that it stands by the British side:

²³³ Dimbleby and Reynolds, “An Ocean Apart”, 328.

²³⁴ Margaret Thatcher, “10 Downing Street-Memoirs”, 194.

President Reagan told television correspondents that the Argentinians had resorted to armed aggression and that such aggression must not be allowed to succeed. More important, the President also directed that the United States would respond positively to requests for military materiel.²³⁵

As a matter of fact, the United States of America provided Britain with considerable military help way before that. The American Defence Minister, Caspar Weinberger, simplified the procedure of providing military materials, for the British, reducing the period of delivery from 15 days to 24 hours. The aid composed from munitions, materials, an important quantity of Kerosene for the aviation, and 200 “Sidewinders”, the most developed air missiles in the moment. More important to mention is the decisive American Secret Services help which used some of their satellites which were for Russian surveillance, just to provide the British with crucial information regarding the positions and movements of the Argentinian troops. Also, One cannot neglect the persuasive work by the British diplomats who they had to penetrate the American administration, comprehend its internal working process, and exercise pressure on the strategic points in the decision making process of the American foreign policy.²³⁶ Steiner described that as follow:

During the Falklands Crisis, the British Ambassador to Washington regularly saw the President of the National Security Council, visited the Capitol on a daily basis, tried to influence the members of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee one by one, and went 77 times on television. It was a great lesson in diplomatic skills.²³⁷

Few days before the British victory, Reagan was honourably received in the House of Commons where he delivered a speech praising the British soldiers who were lost in the war, and describing them as fighters of liberty, and this is a part of his words: “Voices have been raised protesting their sacrifice for lumps of rock and earth so far away. But those young men are not fighting for mere real estate. They fight for a cause, for the belief that armed

²³⁵ Ibid. , 197.

²³⁶ Michael Smith, “Britain and USA”, 22.

²³⁷ Z.Steiner, “Decision making in America and British foreign policy: an open and a shut case”, Review of International Studies, vol. 13 n°1,15.

aggression must not be allowed to succeed.”²³⁸ Later on, he praised Margaret Thatcher in these terms: “I think she was faced with a terrible situation and I believe that she knew how to face it properly. I also think that her success was due to her ability to make decisions and act with firmness.”²³⁹ In fact, a clear description was given by Geoffrey Smith of Reagan’s attitudes during the Falkland conflict and his everlasting support to Thatcher regardless the complexity of the situation, as follows:

Despite recurring evidence that he never really quite understood why the islands mattered so much to Britain, despite many indications that he did not appreciate the details of the dispute, Reagan never let Thatcher down over the Falklands [...]. Reagan knew how much the issue meant to Thatcher. He realised that her position was hanging in the balance and he delivered.²⁴⁰

In addition, Ovendale reported their phone conversations which showed clearly Thatcher determination and her rejection for Reagan’s proposal not to humiliate the Argentinians, mentioning the words of admiration from Reagan when he said: “Here is a woman with a character”. Moreover, Dimbleby also mentioned the important testimony of Dr. Lehman, US Secretary of the navy at the time, regarding the Falkland War, and his explanation of what practically the ‘Special Relationship’ looks like, he said:

One has to understand the relationship of the United States Navy and the Royal Navy- there is no other relationship, I think, like it in the world between two military services. Channels had existed since World War Two for regular naval exercises, exchanges of personnel, sharing of equipment, weapons and intelligence.²⁴¹

He carried on showing that these relations were really beyond the institutional scope:

I had been to England twenty times before setting foot west of the Mississippi [...]. The special relationship is very close and intimate. There is no such thing as a relationship between two countries in the world that allows you to pick up the phone anytime to call, miles away, someone who has stayed in your own home and received you into their family, a close friend whom you call by his first name and you know the first names of his children [...].²⁴²

²³⁸ H. Young, “One of us”, 289.

²³⁹ H. Young and A. Sloman, “The Thatcher Phenomenon”, (London: BBC Publications, 1986), 116

²⁴⁰ R. Ovendale, “Anglo-American Relations..”, 150.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

Obviously, Dr. Lehman was persuaded that the ‘special relationship’ was crucial and he believed that it was decisive for Britain. Without American help, he said ‘I think that Britain would have had to have withdrawn from the Falklands.’²⁴³

Thanks to the “special relationship” which joined the UK and The US together at the Intel level which helped the British to be ahead and put a decisive end to this crisis over the Falklands with the Argentineans. Once again, the special personal relationship between the two leaders of the countries, The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and the US President Ronald Reagan, marked a successful episode of collaboration and showed the strength of the “special relationship” between their countries respectively.

3. US Intervention in Grenade (1983):

In October 1983, the United States intervened in Grenade, a Commonwealth member, and without consulting their British ally. As a matter of fact, this little Island was ruled by the Marxist government of Maurice Bishop. Indeed, it constituted in addition to Cuba and Nicaragua, one of the pillars of the Soviet menace in Latin America. In fact, the Americans and the British accepted this Marxist government for being moderate and less influenced. However, on October 19, extremist officers executed Bishop, took control, and established a hard communist regime. Against that background the United States decided to react without consulting the British, and afraid that this communist virus contaminated Barbados and Dominica.²⁴⁴

Margaret Thatcher mentioned in her memoirs that Washington sent her a report on October 22, 1983, after the National Security Council meeting, citing that they sent 1900 marines close to the Island and ready to intervene when time is ripe. However, on October 24, President Reagan called Thatcher to inform her that he decided to carry on a military action

²⁴³ Dimpleby and Reynolds, “An Ocean Apart”, 314-315.

²⁴⁴ John Dumbrell, “A Special Relationship...”, 117-120.

there. Thatcher refused firmly and argued her rejection in a letter to the president. The day after, Reagan called her to tell her that he was not convinced, and he would conduct a military action in Grenade.²⁴⁵

In fact, on October 25, the marines got in the Island without any notable resistance.

Margaret Thatcher wrote to that regard:

I was appalled and felt betrayed. At best, the British government had been made to be powerless; at worst, we looked deceitful. The day before, Geoffrey Howe had just declared in the House of Commons that he was not aware of any American intention to intervene in Grenada. He and I now had to explain how it could have happened that a member of the Commonwealth was invaded by our closest ally, and what is more, we were also going to have to defend the reputation of the United States in the face of the almost unanimous disapproval of the international opinion.²⁴⁶

The American administration seemed to neglect the important status of Grenade in the eyes of the British, and somehow scratched its honour.

Reagan was convinced that the strong anti- communism spirit in Thatcher would guide her to support an action destined to take rid of a Marxist regime. However, Margaret Thatcher, was convinced that this operation had a hidden motivation for the Americans who seemed at first, on October 22, very prudent and careful, and suddenly 3 days after, they engaged in a military action, she wrote: “What exactly happened in Washington remains a mystery, but I find it hard to believe that the Beirut bombing scandal is foreign to it. I'm sure it wasn't a matter of calculation, but rather a rush of rage following frustration.”²⁴⁷ Tip O' Neill, a President of the British delegation sent to the white house to meet Reagan regarding Grenade action, had the same reflection as Thatcher, explaining that it was a diversion manoeuvre intended to distract public opinion from Beirut massacre.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Margaret Thatcher, “10 Downing Street-Mémoires”, 291.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 290.

²⁴⁸ H. young, “One of us”, 348.

As matter of fact, after the Israeli invasion, a multinational peace force was sent to Lebanon in September. It was mainly composed of American soldiers, who were the majority, French troops, and hundreds of British men. On October 23, a kamikaze action was carried out using a car full of explosions in the American general quarter in Beirut, and killed 242 US soldiers. So, according to them Grenade action was carried out against this background just as a camouflage to drag the American public opinion away from what really happened in Beirut for the truth would create huge troubles for the US administration.

4. The American Preference: UK Choosing USA Rather than Europe:

The ‘Westland Case’ which took people by a storm in Britain, illustrates Thatcher’s priority given to the ‘special relationship’ with the United States of America. In 1985, the only British helicopter constructor ‘Westland’ was on the edge of bankruptcy, and the matter got the interest of the American company ‘Sikorski’. However, the British defence minister, Michael Heseltine, did not favour the American technology domination, and he wanted to keep a balance between the Europeans partners and the Americans. Thus, he suggested that an offer should be made by an association of Britain, France, and Italy. But, the ‘Westland’ administrative council favoured ‘Sikorski’ and in fact Thatcher was behind that choice, and supported it. She believed that the American company provides serious guarantees which are not the case for the European consortium. Indeed, a battle of influence was triggered between the Prime Minister and Heseltine. The latter used the media, and Thatcher used all possible means to achieve her goal. She won at the end and Heseltine resigned. In fact, that incident was a revealing factor of the pro-American attitude of the Prime Minister, and at the same time her mistrust towards European projects of cooperation.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁹ John Dumbrell, “A Special Relationship..”, 115.

Another incident which shows that the 'special relationship' works in the two directions was the 'British Air Ways' case. In 1982, the British government wanted to privatize 'British Air Ways' which was almost bankrupted, but there was an obstacle for that, Freddie Laker who attacked 'British Air Ways', and other companies in the American courts. He alleged that it was an illegal agreement between the companies to get rid of their competitor with his company's cheap flights proposals. 'British Air Ways' was really facing bankruptcy in case of condemnation for the damages and interests in this kind of affairs are too high. Margaret Thatcher waited for the re-election victory of Reagan in November 1984 to make her move, and counterattack. Finally, the US justice minister withdrew the file and a compromise was found between Laker and the companies he was attacking. This incident really shows the influence of Margaret Thatcher, a British Prime Minister, on Reagan and his administration. In fact, these close and warm personal relations between the leaders of the two countries have always been the essential pillar of the 'special relationship'.²⁵⁰

Moreover, a critical scandal hit the American administration which was revealed to public on September 25, called 'Irangate', and was about to break President Reagan down. Going against the strict measures of embargo against Iran and the American law which bans to provide arms to countries labelled as enemies by the America, the US administration negotiated secretly to sell arms to Iran to liberate, in return, American hostages in Beirut who were detained by Palestinian organisations. The benefits of this deal were directed to finance the anti-communist guerrilla in Nicaragua. Indeed, it was a way to escape from Congress which refused to provide the administration with the funds they asked for. The press accused the President himself to be in charge of this operation. Margaret Thatcher during her visit to Washington on July 16, 1987, described the situation, and made her endless support for Reagan public in every occasion in the following words:

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

My old friend and his government were reeling from the 'Irangate' revelations. I found the president wounded and obsessed with what was happening ... Nothing touches a man of integrity more than seeing his basic honesty questioned. This said to me in great anger. I decided to do all I could to help President Reagan weather the storm ... so I resolved to use my interviews and public statements in Washington to get this message across. I say for example to the host of the show face the nation on CBS: "cheer up. Cheer up. Be more upbeat. America is a great strong country with a great president, a great people, and a great future". Our embassy was assaulted by phone calls and congratulatory messages ... I got a phone call from the president who wanted to thank me for what I had said. He was in a meeting with his cabinet and at one point; he put the receiver down and asked me to listen. I heard a long, powerful applause.²⁵¹

Hugo Young reported more clear words she said during another interview defending Regan: "I believe implicitly in the President's total integrity on that subject".²⁵²

In addition, Margaret Thatcher engaged her country, some time before, with the United States of America regardless public opinion which strongly opposed that. During the 1980's, some Arab organisations' attacks were intensified and it was always due to the Palestinian issue in which they were targeting Western people and their interests. The American, British, and French secret services knew that the country which was funding these attacks was Libya under the leadership of Colonel Gaddafi. In 1986, the US president implemented economic sanctions on Libya and sent the US marines close to the Libyan coasts. After the West Berlin attacks, many American soldiers and their families were killed and that fact put public opinion pressure on the American administration. Thus, Washington prepared a series of raids against some targets in Libya, and asked for the help of its European allies. In that respect, Thatcher refused the idea of air strikes proposed by the Americans, which was against international laws, and would not put an end to the problem, she wrote in her memoirs in that regard:

On April 8, just before 11 p.m., I received a message from Ronald Reagan. He was asking for our permission to use F-111 fighter bombers based in Britain to strike Libya. We had to respond by noon the next day. At 1 a.m., in the morning, I

²⁵¹ M. Thatcher, "10 Downing Street-Memoirs", 636.

²⁵² H. Young, "One of Us", 481.

addressed a provisional answer to Ronald Reagan in order to get him to think more. I was making it clear that my first reaction was to support the United States, but ... I wanted more clarification on the targets. I was worried that the American action would trigger a cycle of retaliation. I also wanted to that the action is fully justified in the eyes of public opinion, otherwise we risked reinforcing Gaddafi's position ... In the aftermath, I think that the Americans probably considered this initial response too negative. But it led them to formulate their action more precisely and think about the means to justify it - a service one normally expects from a friend.²⁵³

She described the response of Reagan which she received as strong and detailed, and that she was reassured and convinced by the president arguments. On April 10, she wrote back: “our unconditional support for action directed against Libyan targets directly involved in the development and support of terrorist activities. I pledged to authorize the use of American bases in Great Britain as long as this criterion was respected.”²⁵⁴

In fact, France did not allow the US flights to pass by its territory, whereas, Spain allowed that through Gibraltar, and the raid took place on April 14. Margaret Thatcher was violently attacked in the parliament, and the press which accused her to put her country at the disposal of the American warmongers. Dimpleby and Reynolds described this episode as: “the most dramatic example of Mrs Thatcher’s identification with America rather than Europe.”²⁵⁵

5. The ‘Special Relationship’ Less Special: M. Thatcher- George H. W. Bush (1989-90):

Two factors would change the nature of the Anglo-American relations. The first one was the election of George Bush as the US president, and the second which is the most important, was the end of the Cold War, thus the Soviet menace disappeared. With the new president, it was clear that the exceptional personal relations both Margaret Thatcher and Reagan enjoyed would not continue. In that respect, she wrote in her memoirs:

²⁵³ M. Thatcher, “10 Downing Street...”, 370-371.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Dimpleby and Reynolds, “An Ocean Apart”, 323.

George Bush, now president, felt the need to distance himself from his predecessor: turning my back quite openly on the particular position I had occupied, enjoying the confidence of the Reagan administration and exchanging our opinions, was a means like another to do it. It was understandable. And, by the time I reached the last year of my term, we had succeeded in establishing better relationships. By then, I had learned that I had to defer to him in conversation and not to stint the praise. If that was what was necessary to secure Britain interests and influence I had no hesitation in eating a little humble pie.²⁵⁶

The end of the Cold War made the Anglo-American military alliance, somehow, useless, since their Soviet enemy was defeated. The new administration, namely, the secretary of state, James Baker, and his entourage, believed that Margaret Thatcher influenced to a great extent the American foreign policy, and time is ripe to redefine the latter. From now on, the United States of America will deal with the European community as a whole and if a country deserves a privileged relationship that would be Germany which enjoyed a powerful economy superior to the one of Britain. Needless to say, this attitude of switching from one ally to another one created tensions between the three of them. That started to be evident in the discussions about the modernisation of the Nuclear missiles (SNF: Short range Nuclear Forces) of NATO, especially the US missiles (Lance) stationed in Germany. Russia affirmed that this is considered as an evil act against it, and would jeopardise the detente between the East and the West.

The German government was divided into two different opinions. The first one was of the chancellor Kohl who was for the modernisation and the firmness in negotiations about nuclear disarmaments, especially short range missiles. The other opposing one was of the foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, who was for the idea of short term suppression of the arms. In many occasions, during 1989 and 1990, Margaret Thatcher tried to support the chancellor Kohl vision insisting on the vital feature of (Lance) missiles in the protection of Europe, and confirming the fact that every negotiation with the Russian concerning their reduction should be rejected. Her discussions with Bush, and James Baker, gave her the

²⁵⁶ M. Thatcher, "10 Downing Street...", 648.

impression that the United States of America would come to the same deduction, and would be firm with the Russians. On May 19, 1989, few months before NATO Summit, Thatcher wrote:

I suddenly learned that the American course had changed. They were now unwilling to accept the principle of negotiating the SNFs. James Baker publicly stated that we had been consulted on this turnaround, but we had by no means been. Without in any way endorsing their text, which I considered perverse, I addressed two essential remarks to the Americans. It was to be amended so that the opening of negotiations on SNFs would be suspended on the decision to deploy the successor to the Lance. And it had to include the demand for substantial reductions in Soviet SNFs in order to bring their numbers closer to those of NATO. Jim Baker replied that he doubted the Germans would accept this.²⁵⁷

As a matter of fact, NATO Summit in December 1989 was not too bad; The Americans introduced a new factor which got the consent of all: The condition that the Soviets accept and apply a reduction in their convention forces as a prerequisite to Western SNF. Despite this relative success, Margaret Thatcher made that disillusioned comment:

I [Thatcher] had seen for myself that the new American approach was to subordinate clear statements of intention about the alliance's defence to the political sensibilities of the Germans. I did not think that this bode well. President Bush's remarks in his speech in Mainz on 31 May 1989 about the Germans as 'partners in leadership' confirmed the way Americans thinking about Europe was going.²⁵⁸

In fact, the reunification of Germany made things complicated between the two partners and risked having further implications and consequences more harmful to the Anglo-American Relations. Margaret Thatcher opposed the reunification for two reasons at least: The Soviet reaction which risks restarting the Cold War, and more importantly, the fear of a German hegemony over Eastern Europe recently liberated from the USSR and over Europe due to its powerful economy, and the number of its inhabitants which approach 80 millions.

