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The Pursuit of Absolute Gender Equality: The Unintended Consequences of Government Policy on Fertility and Divorce Rates in Post 1960 America

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH IN CANDIDACY OF THE DOCTORAT DEGREE IN CIVILIZATION

CANDIDATE

SUPERVISOR

Mr. Youcef BENNAA

Prof. Faiza Meberbeche SENOUCI

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, **Youcef BENNAA**, do hereby solemnly declare that the work and ideas I present in this thesis are my own, and have not been submitted before to any other institution or University for a degree.

I assert that all information in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic conventions and ethical conduct. I also assert that I have fully cited and acknowledged all materials that are not original to this work. Besides, this work is conducted and completed at the University of Tlemcen, Algeria.

Signature



DEDICATIONS

To My Family and Friends

AKNOWELEDGMENTS

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ABSTRACT

The literature around the topic of gender is often focused on the notion that achieving gender equity precedes other considerations regarding social, political, and economic issues. This research work examines the legitimacy of this view and the historical evolution of the social and legal interventions to achieve its agenda. The aim is to explore the historical changes of gender relations at the social, economic and political levels that were instigated by U.S and foreign governments (Japan and the EU) to address the issue of gender inequality. A combination of ethnographic and correlational research methods were used to help achieve this aim, which is to make a prediction regarding the unintended consequences of pursuing absolute gender equality in the U.S. The findings of this research suggest that the equation that led to a military and economic “boom” in the U.S after the Second World War witnessed a drastic change. This drastic change in the variables of the “boom equation” will lead to the emergence of a “doom equation” affected by and affecting fertility and divorce rates.

Key Words: Gender, Equality, Divorce, Fertility, Feminism.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

B & M: Business and Management

D.C: District of Columbia

E.E.O.C: Equal Employment Opportunities Commission

E.P.A: Equal Pay Act

E.T.S: Educational Testing Service

F.D.A: Food and Drug Administration

F.D.R: Franklin Delano Roosevelt

G.D.P: Gross Domestic Product

G.I: Government Issue

I.L.O: International Labor Organization

N.A.A.C.P: National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

N.A.S: National Academy of Science

N.B.E.R: National Bureau of Economic Research

O.E.C.D: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

S.C.O.T.U.S: Supreme Court of the United States

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General Introduction

Gender roles have always played a major part, not just in shaping different communities' traditions and standards at the social level, but also at the economic and political levels as well. Each sex was assigned, whether intentionally or not, a certain role to play in the participation to define the political, economic and social landscapes of a particular country, and the United States is no exception. Usually these roles were strictly separated with real or virtual "walls" and borderlines, but with the advent of civil rights, the feminist movements, and the surge of gender issues to the forefront of political agendas after the 1960s these strict "walls" started to be shattered and brought down gradually.

Other factors also played a tremendous role in this process, like the contraceptive revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. However, despite the improvements in the economic, social, and political conditions of women in the post 1960s era, and the betterment of their livelihood, there were some unintended consequences, that would prove to have seismic repercussions not only on the American society, but also on the economic stability and even the national security of the United States. These consequences were the declining fertility rates and the rise in divorce rates among American families in the post "baby boomers" generation.

Literature Review

Most of the feminist literature (Goldin, 1990), (Glenda, 1978) around this topic is focused on the notion that achieving gender equity precedes other considerations regarding the application of such a goal on a whole variety of different issues. Several policy makers, especially in Europe, namely the European Commission (Hakim, 2006) tend to gloss over them, keeping their focus on achieving absolute economic and social equity between the sexes, regardless of what might be really concerning consequences. One of the few

investigations on the results of pursuing the goal of closing the gender pay gap across a multitude of countries was the work of Donald Treiman and Patricia Roos. They attributed the gap to factors such as education, experience, and type of occupation, with a very significant part of the gap being left unaccounted for. (Treiman & Roos, 1983)

Blau and Kahn also targeted this issue on a variety of different research works. They all tried to decompose the root causes behind these stubborn and long lasting, sex-based disparities. They used a historical and ethnographic approach to discover changing and emergent patterns regarding the differences in wages between men and women. They found overwhelming evidence of the gap's continuing reduction throughout its history and they predicted further consequences in its future, but they presented one major problem, which is the impact of such consequences on a variety of different issues, mainly the declining fertility rates and the rise in divorce cases. (Blau & Kahn, 2002)

Catherin Hakim (2003) touched on this subject in her articulation of the preference theory within her categorization of the three types of women's preferences and choices in "modern societies." However, she was only focusing on a European context, highlighting women's choices in the labor market within countries like Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, and Britain. Only recently, as it was the case in Europe post World War II, policy makers in the United States started to structure their economic and social policies in favor of two particular groups of women, which are according to the three-model platform of Catherine Hakim "adaptive women" and "work-centered women" throughout the past 60 years (1960-2016) (Hakim, 2003).

Yet one of the most often missed points in this large conversation is the implications of such social structuring on the other group of women identified in the previously mentioned models, as the "home-centered women." The implications are revolving around fertility and

divorce rates in the United States. These highly controversial issues remain at the forefront of the unanswered questions regarding social and economic policy, yet they are highly politicized due to the extremely high degree of nuance surrounding them, which vary from personal freedom, social engineering, favoring one group of women over the other, and the pursuit of achieving gender equality and protecting the most vulnerable members of society. This research work intends to shed some light on these implications' implications on the American economy, society, and even national security.

Research Questions and Arguments

Given the European adoption of the feminist stance in formulating policies intended at closing the enduring gender pay gap, and the recent sharp decline in fertility rates and the surge in divorce rates, has the adoption of similar policies in America affected the United States in a comparable way? And what would the implications of such a scenario be for the American economy, society, and national security?

The focus of the first chapter will be on the impact that government legislative interventions and the atmosphere that the Second World War created had on these particular variables. The setting of this context will help establish a solid background for the general argument of this thesis and create a spring board to achieve a realization on the nature of the relationship between the variables highlighted and the social, economic, and political conditions at that time. The aim of this part of the research work is to describe the nature of governmental and other forms of institutional social restructuring, especially those influencing gender relations. It also aims to answer the important question: what kind of impact those government interventions had on the demographic compositions and structures of post World War Two American society?

The second chapter will focus on the evolution of the feminist theory and the ever evolving demands and grievances regarding the socioeconomic and political status of women in post 1960 America. The feminists' demands and grievances are a subtle critique and a revisiting of a famous paper published by British sociologist Catherine Hakim. This chapter will also deal with several key historical social events that characterized the post 1960s era as revolutionary, especially those concerning the family and contraceptive patterns. The main question that this chapter will attempt to answer is related to the origins and the root causes behind the social and political push to achieve absolute gender equality and how did that translate into the legal and legislative domains.

The aim of the third chapter is to revisit the socioeconomic status of women compared to that of men in the 1970s and 1980s, and the status of the American families in relation to the variables under study, which are fertility and divorce. This aim is within the context of answering the underlying question: what was the impact of the social revolutions that was accompanied by an “avalanche” of legal and legislative interventions on fertility and divorce rates in America? To answer this question, the overview of this chapter will highlight three major central elements, which revolve around European and Japanese social restructuring and engineering strategies, the roots of feminist discontent, and finally the manifestation of discontent resolution sought by the feminist camp.

The fourth and the final chapter will constitute the main thesis of this dissertation by answering the initially laid out main research question, which was, what are the unintended consequences of pursuing absolute gender equality in the United States of America? It will undergo that feat through the establishment of an important dichotomy of protections versus restrictions, and how eliminating one would bring some unintended repercussions.

Methodology

This research will rely on ethnographic analysis, which is based on principles of qualitative data collection and analysis. It helps reveal the change by discovering emerging patterns, themes, and attitudes in history. This analysis will be used to discover the emergent patterns prior and post the “baby boom” that the U.S. witnessed after the end of World War Two.

This work will also use Correlational Research or associational research, where I will investigate the relationship between two categories of variables. The first category will be called “the predictor variables category,” which will involve, the age of first marriage, educational level, professional work, and the general culture regarding femininity and masculinity in the United States’ context.