²⁵⁷ Ibid, 654.

²⁵⁸ Ibid, 655.

During the discussions with George H. W. Bush in Camp David on November 24, 1989, Thatcher perceived a discomfort when she exposed her ideas about the question. President Bush seemed preoccupied with the German reaction if his administration opposed clearly the reunification. The department of state was at the forefront of the issue, and wanted a reunified Germany playing a leading role within NATO and an integrated Europe. Thus, it did not support the British attitude. Later, chancellor Kohl had spoken clearly in favour of a greater Germany, and James Baker finally announced the American attitude which was in favour of the reunification with the condition that it should be done in the framework of NATO, and within 'amore integrated European community'.²⁵⁹

Margaret Thatcher did not like at all the notion 'a more integrated' for her interpretation to that was of establishing German domination on the continent. In the NATO Summit which took place in December 1989, in Brussels, President Bush used the idea of James Baker which discouraged the British Prime Minister and scrambled the relations with Washington. It was against that background that Margaret Thatcher met with the French president Mitterrand during the European Summit in Strasbourg at the end of December, and also in Paris in January 1990. Thatcher tried to build an Anglo-French axis which is against the reunification, but she failed at her attempt.

The Bush administration focused its attention on dealing with the transition to a new world order, a bipolar to a unipolar world order. Thatcher was afraid that the 'special relationship' might not survive due to the German-American new accords and rapprochement especially the personal relation between M. Thatcher and Bush were cooled down and not as

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 661.

warm as with the previous US president Reagan. She believed that he was “turning his back fairly publicly on the special position I had enjoyed in the Reagan administration.”²⁶⁰

President Bush was asked in a T.V intervention about which country he regarded as the closest to USA in Europe. He referred to the ‘special relationship’, but added “I [G. H. W. Bush] do not think we should have to choose up between friends.”²⁶¹

As a matter of fact, Hostilities were present in this new US administration vis-à-vis M. Thatcher; secretary of state, James Baker, described her as a Cold War dinosaur and Germanophobe.”²⁶²

Margaret Thatcher realised that she was dealing with an administration which obviously favours Germany over Britain. That was evident in the words of the US Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, stating “a real conviction on the part of US policy-makers that relations with Europe could not sensibly be dependent on the compatibilities of Anglo-Saxon instinct.”²⁶³

On 31 May 1989, Bush referred publicly in Mainz to “the partnership in leadership” between the United States of America and Germany.²⁶⁴ In the same line of thought Treverton wrote that “America will see Europe through the prism of Germany.”²⁶⁵ Indeed, these were all indicators of US deserting the ‘special relationship’ with UK and looking up more for Germany as a new special partner.

In fact, between 1989 and 1993, US-UK tensions were due to short-range nuclear force (SNF) modernization, NATO’s future, Bosnia, and mainly German reunification.

²⁶⁰ M. Thatcher, “The Downing Street Years”, (London: Harpercolins, 1993), 783.

²⁶¹ Geoffrey Smith, “Thatcher and Reagan”, (London: the bodley head, 1990), 256.

²⁶² John D. “A Special Relationship.” 106.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Geoffrey Howe, “Conflict of Loyalty”, (London: pan, 1995), 595-560.

²⁶⁵ Geoffrey F. Treverton, “Britain,’s Role in the 1990’s: An American View”, *International affairs*, 60, 703-710, 1990.

Douglas Hurd observed that “M. Thatcher was reluctant rather than against.” while Dickie described Thatcher resistance to the German reunification “as the most serious misjudgement of her career in international politics.”²⁶⁶

However, the American attitude towards Britain changed when the British Prime Minister supported the United States in its campaign against Iraq, after the Kuwait invasion by military troops of President Saddam Hussein on August 2, 1990. When this event took place, Thatcher was in Aspen, Colorado, invited for a conference about defence questions. She seized the opportunity to introduce in her speech a declaration to support the Americans in their quest. With this step, she got the Bush administration by surprise to the extent they invited her directly to the White House to discuss the measures to be taken against Iraq. Indeed, this is how Thatcher ended up her term as the head of the British government contributing in the recovery of the ‘special relationship’ which was completed when her successor, John Major, sent to Iraq the largest allied military contingent after the one of the United States, and with appointing an English General as a second man after the American commander in chief of the intervention troops.

6. Post Cold War ‘Special Relationship’: (1990-2015):

The special relationship is going to be examined through variant international crises and events starting from the end of the Cold War 1990 to 2015.

6.1. John Major (1990-1997) - George H. W. Bush: (1990-1993)

The ‘special relationship’ was faced by a new challenge after the end of the Cold War for the common enemy (Soviets); and the common goal which joined both countries together that is to put an end to communism; now seemed over. The British were haunted by the fear that the USA now may be less interested in Europe and conceive the relationship with

²⁶⁶ J. Dumbrell, “.A Special Relationship...” 208.

Britain as useless and out of use. The special relationship in the post Cold War was questioned despite the military and diplomatic cooperation between George H.W. Bush and John Major in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, and even more during the Clinton administration.

Indeed, The Gulf War (1990-1991)²⁶⁷ has been considered as a resurrection of the ‘special relationship’ in a dynamic and a changing geopolitical landscape. For M. Thatcher, the Gulf Crisis was a deeply symbolic reassertion of the ‘special relationship’. The same vision was shared by the new Prime Minister John Major, who believed that the Gulf War vividly illustrated the vitality of the ‘special relationship between the US and the United Kingdom. He wrote in 1999:

Although the term ‘special relationship’ is often misused, there is a unique rapport between Britain and the United States. British politicians and the military do not have the reserve in dealing with their American counterparts that they show elsewhere, and confidences are shared as a matter of course.²⁶⁸

Bush and Major both shared good personal relationship. For Major, Britain bridges the divide between the United States of America and Europe, he observed that “the US did not want a ‘fifty-first state’, but rather a strong ally in Europe.”²⁶⁹

The Gulf war, indeed, represented a revive of the ‘special relationship’ between the United States and the United Kingdom, especially in a time when the Cold War was over, and the Anglo-American machinery fulfilled its mission to defeat the soviets and communism. M. Thatcher commented: “Suddenly a Britain with armed forces which had the skills, and a

²⁶⁷ The Gulf War was a war waged by coalition forces from 35 nations led by the United States against Iraq in response to Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait arising from oil pricing and production disputes.

²⁶⁸ John Major, “John Major: the Auto-Biography”, (London: HarperCollins, 1999), 578.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

government which had the resolve, to fight alongside America, seemed to be the real European ‘partner in leadership’.”²⁷⁰

Some others believe the opposite, like J. Dickie who observed that the Gulf War marked “the end of the Anglo-American affair”, he argued that decreasing the American bases in Europe and shutting them down, at that time (1990), was a mere indicator to that end. For the Americans, the British role as a standard-bearer in Europe for America, was clearly coming to an end.”²⁷¹

From the American part, James Baker commented that Britain as well as France “saw in this crisis an opportunity to emphasize their heritage as global powers.”²⁷²

The US ambassador Raymond Seitz commented that “the Anglo-American cooperation in the Gulf was the last hurrah of the old regime”.²⁷³

However, the Anglo-American diplomatic cooperation was evident in the United Nations despite some disagreements between the two countries regarding how the military solution should be carried out. President Bush said to the press, while being in Colorado with M. Thatcher that “they are both looking at it, this crisis, on exactly the same wavelength.”²⁷⁴

Thatcher decided in her last days in cabinet to increase the number of British troops there, the fact which the new Prime Minister John Major carried out after her. As a matter of fact, and as observed by J. Dumbrell, the close working relationship during that crisis was at all levels, politically between leaders and parliaments, in which votes within the British parliament were 534/57 in favour of using force and back the United States. The US senates voted 57/42 and the House of Representatives 250/183 to follow President Bush leadership to

²⁷⁰ Margaret Thatcher, “the Downing Street Years”, 769.

²⁷¹ J. Dumbrell, “A Special Relationship...”, 168.

²⁷² James Baker, “the Politics of Diplomacy”, (New York: Putnam’s sons, 1995), 381.

²⁷³ Raymond Seitz, “Over Here”, (London: weidenfield and Nicolson, 1998), 326.

²⁷⁴ Laurence Freedmo and E. Karsch, “the Gulf Conflict (1990-1991)”, (London: faber and faber, 1992), 73.

go to war. Also, between Generals of both countries, in which the UK was the second military presence after the US, they both shared the same need for a military action despite some voices who preached for diplomatic solutions, namely, Edward Heath.²⁷⁵

More important to mention here is the fact of some disputes which were evident between the two countries regarding the death of some British soldiers in ‘friendly fires’, and also about the sole, and unilateral US decision to end the war without consulting their allies. Moreover, President Bush opposed John Major plans to implement a shelter for the North Iraqi Kurds, but he finally embraced this idea on 16 April, 1991. This latter indicated for John Major that Britain still exercises power in influencing US decisions, and that they played effectively together to protect their economic interests in the region.²⁷⁶

Moreover, the main zone of tension in this time was policy towards the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The Bosnian war was an international ethnic rooted armed conflict, and a European problem as perceived by Washington, between the former republic of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Britain on its part, at first, advocated for keeping the integrity of Yugoslavia territory. The conflict have started on 6 April 1992 and after years of fighting and killing, all the European attempts at that time to fix the issue failed, namely Major’s while America remained aloof.

Baker stated regarding the matter that the conflict “seemed to be one of the EC could manage” and “unlike in the Persian Gulf, our vital national interests were not at stake.”²⁷⁷ He continued saying that “it was time to make the Europeans step up to the plate and show that they could act as a unified power.”²⁷⁸ However, Major was unwilling to move under this plan.

²⁷⁵ J. Dumbrell, “A Special Relationship...” 170-171.

²⁷⁶ J. Major, “John Major: the Auto-Biography”, (London: HarperCollins, 1999), 226-244.

²⁷⁷ James A. Baker, “The Politics of Diplomacy”, (New York: Putnam’s sons, 1995), 636.

²⁷⁸ Ibid,

One of the main crucial steps the UN took in the process of fixing the problem was the arms embargo. This decision was indeed problematic for the reason that the United States of America called for releasing it and this idea faced a strong opposition by Great Britain in December 1992, in which it turned aside the US plan which advocated banning military flights over Bosnia- Herzegovina as well as lifting the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, as well as France which discouraged the US Lift and Strike strategy, Which was about lifting the United Nations embargo to allow the Bosnia's to arm themselves in order to create a balance to the conflict and applying the air strike policy against the Bosnian Serbs by attacking their aircraft. Indeed, this policy was adopted by the American president in his 1992 campaign.

In May 1993, the United States' secretary of state Warren Christopher visited governments of European countries in order to convince them to get involved and support the strategy, however Britain, France, Germany, and Russia refused to, as mentioned previously, and the reason for this was the fear from endangering the lives of the UN peacekeepers. At the end, Western countries backed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), succeeded in finding a solution and ceased fire after negotiations that took place in Dayton, Ohio, US on 14 December 1995.

6.2. John Major (1990-1997) – Bill Clinton: (1993-1997)

Clinton was elected as a US president in 1992. In fact, despite his oxford background, he did not have the tendency to support or stand for 'the special relationship' with Britain. During this time, the notion of 'special relationship' became a diplomatic joke, and it was informally banned.²⁷⁹ J. Dumbrell described that through the US ambassador Raymond Seitz' words when John Major visited Washington to meet with the new leader in 1993:

Just before the Prime Minister arrived at the white house, Clinton was sitting with a few aides in the oval office. "Do not forget to say 'special relationship' when the

²⁷⁹ John Dumbrell, "A Special Relationship...", 112.

press comes in". One of them joked-a little like 'don't forget to put out the cat'- 'Oh, yes', Clinton said: how could I forget the 'special relationship"! And he threw his head back and laughed".²⁸⁰

As a matter of fact, Clinton's plan to, promote the Germany/Japan inclusion in the United Nations Security Council as permanent members irritated the British. Besides, Clinton terminated British access to nuclear testing facilities in the Nevada Desert. Moreover, he favoured a more peaceful and pacific US foreign policy, namely to reconsider priorities after the end of the Cold War, and also to link the United States of America into the Asian miraculous economic boost. Indeed, in his office, the US military troops stationed in Europe were radically reduced by the two thirds.

Against this background, the relation between both the United States and the United Kingdom seemed tense and problematic over many issues, mainly, the sanctions policy in Iraq and also over the nuclear development policy in North Korea. In fact, the US air attack on Iraq of 27 June was among these issues, in which the United States of America did not even consult the United Kingdom. Raymond Seitz described the relationship between Major and Clinton at that time as a "Grin-and-bear it basis". Some argued that this strained relationship between the two leaders was due to Major support to Bush in the 1992 presidential elections.²⁸¹

Indeed, Major tried to excuse Clinton's attitude as he was too concerned with "appeasing opinion at home".²⁸² However, the Clinton-Major relationship recovered somehow after its shaky start. In a conference press in February 1994, Clinton stated, at the presence of Major, that the US-UK relationship "was special to me personally and is special to the United States of America".²⁸³

²⁸⁰ Ibid, 113 in Raymon Seitz, "Over Here", (London: weidenfield and Nicolson, 1998), 322.

²⁸¹ Ibid, 113.

²⁸² J. Major, "John Major: the Auto-Biography", 499.

²⁸³ Public papers of the presidents, Bill Clinton, vol1, 1995, 196.

Moving to the Bosnia Crisis, the US-UK cooperation over the policy to be implemented at this time almost did not exist, Major described that issue as “a running sour”,²⁸⁴ between Britain and America. Regarding the European view about the crisis, it was characterised by division, in that respect, David Owen stated that the European Union “does not know how to exercise power”.²⁸⁵ Furthermore, the USA along with non-aligned countries voted in the United Nations for lifting the arms embargo. Indeed that was another sign that shows that the two partners were not on the same page; as Britain and France voted for not lifting it.

Lawrence Kaplan noticed, in that regard, that “Europeans and Americans had not been so divided since the Suez debate of 1956”. Besides, Some US Officials went further to question the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) after the strong hit and damages caused to the western allies by the Bosnia crisis, for them its role to keep US strategically tied to Europe was somehow compromised.

In fact, the Europeans preferred a neutral UN humanitarian presence in a civil war while waiting for a peace agreement. On the other hand, the United States’ vision was focused on condemning Serb aggression, and helping the Bosnian Muslims without committing ground troops. Indeed, the Americans rejected the British plan for its recognition of ethnic cleansing in February 1993. America favoured anti-Serb air strikes and abolishing the arms embargo on Bosnian Muslims. However, the British refused that for it was too risky regarding the fact that Britain had ground troops engaged in the UN operations there. After the voting in the UN for the relaxation of the embargo; the Serbs Army kept attacking UN-designated “safe areas” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, the Croats decided to put an end to these aggressions and massacres. On August 4th 1995 they organized a resistance, in which the Croats fought

²⁸⁴ J. Major, 497.

²⁸⁵ David Owen, “Balkan Odyssey”, (London, 1995), 30.

their last battles for independence backed by NATO and UN armed intervention through air campaigns which destroyed many Bosnian Serb targets. In fact, that operation was set to be a heavy victory as it succeeded in restoring some areas and uniting Croatia, destroying the Serbs Army and bringing the Croatian military force in favor all along with the NATO enlargement.²⁸⁶

Furthermore, all the partition solutions suggested by the US, UK, France, and Germany were totally rejected, the fact which paved the way for the Dayton Agreement in 1995. Indeed, the Dayton peace terms suggested that 60.000²⁸⁷ NATO troops would be stationed in both the Bosnian Serb Republic, and the Bosnian and Croat Federation. In fact, the British troops were the second largest after USA. Yet, this crisis proved almost no understanding between the United Kingdom and the United States of America.²⁸⁸

Later, Clinton and Major were attributed as saving the western alliance and the American president Clinton praised the British prime minister by saying “John Major carried a lot of water for me and for the alliance over Bosnia. I know he was under a lot of political pressure at home, but he never wavered. He was a truly decent guy who never let me down. We worked really well together and I go to like him a lot”.²⁸⁹

Moreover, the special relationship got another hit in February 1994, when the British prime minister rejected Clinton’s will to contact him over his controversial decision concerning granting Gerry Adams a visa to the US. Once more, that decision was problematic because G. Adams was a special case. He was an Irish politician, and a president of Sinn Fein which is the political wing of the provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) which advocated for separation from 1990s. He was indeed, the planner for political resistance in Northern

²⁸⁶ John Dumbrell, “A Special Relationship...”, 135-138.

²⁸⁷ Ibid, 138.

²⁸⁸ J. Dumbrell, 112-114.

²⁸⁹ Britannica.com, seen on 15/12/2020.

Ireland (1983-2018). As a point in case, he was behind the hunger strikes implemented by republican prisoners in Northern Ireland in 1981 and many other sorts of rebellion against the British rule. He was actually elected a member of the British parliament in 1997. However, he refused to take his seat. He was considered a terrorist by London²⁹⁰, That's why allowing him to attend a conference in New York City was troublesome. Indeed, the CIA, the US justice Department, the US state department and the FBI all were against inviting him, for them that step would make the United States look soft on terrorism and could severely harm the special relationship.

In fact, the special relationship endured a lot of setbacks at that time, and despite the fact that Major and Clinton disagreed in many cases, sources confirmed that Clinton was more focused on preserving the special Anglo-American relationship than many of the primes minister's allies.²⁹¹

6.3. Bill Clinton (1997-2001) - Tony Blair (1997.2007):

Anglo-American relations were very good and working at this time for Blair's positive attitude towards US interference in Ireland, as well as his good personal relationship with President Clinton. The special relationship during Clinton-Blair years had another chance to prosper, when the new prime minister was elected in 1997 as he agreed to revive and keep "the two nations unique partnership"²⁹² as Clinton describes it. "Over the last fifty years our unbreakable alliance has helped to bring unparalleled peace and prosperity and security .it's an alliance based on shared values and common aspirations"²⁹³, said Clinton during his first

²⁹⁰ Britannica.com, accessed on 15/12/2020. He was considered as a terrorist for killing British people and leading bombing attacks and military guerrilla inside UK.

²⁹¹ J. Dumbrell, 242-267.

²⁹² Ibid, 143.

²⁹³ Ibid.

meeting with the new Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1997, stressing the great importance of the special relationship on world peace and the common interest of both countries.²⁹⁴

Moreover, the British politicians during that time admired Clinton and the new developments in the Democratic Party which paved the way for Blair's labour party to adopt a new labour model almost similar in ideology to that of Clinton Democratic Party.

Some believed that the two leaders' personal relationship made them reminiscing the Thatcher-Reagan era and closeness. This closeness was due to a shared agenda for the new generation of leaders from both sides of the Atlantic. Blair's attitudes in the early stages of his premiership tend to lean more towards the Americans rather than the Europeans. However, the anti-terrorism strikes on Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 caused a real embarrassment for Blair in London for the fact that he was not consulted at all.

In fact, Clinton and Blair shared the same vision regarding Europe. Blair declared in a joint press conference in May 2007 that they both agreed that " Britain does not need to choose between being strong in Europe and being close to the United States", he continued that " by being strong in Europe we will further strength our relationship with USA".²⁹⁵

Clinton himself stressed again the idea of a Europe "that is undivided, democratic, and at peace for the first time in history".²⁹⁶ He even wished for a new Euro-Atlantic alliance security system in which Russia is part of it.

Moreover, the United Kingdom was the only European country at that time to support and even participate in the Bombing of Iraq in December 1998. Further, and once again London's support for the US position in the unsuccessful conference of Rambouillet and Malo Summit of February 1999 regarding Kosovo issue in which they perceived a NATO solution,

²⁹⁴Britannica.com , accessed on 17/12/2020.

²⁹⁵ Ibid, 221.

²⁹⁶ Public Papers of the US Presidents...1997", vol, 1998, 672.

stood in opposition with its European partners to promote a EU solution to this problem through a European military action.²⁹⁷

Blair was severely accused as Clinton's poodle. When Britain started the air bombing of the Kosovo province of Serbia in 1999, Tony Ben expressed in the House of Commons his regret "that we take our orders from Washington".²⁹⁸

Blair as an international advocator of the humanitarian intervention, claimed that human rights were violated and that an armed campaign against Slobodan Milosevic was required. He strongly advocated a land invasion through NATO which he believed that it should be promoted as a peace-imposing organization. However, by May 1999, Blair and Clinton relationship became conflictual regarding sending troops into a hostile environment. Blair's resolution triggered Clinton's anger. Nevertheless, Clinton decision later to align with Blair's vision accelerated Serb Retreat from Kosovo in June. Clinton announced later that the US will be open to all options when he was asked about ground troops' intervention. Indeed the war ended in 1999 thanks to NATO intervention.²⁹⁹

However, tension between the United Kingdom and the United States appeared when the British ground commander in Kosovo, General Michael Jackson, refused the orders given by the American General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. This incident happened when Clark ordered a French-British air strike on the Russian troops which entered the airport of Prestina, Kosovo's capital, on 12 June 1999. Jackson refused the order scared of being accused to trigger World War 3. London backed its General while Washington announced that Wesley Clark would be quitting his post.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁷ M. Weller, "the Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo", *International affairs*, 212.

²⁹⁸ *Parliamentary Debate*, daily edition 328 n 62, 25 March 1999, 566.

²⁹⁹ *The Independent on Sunday*, 23 May 1999, in Dumbrell, 123.

³⁰⁰ J. Barry and C. Dicky, "Warrior's Reward", *Newsweek*, 9 August 1999, in Dumbrell, 123.

Dumbrell commented that “despite difficulties along the way, war had brought London and Washington closer”.³⁰¹

6.4. Tony Blair (1997-2007) – George W. Bush (2001-2007):

Prime Minister Tony Blair succeeded fast to become really close to President G. W. Bush the son after his election in 2001. They both worked well from the beginning in international matters, such as the nuclear dispute between India and Pakistan in 2002. Blair stated clearly his liking for Bush directness saying: “he just tells you what he thinks”, maybe in a sense of comparison between him and Clinton.³⁰²

Important to mention is the fact that some incidents tempered the special relationship between the two countries before the Attacks of 9/11, such as the white house spokesman’s comment regarding some economic rivalries between the EU and the USA, he criticised “European integration as an attempt to sideline America and undermine NATO.”³⁰³

Moreover, the US abrogation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty (ABMT) angered, on the other part, the Europeans who became irritated by the new US administration’s attitudes to the degree that they hated even more the use of “Americanism” by the US administration in foreign policy. Furthermore, Bush Junior’s journey to Europe in June 2001 without visiting the United Kingdom was an indicator that the United Kingdom is no more a bridge to Europe, and Blair’s new task seemed now to focus more on attempts to reshape the Atlantic bridge role.³⁰⁴

After the attacks of 9/11, Blair rushed to the USA to show support to their closed ally in fighting against terrorism. The war in the world, for them, is between two camps, friends of

³⁰¹ J. Dumbrell, 123.

³⁰² Ibid, 148.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

freedom and friends of terror. To some observers, like John Dumbrell that marked a new high peak in the ‘special relationship’ and a resurrection to it. Britain helped gather the EU voices to back America in its war on terror, and Blair played a huge role in that. Thanks to his diplomatic leadership, the ‘special relationship’ was revived at that time, and he became the most favourite person in Washington. Indeed, he became a spokesman and advocator to the Bush 9/11 response and orientation. He spent more than two months meeting with world leaders gathering international support for military action as it was shown by a research done by the BBC “ the prime minister held 54 meetings and travelled more than 40.000 miles just to stand shoulder to shoulder with his American friend.”³⁰⁵

He sought international support preaching that “this is not just the issue for the United States. It is an issue for Britain. It is an issue for the wider world. America should not have to face this issue alone. we should face it together”³⁰⁶ .thus, Great Britain was the only European country sending troops in 2003 in what was called Operation Iraqi freedom by the west, a war which ,indeed, was planned way before from the 1990’s, before even the 9/11 attacks.³⁰⁷

Blair’s reaction this way was indeed an opportunity for him to rebuild the transatlantic bridge again around UK. Another reason for his reaction as Blair himself put it “standing aside and criticising Bush from the sidelines was both irresponsible, and also the biggest impulse to unilateralism there could be.”³⁰⁸ Once again, it is the feeling of Britain to side close USA to guide its might and power for the good.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁵[www.Britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Blair_and_George_W._Bush_\(January_2001_%E2%80%93_June_2007\)](http://www.Britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Blair_and_George_W._Bush_(January_2001_%E2%80%93_June_2007)), seen on 15/12/2020.

³⁰⁶[www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Blair_and_George_W._Bush_\(January_2001_%E2%80%93_June_2007\)](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Blair_and_George_W._Bush_(January_2001_%E2%80%93_June_2007)), accessed on 15/12/2020.

³⁰⁷[www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Blair_and_George_W._Bush_\(January_2001_%E2%80%93_June_2007\)](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Blair_and_George_W._Bush_(January_2001_%E2%80%93_June_2007)), accessed on 15/12/2020.

³⁰⁸ Ibid, 151.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

The United States directed its military power to spread democratic goals, mainly, in the Middle East. The attacks on Afghanistan, indeed paved the way to target Iraq later. The British government allowed USA to use the Fylingdale station In Yorkshire to develop its national missile defence (NMD) system in 2003, it took the military lead with USA in the mission of Afghanistan in October 2001 and Iraq in March 2003. In October 2001, Britain was part of the air strikes on Afghanistan, and Blair made a statement in what could be understood that the scope of this war would extend to other countries.³¹⁰ He said: “we are in this for the long haul. Even when El-Qaeda is dealt with, the job is not over.”³¹¹

However, some conflicts were present at this moment between Britain and America, when Blair started to rush Bush the son to work through the UN before the invasion of Iraq not to raise the international voice against them, and also Britain’s complains about the civilian casualties in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The British at that time, indeed, hated the fact that America was taking their support for granted. And, for them, the reasons for invading Iraq (suspected WMD’s) were gloomy and not evident.

Indeed, evidence or lack of it regarding the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was never a priority or a must for them since there was no rational link between the attacks of 9/11 and Iraq, but the American goal in 2003 in Iraq was regime change as a priority. Blair ultimate aim at that time was to support USA and direct it away from unilateralism at all costs.³¹² On the same flow prime minister Blair stated that “it has always been our policy that Iraq would be a better place without Saddam Hussein. We know he has

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ J. Kampfner, “Blair’s Wars”, (London: free press, 2003), 130-131.

³¹² Dumbrell, 158.

been developing these weapons. We know that those weapons constitute a threat. The issue has to be dealt with".³¹³

In fact, the good personal relationship between the two statesmen best served the special relationship, starting with fighting for world peace after the terrorist attacks in Washington in 11 September. The British Prime Minister Blair stated that:

This is not a battle between the United States of America and terrorism, but between the free democratic worlds and terrorism. We therefore here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy, and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our world.³¹⁴

Bush also declared on his part that "America has no truer friend than Great Britain." Besides, the US first lady Laura Bush asked the Prime Minister Blair to join the congress meeting which was a first for a foreign leader to attend the US emergency session of Congress.

Blair tried to keep sort of a balance between his alliance with bush and his role in the European Union (EU); however, many have criticized this. The American bombing attacks on Iraq really annoyed the European partners, and it became evident now that Blair has made his biggest political gamble and mistake to date by siding bush on the decision to go to war with Iraq.

Indeed, the US-UK-EU relationship was really complex and that was evident in the Balkan wars³¹⁵. However, when it comes to the war on Iraq in 2003, UK clearly sided the United States on the extent of the EU countries.³¹⁶ Blair even preached that the US and

³¹³ [www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Blair_and_George_W._Bush_\(January_2001_%E2%80%93_June_2007\)](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Blair_and_George_W._Bush_(January_2001_%E2%80%93_June_2007)), seen on 15/12/2020.

³¹⁴ [www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Blair_and_George_W._Bush_\(January_2001_%E2%80%93_June_2007\)](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Blair_and_George_W._Bush_(January_2001_%E2%80%93_June_2007)), seen on 15/12/2020.

³¹⁵ The Balkan Wars (1991-1999) : or the Yugoslav Wars (in Slovenia 1991, in Croatia 1991-1995, in Bosnia 1992-1995, in Kosovo 1998-1999, insurgency in the Presevo Valley 1999-2001, and Macedonia 2001): were a series of separate but related ethnic conflicts, wars of independence, and insurgencies fought in the former Yugoslavia, leading up and resulting from the break up of the Yugoslav federation in 1992, its constituent republics declared independence due to unresolved tensions between ethnic minorities in the new countries, which fuelled the wars. Britannica.com.

³¹⁶ Dumbrell, 210.

Europe must come together to save world stability, he said “Europe and America should stand together. The moment people think they can play Europe and America off against each other then every bad lot in the world will be doing it, and we will be the losers.”³¹⁷

Important to mention, despite Blair’s support to Bush, the special relationship was going down. It was mentioned in *the Economist* (2007) that “nobody doubts that the special relationship between Britain and America is going through a rough patch”³¹⁸, the said support impacted negatively Blair’s reputation and he became less popular in general and in his own party in specific to the degree that he was nicknamed by some British press as “Bush’s Poodle”.³¹⁹

During 2004-2005, Blair government tried to distance itself from some problematic issues raised by Washington, such as the attack on Iran. Disputes were evident too regarding aids for Africa, and climate change where Britain stood on the European side. To defend himself, he used that and claimed that his partnership with the American leader Bush helped in these issues, as well as helped in the peace process in Palestine and the Middle East in general. Some observed that “the Blair-Bush relationship exposed the limits of the British influence over America.”³²⁰

6.5. Gordon Brown (2009-2010) / Barack Obama (2008-2015):

Before Barack Obama was elected as a president of the United States of America in 2008, he declared that the bush period disappointed the expectations of the United Kingdom Britain and to that respect he said “we have a chance to recalibrate the relationship and for the

³¹⁷ [www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Blair_and_George_W._Bush_\(January_2001_%E2%80%93_June_2007\)](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Blair_and_George_W._Bush_(January_2001_%E2%80%93_June_2007)), seen on 15/12/2020.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Dumbrell, 158.

United Kingdom to work with America as a full partner.”³²¹ Again in March 2009, the US president reinsured while meeting with the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown that “Great Britain is one of our closest and strongest allies and there is a link and bond there will not break... This notion that somehow there is any lessening of that special relationship is misguided ... The relationship is not only special and strong but will only get stronger as time goes on.”³²²

Likewise the British Prime Minister G. Brown also promised, on his part, to work hand in hand with the US president and stressed that their domestic agendas had several points in common. He also congratulated the Americans for their choice as he believed that the president Obama was able to answer and to give solutions to the economic crisis back then.

In the same context in an article to *the Observer* he said that “it is up to us whether 28 is remembered for financial crash that engulfed the world or for a new resilience and optimism from a generation which faced the economic storm head on and built the fair the society in its wake”³²³, he added “the people of America made their choice last week. They picked a progressive president, inspiring the world with their beliefs that in difficult times, people need their government to ensure more -not less- help and security is available for families and business. And I am looking forward to co-operating with the president in building a new global society in which the advancement of people, their homes, jobs, savings and pensions-is always put first.”

He set Obama’s victory as an example to give hope to the people saying “ but the lesson from recent times , and now from the Obama victory – whether it be on financial

³²¹ Julian Borger, “UK's special relationship with US needs to be recalibrated”, Obama tells ex-pats in Britain, *The Guardian* (27 May 2008). Retrieved 15 March 2020..

³²² "Obama hails special relationship". *BBC News*. 3 March 2009. Retrieved 3 March 2020.

³²³ [www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Brown_and_Obama_\(January_2009_%E2%80%93_May_2010\)](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Brown_and_Obama_(January_2009_%E2%80%93_May_2010)), accessed on December 2020.

instability , the creation of jobs on climate change –that only progressive answers , clear public purpose working for the benefits of all , can meet the big challenges we face.”³²⁴

However, later, that special relationship started taking some hits, during a trip to the US, British officials strove not least than five times to set a bilateral meeting with the US president, yet none of the five attempts was successful informed British diplomatic sources. Despite prime minister G. Brown endeavours to secure a personal appearance to the public with Mr. Obama, he got instead a quick talk. Thus, it was reported in 2008 that the special relationship between Britain and the USA were the lower it had been since the Major-Clinton frictions. A British diplomat stated to *the daily telegraph* that “it is wrong for people to say that we have relaxed about the way things have gone, there were five attempts to set up a meeting and none have come off”, the same source ensured that the refusal has caused a serious embarrassment for prime minister G. Brown especially when the US president Obama hosted meetings with the Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, and the Chinese President Hu Jintao. Yet, in another desperate attempt to set a meeting or a press conference with the president of the United States, London altered the policy concerning providing swine flu vaccines to Africa as to match in Obama administration’s policy; yet nothing ever worked.³²⁵

Furthermore, the ‘special relationship between USA and UK got more complicated and troublesome at that time, and the reason behind this was due to the release of the Lockerbie³²⁶ bomber Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed Al Megrahi. Indeed, the Lockerbie bombing

³²⁴[www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Brown_and_Obama_\(January_2009_%E2%80%93_May_2010\)](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Brown_and_Obama_(January_2009_%E2%80%93_May_2010)), accessed on December 2020.