The second category will be labeled “the criterion variables category,” which will deal with fertility and divorce rates. Of course there will be no manipulation of these variables; merely an investigation of their relationships in two distinctly different historical periods. The reason why I have chosen to carry out this study through this particular type of research is best articulated by Franckel, Wallen and Hyun (2012) in their famous study, *How to Design and Evaluate research in Education*. In which they stated:

Correlational research is also sometimes referred to as a form of descriptive research because it describes an existing relationship between variables. Correlational research is carried out for one of two basic purposes—either to help explain important human behaviors or to predict likely outcomes. It must be stressed, however, that correlational studies do not, in and of themselves, establish cause and effect... If a relationship of sufficient

magnitude exists between two or more variables, it becomes possible to predict a score on one or more variables if a score on the other variable is known. (Francke, Wallen, & Hyun, 2012, p. 331)

Significance of my Research

This research work will contribute to the already rich and large conversation that had been and is already taking place in the field of American Studies about gender relations and gender equity, by tapping on the highly sensitive and controversial topic of whether governments should be involved in structuring and prescribing fertility rates by designing policies favoring one group of women over the others or making actions impacting marriage and divorce decisions. And how would this involvement affect the overall status of the economy, social hegemony, and eventually national security.

**CHAPTER ONE: It Used to
Work: “The Baby Boomers”
and Social Structuring in Pre
1960s America**

1-1-Introduction

The first chapter will set the stage for upcoming discussions regarding the foundational elements and variables of this research work. It will lay out the context and the landscape of social restructuring in pre 1960 America; especially those related to marriage, divorce and fertility. The focus will be on the impact that government legislative interventions and the atmosphere that World War II (1939-1945) created had on these particular variables. The setting of this context will help establish a solid background for the general argument of this thesis and create a spring board to achieve a realization on the nature of the relationship between the variables highlighted and the social, economic, and political conditions at that time.

The aim of this part of the research work is to describe the nature of governmental and other forms of institutional social restructuring, especially those influencing gender relations at the social and economic levels. It also aims to answer the important question of what kind of impact those government interventions had on the demographic compositions and structures of post World War II American society. The structure of the first chapter will be based on different elements, centered on the social and political landscape of gender relations prior to the 1960s, and the economic composition of the American family.

1-2-It matters: Fertility and Divorce Patterns in America prior to 1960.

The 1960s were one of the most major turning points in American history. It was so tumultuous and eventful that it was marked as the end of an era and the beginning of an entirely new one. This shocking transformation touched almost every aspect of American life; technology with space programs, the military with the coming of age of the nuclear arsenals, and above all societal and cultural shifts.

However, despite the magnitude of this progress and breakthrough, the social unrest and the shift in social and cultural norms were not in any way shape or form less astonishing. But before delving into those revolutionary changes, a feat that will be postponed to the upcoming chapters, a clear and closer look needs to be taken at the socioeconomic status of the American families and individuals that came before the exciting years of the 1960s.

As it is the case with every revolution historically there were always preceding signs or the “calm before the storm,” and prior to the sexual revolution of the late 1950s and 1960s there was a relative calm and a conservative view on sex, gender roles, and more importantly marriage. Marriage was a sacred institution to not just individuals, couples and society but to the entire American political, judicial, and legislative establishments. Therefore it was only fitting and natural that support for marriage and for staying married was very popular even at the institutional level. Prime examples will be discussed, such as “marriage prohibitions” and “Federal Order 213.”

Those practices were telling of the general sentiments of the American population towards gender roles and particularly within the institution of marriage. Both types of marriage bars whether the hire bar, which stopped the recruitment of married women, or the retain bar, which forced single women; who got married to leave their positions captured this sense or this belief that women belonged in the home. There were even “dowries” or sums of


money given to lure women to leave their jobs, be a housewife, and have lots of kids (Goldin, 1988). Another logical deduction that can be taken from this proposition was the existence, or to be more accurate the creation of roadblocks and obstacles to permanently leave the sacred institution of marriage, or as it is commonly known as getting a divorce. However, prior to delving into institutional and social barriers, the statistics of the pre 1960s and 1950s divorce rates were something to behold. (See Figure one)

Since the start of the documented history of the U.S. that was made possible by specialized census and research centers; mainly the National Bureau of Economic Research, within the Department of Labor and its affiliates, divorce rates were relatively minimal and generally uncommon among Americans. In the instances where there were cases of divorces among married couples, it was only due to extreme circumstances and unbearable life situation.

According to an article published by *The Washington Post* in 2010, documenting the evolution of divorce and marriage in the U.S. throughout 114 years, starting in 1860 and ending in as recent as 2010, found that the prime reasons for getting a divorce back then, alluding to the period prior to 1945 were either violence, infidelity, or abandonment (Olson, 2017).

In that same article that was based on a sophisticated comprehensive study of divorce and marriage patterns, historically it was claimed that marriage rates and numbers were getting higher and higher especially during the post-World War II era and the pre 1960 era, and they back this claim by showing some convincing statistics. For example, before 1950 the number of marriages per 1,000 single women in the 18 to 64 years demographic had exceeded the 200 marriages (See Figure one).

Figure one: 144 years of Marriage and Divorce in the U.S.



Source: Olson, R. (September 13, 2017). 144 years of Marriage and Divorce in the U.S. *The Washington Post*, Retrieved October 15, 2019 from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/>

Another important statistic that they showcased is the divorce cases happening at the same time span. The parallel divorce rates were also telling of the conservative and traditional social dominance in the realm of marriage and family values at the time. According to a study published by the National Bureau of Economic Research the number of divorce cases that actually went through and culminated in total separation was meager 04-06 cases per 1,000 women (Olson, 2017). Not only that there was also some really interesting twist to these figures, the numbers of divorce cases were actually observably dropping significantly during the period between 1950 and 1960 (See figure one). The institution of marriage back in the early years of the 20th century was not just a matrimony dictated by emotional and social needs, but it was also based and built on economic ties and bonds. According to economists Jeremy Greenwood and Nezih Guner, the marriages were economic units of some sort built on a form of consensus, or as they articulated:

At the time, most marriages were arranged by the parents of young adults. Key considerations were whether or not the potential groom, the husband, would be a good provider and the bride would be a good housekeeper. (Greenwood, & Guner, 2009, p.2)

And for a long period of time this arrangement and social unanimous agreement on the division of labor or ascribed gender-roles, seemed to be beneficial or at least provided some form of contentment for all parties. This can be derived from one simple observation, although, a full conclusive result cannot be reached from this observation due to the simple fact that the evaluation that can be decisive or general about the level of contentment of men or women about their marriage was not available at that time.

However, this observation was taken from the ratio or fraction of adulthood or adult life spent within the boundaries of what is labeled as the “golden cage”: marriage. This important and vital statistic can be found in the work of Greenwood and Guner (Greenwood, & Guner, 2009). It is one of the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research’s publications.

They found that the fraction of adulthood (from 18 and above) before the years 1950 and 1960, which is spent in marriage of women’s lives, was a whopping 85% (Greenwood, & Guner, 2009). That is the overwhelming majority of their adult life, which showcases the value and sanctity of marriage in the sense that it led many women to invest such a long and valuable amount of their lifetime in it. This large investment in time and energy had to come at a certain expense.

It also meant that they were either getting a highly compensating reward or they were giving up on one, or both. Marriage for most women has two facades; one is positive and the other one not so much. The decision that women make regarding opting to stay in a marriage

depends for the most part on which side of the previous scale is tipped. The negative aspect for many women was giving up on the prospect of a sophisticated and high-paying career, while the positive aspect was the fulfillment of having a home and particularly, a husband and children.

1-2-1-Fertility and Divorce Rates

The U.S. after the end of the Second World War emerged as a powerhouse, in pretty much all aspects of economy, industry, and military, among others. Not only that, there was also another explosion or in other words a “boom”. This previously mentioned boom in the introduction of the Baby Boomers generation was in this context, a cultural reference associated with a generation that the US Census Bureau defined as: “any person born between 1944 and 1964” (Berkin et al, 2011, p.630).