³²⁵[www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Brown_and_Obama_\(January_2009_%E2%80%93_May_2010\)](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Brown_and_Obama_(January_2009_%E2%80%93_May_2010)), accessed on December 2020.

³²⁶ Lockerbie: A pan Am Flight 103 scheduled from Frankfurt to Detroit via stopovers in London and New York. While the plane was in flight over the Scottish town of Lockerbie, it was destroyed by a bomb that had been planted on board, killing all 243 passengers and 16 crew in what became known as the Locketrbie Bombing. A Lybian secret agent, Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed Al megrahi was charged, convicted for that, and jailed for

was a terrorist attack that caused the death of 270 persons in total by bombing aircraft in the area of Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. After the investigations, the Libyan intelligence officer Abdelbaset AlMegrahi was convicted and jailed for life in 2001. However, the Scottish government released him in August 2009 out of compassion for he was suffering from prostate cancer. Before he was released, Hillary Clinton the US secretary of state said in disapproval with the release “we are still encouraging the Scottish authorities not to do so and hope they will not.”³²⁷ The Scottish decision made President Obama furious and disappointed and called the Prime Minister to discuss this matter. However, Mr. G. Brown claimed that the release of Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi was entirely up to the Scottish executive.³²⁸

Although, the weakness of the special relationship was evident, the British Prime Minister and his administration still denied it claiming that Obama and Brown sat next to each other in the G20 Meeting of this year (2009), so they had a great deal of time to discuss and stressed the fact that the two leaders were working on international problems together, like, economic regulation and climate change. Indeed, Obama acknowledged that Brown had “taken the helm of the British economy at a very difficult time”³²⁹ and said that, as the US and the UK sought to deal with the economic crisis, they did so with shared values. In the same respect, He added that they both believe in free markets, believe in government that is not overbearing, and allowing enterprise and business to thrive, But they also share common belief that there has to be regulation and structures in place so that the market does not spin out of control.³³⁰

life. However, he was released by the Scottish government in 2009 on compassionate grounds after being diagnosed with prostate cancer. He died in May 2012. Britannica.com

³²⁷ [www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Brown_and_Obama_\(January_2009_%E2%80%93_May_2010\)](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Brown_and_Obama_(January_2009_%E2%80%93_May_2010)), accessed on December 2020.

³²⁸ [www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Brown_and_Obama_\(January_2009_%E2%80%93_May_2010\)](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Brown_and_Obama_(January_2009_%E2%80%93_May_2010)), seen on December 2020.

³²⁹ <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/mar/03/obama-brown-special-relationship>, seen on 22/12/2020.

³³⁰ <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/mar/03/obama-brown-special-relationship>, seen on 22/12/2020.

Gordon Brown, on his part, stated that he believes that the special relationship is strong, and it continues to strengthen. However, when Obama delivered a speech to the UN, “the time has come for the world to move in a new direction ... a new era of engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect.”³³¹, this statement of his showed his will to end the unilateralism executed by the former US administration between Bush and Blair, and to make new relations that serve best the interests of the American nation.

Additionally, once again, the Middle East has caused some troubles to the strength of ‘the special relationship’ as dispute went on talking with *Hamas*³³² and *Hezbollah*³³³. in further details, US State Department official argued that Britain did not inform USA properly when deciding to talk to the political wing Hezbollah, just after Obama administration had declared the will to talk to the other political wing Hamas, A senior Foreign Office official said “This should not have come as a shock to any official who might have been in the previous administration and is now in the current one.”³³⁴

A new hit was , the Bermuda Guantanamo Crisis ; one commentator has described the Bermuda case as “a wake-up call” and “the latest example of American government ignoring Britain when it comes to US interests in Britain territories abroad.”³³⁵ In fact, On June 2009, the British government was strongly tempered after what the US did concerning the British overseas territory Bermuda, when they did not seek the approbation before negotiating with the self-governing British territory to resettle four ex-Guantanamo bay prisoners coveted by the Republic of China. And this was said to be the reason the special relationship has taken

³³¹ <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSWEN3880>, seen on 22/12/2020.

³³² Hamas: Islamic Resistance Movement is a Palestinian Sunni-Islamic fundamentalism, militant and nationalist organisation. Its military wing is Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

³³³ Hezbollah: is a Lebanese Islamist political party and militant group, led by its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah since 1992.

³³⁴ [www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Brown_and_Obama_\(January_2009_%E2%80%93_May_2010\)](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Brown_and_Obama_(January_2009_%E2%80%93_May_2010)), accessed on December 2020.

³³⁵ [www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Brown_and_Obama_\(January_2009_%E2%80%93_May_2010\)](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Brown_and_Obama_(January_2009_%E2%80%93_May_2010)), accessed on December 2020.

new wrong turns. Therefore a foreign office spokesman expressed British annoyance stating the necessity that they should be consulted and added when asked if the prisoners will be sent again to Guantanamo bay that all options have been taken into consideration.³³⁶

Again, The Falkland Islands were the heart of the disagreement. The Falkland Islands is an overseas island chain self-ruling British territory since 1833. However Argentina argued that they had control over the islands for few years before 1833. This disagreement accumulated in 1982 when Argentina overran the islands and in consequence started the Falklands war that ended by the victory of Britain as mentioned before in the Thatcher-Reagan era. Nevertheless, in March 2010, Argentina called for negotiations over the latter archipelago after the British decision to look for oil close to the islands. Hillary Clinton proposed to mediate between the two countries in dispute, but her offer was rejected knowing that she was pro Argentina against Britain. The said support led to several remonstrances from the British side. The public started to question the credibility of the special relationship and that raised again scepticism among British politicians to the degree that the foreign affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons argued that “the British government should be less deferential towards the US” and focus more on the British interests. Mike Gapes, the committee chair put it clearly that:

The UK and the US have a close and valuable relationship not only in terms of intelligence and security but also in terms of our profound and historic cultural and trading links and commitment to freedom, democracy and the rule of law, But the use of the phrase ‘special relationship’ in its historical sense, to describe the totality of the ever-evolving UK-US relationship, is potentially misleading, and we recommend that its use should be avoided.³³⁷

Indeed, the special relationship has not been so outstanding during these times especially with US foreign policy pivoting towards the Asia-Pacific region and the American

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Ibid.

irritation with European contributions to NATO. The years to come were to provide more insights about how the future of that ‘special relationship’ might be.

6.6. David Cameron (2010-2015) - B. Obama (2008-2015):

After being elected as a Prime Minister in 2010, the US president Barack Obama was among the first leaders in the world to congratulate David Cameron. He went on by saying “as I told the Prime Minister, the United States has no closer friend and ally than the United Kingdom, and I reiterated my deep and personal commitment to the special relationship between our two countries—a bond that has endured for generations and across party lines.” As a response to the positive approach and will of the American president, William Hague, the British Foreign Secretary said in agreement “we are very happy to accept that description. The United States is without doubt the most important ally of the United Kingdom.”

As a matter of fact, when W. Hague first met with Hillary Clinton in 2010, he highlighted the fact that the special relationship is “an unbreakable alliance and it is not a backward-looking or nostalgic relationship. It is one looking to the future from combating violent extremism to addressing poverty and conflict around the world. Indeed, that was a new opportunity for both countries to refocus their efforts on working together in their armed campaign in Afghanistan as a part from their common concern that is, securing the world and ending any peace threat, such as violent extremism and terrorism.³³⁸ Moreover, they both shared the same disapproval and concern over the Iran’s nuclear programme.³³⁹

Furthermore, in 2010 an industrial disaster hit the Gulf of Mexico named the ‘Deepwater Horizon oil spill’, dragged a huge fury by the American media against the British

³³⁸ Terrorism: is a charged term. It is often used with the connotation of something that is morally wrong. It is in its broadest sense, the unlawful use of intentional violence to achieve political aims. It is used in this regard primarily to refer to violence during peacetime or in the context of war against non-combatants (civilians). Extremism: is a form that condones and enacts violence with ideological or deliberate intent, such as religious or political violence. Britannica.com.

³³⁹ [www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Cameron_and_Obama_\(May_2010_%E2%80%93_July_2016\)](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Cameron_and_Obama_(May_2010_%E2%80%93_July_2016))), seen on 17/12/2020.

oil company (BP). In this case the Obama administration was condemned of not standing with the British side –her best ally - thus The Christian Science Monitor said that the Obama administration repeatedly used the term ‘the British Petroleum’ although this name was no longer used by the company, knowing that American held important number of shares .That incident really strained the ‘special relationship’ as observed, and once again the value of this relationship was questioned one more time. On his part the Prime Minister chose to ignore the presidents rough “aggressive and rhetoric” criticism and chose not to make a big deal out of it which may trouble the Anglo-American relations. For that reason; once again many doubted the existence, let alone the role of the so called ‘Special Relationship’.³⁴⁰

On July 20th the two leaders, David Cameron and Barack Obama, held a meeting during Cameron’s first visit to the US after his election. During that meeting, among other common issues shared by both countries, the Afghanistan War was discussed again and Obama stated in that respect that “we can never say enough, the United Kingdom and The United States enjoy truly special relationship” and added that both nations celebrate a common heritage and cherish common values and above all, their alliance thrives because it advances our common interests.”³⁴¹

David Cameron on his part said: “From the times I have met Barack Obama before; we do have very, very close allegiances and very close position on the key issues, whether that is Afghanistan or the Middle East peace process or Iran. Our interests are aligned and we have got to make this partnership work.” However the Prime Minister D. Cameron was against the idealization of the term and called for a more logical association of it, an association based on mutual and natural interests sharing saying: “...I [D. Cameron] am unapologetically pro-America but I am not some idealistic dreamer about the special

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ [www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Cameron_and_Obama_\(May_2010_%E2%80%93_July_2016\)](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Cameron_and_Obama_(May_2010_%E2%80%93_July_2016))), accessed on 17/12/2020.

relationship. I care about the depth of our partnership, not the length of our phone calls. I hope that in the coming years we can focus on the substance, not endlessly fret about the form.”³⁴²

Nevertheless, this strength in the special relationship faded away as in January 2011, Obama declared the USA does not have a stronger friend and stronger ally than Nicolas Sarkozy and the French people during a meeting with the latter president. More on the same idea this statement triggered a large fury in Great Britain. However, this statement did not prevent Obama from enjoying some privileges and special treatment as in May of the same year he was the fourth US president to be granted a state visit to the UK when he met the Queen Elizabeth the Second, and was the third US president after Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton to talk to both houses of British parliament.³⁴³

Furthermore, in 2013, the British parliament refused to give a green light to the government to be engaged with USA in a war in Syria. John Kerry, the American Secretary of State commented on that as follow: “the relationship between USA and UK has often been described as special or essential and it has been described thus simply because it is.”³⁴⁴ as it is clearly mentioned for the Americans that relationship with Britain was special before that negative vote in parliament and it will be for long after that vote. On the other side the Atlantic, William Hague who also agreed and replied saying “so the United Kingdom will continue to work closely with the United States, taking a highly active role in addressing the Syria crisis and working with our closest ally over the coming weeks and months.”³⁴⁵

In 2015 Cameron revealed that Obama called him “bro” which shows clear closeness and intimacy between them, and that his fellow American considered “the special

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/17/america-has-no-stronger-ally-than-fill-in-the-blank/>, seen on 18/12/2020.

³⁴⁴ [www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Cameron_and_Obama_\(May_2010_%E2%80%93_July_2016](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Cameron_and_Obama_(May_2010_%E2%80%93_July_2016))

³⁴⁵ [www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Cameron_and_Obama_\(May_2010_%E2%80%93_July_2016](http://www.britannica.com/en/Special_Relationship#/Cameron_and_Obama_(May_2010_%E2%80%93_July_2016)

relationship” between Washington and Westminster as “stronger than it has ever been.”³⁴⁶ However that did not hold Obama from criticizing D. Cameron regarding the intervention in Libya where Britain refused to be part of a US plan there to remove Colonel Gaddafi, accusing his so called “bro “of being ‘distracted’.”³⁴⁷

Indeed, President Obama, like US presidents before him, wanted Europeans to take more responsibility for their security. Put it differently, he wanted them to provide higher defence spending and closer European cooperation. In fact, this is where American interests coincide with David Cameron's referendum campaign to remain in the EU. Well-known as a fact that President Obama would never dictate or tell the British people how to vote, but his visit to Britain at that time was considered as one of the more unusual interventions by an American president during the past 60 years. The Americans strongly believe that the fact of Britain leaving the EU would weaken the Atlantic Alliance.

The US trade representative Michael Froman has made it quite clear that Britain out of the EU will be treated as equal as China, India, or Brazil with no preferential. USA, of course, says it is following its own interest. Its vision is that the British exit would damage the international economy and weaken Europe during a hard period. Indeed, USA sees Britain's place in the world as part of the European project.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ www.bbc.com/news/uk-36084672, seen on 20/20/2020.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

7. Conclusion:

The 'special relationship' witnessed its weakest state during the Major-Clinton period due to many factors, such as Major's support for Bush in the election which was perceived as an interference in the US internal business, the act that was never forgotten by Clinton when he became president. The latter banned Britain from using the Nevada Desert as a nuclear testing ground which complicated things even more as well as the Irish dilemma and the Balkan wars. The Balkan episodes, indeed, clearly exposed the frictions between the US, the UK, and the EU and the status of Britain as a bridge linking the two continents became at stake. Nevertheless, with the coming of Bush to power and Blair, the 'special relationship' reached its highest point. Indeed, their personal relationship helped a lot in resurrecting the old 'special relationship' as well as their coalition in the war against terror after the 9/11 attacks, the war in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003. As observed by John Dumbrell that the special relationship reached its lowest point of its history during Obama and D. Cameron period of governing in which the future of the special relationship started genuinely to be questioned. In fact, in this era from the history of the 'special relationship' even the use of this term becomes problematic and a matter of unease for politicians and leaders from both sides of the Atlantic, and frictions came to the surface especially during the Libya episode in 2010. Indeed, both leaders come up with embracing the notion of 'essential relationship' based on shared interests and values rather than special relationship. The coming chapter will shed light on the future of the special relationship, the impact of the UK relation with the EU in general and how that affected the future of its relation with its American counterpart.

Chapter 4:

European Integration and the Future of ‘the Special Relationship’

Challenges and implications

1. Introduction:

Insights will be given on the nature of the relationship between Britain at first and its European neighbours, and then the impact of the EU integration on the special relationship between the United States of America and the United Kingdom and how this latter influenced the nature of Britain's relationship with its European partners in the EU.

2. Britain's Sceptic Relationship with Europe:

The British people attitude was always characterised by scepticism and doubt towards their European neighbours. Their relationship was never at peace, they were always aloof regarding their relation with the other European nations. That indeed creates a huge obstacle on the way of uniting all the European countries under one umbrella. In fact the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, the leader of the Conservative Party was the first one to envision a United States of Europe after the end of WWII when he said:

We must build a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the materials strength of a single state less important. Small nations will count as large ones and gain their honour by their contribution to the common cause.³⁴⁹

However, Britain had consistently been a rock on the way of European integration. The United Kingdom had always been Eurosceptic due to many reasons, namely Britain would never give up on its national sovereignty (Westminster), or its national identity. In fact, countries which chose to be a member within the European Community have to cope with and surrender their national policies to those of the EU institutions, norms and regulations. Indeed, that was always problematic for the British.

³⁴⁹ Winston Churchill, "Winston Churchill's Speech to the Academic Youth". Zurich, 1946. <http://www.europa-web.de/europa/02wwwswwww/202histo/churchil.htm>, last seen in 08/12/2020, Quoted in Bojana Persisc, "Britain and Europe: a History of difficult Relations", Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, Berlin March 2010, 1.

As a matter of fact, each country in the world has an idea of its role at the international level, the fact which determines the identity of this country in regard to other nations. The Great past of the British Empire has always influenced its politicians view regarding the position of their country in Europe. Indeed, Britain was the greatest empire in history, and it had colonies dispatched all around the world corners. However, the twentieth century witnessed an accelerating decline of this empire ending up by giving independence to all its former colonies. Moreover, Britain created the Commonwealth which is composed of its previous colonies which are symbolically loyal to the British crown. Therefore, Britain shaped the history of the world for a long period of time, and it is not surprising that many British still feel proud and superior because of that. So, for the British being part of Europe would mean a loss of its world influence, and would narrow its opportunities, especially regarding the United States. That psychological barrier made the relationship between the United Kingdom and Europe constantly difficult.

Moreover, Britain was a late comer and did not actively participate in the foundation of the European Community and its rules, which means it has to adopt readymade norms by the founding members. In fact, Britain was invited through the labour government of the Prime Minister Atlee to be a founding member in the very first steps towards creating the European community through the creation of the ‘European Coal and steel community’ (ECSC) . However, Atlee officially refused the offer because of the aforementioned reasons.

The six founding members of the ECSC³⁵⁰ then decided to extend the scope of this community to a greater common market, “The Treaty of the European Community”, known also by “The Treaty of Rome”, took place and led to the creation of “European Economic community” (EEC) and the “European Atomic Energy Community” by France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, And West Germany, in which they eased the matters of

³⁵⁰ The six founding members are: France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and West Germany.

collaborations in the field of energy and exchange of goods between them. However and once again the British government of Anthony Eden rejected this treaty and did not give it too much attention or importance. After that Treaty, its founding countries improved and developed in terms of economy whereas Britain economic situation was sinking going through hard times because of internal crisis and the devaluation of its currency.

3. The American Influence Regarding UK Integration:

The United States' attitudes regarding Britain integration in Europe have always been favourable and for the idea of the United States of Europe where Britain is an active member. However, Britain attitude has been characterised by scepticism and avoidance to be part of the European community which threatened its identity and interests worldwide. This British attitude was not welcomed by the Americans, and was not helpful for the United States to carry out its policy in Europe. In fact, the British understanding of the "Special Relationship" was a fuel for those who are against Europeanism in the United Kingdom.

However, Britain was caught between choosing an Atlanticist future or an Europeanised one. Indeed, this matter of integrating the United Kingdom in a greater European community created hard times for the 'special relationship' between the United States and Great Britain and never let it rest in a peaceful status.

Moreover, the other European countries believed that this 'special relationship' between UK and USA will always stand as a rock in a complete European unity for the simple reason that Britain would always choose to lean towards USA at the extent of Europe; the fact which will make Britain looks like the 'Trojan horse' of the United States inside Europe.

In fact, the American Support was evident during the 1960's in form of the pressure put on the six founding members (West-Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and Netherlands) to help Britain join the EU. However, the first British application to join the

EEC was faced by a rejection and a veto from the French president Charles De Gaulle (1890-1970).

The latter, justified his stance and strongly believed that the strong link and commitment of Britain to both the United States as well as its Commonwealth could curb British dedication to the European Union. The fact which the Americans were aware of and predicted regarding how the French reaction and how stubborn they can be.

When De Gaulle vetoed British entry, he clearly was motivated by two things; firstly, he opposed the idea to bring in the EU a servant for the American interests, and secondly, France felt offended by the Polaris Deal.³⁵¹ It was evident that the “special relationship” both Britain and America enjoy, was the reason for the rejection of the British application as De Gaulle’s words and arguments showed, and that ‘special relationship’ with both countries created hard times for the British to be accepted by the other European neighbours.

In fact, the motto of the British administration during that time regarding the European integration was "interdependence," in other words; the British were against the creation of a federal state in Europe, or a creation of a unified European army, and thus the rejection of national forces, and hindering NATO efforts under the leadership of the USA, but rather a pragmatic way, in forms of interchange in economic policy of Western states in the interests of British economy.³⁵²

However, and once again, in May 1967, De Gaulle rejected for the second time the British application as mentioned before for he disliked the Anglo-American economic and monetary cooperation which emphasised the special treatments and operations between the two special partners, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. To put it

³⁵¹ A. P. Dobson, “the Special Relationship and European Integration”, (1991), 85-86.

³⁵² Gowland, D., Turner, A., Wright, A., “Britain and European integration since 1945: on the sidelines”, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 158

differently, the 'special relationship' was again an obstacle for Britain to be integrated in a united Europe.

As a matter of fact, the United States of America was impatient about the British lack of enthusiasm to join a united Europe. However, the United Kingdom was tortured by the thoughts of carrying 'the special relationship' into an integrated Europe and the challenges and implications related to that whether economic, military, or diplomatic. Needless to say, it was evident for them that having foot in both camps will be problematic. In fact, even for the Americans, the vision regarding the future of the 'special relationship' was characterised as being ambiguous.³⁵³

The United States of America actually supported eagerly the idea of European integration via the 'Marshal Plan' which set the very steps of founding the organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Paul Hoffman who was in charge of the Marshal Plan aid operations advocated for the idea of 'a single large market' in Western Europe.³⁵⁴

Moreover, the Americans continued to advocate for the previous idea especially in the scope of anti-communism despite some fears in the States from a Western European trading Cartel. In fact, President Kennedy told Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany in 1961 that: "It is best for the Atlantic Community if the United Kingdom joined the EEC (European Economic Community) on an unconditional basis"³⁵⁵.

Once again, in July 1962, he declared: "we [the Americans] do not regard a strong and a united Europe as a rival but as a partner. To aid its progress has been the objective of our

³⁵³ John Dumbrell, "A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After", (London: Macmillan, 2001), 173.

³⁵⁴ Bainbridge T. "The Penguin Companion to the European Union", (London: Penguin, 1998), 444.

³⁵⁵ "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-63", vol.13, (Washington DC: USGPO 1985), 6.

foreign policy for seventeen years.”³⁵⁶ The same policy was carried out during the time of President Johnson who confessed to the British Prime Minister Wilson that ‘the British entry would certainly help to strengthen the west’³⁵⁷, and that he is committed to provide all kinds of support to Britain to ease the path for its entrance in the European Economic Community.³⁵⁸ It was really evident that Wilson’s shift and new attitude concerning the integration of his country to EEC was due to constant US pressure on the British leaders to fit into their grand design for Europe.

Indeed, the American support for the European Integration was motivated by many factors which have been summarised by Geir Lundestad as follow:

First, European integration was seen as in the tradition of American federalism. Secondly, integration was seen to further the cause of political and economic rational efficiency. Thirdly, European integration might ease America’s defence burden. Fourthly, and unsurprisingly, European integration was seen as further the cause of Anti-Soviet containment. Lastly, and especially strong in the early years of integration though far from entirely absent thereafter, was the perceived need to contain Germany.³⁵⁹

Regarding the third factor, indeed, British policy makers were consistently worried that defence integration might speed the United States withdrawal from Europe- ‘letting them off the hook’, as the British Diplomat Roger Makins called it in the late 1940’s³⁶⁰. Another reason was the US looking up for economic benefits from trade with a strong Europe. Furthermore, and regarding the last factor, President Kennedy wrote in May 1961 to Macmillan that: “we [the Americans] believe that only with growing political coherence in Western Europe can we look to a stable solution of the peace of Germany.”³⁶¹

³⁵⁶ “Public Papers of the President of the United States ...John F. Kennedy 1962-64”, (Washington DC: USGPO, 1964), 538.

³⁵⁷ *ibid.*

³⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 332.

³⁵⁹ J. Dumbrell, “A Special Relationship...” 178.

³⁶⁰ H. Young, “One of Us”, 75.

³⁶¹ “ Foreign Relations of the US”, 20

Pascaline Winand, the director of studies at the college of Europe in Natolin, and the writer of the prize winning book *'Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe'*, early described that idea or vision as “a network of American and European friends and colleagues who co-inspired to further the cause of European integration”.³⁶² Ormsby Gore provided a comment in which he showed the extent to which the Americans wanted Britain in an integrated Europe, he said: “the US had heavy stake in the success of the negotiations.”³⁶³ He meant the negotiations and attempts to join the EEC.

Furthermore, President Johnson was not a pro-advocator for European integration as President Kennedy was. Indeed, President Johnson believed in an Atlanticised integrated Europe, where the United States enjoys strong links with the whole Europe, and benefits economically from that. The US President Johnson said in 1966: “every lesson of the past and every prospect for the future argue that the nations of Western Europe can only fulfil their proper role in the world community if increasingly they act together.”³⁶⁴

All of that shows clearly how much the United States wanted Britain to hasten the pace for joining the European community and put a huge pressure for that sake. In other words, their ‘special relationship’ made America interfere for Britain to be accepted in the EU to bring Britain closer to Europe and the Europeans on one hand, and to serve its national interest in an Atlanticised sphere on the other hand.

³⁶² Pascaline Winand, “Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe”, (London: Macmillan, 1993), 164.

³⁶³ John Dumbrell, “A Special Relationship...”, 179.

³⁶⁴ “Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson”, 1966-67”, (Washington DC: USGPO 1985), 477.

4. Britain as a EU Member Struggling to Hold on to the S.R:

After the United Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973, the British public opinion as well as the British politicians realised that their country did not achieve any economic progress, especially with the oil crisis of 1973. The labour party during the 1970s, opposed the idea of staying within the EEC, and promised to make a referendum on withdrawal if they won the next elections in 1974. In 1975, Wilson, the labour leader came to power and was good to his words. Indeed, he conducted the promised referendum in 1974 for the fact that his country with the EEC did not achieve any economic boost. However, the results were not as expected, and Britain remained in the EEC. Thus, the labour leaders changed their mind, and became more engaged in Europe. Meanwhile, the conservatives started to question their entrance into the EEC, and they were against it in the 1970s. That fact was evident in the time of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990).

When M. Thatcher came to power in 1979, she openly expressed her disbelief in the integration because she was pro American, and British isolation from Europe was evident. Indeed, she was against a complete economic, political, and social integration. Thatcher government believed that Britain contributed more to the European budget than the other members, and this should be changed; knowing that a great share of the European Community budget was spent on the common agriculture policy which is not a major sector in the United Kingdom. That fact which made Britain feels that it benefited less than the other countries. Great Britain made a contribution of 20% from the total Community budget, but it got from it in the form of various payments only about 10% during the 1980s³⁶⁵

In this regard, Margaret Thatcher began the struggle for the reduction of the British contribution to the Community budget. Already in November 1979 at the meeting of the

³⁶⁵ Minford P., Mahambare V., Nowell E, "Should Britain leave the EU? : an economic analysis of a troubled relationship, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar in association with the Institute of Economic Affairs", 2005), 14

Council of Ministers of the EEC she demanded the return of one billion pounds sterling from the Community budget, not 350 million as EEC Commission offered.³⁶⁶

Moreover, Thatcher believed that the United Kingdom was losing its sovereignty to Brussels, she stated in her Bruges Speech in 1988 that:

To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve ...Working more closely together does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy.³⁶⁷

For the British, joining the European unity was motivated by and for economic reasons only, without seeking any political integration. Once again, the ‘special relationship’ between Great Britain and the United States of America was at the heart for Prime Minister Thatcher was a pro-American, and chose to side the Americans, in many occasions, on the extent of Europe which created some frictions between the United Kingdom and the members of the European Community .

Later on, in 1990, John Major replaced Thatcher as Prime Minister from 1990 to 1997, and ratified the Maastricht³⁶⁸ Treaty 1992, which contributed to the foundation of the European Union (EU).

Indeed, one of his main achievements was negotiations in December 1991 concerning the Maastricht Treaty. He was proud that with the help of a tough stance he was able to defend the interests of his country, and to secure a special status in the EU.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁶ Stephen, W. “A stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair.” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 7.

³⁶⁷ Margaret Thatcher, “The Bruges Speech”, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Bruges, 1988.

<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=107332>. Last seen in 09/12/2020.

³⁶⁸ The Maastricht Treaty on the European Union envisaged three main directions of integration - the creation (mainly through the introduction of the single currency) of a single European market, the European Central Bank (ECB), the unification of internal and legislative policies of the member- countries, the formation of a single course in the field of foreign policy and defence. Britannica.com

³⁶⁹ J. Major, “The Autobiography”, (London: Harper Collins, 1990), 267

However, John Major withdrew from some sections, the social ones which mainly deal with social policy and the monetary union, the fact which reinforced the outlandish British position towards the European Union in the beginning and mid 1990s.

In 1997, the leader of the labour party, Tony Blair³⁷⁰ became Prime Minister. He was Pro-European and very enthusiastic to the idea of the European Union. Thus, he directly signed the social chapter of the Maastricht Treaty which provides a legislative tool by extending in an extremely limited way, qualified majority voting to some areas of social policy, which Thatcher and Major after her refused to sign. Blair, indeed, ratified the Social Chapter of the Treaty on European Union, initiated a discussion on the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, fully supported the idea of the need for institutional reform and participated in the process of EU enlargement.

In fact, Britain under the leadership of the labour party of Blair and Gordon brown³⁷¹, succeeded to maintain the image of a European member, an image different from the one that existed before these two labour leaders. However and once more, the 'special relationship' of Britain and America was there to trouble the UK - EU relations. Indeed, many EU members believe that the European Union was created to counter weight the United States of America. However, Britain did not support this vision for it would harm its 'special' relation and dwindle its foreign policy options. The conflictual situation became evident and apparent after the attacks of September 2001³⁷². Tony Blair stood blindly by the American side and sent troops to Afghanistan and Iraq while going against the will of the European Union members which strongly opposed his move. He believed that Britain interests are best served by

³⁷⁰ A British politician who served as a prime minister of the UK from 1997 to 2007. Britannica.com

³⁷¹ A British politician who served as a British prime minister of the labour party from 2007 to 2010. Britannica.com.

³⁷² The September 11 attacks, also referred to as 9/11, were a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks by the militant islamist terrorist group al Qaeda against the United States on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001. Britannica.com.

remaining 'shoulder to shoulder'³⁷³ with the American government. Blair's government showed close links to the United States of America which sometimes exceeded those with the European Union. This prevailing attitude was always there to trouble the United Kingdom's position in the EU.

The New Labour governments tried to combine the European policy and the "special relationship" with the United States, but obviously that did not bring any benefits, but rather became the subject for criticism within Britain and the EU.

Moreover, Great Britain took an active role regarding the matter of developing a European institution in December 2001. The draft of the constitution suited Britain to a great extent and met its expectation to the degree it was even called a British project.³⁷⁴ However, the Conservatives consistently opposed it. For them, Great Britain had already given too much power to Brussels.³⁷⁵

The agreement on the Constitutional Treaty assumed the establishment of the President, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the EU, the transfer of a considerable part of a state policy to Brussels, the emergence of the flag, hymn and motto of the EU, introduction of the term "European law", the rules of a qualified majority voting in the Council of the EU, on which depended the degree of influence of the member-states in decision-making.³⁷⁶

Indeed, all the clauses that led to the creation of a single European state were removed from the document, mainly, those regarding such symbols as the flag, anthem and coat of

³⁷³ Seldon Andrew, "How will History judge Blair", BBC News, 10 May 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/news/policy/6636091.stm> Last seen in 29/12/2020.

³⁷⁴ Gifford, C, "The Making of Eurosceptic Britain: Identity and Economy in a Post-imperial State.", (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008), 145

³⁷⁵ Time for Common Sense. Conservative Party General Election Manifesto (2001). Retrieved from <http://www.conservativeparty.net/manifestos/2001/2001-conservative-manifesto.shtml>, last seen in 29/12/2020.

³⁷⁶ European Constitution. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/09_01_05_constitution, last seen in 29/12/2020.

arms of the EU. All that could suggest an idea of a super state nature of the European Union were left out.

At the same time, the Treaty of Lisbon³⁷⁷ of 2007 suggested the introduction of the president of the EU who will be elected for 2,5 years. Also, The European Commissioner for External Relations was to be introduced into its structure. It was also planned to expand the powers of the European Parliament, which would get greater influence on legislative matters, especially in the sector of Justice and Home Affairs.³⁷⁸

The Conservatives opposed this treaty as well. They called for a nationwide referendum, because, according to them, the new treaty was a copy of the European Constitution. In particular, in 2007, David Cameron publicly gave a strong affirmation which guaranteed such a referendum.³⁷⁹ He promised the day they come to power to put the document to a nationwide vote. “There will be no change in Conservative policy as long as the Lisbon Treaty is still not in force”, said by David Cameron. According to him, if the treaty does not come into force before the general parliamentary elections in Britain in 2009, the new Conservative government will hold the referendum. “If the Treaty is not ratified in all Member States and not in force when the election is held, and if we are elected, then we will... lead the campaign for a ‘No’ vote” , said by David Cameron.³⁸⁰

In 2009 the Conservatives party actively campaigned against the Lisbon Treaty, in which they believed would have given much of a national power to the EEC. Following the results of the general elections in May 2010, a coalition government was formed headed by

³⁷⁷ It is an international agreement which amends the two treaties which form the constitutional basis of the European Union. It was signed by the EU member states on 13 December 2007, and entered into force on 1 December 2009. Britannica.com.

³⁷⁸ Treaty of Lisbon. Retrieved from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:TOC>, last seen in 29/12/2020.

³⁷⁹ Hannan, D.(2007, October 26) ”Cast-iron guarantee”must not rust. Retrieved from http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/danielhannan/3677881/Castiron_guarantee_must_not_rust/, last seen in 29/12/2020.

³⁸⁰ Helm, T., McDonald, H. (2009, October 4). Tory turmoil over EU as Ireland says Yes to Lisbon treaty Retrieved from: <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/oct/04/conservatives-eu-ireland-lisbon-yes>, last seen in 29/12/2020.

both, the leader of the Conservative Party David Cameron and Liberal Democrats leader Nick Clegg³⁸¹. The real difference between them is that the Liberal Democrats are pro-European, unlike the Conservatives, who are Eurosceptics. However, the main foreign policy priorities of the new government remain both transatlantic and European.

In February 2013, D. Cameron repeated the proposal of holding a referendum whether to stay in the EU or not, as he expressed hope that Britain will not leave the EU. For him, the Union can regain trust of the British, if it will conduct reforms. Indeed, the Liberal Democrats were not for this idea, and in fact, D. Cameron was genuinely trying to appease eurosceptics in his party, who threaten to dismiss him from its leadership.