In the mid 1900s, particularly in the period between 1950 and 1960, two important events were simultaneously taking place that would in a combined and reciprocal manner create one of the most influential changes in post World War II American society. In a study conducted by the National Bureau of Economic Research and the University of Pennsylvania, they found that between 1940 and 1960 upon examining the divorce and marriage rates of the women in the 18-64 demographic, the marriage rates were at an all time high above the 300 per 1,000 women mark, while divorce rates were at an all-time low below the 100 divorce case per 1,000 women (see figure one). This meant more marriages with fewer divorces, which also meant more time or fraction of the life spent married as a collective average. (See Appendix 3) A very important observation is also taken from this, which is more time dedicated to having more kids. The impetus or the propeller for families in general and for women in particular to have more children is very complex and usually not a single reason, but rather a myriad of intertwined, mutually reciprocal and complementary originators.

But before delving into the intricacies and complex world of fertility rates cause and effect, we need to define the term properly, due to its importance and frequent occurrences throughout the different chapters of this research work. Fertility rates or total fertility rates, in a given year are the sum of age specific fertility rates over all ages (“Fertility”, 2019). It can be interpreted as the total number of children an average woman will have over her lifetime if age specific fertility rates stay constant over time (Goldin, 2016).

As it will be laid out, there was a large Baby Boom in the period after the Second World War. A large chunk of babies was born in that time, that it would make or constitute about 40% of the entire U.S. population in the years to come. This substantial addition to the already large American population came due to a significant and sizable rise in fertility rates among women and young women in particular. In a study done by Claudia Goldin in 1990 and was further corroborated by another paper published in December 2007 by Mathews Doepke, found that the total fertility rates in the United States actually saw a steady increase from just 2.3 in 1940 to an impressive 3.8 in 1957 (Goldin, 1990) and (Doepke et al, 2007).

That period as many observances will testify was the post-world War II period. Many studies (Goldin & Lawrence, 2002) and (Mettler, 2005) had attributed the rise in fertility to the war effort, whether directly or indirectly, whether to the home front or actual mobilization of soldiers abroad, with varying degrees of influence and impact. One of these studies put forth a very compelling case for at least a partial explanation of the sudden explosive rise in fertility and it associated it directly to one major element of the war effort, which is the mobilization effort. Moshe Hazan and Yishay Maoz embarked on a large data collection mission in several American states where there have been a large recruitment and drafting of young men, the states included: New Hampshire, Minnesota, Nevada, Washington, Massachusetts among others, but these five previously mentioned States stand out during that process of data collection and analysis (Hazan & Maoz, 2013).

There were actually two things that were in common between these states that caught the attention of the researchers. The first was the high mobilization rates in these particular states, which varied from a whopping 50 to 55% of the entire young male population, were recruited to join the war in the period between 1941 and 1945 (Hazan & Maoz, 2013).

The other major element that brought a sense of curiosity to the authors of this particular paper was the fact that these formerly referenced states had the largest fertility rates during the baby boom in the entire nation (Hazan & Maoz, 2013). This observation according to the authors correlates throughout the entire sampled states. This is that, “states with higher mobilization rates have the largest fertility rates” (Hazan & Maoz, 2013, p.23).

Another observation in that landmark study analyzed this correlation between high mobilization and higher fertility, by trying to add or explain this relationship and whether it was just a correlation or was actually caused by it, directly or through a chain reaction of events.

Doepke established an economic model that had three main principles and precepts that created the framework for the manifestation of the previous correlational relationship between the high rate of young men joining the Second World War effort, in particular states like Massachusetts, Minnesota, and the rest, and with the large increase in fertility rates in those exact states when The War had ended. There are three pillars that constitute this specific economic model and framework. First, World War II represented a shock to government spending, the second pillar was the fact that there was a reduction in male labor supply, and the third and final pillar was that, there was an increase in female labor supply (Doepke et al, 2007).

This model is based on “a crowding-out” effect concept, which states that when young women reached adulthood i.e. they were in a working age, just after the Second World War

had ended and they wanted to enter to American workforce, they faced not just one but two major obstacles or to be more accurate two major competitors; that were more experienced and more favorable in meeting the requirements and characteristics demanded by the American labor market (Doepke et al, 2007).

These competitors that crowded out young and unexperienced women from the labor market were the experienced women, who were called upon during the war effort to work in weapons and logistics factories to support and replace the departing young men, who went to fight the actual war, and the second competitors were the returning soldiers who came back home after the war had ended (Doepke et al, 2007).

Unable to compete in the labor market with the experienced women and the returning soldiers, young women also faced a difficult hurdle, perhaps this one proved to be “the last straw” that made them get out of the labor market, and opt for another life. As it is the case with every post-war economy; in order for a country to cover the large expenses and the tremendous spending during the war effort some rather difficult measures have to be taken.

The U.S economy of course was no exception. One of the measures that the U.S. policy makers made was raising taxes to curb the deficit and the federal debt (Flynn, 1993). This meant even more trouble for young women who reached working age during this period, because it meant fewer job openings and investments that create employment. Faced with this gloomy reality and the previously mentioned competition from the experienced women and the returning soldiers, young women opted in droves to get married, be housewives, and most importantly, in order to fill the emptiness in their lives, have lots of children (Doepke et al, 2007).

With this mechanism, the research study done with the National Bureau of Economic Research claimed that 80% of the baby boom and the tremendous rise in fertility rates are

explained, and the remaining 20% is explained by other financial and more precisely fiscal variables. See (Da Rocha, & Jose Maria, 2004), for further reading on why fertility rates and female employment positively correlates.

1-3-The Social Landscape of Gender Relations in pre 1960s America:

The United States of America, as it is the case with many countries in the modern world is some form of an experiment. Throughout the United States' relatively short history plenty of bold experiments at every single field have taken place, whether it is in the military, agriculture, infrastructure, space, or technology. Most of these experiments varied from success to total failure. Some could be interpreted in many different ways and many of these experiments are yet to be clearly judged.

The beginning of the 20th century, especially in the first years of the 1900s America was going through a period of rapid transition in its social, political, and economic landscapes. One of the most obvious changes was its military. These signs of change took place at two different fronts: at home and abroad. The first facade of these changes took place in the opening years of the 1900s under the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (1855-1919). The United States acquired a new status in the world after its three months war with Spain, which resulted in the emergence of America as a world power (Macgregor, 2003). This meant that it had to adjust all of its institutions and political, economic, and military machines to the new status quo.

In order for the U.S to remain competitive and relevant in the world stage, modernizing its armed forces was not only essential but rather vital. The modernization efforts also required a great deal of unorthodox and bold experiments. The newly acquired areas that were gained from Spain after the war had ended, mainly Guam and other islands

and territories in the Caribbean necessitated a constant, assertive, and quick presence by the U.S. Armed Forces.

However, even with the efforts to expand its Navy Fleet of Destroyers and Cruisers, the usual route of the U.S. ships, whether through the Atlantic Ocean, down the Strait of Magellan, or into The Drake Passage put them at a great disadvantage, regarding the time and the safety of the vessels (Parker, 2013). Under these pressing circumstances one of the most exceptionally brilliant ideas emerged. And this idea would not only change the trade routes in the Americas and the Caribbean, but also transform the ability of the U.S. surface combatants to reach the China Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Pacific Ocean in record time (Parker, 2013).

Of course this idea was the Panama Canal. This unusual idea was a prime example of American exceptional and bold willingness to traverse 77 kilometers of land to connect two oceans. The Navy, coastal defense programs, and the Panama expansion were not the only major overhaul attempts to modernize the U.S. Military, The leadership in Washington D.C wanted to build a new sophisticated and well organized professional army with the personnel structure to its administrations and institutions (Sherry, 1995).

Under the presidency of former Secretary of War William Howard Taft (1909-1913) the Army knew several tweaks and changes to the organization of its ranks and “the elimination of widespread inefficiency in the operations of the war department” after the Spanish-American War (Parker, 2013). This led to the establishment of the General Staff, which included the offices of the war department, which was later substituted by the Department of Defense and they were divided into groups of the army, militia and volunteers (Stewart, 2005).

This fusion and unification ended the longstanding disputes of authority among the Commanders, Generals, and the Secretaries of War i.e., between the military and civilian

personnel (Stewart, 2005). The revolutionary restructuring of the military was initiated during what became to be known as the “Progressive Era” during which the U.S. was going through a prosperous period of economic, military and political progress and stability. Such times of economic well-being and efficiency are usually accompanied by progressive and liberal policies and legislation, especially regarding gender issues. The opposite is also true; hard times and constraints to the economic and political well-being of any particular state can bring with it regressive policies and measures, and the US of course was no exception. The first twenty years of the 1900s saw the booming of American economy, which was reflected on many social issues that were practically unspoken of prior to the late 19th century. That period was filled with social justice activism and the loud calls from many in the political and social landscape for reform. These calls varied depending on issues of race, sex, anti-war sentiments, and economic grievances, but they were also different in tone and degree of radicalization (Hyman, 2014).

The most vocal were the ones directed at the political establishment and entities claiming monopolies on various businesses, famously known as the “Anti-Trust Movement” (Sundquist, & Morgan, 1995). These grassroots movements encouraged many politicians to make these sentiments as the foundation for their political campaigns and to create a base out of the activist movement that was taking place.

The winds of change in American society helped elect three progressive Presidents successively and that orchestrated arguably the most intense and most rapid shift in the American social and political scenery and these presidents were: Theodore Roosevelt, William Taft and Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) (Hyman, 2014). The latter was not just the main figure of the Great War with his Fourteen Points Plan that laid the foundation for the establishment of the United Nations, but also the president who during his tenure saw the first

major breakthrough for gender equality pursuit in American history, which is the passage of the 19th Amendment (Neustadt, 1954).

The progressive momentum saw many issues being dealt with including tackling long-standing economic and political problems in the United States mostly related to the corruption of the economic and political establishments. All thanks to a type of an investigative journalism movement that encouraged public dissent and was fed by mostly a healthy skepticism of the elite class in the United States, this group was called “The Muckrakers” (Filler, 1976, p. 361). However, many social issues did not have that same amount of rigorous attention from the public and on the political agenda in Washington D.C. The one issue that stands out was gender equality and the issue of the economic status of women.

After the women’s suffrage of the 1920s and their social activism that led to that point, many progressive leaders including the formerly mentioned presidents focused on preserving the family structure by designing policies that maintain the traditional gender roles and strengthening them (Glenna, 1987). These traditional gender roles have historically ascribed males or husbands with the qualities of providers for the family and females or wives with care-giving and child-rearing, or in short as housewives (Glenna, 1987).

The American housewife prior to the late nineteenth century had little or no contribution to the external fabric of the American society, except for the occasional mention of her being the glue that holds the family together. All these remarks that were made about women or housewives in particular were not drawn from her position in society as a whole but rather from within the boundaries of what was considered and labeled a “woman’s sphere” (Glenna, 1987).

However, due to the tides of progressivism agenda, that perspective of the house work and that perception of roles assigned to the home were about to change dramatically and

drastically but rather in a relatively slow pace. These changes were preceded by a systemic desire and willingness of the American political and economic leadership and establishment to expand the tools of power of the U.S. to match its new status as a world power, which meant expanding the most important factor and source of these powers, which is the human capital or “manpower” (Glenna, 1987). To determine the expansionist policies of family engineering one must analyze one of the earliest systemic practices that encouraged whether, directly or indirectly the enlargement of family units through the prescription and division of gender roles, not necessarily by political or judicial means but generally through economic incentives i.e., by making it more profitable for women, especially married women to stay at home and have as many children as possible rather than have a career for themselves. To fully understand these mechanisms and their function, this dissertation is going to analyze some of their basic goals and their impacts on married women in particular and family structuring in general.

1-4-The First Drop: The Marriage Bars. (1900-1950)

One of the earliest attempts at the federal and state levels to restructure and determine the gender roles of a family unit was somehow to force women, especially married women to stay at home via legislative and executive authorities. These actions of deeply and highly restrictive nature affected a major group of American society: married women. Married women prior to the 1960s period went through an era that would prove to be of great influence to their status in the American economy and society.

This period affected particularly workforce participation rates and consequently their economic status in comparison to their male counterparts. In the period between 1900 and 1960 the American society in general and their view on family and gender roles were very conservative and traditional, that is they perceived men as the natural bread-winners for their

families and women as the natural care-giver and keeper of the children and the hearth. The overwhelming social consensus provided fuel for economic and social policy regarding women's status in the labor force. One of the most obvious forms of these policies were designated the name of marriage bars by Harvard Professor and U.S National Bureau for Economic Research (N.B.E.R) associate Claudia Goldin. Marriage Bars were designed and tailor-made to put women or to be more accurate married women out of the American labor force. As an institution of laws and policies, Marriage Bars were not some sort of vague and implicit measures, but they were rather very candid and earnest about their intentions and objectives.

The Marriage Bars started as far back as the late 1800s and continued to block the hiring and the maintaining of married women in the realms of employment until the mid-1900s when it abruptly ended due to many circumstantial reasons and an understandable intense push back from many sources as it is about to be demonstrated (Goldin, 1988).

The marriage prohibitions had two distinct forms and two different ways to manifest themselves, but before delving into the definitions and the extent and the limitations of such measures there must be a close examination of the circumstances and conditions of not just the economic landscape of the United States back then, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, but also societal norms and traditions that most of the policies were drawn and gained legitimacy from.

A staggering number that speaks louder than any words and speaks volume to the mentality of the age is the fact that only 5.6% of women were employed outside the home in early nineteenth hundreds in the sense of modern form of pay for work (Glenna, 1987). American sociologist Glenna Matthews described the way society perceived married women

and especially housewives and summarized it perfectly in her revealing book *Just a Housewife: The Rise and Fall of Domesticity in America (1987)*. Matthews said that:

...Women were frequently apologetic about that rules to be a good housewife was a to be an end in itself rather than as a means to a greater or more meaningful the world foreseen as serving the purely private ends of providing for the needs of those who lived in it wife had no reason to think of herself as vitally linked with the world outside the home. (p.3)

Matthews continued to articulate on one more point which is more central and relevant to this thesis that is the dichotomy of male public activity and female private passivity (Glenna, 1987). To further expand this dual concept of mutually reciprocal influence, this research articulates that the belief system in American society in the early nineteen hundreds was built on the idea of freeing men of all house related activities and work in order to be to be fully productive and completely able to do his job, which has two main objectives; provide for his family and grow the economy.

In the face of such a large burden of responsibilities and duties Americans believed every man should not be burdened with more “trivial” concerns as raising children and managing the home. This latter responsibility of ‘trivial’ but equal importance was designated for women. But in order to be completely “fair” and to make sure of the viability and continuity of this arrangement, married women had to be taken out of the labor force and be kept out of participating in the workforce, and be assigned exclusively to the duties of the home. Following this line of logical thinking emerged the institutions of the marriage bars. Going back to the earlier distinction of the two forms and the two ways of their manifestation; First, the two technical, legal and tangible forms.

1-4-1-The Recruitment Prohibition:

The main focus of these prohibitions or to put it more accurately, the specific fields that were targeted by the marriage bars institution were usually female-dominated occupations such as office and clerical work and education i.e., teaching and school-related activities. In two separate data collection measures that were conducted in 1931 and 1940, starting during the years of the Great Depression in order to ration federal government spending and create proportionate policies regarding the high levels of unemployment that had hit the American people as a result of the 1929 stock market crash (Sherry, 1995).

These two censuses directed at firms, offices, and school boards in a variety of different states and cities which included: Chicago (Illinois), Hartford (Connecticut), New York City (New York), and Philadelphia (Pennsylvania) in the 1931 sampling were very telling (Goldin, 1988). In the 1940 census two more cities were added, which were Los Angeles (California) and Kansas City (Missouri) (Goldin, 1988). These were large-scale census and surveys according to an (National Bureau of Economic Research Paper) the number of the total samples in these data collecting surveys amounted to a staggering total of 339 firms and school boards, and a whopping 76955 employees and employers (Goldin, 1988).