In more details, David Cameron wanted to hold the referendum after the victory of the Conservative Party in the parliamentary elections in June 2015. Only then and after the negotiations with the EU members, the cabinet will proceed for that referendum. He suggested that a new treaty should be made between all EU member states, or at least, a new agreement should give London its sovereignty back.³⁸²

Moreover, after the ratification of the Treaty by the last 27th EU state Czech Republic in November 2009, the Conservatives finally had to rethink its vision. David Cameron admitted that the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, of which he made promises, was no longer possible to hold. However, he firmly repeated that never again would Britain agree to transfer some of its powers to Brussels without a referendum.³⁸³

David Cameron stated regarding the new policy towards the European Union, after he gave up on his promise to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty: “We [the British] cannot hold a referendum and magically make the Lisbon treaty disappears. Because it is no longer a

³⁸¹ A British politician who served as leader of the Liberal Democrats(2007-15) and as deputy prime minister of the UK (2010-15). Britannica.com.

³⁸² Helm, T. (2012, June 30). David Cameron pledges referendum if EU demands more powers. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/jun/30/david-cameron-referendum-eu>, last seen in 30/12/2020.

³⁸³ David Cameron: A Europe policy that people can believe in. Retrieved from: <http://conservativehome.blogs.com/files/david-cameron-europe-statement>, last seen in 20/12/2020.

treaty: it is being incorporated into the law of the European Union.”, - D. Cameron admitted³⁸⁴. The Treaty actually entered into force on December 1, 2009.

Furthermore, he promised again to pass a law on which would guarantee that the last word will remain for British legislators. For him, Britain will have an opportunity to express its opinions on all important future European treaties. As he noted, the guarantee of a referendum on future treaties and the return to London the authority in certain matters - is "significant, real and achievable."³⁸⁵ It seemed like David Cameron was trying to blackmail the EU, return some of the powers, or we will withdraw.

D. Cameron (2010-2015) expected that he will get the same results as Harold Wilson (1974-1975) when he successfully used the threat of using a referendum to get the EEC members to reconsider the terms of UK entry, and gained favourable outcomes for his country. In this situation, in fact, London came closer to M. Thatcher vision to exit the EU.

M. Thatcher clearly uttered that the British are deceiving themselves by believing that they can stop or slow down the creation of a European super state, and she urged them to leave the EU. Her view back then was considered as extreme, and did not change anything. However, it seems that D. Cameron government returned to Thatcher's position on the matter.

Furthermore, on the other side, The American attitude towards what was happening within the European community, and especially regarding UK stand, was characterised by anger and somehow threatening London to reconsider its position. One can easily deduce that from President Barrack Obama's attitude who considered German Chancellor Angela Merkel³⁸⁶ to be his "closest international partner" and said the UK would be at the "back of the queue" in any trade deal with the US if it left the European Union, and he accused British

³⁸⁴ Summers, D. (2009, November 4). David Cameron admits Lisbon treaty referendum campaign is over. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/nov/04/david-cameron-referendum-campaign-over>, last seen in 30/12/2020.

³⁸⁵ D.Cameron speech on EU. (2009). Retrieved from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8343145.stm>, last seen in 30/12/2020.

³⁸⁶ A German politician and scientist who served as the Chancellor of Germany from 2005 to 2021. She was the first female chancellor of Germany.

Prime Minister David Cameron (2010-2015) of being "distracted by a range of other things" during the 2011 military intervention in Libya.³⁸⁷ However, later he stated that he respected the decision made by the people of the UK, despite not supporting the country leaving the EU. This period of the American president Obama (2008-2015) and the British Prime Minister David Cameron (2010-2015) actually marked somehow the eminent waning of the special relationship between the UK and the USA, and it remained then as an empty historical term used in some diplomatic occasions.

5. Impact of the ‘Special Relationship’ in an Atlanticised Context:

The phrase ‘Special Relationship’ entails the inventors’ perception that the UK-US alliance is both unique and dominant. As mentioned before, the existence of shared language, history and values, as well as the war experience loaded the word ‘special’ with a significance of a special identity implemented in reality,

Furthermore, this special form of identification suggests the existence of a shared identity between the two countries. The collective ‘Self’ of the US and the UK within the ‘Special Relationship’ sets them apart from the ‘Others’ who are not part of the alliance.³⁸⁸

This separation of ‘Self’ from ‘Other’ connotes the self-perception of the dominance of the US-UK relationship in comparison to other Transatlantic alliances. In fact, the relationship between the UK and the United States of America has become an ‘unusually self-conscious one’, as Alex Danchev noted.³⁸⁹ Therefore, indicating that the two states are both aware of the unique alliance and identity that they enjoy.

³⁸⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/politics>. (Friday 11 Mar, 2016), last seen in 30/12/2020.

³⁸⁸ Buzan, Barry, “The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century”, (Polity Press Ltd, 2004), 18.

³⁸⁹ Danchev, Alex, ‘Tony Blair’s Vietnam: The Iraq War and the ‘Special Relationship’ in Historical Perspective’, *Review of International Studies* Vol.33, No.2, 200, 190.

Therefore, the ‘Special Relationship’ between both countries can be considered to dominate all other transatlantic partnerships, for the mere reason that Britain and America have identified each other as unique allies.

The term ‘special relationship’ was historically comprehended that Britain and America share language, history and values and they still maintain similar perceptions of the world and how it should be,³⁹⁰ that perspective which has been put into practice. A case in point, the 2015 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) highlighted how the two nations provide joint global leadership to promote international stability, and some of their key shared interests which include working to combat terrorism, as well as ‘promoting the rule of law and free trade’.³⁹¹

Speaking in economic terms, America in reality is the UK’s largest single export partner.³⁹² This entails that for the British; the ‘Special Relationship’ can be superior on an international level rather than only be dominating the transatlantic relations. These two nations, the United Kingdom and the United States, also invest \$1 trillion in each other’s economies, making the ‘Special Relationship’ the closest investment alliance in the world³⁹³, therefore maintaining and reinforcing the dominance of their special partnership both on a Transatlantic, and a global dimension. Therefore, the transatlantic ascendancy of the ‘Special Relationship’ goes beyond existing in the linguistic and rhetoric realm.

In Military and intelligence terms, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in 2010, showed US-UK intelligence sharing as a basic feature of the special

³⁹⁰ Dobson, Alan, & Marsh, Steve, “Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship”, *The International History Review* Vol.26, No.4, 2014, 689.

³⁹¹ Ministry of Defence, ‘*National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom*’, [online] London: Cabinet Office.2015. retrieved from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf. seen on 10th January, 2021

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Fox, Liam, *Brexit Can Supercharge Britain’s ‘Special Relationship’ with the US*, time.com. retrieved from: <https://time.com/5467867/liam-fox-brexit-trade-us/>.(30th November2018), seen on: 9th January 2021.

relationship, observing that ‘the field of intelligence cooperation is one of the areas where the UK-US relationship can be rightly described as “special’.³⁹⁴ This perception was more recently confirmed in the 2015 SDSR, which described the US-UK intelligence sharing relationship as ‘unparalleled’.³⁹⁵

Furthermore, the British and the American intelligence agencies have been often proven to work exceptionally close with each other. For example, in 2013, it came to be known as a fact that the US National Security Agency had given around £100 million to one of the UK’s intelligence agencies within a three-year time to secure both access and influence to some of the UK’s key intelligence collecting programmes.³⁹⁶

This shows to what extent the British and the American agencies are cooperating with each other’s intelligence gathering, which also suggests the financial and monetary aspect incorporated in the process. Thus, one can easily deduce that the ‘Special Relationship’ between Britain and America dominates all other transatlantic relations for it enjoys an unparalleled alliance in terms of intelligence sharing. This feature has genuinely given real superiority over the other transatlantic partnerships.

Military collaboration and closeness with the United States, however, has also led Britain towards ambiguous and controversial decisions. A clear example of this was the 2003 Iraq invasion. After the 9/11 attacks, the UK opposed attacking any country that is not clearly connected to this dramatic event. Nevertheless, British policy rapidly shifted its direction to

³⁹⁴ House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Global Security: UK-US Relations*, HC 114, London: The Stationary Office Limited. 2010. retrieved from: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcaff/114/114.pdf> .seen on : 9th March 2021.

³⁹⁵ Ministry of Defence, ‘*National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom*’, [online] London: Cabinet Office.2015. retrieved from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf. seen on 10th January, 2021

³⁹⁶ Hopkins, Nick & Borger, Julian,), *Exclusive: NSA Pays £100m in Secret Funding for GCHQ*, *theguardian.com*, (1st August 2013, Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden> seen on: 10th March 2021.

support the Americans in their new operation to invade Iraq in order to overthrow Saddam Hussein.

The invasion was carried out despite the uncertainty over Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the British Prime Minister then, Tony Blair, sided the US in its operation, apparently in an attempt to put himself in a position to influence the American decision making process. That move which has been interpreted by some scholars like Dumbrell as a "warning against excessive loyalty to American war agendas".³⁹⁷ Yet more importantly, in the past Britain was capable of going against the American will and wish, as demonstrated in the Vietnam War, when the British Prime Minister Wilson refused to send military troops to support the United States.³⁹⁸

It's worthwhile noting that the flexible nature of the Anglo-American special relationship has allowed disagreements like this to happen without permanently harming it.

This 'special' alliance which was demonstrated by the aforementioned 2003 Iraq War, in which the UK supported the US action despite of all odds, has been interpreted as a basic example of the defensive nature of the 'Special Relationship'.³⁹⁹

Wyn Rees has noticed that during this period, UK loyalty almost solely lay with Washington, largely to the detriment of some of the UK's European relationships.⁴⁰⁰

This view is sustained and supported by Jane Sharp, who believes that the UK prioritised its alliance with America over relationships with some of its most vital European

³⁹⁷ Dumbrell, John, "The US-UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st-Century Temperature", *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* Vol.11, 2009, 65.

³⁹⁸ Dobson, Alan, & Marsh, Steve, 'Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship', *the International History Review* Vol.26, No.4, 2014, 689.

³⁹⁹ Rees, Wyn, *The US-EU Security Relationship*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 42.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

allies.⁴⁰¹ Therefore, the Iraq War demonstrated the ascendancy of the UK-US ‘Special Relationship’ over others in the Transatlantic, as the two partners stood by each other despite all the criticism they faced from other European powers.⁴⁰²

Moreover, nuclear cooperation has continuously been considered as a unique feature of the ‘Special Relationship’. In fact, as stated earlier, The Mutual Defence Agreement of 1958 allowed for exceptional cooperation on nuclear technologies⁴⁰³, and this latter was freshened in 2014 for a further ten years.⁴⁰⁴

In addition, the ‘special’ defensive relationship can also be observed through the use of joint forces and collaboration on defensive programmes.⁴⁰⁵ For example, Britain is the only ‘first degree partner’ to the US on the Joint Strike Fighter Programme, which is one of the largest defence equipment programmes, and this has paved the way for the UK to have a unique status and a priority in purchasing US defensive equipment.⁴⁰⁶

Furthermore, the ‘Special Relationship’ has proved itself to be a key element of NATO. A British House of Commons Defence Committee report concluded that the US-UK alliance was ‘fundamental for the functioning of NATO’, citing the relationship’s leadership within the organisation, superior ability to deploy troops, financial involvement, and largely complementary policy goals as key reasons for this.⁴⁰⁷ On the other hand, the Other European powers, Germany for instance, have been continuously hesitating to contribute in such a way

⁴⁰¹ Sharp, Jane, ‘Tony Blair, Iraq and the Special Relationship: Poodle or Partner?’, *International Journal*, Vol.59, No.1, 2003, 59.

⁴⁰² ⁴⁰² Rees, Wyn, *The US-EU Security Relationship*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 42.

⁴⁰³ House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Global Security: UK-US Relations*, HC 114, London: The Stationary Office Limited. 2010. retrieved from: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaaff/114/114.pdf> .seen on : 9th March 2021.

⁴⁰⁴ Norton-Taylor, Richard, *UK-US Sign Secret New Deal on Nuclear Weapons*, theguardian.com. (29th July 2014, Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/defence-and-security-blog/2014/jul/29/nuclear-weapons-us-uk-cooperation> , seen on: 11th March 2021.

⁴⁰⁵ Oliver, Tim & Williams, Michael, ‘Making the Special Relationship Great Again’, *LSE IDEAS*, 2017, 6.

⁴⁰⁶ Rees, Wyn, *The US-EU Security Relationship*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 41.

⁴⁰⁷ House of Commons Defence Committee, *Indispensable Allies: NATO and UK Defence Relations*, HC 387, [online] London: House of Commons. 2018,27, Retrieved from: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmdfence/387/387.pdf> , seen on: 10th March 2021

to NATO, and do not pay 2% of their GDP to the organisation.⁴⁰⁸ This reinforces the Special Relationship's transatlantic hegemony within multilateral institutions instead of its bilateral nature.

Worth mentioning, with the talks starting about implementing what the British Prime minister David Cameron promised regarding the British exit from the EU, some believe that the UK will put more focus on the 'special relationship', like the Ex-Secretary of State for International Trade, Liam Fox who believed that Brexit⁴⁰⁹ would provide the UK with the 'opportunity to raise 'the Special Relationship' to a new level".⁴¹⁰ One of the main British strategies after their exit from the EU is to negotiate new deals with both the Americans and the European Union which showcase the British dependence on the 'special relationship' once again.

As such, from the UK's viewpoint, the supremacy of the 'Special Relationship' somehow comes from a state of dependency. Thus, this extent of dependency means that the 'Special Relationship' does dominate all other relationships in the context of the Transatlantic, as the United Kingdom lies more on the United States than any other relationships with the Europeans.

It can be said that the alliance's supremacy depends more on self-interest, context, and from which perspective one is looking. In fact, the dominance of the 'Special Relationship' from the American point of view is more conditioned on self-interest and whenever time is convenient to activate it or not. As analysed earlier, the decline of the United Kingdom as a

⁴⁰⁸ Knuckey, James, *NATO: Which Countries Pay Their Share on Defence?*, forces.net, (29th November 2019), Retrieved from: <https://www.forces.net/news/world/nato-which-countries-pay-their-share-defence>, seen on: 12th March 2021.

⁴⁰⁹ The British exit from the European Union.

⁴¹⁰ Fox, Liam, *Brexit Can Supercharge Britain's 'Special Relationship' with the US*, time.com. retrieved from: <https://time.com/5467867/liam-fox-brexit-trade-us/>, (30th November 2018), seen on: 9th January 2021.

supreme Power during the 1960's and 1970's caused a decline in Britain's value to the United States, and therefore, a decline in the 'special relationship'.⁴¹¹

This entails that the 'Special Relationship' is only dominant from the American part when the British are more powerful to contribute to the alliance. So, a rational question should be raised here regarding the British actual value to the Americans. The United Kingdom has traditionally bridged the US and Europe, and has advocated for policies within Europe that align with American stances.⁴¹²

Therefore, the fact that the British will leave the EU may harm this important position that the UK enjoyed, and thus lead to a decline in the perceived value of the UK as a 'special' US partner. In that regard, the American President Obama warned that the UK would be at the 'back of the queue' for a trade deal with the US if it left the EU. The fact which connotes that the 'special relationship' does not hold a consistent position of superiority and that for America, the dominance of the 'Special Relationship' is dependent on context and self-interest. Thus, it is more dominant from the UK perception, but rather flexible based on convenience and context from the American perspective.

Speaking in diplomatic terms, The 'Special Relationship's' ascendancy is dictated by context and the trials that it faces. This means that the relationship cannot be dominant all the time, as we have seen earlier that both Britain and America may sometimes align themselves together in their decisions regarding some issues, and other times may radically disagree. This line of thought is significantly demonstrated by the Suez Crisis of 1956.⁴¹³

⁴¹¹ Reynolds, David, "A Special Relationship"? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War", *International Affairs* Vol.62, No.1, 1985, 13.

⁴¹² Oliver, Tim & Williams, Michael, 'Special Relationships in Flux: Brexit and the Future of the US-EU and US-UK Relationships', *International Affairs* Vol.92, No.3, 2016, 554.

⁴¹³ Dumbrell, John, "A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After", (Macmillan Press Ltd.2001), 46.

The British military action over the nationalisation of the Suez Canal was strongly opposed by the Americans, which obviously created an atmosphere of tension and mistrust within the alliance.⁴¹⁴ Accordingly, this case has been seen as one of the most vital crises of the ‘Special Relationship’, and proves how the alliance has not been consistently superior. Such situations can directly lead to shift attention on other transatlantic partnerships.

One of the most recent demonstrations of this is the transatlantic disagreements over Iran. While Britain continues to advocate for the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal with other European countries like France and Germany, the Americans opposed and retreated from the deal. The aforementioned Iran case, along with other historical cases we analysed before when the ‘special relationship was weak and almost damaged; can showcase how the ‘Special Relationship’ does not always dominate all other transatlantic alliances. Other relationships can be more dominant during the times of US-UK disagreement, and therefore the alliance only become superior to others when it is mutually beneficial for the UK and the USA.