These observations did not just include raw data and statistics but also really revealing interviews with really candid employers, which helped in showcasing the work mentality and recruitment policies in school boards and firms. First of all, the hire bar or the prohibition that was put in place by the employer was defined as: the banning of married women from entry to positions offered by these institutions (as cited in Benna, 2016). The business of these institutions varied and included fields and sectors such as, insurance, publishing, banking, public utilities, investment, manufacturing, sales, and last but not least advertising(For further

details on the occupations from which women were banned, see Goldin's Marriage bars) (Goldin, 1988).

The first obvious and hard-hitting observation is that the implementation of such prohibitions varied depending on the change of two particular variables, which are the number of female workers and the sectors in which these female employees were employed, and here was specifically office work and teaching (Goldin, 1990). More of the same observation can be stated about the two surveys (1931 and 1940). For example in the years 1930 and 1931 about 62% of school boards in the previously mentioned sampled states did not hire, or in other words refused to accept women when they got married before the period of their employment, that's more than half of all female teachers and instructors in those States (Goldin, 1988).

The observations in 1941 were even worst for married women in the education sector. The percentage of school boards which chose not to hire married women to be teachers in their classrooms was a whopping 87% (Goldin, 1988). That is an overwhelming majority of school boards in the states under study. Married women employees in the clerical sector did not enjoy much better circumstances either. Those women who married prior to seeking employment in states or cities such as Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), Kansas (Missouri), or Los Angeles (California) were 51%, 7%, and 38% consecutively less likely to be accepted at any offices or firms residing in any area inside those cities (see table one).

These percentages were observed and taken from the 1931 census; those of the 1941 survey however were somewhat higher, particularly for the city of Philadelphia. In the 1931 census findings the percentage of firms hiring office workers did not hire married women was almost 51%, however, that number increased by approximately 10 percentage points in the

1941 observations to reach nearly 60.4 % (see table one). (For Further elaborations see Appendices 1&2)

Table one: Marriage Bars among School Boards, 1928 to 1951 and Firms Hiring Office Workers, 1931 and 1940

Year	Do Not Retain Single Women When Married		Do Not Hire Married Women	
	Weighted	Not Weighted	Weighted	Not Weighted
Teachers				
1928	47.3%	52.2%	61.9 %	61.0%
1930/31	52.2	62.9	72.2	76.6
1942	58.4	70.0	77.7	87.0
1950/51	9.4	10.0	19.5	18.0
Clerical Workers				
	(Policy)		(Policy)	
1931(178)	25.0%	12.0%	36.0%	29.2%
Phila, (44)	26.4	14.3	40.4	31.8
1940				
Phila. (106)	26.6	23.6	41.1	50.9
Kansas				
City (83)	28.4	15.7	41.7	31.3
Los Angeles(139)	9.4	8.6	24.4	15.8
	(Policy & Discretionary)		(Policy & Discretionary)	
1931	34.7%	27.3%	51.7%	52.8%
Philadelphia	36.9	35.7	60.7	59.1
1940				
Philadelphia	34.5	34.9	58.5	60.4
Kansa City	46.0	30.1	57.8	43.4
Los Angeles	25.1	15.7	38.8	26.6

Source: Goldin, C. (1990). *Understanding the gender gap: An economic history of American women*. New York: Oxford university press.

These were the data and observations regarding the Hire Bar, those pertaining and relating to the Retain Bar, were not that much different, and the disparities between the two types and forms of prohibitions are barely and hardly tangible.

1-4-2-The Maintaining Prohibition

Some of the most vocal comments concerning the staggering numbers and percentages of prohibitions regarding the hiring or firing of married women focused heavily on the discretionary and transparent nature of such bars. For example, two of the most prominent political and economic policy commentators, Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen remarked in their *American Economic Review* article entitled, “Agency, Earning Profiles, Productivity and Hours Restrictions,” published in 1981 that, even though some firms were being abundantly and blatantly clear about their stated policy and intent to not retain married women employees they claimed that:

Firms often adopted internal promotion fixed salary scales and benefits packages to conserve costs and encourage efficiency and effort among employees there for discretionary firing could result in greater wage demands to compensate employees for that probability of being terminated. (p.45)

In spite of this high cost of losing qualified and trained employees, many firms and school boards opted to continue with their practices of not retaining married women, whether through policy mandated measures, or through using some sort of discretionary methods. The retaining bar is economically defined as the act of not keeping or not retaining single women if they got married during employment (Goldin, 1990). School boards in Kansas, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and the rest of the cities in the 1931 census had low approval ratings and a really unfavorable view of women who married during their employment. For example, in the years 1930 and 1931 almost 63% of all schools in the previously mentioned cities fired single women after a short period of their matrimony (see table one).

That high percentage got even higher in the 1941 census. In 1942 almost a staggering 70% of all schools boards did not retain newlywed women (see table one). The same can be said about clerical work too; however, with somewhat less staggering figures. In 1931, firms hiring office workers in Philadelphia , about 37% of them did not retain women who married during employment, and other cities have comparable figures; except for Kansas City where the numbers were about 10% higher in 46% (see table one). The census that was done in 1940 had similar and comparable numbers and figures as well. Firms and school boards did not suffer any costs or real cost from firing single women who married during the job, neither economically nor politically, even the occasional pushback from some of the few women rights activists back then was very minimal.

On the contrary, as previously mentioned the societal norms and traditions encouraged such practices that were not viewed maliciously as it is perceived in today's litigious world, but rather were even evangelized as being protective of women, children, and ultimately society as a whole.

The long-lasting impact of such prohibitions on the employment and subsequently the education and human capital investment of married women in particular, and women in general were very damaging. They further widened the already wide gender pay gap, and left women rights activists and consequently policymakers in Washington, who were influenced later on by The Civil Rights Movement, with a huge mountain to climb in order to guarantee the supposedly constitutional right of equal pay for equal work for their unhappy female constituencies.

Despite the large-scale implementations of the marriage bars throughout a myriad of different states across the American mainland and their long-term duration and even longer

term damage to gender wage equality, they were only a small portion of an even larger prohibition that was federally mandated on all fifty U.S. States and territories.

1-5-The Great Depression of Gender Equality: Order 213.

In May 1932, twenty thousand army veterans and their families stormed to Washington D.C. in front of a helpless Congress and even in front of a more helpless President Herbert Hoover (1929-1933), to seek their First World War's bonuses, which they were promised after the Great War had ended (Doepke et al, 2007). President Hoover had to barricade himself from the angry "mobs" of unhappy and desperate protesters outside the White House lawn he even had to call troops from the U.S. army and the U.S. National Guard to restore peace to the Capital but to no avail (Doepke et al, 2007).

After the clashes had ended two veterans and a child were killed at the beginning of what will become to be known as the single most devastating economic crisis in the history of the United States, the Great Depression of the 1930s (Hyman, 2014). After almost a decade of prosperity and ever expanding post-war economy in what was known in the literary milieu as "The Roaring Twenties," that economy came crashing to the ground.

After those dark years where people could not provide for their families and millions were out of bread-making jobs, something had to be done in order to prevent the United States' economy and the American dream from crumbling into the bottom barrels of history. After Edgar Hoover's Presidency, who received the large share of the blame for the crash of 1929 and for the nationwide disaster, time came for the presidency of the longest ever serving president in the history of the United States: the four terms President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1933-1945) (Sherry, 1995).

Roosevelt came up with bold and drastic economic and social policies to fix the cluster mess that he found himself in the day he was sworn into office in the fourth of March of 1933.

One of the most important platforms of his running campaign prior to his inaugural was a series of economic reforms that were later labeled as “the New Deal deal.” Unlike some “deals” that America received from prior presidents from other presidents, like Theodore Roosevelt's Square deal (Thompson, 1905), and Harry Truman's Fair Deal (Hyman, 2014), “the New Deal encompassed one important federal order that came in line with the marriage prohibition policies previously mentioned (Hyman, 2014). The federal order came in the guise of rationing jobs, which were in dire conditions due to the existing circumstances of the time, therefore the U.S. government under the policies of the “New Deal” pushed a federal order called “Federal Order Number 213” (D’Ann, 1984).