The impact of self-interest on the dominance of the US-UK special relationship was also evident in the early 1970s during Britain’s petition for entry into the European Economic Community. British withdrew from America was conceived as a necessary move or condition for joining the European Community, as other European powers, namely France, did not want the United Kingdom acting as an American puppet within the organisation.⁴¹⁵

These examples demonstrate that both America and Britain can prioritise other European alliances and distance themselves from each other at times when their self-interest dictates so.

⁴¹⁴ Rees, Wyn, “The US-EU Security Relationship”, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 47.

⁴¹⁵ Bartlett, C. J, “The Special Relationship: A Political History of Anglo-American Relations Since 1945”, (New York, Longman Inc, 1992), 130.

The British-French defence agreement of 2010 supports this.⁴¹⁶ This treaty provide the mutual use of forces and aircraft tools, along with a greater levels of nuclear cooperation, which was beneficial for both countries for the declining military budgets of the two.⁴¹⁷ This proves how circumstances and self-interest dictate which partnerships are more important at certain times and situations, thus confirming that the ‘Special Relationship’ is not consistently dominant within the Transatlantic.

Oliver and William note that: “The alliance has a tendency to contextually disintegrate and become less significant due to personal relations or certain circumstances, but it re-emerges under more opportune conditions.⁴¹⁸ In fact, this fluidity is a key core within the ‘Special Relationship’.

Another important factor which contributes to the importance of the relationship is the change in leadership in both countries. The special relationship shifts its strength according to who the leaders are in the two nations, along with the public opinion of them. For example, it has been proven that the relationship was too strong under the leadership of the American President George W. Bush and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, as demonstrated by their joint action in Iraq 2003.⁴¹⁹

Nevertheless, this unique close relationship became distant under the Brown administration.⁴²⁰ Public opinion in Britain was strongly and clearly against the American leadership after the Iraq War, which resulted in a cooling of the special relationship between

⁴¹⁶ Wintour, Patrick, *Britain and France Sign Landmark 50-Year Defence Deal*, theguardian.com, (2nd November 2010), Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/nov/02/britain-france-landmark-50-year-defence-deal>, seen on: 12th March 2021.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

⁴¹⁸ Oliver, Tim & Williams, Michael, “Making the Special Relationship Great Again”, *LSE IDEAS*, 2017, 6.

⁴¹⁹ Rees, Wyn, “The US-EU Security Relationship”, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 124.

⁴²⁰ Dumbrell, John, ‘The US-UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st-Century Temperature’, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* Vol.11, 2009, 66.

the two states from 2008 to 2010,⁴²¹ and British leaders became even reluctant to use the term ‘Special Relationship’ in their diplomatic and political speeches.⁴²²

Moreover, during that time, the German and the French became closer to the US administration, the fact which generated a positive reaction and welcome from the American side.⁴²³ This closeness which was important for the Americans entails that leadership dynamics plays a crucial role in dictating the dominance of the ‘Special Relationship’.

Moreover, the election of the American President Barack Obama put an end, somehow, to the previous distance under Brown leadership which stopped the American unilateralism, and revived the values of the ‘Special Relationship’.⁴²⁴ However, as Marsh argued, Obama was perceived to be one of the least Anglophile Presidents in recent times, which may be due to his need to politically distance himself from the previous Bush administration.⁴²⁵

In fact, the US President Barrack Obama’s decision to hold his speech addressing the Europeans in Berlin rather than London during his election campaign was considered as a clever move to distance him from the previously unpopular US-UK close relationship.⁴²⁶

The latter indicates how perceptions of different leaders can influence the strength of the Anglo-American special relationship. Thus, contributing to the alliance’s shifting supremacy.

⁴²¹ Marsh, Steve, ‘Global Security: US-UK Relations: Lessons for the Special Relationship’, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* Vol.10, No.2, 2012, 182.

⁴²² Dumbrell, John, ‘The US-UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st-Century Temperature’, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* Vol.11, 2009, 66.

⁴²³ Dunn, David Hastings, ‘The Double Interregnum: UK-US Relations Beyond Blair and Bush’, *International Affairs*, Vol.84, No.6, 2008 1131.

⁴²⁴ Wallace, William, & Phillips, Christopher, ‘Reassessing the Special Relationship’, *International Affairs* Vol.85, No.2, 2009, 263.

⁴²⁵ Marsh, Steve, ‘Global Security: US-UK Relations: Lessons for the Special Relationship’, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* Vol.10, No.2, 2012, 191.

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

This proves that context, which leadership's switch is part of it, and self-interest are crucial agents in constructing the dominance of the special relationship. Therefore, these two factors can be considered as a key indicator of the changing transatlantic ascendancy of the 'Special Relationship'.

All in all, the findings of the research reveal after reviewing the main events of the century to determine the real importance of this relationship that 'the Special Relationship' between both the UK and the USA was and is a reality and a genuine alliance founded and implemented as a cornerstone in their foreign policy through different periods of times and administrations to face different threats and achieve considerable benefits for their countries at variant levels namely, Defence, intelligence, foreign policy, and economy.

Like any other relationship, this one was subject to difficulties and hardships, as demonstrated in the China and the Korean War (1950-1953), The Iran Crisis (1951), The Indochina War (1954-1955), The Suez Crisis (1956), The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and The Vietnam War 1955 (1954). However, no one could deny the intimate and trustworthy relations between "Churchill and Roosevelt", "Macmillan and Kennedy", "Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan", "Tony Blair and G. W. Bush" which were considered as symbols of this alliance and render it very special. In fact, their intimate personal relationships was an evident reason which helped this extraordinary relation to survive and keep kicking as well as the common language, culture, and their political principles similarities which helped the two countries ended WWII on the winning side.

The objectives to prove that the special relationship was real and genuine was fully met in the sense that it was more than essential and it continued influencing to a huge extent the decision making process in the United States' foreign policy, especially during the period of the British Prime Ministers Winston Churchill, Margaret Thatcher, Macmillan, and Tony

Blair; and the US Presidents D. Roosevelt, Kennedy, R. Reagan, and G.W. Bush., especially during the Cold War, and the Iraq War, and here, the conducted research shares almost the same line of thought or viewpoint advocated by some scholars like David Reynolds. i.e.: my deductions revealed that the special relationship was pragmatic by the Americans, a kind of Realpolitik, based on benefits, rather than sentimental which was the case of the British. Moreover, beyond these political leaders, the two countries together formed the foundations of NATO and very crucial intelligence-sharing network, institutions that persisted through time no matter what and whoever was the leader from both sides of the Atlantic.

The research also reveals that the special relationship' was built on economic, social, and cultural, as well as on common interests forged during the War as well as The capacity of feeling sympathy, trust, mutual consideration, and the will to accept the other's demands, which serve to fix differences in a friendly manner, and collaborate in domains of common interest, and helping each other whenever needed. Despite the fact that it was not formalised by any document, it persisted through time by succeeding administrations like any other alternative was possible for both countries. That special relationship was indeed a reality that held weight on the other side of the Atlantic.

The inactivity of the 'special relationship' by the Americans between 1945 and 1950, 1964 and 1975, in 1989, and more durably since 1991, despite Tony Blair's efforts; could be interpreted as a logical result of British economic decline especially with the economic boost of both Germany and France as well as its withdrawal from East Suez

Moreover, the importance of the 'special relationship' between the two countries at an international level, which has evolved considerably over the last sixty years as well as the central role 'the special relationship' plays in the representation of Great Britain in the world with a unique identity, and the personal element, all are determined factors which serve as a compass to this 'special relationship' through time.

The special relationship survived the end of the Cold War and being resurrected in the war against terror despite the predictions that it could come to an end after the end of the Cold War which it perfectly served. The Balkan episodes, indeed, clearly exposed the frictions between the US, the UK, and the EU and the status of Britain as a bridge linking the two continents became at stake. Nevertheless, with the coming of Bush to power and Blair, the 'special relationship' reached its highest point. Indeed, their personal relationship helped a lot in resurrecting the old 'special relationship' as well as their coalition in the war against terror after the 9/11 attacks, the war in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003.

The special relationship reached its lowest point of its history during Obama and D. Cameron period of governing in which the future of the special relationship started genuinely to be questioned. In fact, in this era from the history of the 'special relationship' even the use of this term becomes problematic and a matter of unease for politicians and leaders from both sides of the Atlantic, and frictions came to the surface especially during the Libya episode in 2010.

Furthermore, the failure of the two British attempts to join the EEC showed more clearly the critical character of 'the special relationship' for the status of Britain in the world. Indeed, the UK was perceived by some sceptical Europeans like France as the Trojan horse within the EU to serve the US agenda, the fact which made the relationship between the UK-US and the UK-EU even worse and problematic. Britain was caught between safe guarding its special relationship with the USA and gaining the trust of the Europeans and be an active member within the EU.

The Thatcher period, for instance, showed more clearly the reality part of the 'special relationship' without exaggerations. Agreements upon applying the same economic policy on both sides of the Atlantic gave more credibility and weight to her policy against her opposers. The image of her country able to influence US policy allowed her to go against the will of her

European partners. Indeed, from the Arrival of Thatcher to government in 1980, the ‘special relationship’ with the United States of America served the British to counter balance the grandeur of the European community.

As a matter of fact, it was always problematic for Britain to combine both approaches, i.e. pro American and pro EU at the same time, as demonstrated in the case of the Iraq War when Tony Blair sided by the USA going clearly against the will of his European partners. The British main concern was always where to put the main emphasis in their foreign and defence policy, and economic diplomacy whether with the USA which gradually started to lose its sympathy with the UK, or with the EU which never ease the path for a loose economic cooperation with Britain and which shares different visions regarding international order.

The US-UK special relationship obviously has some key dominant features in the transatlantic context. Mutual values and interests which were translated into practical realities, as well as economic exchange, defence and intelligence sharing are crucial elements which paves the way for the Anglo-American special relationship to dominate all the other transatlantic relations.

However, the ‘Special Relationship’ is not fixed, and is subject to change. The dominance of the relationship changes in strength depending on whose perspective one is looking from, and is clearly more dominant from the British side as it is the more dependent of the two allies. From the American view point, the alliance is only dominant some times when Britain appears to be a capable and useful partner. Moreover, the superiority of the relationship is deeply related to the leaders and levels of self-interest which can determine the importance and strength of the special relationship.

In fact, what should be done on a strategic level for both countries, the USA, and the UK to take the lead of the world today is the urgent revival and reactivation of the special relationship at all levels of cooperation especially facing the eminent danger of China and Russia. On the tactical and operational side, both countries should implement the previous techniques of collaboration, namely military, intelligence, and economic in today's wars and challenges raised by Russia in Ukraine and the middle east and Africa too to cut the way in front of China and Russia to lead the world with its new emerging powers and allies like Iran, and North Korea.

6. Conclusion:

Many historians, like Paul Sharp, saw Britain's position on the EEC in the fifties and the sixties and during entry into the European Community from 1973 as an outdated old foreign policy looking up to maintain and boost British influence in world affairs. Other Historians, like John Young believe the opposite and they explained the British entry into the EEC as a turning point in British foreign policy in the twentieth century.

It was actually under E. Heath's government (1970-1974) that London succeeded in fitting into the EU and set the cornerstones of the future of its policy with Europe. Under M. Thatcher's ruling (1979-1990), London chose to use a combination of a selective participation in the EU with a promotion of its own initiatives which helped adjust the development of the European Community in a direction which suited Britain the most. Its government aimed, on one hand, at slowing down the integration process in monetary and finance as much as possible to gain time for the restructuring of the British economy. On the other hand, the British wanted to accelerate the integration in foreign policy and security. Britain, indeed, rejected any changes that could give more power to the institutions of the Community.

Under J. Major (1990 to 1997) the general policy of Britain towards the EU did not change much. It was going through constant conflicts and tattered between Euro-scepticism which became evident during the last days of his premiership, and Euro-enthusiasm which helped ratify the Maastricht Treaty (1992) on the EU.

The British elite became convinced that it was almost impossible for them to change the EU from the inside. Thus, they got back to the old euro-sceptic attitude which was evident during the ruling of M. Thatcher.

Moreover, throughout the 13-year period of the Labour governments, London did not change its position of euro-scepticism. It strongly opposed the transfer of power and prerogatives to the institutions of the European Union which naturally reflected negative

attitudes regarding the EU constitution and the Lisbon Treaty which took its place later in 2007. Indeed, what Britain wanted is to get back some powers from the EU in some areas. For the British, The EU remains an important element, but not the only drive in British foreign policy priorities for the United Kingdom clearly emphasizes the importance of cooperation with both the United States and the Commonwealth as well as with new centres of power such as China.

The position of the late government did not change either. Britain focused on playing a crucial role within the EU through its engagement in strengthening the single European market, in the reform of the common agricultural policy and budget cuts. However, it kept a cautious attitude in the area of social policy, justice and defence. The British clearly and strongly opposed any attempts of European autonomy from NATO and the U.S. in the military field.

Great Britain despite its rejection of the euro, it remained committed to the economic field by supporting the idea of the single market, and also in the military field through NATO. It also advocated for the enlargement of the EU and for the implementation of common programs in the field of energy and transport. Last but not least, the British were for the idea of Europe of nation states without any federalization in the future. They, indeed, want to belong to Europe, but not controlled from it.

In general, The ‘Special Relationship’ is a fluctuating identity which is fluid and flexible in nature, and which has proved itself to be dynamic and pliable via variant contexts and situations.

The benefits obtained by the United Kingdom from its special relationship with the United States of America far outweigh the costs. Since the Second World War, they have been partners in many successful military and defence operations, as well as they developed a successful tradition in collaborating in intelligence, military research and training.

The United States, without any doubt, has been of special help to Britain to develop its security and nuclear deterrent. And since the American aid to Britain's economic recovery in the post-war period, the USA has become the first and the foremost economic partner and the main source of trade and investments within the UK. Fears regarding the UK becoming the American poodle in all matters and extremely dependent on it have been rejected by the fact that in many occasions Britain's directions and policies have totally opposed the American wishes, but without damaging the special relationship which was proven to be hard for Britain to manoeuvre in a transatlantic context. To keep close links to its European strategic dimension and the American one, indeed, was and remain a tough nut to crack within the British foreign policy and agendas.

General Conclusion:

The seed of the Anglo-American relations are nurtured by several factors including: the historical and the cultural ties, in which common language and colonization played an important role, Mutual interests and sentiments, in which the foreign policy stands at the peak, the legal and political structures, in which similar documents and shared values are prominent, Security and military aspects, in which alliances and nuclear weapon development have a vital role, and finally the common threat, in which anti-communism was the major theme. 'The Anglo-American special relation' had, indeed, a significant role especially in the twentieth century, for it navigated two World Wars and the multilateral conflict that was the Cold War.

After a series of events which were about to break the bone of the 'Special Relationship' between the United States of America and the United Kingdom, namely the Suez Crisis (1956) and The Vietnam War (1955), Britain seemed to manoeuvre again this relationship and paved the way for Margaret Thatcher to bridge the gap and fix what was about to tear both countries apart, during her premiership with President Reagan the 'special relationship', in fact, witnessed its golden age.

In fact, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, Callaghan and Jimmy Carter, are strong examples of harmony and compatibility that served to a great extent the special relationship between their countries. John Major, the conservative Prime Minister (1992-1997) and the democratic President Bill Clinton (1993-2001), also tried to keep the tradition of which the relation between the United States and the United Kingdom is defined. However, they were just not compatible.

Whatever was said, no one could deny the intimate and trustworthy relations between “Churchill and Roosevelt”, “Macmillan and Kennedy”, “Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan”, which were considered as symbols of the “special relationship”. Nevertheless, that relationship was constant, but variant in its intensity, and faced ups and downs through the years. Indeed, defence, intelligence, foreign policy, and economy, were the cornerstone or the pillars of this ‘special relationship’.

Moreover, some said, such as, the British Scholar Beatrice Heuser that the ‘special relationship’ comes to an end after the Cold War (1990). Their main arguments were that the special relationship was primarily based on military and intelligence cooperation and interests to get rid of the Soviet threat. The US commitment to Europe, mainly UK is questioned after the end of the Cold War for the mere reason explained by Beatrice Heuser that is the US commitment was linked to the conflicts and struggles with the Soviet Union, and that the US security starts with the stability in Europe. So, after the defeat of the Soviet Union, there is no need to carry out the same policy in Europe. Indeed, the United States had different plans after the end of the Cold War, its foreign policy was forwarded towards Asia mainly rather than the EU.

Furthermore, it is believed especially by Dumbrell that the Nixon presidency (1969-74) developed a sceptical view of an enlarged, competitive EC when the British Prime Minister Heath sought to re-orientate foreign policy away from the ‘special’ Anglo-American relationship towards the European Community. Thus, the Heath-Nixon period is viewed as a low point in the post-1945 alliance because of the EC enlargement.