This particular Federal order was passed by Congress three years after the stock market crash of 1929; it was a small fraction of the Federal Economy Act, which was itself part of the grand plan of Roosevelt's New Deal measures to achieve the “Three Rs”: Recovery, Reform and Relief (Hyman, 2014). It has been mentioned that the rationale behind this federal or worse to ration and give jobs to the most deserving and with the most needs, or in other words with the most mouths to feed.

The U.S. government then thought that in order for it to make its citizens follow suits to their policies they need to lead by example. That is why according to this order “it was mandated that executive branch officials in the face of layoffs [they should] fire workers whose spouses were employed by the federal government” (D’Ann, 1984, p.23). The policy influenced almost entirely and disproportionately female employees, because most of the executive officials that were kept employed were overwhelmingly males (D’Ann, 1984).

Therefore in addition to the previously mentioned seven to eight cities that were affected by the marriage prohibitions, a lot more territories and people had been touched by this Federal order 213. According to Shallcross's findings, almost “26 States had proposed

legislation to restrict married women's employment in state government jobs, and nine other [states] had some form of restriction already in place (Goldin, 1988). These pieces of legislation, policies, and practices further confirm the assumption that social norms and social consensus around gender perspectives and stereotypes are the backbone or rather the source that these policies gain legitimacy from. This position was perfectly articulated by economics professor Claudia Goldin when she stated in a *National Bureau of Economic Research* published article that:

... The bars were extended during the depression but it is inconceivable that these prohibitions could have gained such wide acceptance during the depression had previous policies not existed and had social consensus not being built around them.
(Goldin, 1990, p.11)

The core issue of this fundamental problem facing the American people to constantly redefine gender relations and assigned gender roles was in its essence a double-headed conundrum that had not even begin to show its true dimensions at that time, meaning prior and during the Great Depression, with a few exceptions.

This conundrum had to be solved through two means, and two distinct but intertwined levels: the social and political levels. But before discussing those extremely important elements of the gender equation, there is another humongous factor that contributed beyond measure to the future of gender and family structuring policies in America, which is the Second World War.

1-6-The Second World War and the Largest Generation in American History

One of the most forgotten and often neglected aspects of every major war and the fuel to any professional army is its home front. The usual focus of military historians is often

revolved around the battlefield, the equipments, the soldiers, and the generals. World War II was by far the largest military conflict in human history from all aspects and all capacities. The casualties exceeded all expectations and left the world with very deep wounds that it has not been able to recover from to this very day. After 1945 and the defeat of the Axis Countries' forces and the unconditional surrender of the Germans, the world gazed at the number of casualties that the modern machines of war brought, with broken hearts. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the total estimates of those who died during the war was over 60 million people, that number represented almost 0.3% of the planet's total human population (Overy, 1997). The number of casualties was not the only hearts and records breaking figure in the Second World War. The number of soldiers and equipment as well was beyond anything humanity had ever witnessed. The U.S. prior to the war was the most industrial nation in the world, and during the war that capacity was doubled, according to Richard Overy. Overy in his extensive comparative study of the Second World War entitled, *Why the Allies Won (1987)* stated that:

American industry provided almost two-thirds of all allied military equipment produced during the war, 297,000 aircrafts, 193,000 artillery pieces, 86,000 tanks, two million army trucks. In four years American industrial production, already the world's largest, doubled in size. The output of the machine-tools to make weapons trebled in three years. The balance between the U.S. and her enemies changed almost overnight. (p.2)

The U.S. was as Franklin D. Roosevelt put it "the Arsenal of Democracy," but it was not just that. It also provided the Allied forces with over 10 million soldiers as well (Doepke et al, 2007). A ten million segment of a roughly 75 million total population was really significant in terms of labor force to compensate it.

These soldiers that were deployed to Europe and other parts of the world were principally and primarily young men, which are the driving soul of any economy and specifically its workforce. Roosevelt stated and highlighted this important fact on one of his many speeches to the American people, to lift their morals and to mobilize them in that time of war saying that:

“every combat division every naval task force, every squadron a fighting planes is dependent for its equipment and ammunition and Fuel and food ... On the American people in civilian clothes in the offices and in the factories and on the farms at home.

(Harper, 2007, p.3)

There is neither debate nor controversy among military observers about the critical vitality of having a strong working, and industrial home front to support the war efforts. Therefore many current sources of power-measuring military magazines and websites had more than just equipment counting and analysis to determine the full capacity of certain armies. Taking one of the most frequented websites as an example, Global Fire Power uses many criteria to evaluate the whole defense capabilities of countries.

These criteria include but are not restricted to the obvious military assets such as; available manpower (infantry and Special Forces), airpower (fighter aircraft and Attack Helicopters), army strength (Tanks and Artillery), and naval forces (destroyers and frigates), however, they also focus on other assets as well (“Global Firepower”, n.d.).

They count the natural resources of that particular state because “as much as any weapon system is vital to an ongoing military campaign, wars still rely on availability of natural resources” (“Global Firepower”, n.d.). The other important non-weaponized criterion is logistics, which is the reason labor force is so important. The C.I.A cited website argued

that: “War is as much a battle of logistics, moving man and machine from and to points all over, as it is direct combat. A quantitative/ robust labor force also adds to available wartime industry” (“Global Firepower”, n.d.).

However, there was a major issue in the U.S. standing in front of actually providing a “quantitative and robust labor force” to their economic and war machines in the years, not just during the war, but in the whole period prior to the 1960s. This issue caused tremendous shortages of workers, when the country was in dire need for eligible, qualified, or even for unqualified workforce to get through the war efforts. This point will be further expanded in the second and third chapters, but I digress. This obstacle was the elimination and marginalization of a large chunk of the American population due to a legacy of discriminatory policies against several minorities that ought to be utilized and called upon for help during these rough times. Of course legacy is that of Jim Crow Laws.

1-6-1-The Gender Burden of Jim Crow Laws in WWII

“Some would say that a woman is good in her place. This reminds me of what some white people say of the Negro: that he is good in his place” (Glenda, 2018). This was a statement made by Sarah Dudley Petty in a *Washington Post* (2018) published article about the notion of putting people of color down especially, black women. Jim Crow Laws came as a reaction to the Reconstruction Era that brought with it several civil rights enhancements to the African-American community, the most important of them was the Emancipation Proclamation, the famous Abraham Lincoln’s executive order that freed slaves (Glenda, 2018).

Several attempts have been made to correct what is considered as “the biggest sin” in American history, which is slavery. The institution was abolished and slaves were freed in the sense that they were no longer considered property to be sold, bought, owned, or gifted,

however, no one could really argue that just as those horrifying and horrendous practices were over, everything went back smoothly to racial and social equality and equal opportunities to all.

In particular after all those emotional and literal deep wounds of the Civil War, that were fought at least in part to end slavery between large numbers of people who had drastically and fundamentally different views about how to treat black folks. The nation was utterly divided after the Civil War was over, even though it was officially united under the federal system as a result of Abraham Lincoln and the Union's victory in the 1965 Civil War's aftermath (Glenda, 2018).

Despite institutionally mandated reform, the American society was not ready to cope with the new status of their not long ago former slaves. These sentiments that were harnessed, especially in the Southern states of the United States exploded with a thinly-veiled new form of discrimination, that was just one step shy of the unjust institution of slavery. This form came under the doctrine of "separate but equal;" which mainly dealt with the receiving of public services, such as public schools, universities, hospitals, and the infamous separate drinking fountains (Glenda, 2018).

These systemic forms of racism continued until the beginning of the twentieth century, and it caused a lot of pain and suffering to the entire U.S. population and especially to the most vulnerable component of society at that time: black women. Before their abrupt end due to the process of the Civil Rights Movement, the U.S. military in its resolve to keep these practices were tested and put under severe pressure to, either neglect the call to recruit more workers to enhance their war efforts and suffer the grave consequences of that, or open these shipyards and factories and take the risk of facing social backlash from the white Southerners who are still in favor of pursuing those policies.