As a matter of fact, Nixon considered Western European integration and Anglo-American relations to be important components of the Atlantic Alliance and his Cold War strategy. While the US supported an integrated Western Europe with British participation

since 1947 and the Marshall Plan (1948-51), Britain decided not to join in the early European integration projects of the 1950s, as a greater priority was placed on maintaining a global strategy. However, when the UK focussed on joining the EC, the US President Richard Nixon, entering office in January 1969, sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union, normalise relations with China, and end The Vietnam War (1955), therefore devoting less time to the Anglo-American alliance and the EC.

It became evident during post Cold War period that if the USA needed an intermediate with the European community, it would surely turn to Germany rather than London. In fact, in the Clinton era (1993-2001), Germany, Canada, and Mexico probably mattered more than the United Kingdom.

However, the 'special relationship' survived the post Cold War era mainly to Blair's reaction to the 9/11 attacks, and Bush the son new foreign policy and War on Terrorism. Also, it remained as special as it had never been during the First Gulf War (1990-91), and the Second (2003-2011). In those years, Prime Minister John Major (1990-97) committed a large division to the Gulf War under the command of President George H.W. Bush. Later (1997), Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bill Clinton walked hand in hand in Kosovo. Right after that, Blair stood unshakable, despite the entire local and international rage on his attitude, by the US President George W. Bush's side in the wars of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003).

As a matter of fact, through the history of the special relationship, one can easily deduce that it was saved by personal friendship, for instance, between President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair, and President Bush and Blair. In fact, the resilience of the Special relationship after the end of the Cold War was, indeed, mainly due common interests at that time.

Moreover, the United States of America, indeed, needed the United Kingdom within the EU believing that would serve ease many tasks for America in its new world order, share the burden in world security, and open new economic gates for it. Great Britain, in fact, was the US special ally and interlocutor within the EU. However, U.K.'s lost influence in Brussels reduces value of relationship with U.S. for their partnership with the United States always depended on its usefulness, and it becomes evident that it is starting to fall down especially after the British exit from the EU. In fact, the political, economic, and military relations of the United States and the United Kingdom have never looked worse after Britain pivots to China for its strategic technology.

Needless to say, what happened in Kosovo in 1998, Basra, Iraq's second-largest city at the time, when the British succeeded in 2003 in taking it and they spectacularly failed in holding it, as well as during a similar disaster that was awaiting the British soldiers in Helmand province in Afghanistan where the U.S. Marines rushed to reinforce the unprepared British soldiers; were warning signs that the 'special relationship' would not last. Since then, Britain lost its strategic value in the eyes of America which accelerated its unilateralism worldwide and that has not made the relationship any better, but it triggered the waning of that special relationship which was evident during the time of Obama (2009-2015) and David Cameron (2010-2015) .

For Britain, the country's exit from the EU signalled an exit from world leadership. Leaning to the Chinese looking for corporation in the field of technology and Intel in what was labelled The Huawei case, indeed, showed the desperate position UK is going through and striving. Things will be shaky for the British after leaving the EU regarding which path to follow or road to take. It is expected that it will stick to follow the EU trading rules, thus, less free trade deals would be realised with other nations. Its influence will dwindle in Washington both in the economic and diplomatic fields. If by any means the UK 'special relationship'

with the US persists, it will surely be confined to the military and intelligence fields, but this relationship would never be the same as before.

The British will do their best to save their special links within Europe and throughout the Atlantic. However, they will be forever facing the puzzle posed by Dean Acheson, the great US diplomat, back in 1962 when he said that Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role. Whichever path Britain may take, it will be difficult to survive alone in an everlasting dynamic world unless it recognises the compromises that are needed to solve today's big challenges. This means acknowledging that alone has never been a serious option and certainly is not today especially with China rising as a new superpower which may lead the world in the near future. The decline of the Anglo-American 'special relationship' will probably if not sure, prove to be a blessing into disguise, perhaps this is what Anglo-American relations need to bring back both countries together and be reunited once again like before to face the rise of the Chinese red dragon.

This research could be further improved by some important interviews with officials from both sides of the Atlantic, USA, UK, EU and some questionnaires conducted in their societies respectively to forecast people's opinions and views which was a tough nut to crack for me due to time and access restraints to people and government officials in the USA and the UK. Besides, for further research related to this study one could address the problematic of the future of the special relationship after Britain's exit from the EU, how much the British can count on the US to protect their interest in a post-Brexit world? And perhaps how to reactivate the old special relationship to face the new threats represented by China and Russia all together?

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Appendices:

Appendix 1:

Chronological order of historical key events:

- November 1940: First Anglo-American agreement on the collaboration of their intelligence services.
- March 11, 1941: Ratification of loan-lease agreement by Congress.
- August 1941: Churchill-Roosevelt meeting in Placentia Bay - signing of the, Atlantic Charter.
- August 19, 1943: Anglo-American nuclear cooperation agreement in Quebec.
- July 22, 1943: Bretton Woods Agreements Establishing a New World Economic and Monetary Order.
- November 28, 1943: Tehran Conference - Churchill is reduced to playing a secondary role.
- September 1944: Hyde Park agreement on continuation of Anglo-American nuclear cooperation after the defeat of Japan.
- August 31, 1945: Suspension of loan-lease.
- December 1945: Agreement on a major loan from the United States to Great Britain.
- March 5, 1946: Speech by Churchill in Fulton, Missouri, "An Iron Curtain Has Come Down Over Europe".
- March 12, 1947: Truman's speech to congress setting forth the "Truman Doctrine".
- June 5, 1947: Marshall's speech at Harvard - Massive US aid to Europe.
- July 15, 1947: ephemeral re-establishment of the free convertibility of the pound.
- October 4, 1947: The United States accepts the idea of partitioning Palestine.
- January 7, 1948: Signature between the United States and Great Britain of the modus vivendi on nuclear energy.
- February 25, 1948: Prague coup: the communists seize power in Czechoslovakia.

- March 17, 1948: Treaty of Brussels establishing the WEU.
- June 11, 1948: Adoption by the Senate of the Vandenberg resolution recommending that the United States participate in regional defence agreements.
- June 14-15, 1948: Independence of India.
- June 1948: Bevin authorizes American bombers stationed in Great Britain to intervene in Europe.
- July 1, 1948: Beginning of the airlift to rescue the inhabitants of West Berlin.
- August 1948: Congress passes the McMahon Act banning all nuclear communications with foreign countries.
- April 4, 1949: Signature in Washington of the North Atlantic Treaty.
- October 1, 1949: Proclamation of the People's Republic in China.
- January 1950: Recognition of People's China by Great Britain.
- June 25-27, 1950: Communist troops from North Korea invade the South and take Seoul.
- September 15-25, 1950: MacArthur succeeded in his counteroffensive in Korea and reached the 38th parallel on October 2.
- November 25-26: Chinese troops cross the Yalu River and sweep over Korea.
- November 30: Truman does not rule out the use of atomic weapons in Korea.
- March 8, 1951: Nationalization of Anglo-Iranian Oil by Dr Mossadegh.
- April 1951: Austerity budget presented by Gaitskell: massive increase in military spending.
- September 1, 1951: Defence Treaty between the United States, Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS).
- August 19, 1953: Overthrow of Dr Mossadegh thanks to CIA-MI 6 cooperation.
- May 8, 1954: Fall of Dien Bien Phu taken by the Communist troops of the Viet-minh.
- April 25 - July 1954: Geneva Conference regulating the situation of Indochina.

- September 1954: At the London Conference, Great Britain undertook to have 4 divisions stationed permanently in Germany.
- July 19, 1956: Foster Dulles announces the suspension of American aid to Egypt for the construction of the Aswan High Dam.
- July 26, 1956: Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal.
- October 29, 1956: Israel launches offensive in Sinai - Suez crisis.
- November 2, 1956: The American motion condemning the Franco-British intervention in Egypt adopted by an overwhelming majority.
- November 6, 1956: Britain and France accept ceasefire requested by UN.
- October 4, 1957: The Russians launch the first artificial satellite "Sputnik".
- 1957: Sandy's White Paper.
- November 10, 1958 : Khrushchev announces that he wants to integrate all of Berlin into the GDR - a six-month ultimatum addressed to Westerners.
- November 27, 1956: .Berlin crisis
- 1958: Repeal of McMahon act.
- September 1959: Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting at Camp David - Khrushchev renounces his ultimatum on Berlin.
- Mars 1960: Macmillan visit to Washington - agreement on US Skybolt missiles to equip RAF V-bombers.
- April 17-19, 1961: Failure of the landing in the Bay of Pigs of Cuban exiles supported by marines.
- June 2-4, 1961: Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna. Kennedy stops in London.
- August 1961: Building of the Berlin Wall.
- June 16, 1962: Speech by Dean Acheson in Ann Arbor thinly veiled condemnation of the British nuclear force.

- October 16, 1962: Cuban missile crisis.
- October 22, 1962: Kennedy announces that the Soviets are installing missiles in Cuba, he imposes a total blockade on the island.
- December 11, 1962: McNamara, visiting London, announces the abandonment of the Skybolt program.
- December 21, 1962: Nassau Accords: Great Britain receives Polaris missiles.
- January 14, 1963: De Gaulle opposes his veto to the entry of Great Britain into the EEC.
- April 6, 1963: Polaris deal.
- August 5, 1963: Signing in Moscow of the agreement banning land and atmospheric nuclear tests.
- 1964: Effective abandonment by Washington of Multilateral Nuclear Force proposals.
- February 7, 1965: Johnson decides on several waves of bombardments on North Vietnam.
- April 1, 1965: The Wilson government preferred the American F 111s to their British competitors.
- June 17-20 1965: Wilson proposes to the Conference of Commonwealth countries to send a mediation mission to Vietnam - Refusal of the North Vietnamese.
- November 11, 1965: Unilateral declaration of independence of Rhodesia by the white government.
- June 29, 1966: Wilson disapproves of the Commons and the American bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong.
- 1967: Major defence cuts announced by London, especially East of Suez.
- November 16, 1967: 14% devaluation of the pound.
- January 16, 1968: Wilson announces the gradual end of the British presence east of Suez and in the Middle East.
- July 1, 1968: Nuclear Anti-Proliferation Treaty.
- 1971: Indo-Pakistan War.

- May 1972: SALT I and AMBT agreement on the limitation of long-range missiles.
- April 23, 1973: Nixon's speech launching the Year of Europe.
- July 25, 1973: Heath refuses to discuss with the Americans on Europe without his European partners.
- 1973: Britain accedes to Treaty of Rome.
- October 6, 1973: The Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt and Syria breaks out.
- October 24, 1973: US forces on high alert for fear of Soviet intervention in the conflict.
- 1974: Cyprus crisis.
- June 1976: Americans get standby credit for Britain.
- 1976: IMF crisis.
- January 1979: Jamaica Summit - Callaghan obtains from Carter the study of the request for a Trident submarine equipped with C-4 missiles. The Agreement is signed the following July.
- December 12, 1979: The Americans are announcing the upcoming deployment of Intermediate-range missiles in Europe.
- 1980: Rhodesian settlement.
- 1981: Trident deal - Siberian pipeline project cancellation.
- March 1982: Thatcher-Reagan Agreement on Polaris II and D-5 missiles.
- April 2, 1982: Capture of the Falklands by the Argentines
- April 29, 1982: Argentina rejects Haig's peace plan.
- June 14, 1982: The Falklands taken over by the British.
- March 23, 1983: Reagan presents the Strategic Defence Initiative [SDI].
- September 1983: Mr Thatcher visits Washington - Convinces Reagan not to include British and French nuclear forces in negotiations with the Russians on nuclear arms limitation.
- October 25, 1983: American troops land in Grenada.
- December 1984: Gorbachev's visit to Britain.

-December 22, 1984: Joint Anglo-American Declaration on SDI and American Engagement in Europe.

-1985: Anglo-Irish agreement.

-April 14, 1986: American raid on Libya.

-1986: Westland affair.

-July 16, 1986: Margaret Thatcher arrives in Washington in the midst of the Irangate scandal - supports Reagan publicly.

-October 1986: Failure of the Reykjavik summit because the SDI almost reached an agreement on the zero option.

-Mid-November 1986: Margaret Thatcher affirms the need to conserve nuclear weapons in order to guarantee peace.

-May 31, 1986: In Mainz, Bush describes the Germans as partners of the United States in Europe.

-1989: Fall of Berlin Wall.

-1990: Transatlantic declaration.

-January 1990: Strasbourg Summit: Thatcher and Mitterrand agree on German unity.

-August 2, 1990 - 1991: Iraq invasion of Kuwait - Gulf crisis and war

-November 22, 1990: Resignation of Margaret Thatcher - John Major Prime Minister shortly thereafter.

-1993: US rejects Vance-Owen plan for division of Bosnia

-1994: Gerry Adams admitted to US

-1995: First Clinton visit to Belfast

-1997: Hong Kong handover to China

-1998: Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement - Air bombardment of Iraq

-1999: Air bombardment of Kosovo and Serbia.

Britanica.com.

Appendix: 2:**British Prime Ministers: (1945-2015):**

1945: Winston Churchill (Conservative)

1945-1951: Clement Attlee (Labour)

1951-1955: Winston Churchill (Conservative)

1955-1957: Anthony Eden (Conservative)

1957-1963: Harold Macmillan (Conservative)

1963-1964: Sir Alec Douglas-Home (Conservative)

1964-1970: Harold Wilson (Labour)

1970-1974: Edward Heath (Conservative)

1974-1976: Harold Wilson (Labour)

1976-1979: James Callaghan (Labour)

1979-1990: Margaret Thatcher (Conservative)

1990-1997: John Major (Conservative)

1997-2007: Tony Blair (Labour)

2007-2010: Gordon Brown. (Labour).

2010-2015: David Cameron. (Conservative)

-<https://www.gov.uk/government/history/past-prime-ministers>

Appendix Three:**American Presidents: (1945-2015):**

1945-1953: Harry S. Truman (Democrat)

1953-1961: Dwight D. Eisenhower (Republican)

1961-1963: John Kennedy (Democrat)

1963-1969: Lyndon B. Johnson (Democrat)

1969-1974: Richard Nixon (Republican)

1974-1977: Gerald Ford (Republican)

1977-1981: Jimmy Carter (Democrat)

1981-1989: Ronald Reagan (Republican)

1989-1993: George H. W. Bush (Republican)

1993-2001 Bill Clinton (Democrat)

2001-2009: George W. Bush (Republican)

2009- 2015: Barack Obama (Democrat)

-https://www.loc.gov/rr/print/list/057_chron.html

Appendix Four:**British Foreign Secretaries (1945-2015):**

1945 -1951: Ernest Bevin

1951: Herbert Morrison, Lord Morrison of Lambeth

1951 -1955: Sir Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon

1955 : Harold Macmillan, Earl of Stockton

1955 -1960: John Selwyn Brooke Lloyd, Lord Selwyn-Lloyd

1960-1963: Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Lord Home of the Hirsel

1963-1964: Richard Austen Butler

1964-1965: Patrick Gordon Walker

1965-1966: Michael Stewart

1966-1968: George Brown

1968-1970: Michael Stewart

1970-1974: Sir Alec Douglas Home

1974-1976: James Callaghan

1976-1977: Anthony Crosland

1977-1979: David Owen

1979-1982: Lord (Peter) Carrington

1982-1983: Francis Pym

1983-1989: Sir Geoffrey Howe

1989: John Major

1989-1995: Douglas Hurd

1995-1997: Malcolm Rifkin

1997-2001: Robin Cook

2001 – 2006: Jack Straw

2006 - 2007 : Margaret Beckett

2007 - 2010: David Miliband

2010 - 2014: William Hague

2014 - 2015 : Philip Hammond

-<https://www.gov.uk/government/history/past-foreign-secretaries>

Appendix Five:**US secretaries of state (1945-2015):**

1945-1947: James Francis Byrnes

1947-1949: George Catlett Marshall

1949-1953: Dean Gooderham Acheson

1953-1959: John Foster Dulles

1959-1961: Christian Archibald Herter

1961-1969: David Dean Rusk

1969-1973: William Rogers

1973-1977: Henry Kissinger

1977-1980: Cyrus Vance

1980-1981: Edmund Muskie

1981-1982: Alexander Haig

1982-1989: George Shultz

1989-1992: James Baker

1992-1993: Lawrence Eagleburger

1993-1997: Warren Christopher

1997-2001: Madeleine Albright

2001-2005: Colin Luther Powell

2005-2009: Condoleezza Rice

2009-2013: Hillary Rodham Clinton

2013-2015: John Kerry

-<https://www.state.gov/former-secretaries-of-state/>

Appendix Six:**Treaties:**

First Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: 1963.

The Treaty of Rome, signed: 25/03/1957, Effective: 1 January 1958

The Maastricht Treaty Signed: 7 February 1992, Effective: 1 November 1993.

The Lisbon Treaty, Signed: 13 December 2007, Effective: 1 December 2009.