Due to the pressing needs, the Roosevelt administration had no real option but to opt for the former and sign an executive order that would prove to be a chunk in the armor of the medieval practices of Jim Crow laws. That is Executive Order Number 8802 which declared that: “There shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense Industries and in government because of race, creed, color, or national origin” (Sundquist, & Morgan, 1995, p.30).

This reaching-out by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, without being too judgmental on the nobility of his intentions when he made this decision, was in fact or can at least be read as circumstantial and very limited act of generosity to the African-American community. It was not only the generosity of President Roosevelt that led to the signing of that particular executive order in 1941, it was also namely the tremendous efforts of civil rights activists like the president of “the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Protesters,” Philip Randolph (Mettler, 1998).

He and his non-governmental organization that was focusing on giving the black community equal rights one civil battle at a time, threatened their First Amendment right to peacefully protest and publicly show dissent at the way they have been treated, especially when it came to hiring them in defense and military related occupations and government positions (Mettler, 1998).

After the response of the U.S. presidents to rising demands and voices from all American political affiliations, black workers in general, and especially black women workers entered the American labor force and the military industries in droves. They started working in industries like shipbuilding, aircraft manufacturing, and armories. This led or at least contributed immensely in the previously mentioned astronomical numbers of equipments that were used either by the U.S. military or the quantity that were shipped to allied forces in

Europe and elsewhere in the world, earning the United States the Second World War title, assigned by its own President Roosevelt “The Arsenal of Democracy.”

However, the feelings that many had about this makeshift decision to lift the Jim Crow prohibition to just such a limited scope, mainly defense Industries were just feelings of well-placed doubts. Or to be more accurate fears and concerns that these measures were only temporary, and instead of them being expanded to cover other industries and services like schooling, education, and healthcare.

The African-American community and women to be precise feared that these measures will be rescinded or diminished or even eliminated as soon as the war was over. Despite being recognized as war heroes and being compensated on their efforts whether on the war front or the home front, at least financially, but the activists’ fears were justified and they were mortified about their post-war status, when they still received the same discriminatory treatment in the country where they fought and bled to keep it safe.

It was not until twenty years after that, that things started to look brighter for that oppressed minority or to put it more realistically, at least they started to see that there was a light at the end of the discrimination tunnel. Moreover, another aspect of race and racial issues was brought to the forefront of the national political debate, which is the focus of this research: gender. But there was one even larger issue that was fundamentally and categorically affected by the largest conflict in human history, World War II, and that is the American family.

1-6-2-The Effects of the Second World War on the American Family and Gender Roles

The participation of the United States in the Second World War in the official active military interference was historically dated and marked at the seventh of December of 1941. However in the U.S. mainland and society or what is generally referred to as the “home front

War,” many historians would argue that, the war predates that historical point. “So comprehensive and fundamental are the changes wrought by war. And so closely is the family interrelated with the larger society, that there is perhaps no aspect of family life unaffected by war” (Harper, 2007, p.51) According to American sociologist Philip M. Hauser: “American participation in the war antedates December 7, 1941. The defense... programs had already been initiated when Pearl Harbor was attacked” (Harper, 2007, p.51).

This was probably precisely what led to the particular attack, and the immediate entry of the U.S. the battlefield of World War II. The U.S. industries had a humongous ability to deliver equipment on a yearly basis, consistently and even increasingly effective. The U.S. had to reach full employment to satisfy their war efforts. This changed dramatically not just the economic status of the American family, but also as sociologist James H.S. Bossard stated in his book *Family Backgrounds for Maritime Adolescents* (2007):

Every aspect of family life, the most obvious impact of the war was that most Americans lived in rural places inside America, and most of the factories, armories, and shipyards were in metropolitan areas, like the Willow Run bomb Factory stationed in Michigan and famous shipyards, where Cruisers and destroyers were built and commissioned, the San Francisco Bay Area. (p.52)

The geographical situation of these reliable sources of income and the tremendous job opportunities they gave to the American families, came as a breath of fresh air after the devastating years of the Great Depression in the 1930s, where most families could not even provide their most essential needs let alone to sort of privileges these jobs and the consequent

salaries provided. But this privilege and these comfortable wages came for most Americans with a heavy price.

A lot of American family members, especially husbands and fathers or both had to leave their families behind in order to support the war efforts. The numbers and statistics of that type of migration are really staggering. But before seeing those numbers a very important point needs to be highlighted, which is central to the rest of this argument about interstate migration. As I have mentioned earlier, Americans suffered immeasurably during the years of the Great Depression. One area, however, was kind of measurable in the sense that it could be put into figures in numbers that are tangible.

This area of great concern to the American public is unemployment. Perhaps the simple most demonstrably tangible change that war caused to America as a country was a sharp reduction in unemployment rates. In 1939, prior to the U.S. entry in the Second World War the number of unemployed Americans was 9.5 millions, that's about a fifteenth of the total population, but just after two years and a few months after the commitment of the U.S. to the allies and becoming a belligerent in that devastating conflict, that number dropped significantly and dramatically to 670,000 unemployed American, that's almost full employment according to the economic standard for a nation of that magnitude (a population of roughly 150 million citizens) (Macgregor, 2003).

These horrifying numbers led many Americans to perceive uprooting themselves and their families from their homes as a meager price to pay in exchange for providing a living for their loved ones. This mentality of desperation led to probably the largest "exodus" of Americans since the country's inception. By the year 1944, about 15 million Americans who inhabited a particular county at the beginning of the war chose to live or were living in a completely different county by the end of the conflict, another 16 million Americans had

served in a branch of the U.S. armed forces, whether it was the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army, or the U.S. Air Force by 1945 (Macgregor, 2003).

The gradual evolution in the number of service members in the armed forces was staggering. For example, in 1939 the number of active military personnel in all military divisions was about 334,473 that number skyrocketed to 12 million in 1945 (Harper, 2007). This interstate migration due to the economic necessities of the war, the draft, and volunteering for the war due military necessities, had a dramatic effect on the demographic scenery of the United States. Some of these states witnessed an increase in child birth rates other suffered a sharp decrease.

As previously mentioned, many Americans left their home counties and even states to find a proper work amid the booming of the defense industries. Among those states which had a dramatic increase in children's population is the state where there was one of the largest armories in the U.S. Mainland, the state of North Carolina. "The old North State" saw the biggest increase of children under five among most U.S. states with up to 135.6% larger than in the beginning of World War II (Harper, 2007).

"The Magnolia State" Mississippi came in close second as the percentage of children under five exploded to a whopping 127.7%, Kansas and Georgia also added high percentages 80.1%, 60.4% respectively, the Lone Star State, Texas had large increases as well especially in town such as Fort Worth, Beaumont, and Port Arthur.

But the temporary war scenery was about to shift dramatically with the ending of the war and the homecoming of millions of soldiers, mostly and notably young single men who were eager to live in a more peaceful America and start a family with a lot and a lot of children gaining by that the most famous nickname as a generation.

1-6-3-The Golden Generation: The Baby Boomers of Post 1945

One of the prime examples in history on how influential growth in birth rates on any given economy or society or even military is the post Second World War Baby Boom in the United States of America. After the war had ended a large number of soldiers came back to the U.S. amid a whirlwind of welcoming emotions from the American population who had unanimously gathered in support of the young men who won the deadliest conflict in human history.

Of course no one was happier with the return of the soldiers than their families and loved ones. However, another important and more powerful institution was also ecstatic with that return and wanted to compensate their efforts in the war, and also help in their reintegration into the American society, labor force, and normal daily life. Of course, this large institution is the American federal government. According to estimates from the American Census Bureau, the number of American soldiers who returned to America in 1945 i.e. after the ending of the war was a whopping 10,643,238 individuals (Overy, 1997).

These large numbers of soldiers needed large scale resources, in order to regulate their needs and issues whether these issues were economic i.e. providing jobs and benefits, or social through creating social programs that help train and educate these returning young men. So these issues became highly politicized and came to the forefront of the legislative rhetoric in Washington D.C. and it culminated in the passage of one of the most effective and most popular pieces of legislation in American history: The G.I Bill. (1944)

1-6-4-The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944: The Male Bill

Amid the rising affections of the general population towards the returning soldiers and young men, many if not most politicians, as it is the habit of any political discourse in a democratic society rushed to ride this wave of sentiment of gratefulness and gratitude and the

desire to reward the triumphants in the largest conflict of the century. Therefore any law concerning the compensation of these war heroes would receive bipartisan support from both political parties, Democrats and Republicans.

However, prior to reaching the office of the presidency for Signature, or even prior to reaching the House of Representatives and the US Senate floors to be discussed and formulated, the idea of this compensation was lobbied and pushed forward by an American organization that promotes the interests of the War veterans called “The American Legion” (Mettler, 2005).

One of this organization’s most influential officials, Harry Colmery captured the feelings and sentiments around this issue in this statement: “We recognize the burden of wars fall upon the citizen soldier who has gone forth overnight to become the answer and hope of humanity we seek to preserve his rights to see that he gets a square deal” (Mettler, 2005, p.471). It was not only the sentiment of gratitude that led this charge to provide economic and social privileges to veterans but there was also the need of the American society and even economy to use the discipline acquired by and through years of training and dedication.

The political establishment wanted to make the most of this talent, and redirect their skills of killing and destruction towards a more subtle use, in industry and education. This notion was implied in the words of the American Legion’s National Commander Warren Atherton when he said:

However great may be the service of the men and women who on the battlefield in front in this war in even greater obligation will face them when peace Returns the continuing duty of citizenship is the East to apply the lessons of this war to establishments better

and stronger Nation as these veterans have led in war so must they lead in peace. (Mettler, 2005, p.22)

The bill was formulated eventually and was called the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1945 officially but was known and was famous for its unofficial name which is the G.I. Bill. The G.I. acronym stands for Government Issue, because soldiers were seen that way (Mettler, 2005). The bill reached President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's desk for the final signature and official enactment into the American law on the June 22, 1944 (Mettler, 2005).

This may also be interpreted as another boost to the morale of soldiers when the war was reaching its final days. The main goal of this famous bill was principally and practically to give benefits to war veterans, specifically the Second World War veterans because the soldiers of World War I and their cash bonuses were excluded from the final wording of the bill. These benefits included and ranged from providing and giving the beneficiaries low-interest loans to start a business of their own, one year of an unemployment compensation and wages, and other useful social programs that helped tremendously in the re-assimilation of the returning soldiers (Mettler, 2005).

But two main articles or benefits in the bill stand out, and would prove to be one of the major turning points in the booming of the U.S. economy and most importantly to research the booming of the U.S. population. The first of these benefits is the involvement of U.S. government in providing payments for tuition and full scholarships for veterans to attend college or universities and enter vocational and technical institutions (Sitkoff, 1978).

This made a foundation or to be precise, a future investment in the young men to educate and train for the post-war challenges and feats, whether socially or economically. In order to put the magnitude and the large-scale effects that this bill would have on the American society and economy and other institutions is to consider the big number large pool

of beneficiaries. As previously mentioned, the number of returning Soldier exceeded the 10 million mark of young men motivated, and proud males, if properly invested in and properly guided it would give the U.S. a large advantage over the rest of the war-devastated world.

Except for the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese Navy and the air forces in 1941, the U.S. mainland was not subject to the mayhem and destruction of the war that Europe, the Soviet Union, and Asia all suffered from. Returning to the main point of the human capital investments regarding education and or the job training, the interaction and engagement of the veterans in the educational program and section of the G.I. bill in the first few months after its enactment was very timid to state the least. It even brought many observants to judge it to be a total failure.

For example, by September of 1945 and three months after the signature of the draft only a meager 15,000 veterans have entered in colleges and universities under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act (Sitkoff, 1978). But this was soon to change and exceed even the wildest of imaginations and expectations of even the bill's most prominent supporters and optimists. By the year 1947, the number of returning soldiers who used the education section of the bill to enroll in colleges and universities reached a whopping one million and only two years later in the year 1949, that already large number became even larger in fact it doubled to reach two million veterans (Sitkoff, 1978).

These numbers are just for universities and colleges. The number of veterans who engaged in a school or institution below the higher education level was also remarkable. By 1949, the figure for the returning soldiers who enrolled in schools below the university level exceeded 2.5 million (Sitkoff, 1978). Eventually the data on the quality and quantity of veterans who use the G.I. Bill or the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 in order to enhance or make a substantial human capital investment whether in higher education or in

levels beneath that, proved the bill to be a major success for President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the generations to come.

The bill had covered unexpectedly the majority of the returning soldiers. Out of the 10 million Armed Forces members that had returned from the war 7.8 million decided to use the bill that is a whopping 78% of the total young men in uniform (Stewart, 2005). The amazing factor about this large number of soldiers and fighters who decided to use the government subsidies provided in the Bill is the fact that the majority of any group of people who survived a major conflict do not usually rush back to school.

The veterans' first impulse and reaction are not to sit in a classroom to get an education, but rather to escape the horrors and traumas of the war and enjoy the life of peace. This logical assumption was confirmed by a survey conducted by Frederickson Schrader, which was done to students in 16 U.S. universities.

The educational testing service or the E.T.S, which was the department responsible for this survey, found that veterans were asked about whether they would have attended college or some form of educational training without the financial aid that the bill provided, 20% of them replied with "probably or definitely not" (Mettler, 1998). This was a clear indicator to the extent of the impact that the bill had on veterans.

Another important aspect that has to be taken into consideration is the gender composition of those young soldiers. In order to put things in perspective, a closer look is needed to the atmosphere of the pre U.S. engagement in World War II. In 1940 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the longest serving president in the history of the United States signed the first peacetime draft in the history of America, it was called The Selective Training and Service Act (Mettler, 1998).

Its main pool of recruits or rather the only pool of the recruits was the U.S. male population (Mettler, 2005). The law mandated that any men aged between 21 and 36 is required to register to be drafted and would be subject to the call of the Armed Forces, this led to the registration of more than 16 million American men. Though a large chunk of those who went to the war did not return home but as previously mentioned the majority did.

In addition to the G.I. Bill another bonus was already waiting for them thanks to the Ingenuity of one particular man and his two sons. Entrepreneur Abraham Levitt and his two sons William and Alfred had an idea that would prove to be of great impact and even reshape the whole notion of the American dream for generations to come.

This idea was simply a town or a community that is neither a city nor a rural area, but a mixture of both that had the best of both worlds: proximity to the city and all its luxuries and comforts, while still enjoying the calm and the coziness of the countryside. This concept was named after him, Levittown which used to be a farm land that was transformed to a suburban community that housed thousands of veterans and their spouses and children (Glenna, 1987).

The urban and architectural innovative concept was not just tempting because of its geographical and logistical indulgences, or just the realization of the dreams of and visions of two presidents Thomas Jefferson who viewed cities as “Pestilential to the morals, the health and Liberties of men,” (Marshal, 2018) or F.D.R who envisioned “A nation of homeowners of people who own real share in their land is unconquerable” (Marshal, 2018), but rather most importantly for the financial allure and accessibility to the middle class.

The idea soon spread through the country like wildfire and by the 1950s about 20 million Americans were living in a community with an urban structure that is comparable to that of Levittown design (Marshal, 2018). Hence the legend of suburbia was born and the new face of middle-class America and a new notion and definition of the American dream was

taking form and gaining momentum. With that new perception of the American dream an older perception of the American family and household was reinforced and eventually gender roles were affected drastically by this reinforcement of traditional norms.

1-7-The Cultivation of the Cult of Domesticity:

One of the most famous T.V. shows that defined the American society's views on how the household is shaped should be shaped is a program called "I Love Lucy." The American sitcom narrated the life of what was considered to be the perfect home; a hard-working father, two beloved children, and Lucille Esmeralda McGilcuddy Ricardo or "Lucy" the protagonist of the T.V. series ("I love Lucy", n.d).

Going beyond the obvious racial preferences of the show given the context of the pre-Civil Rights era, the gender roles assignments are that of a traditional puritanical household, which is that the men are usually bread-winners in the family and their protector, and women are, well the housewives. This dichotomy of the male public activity and female private passivity was best articulated by American sociologist Mark Beth Norton:

Before the American Revolution women were frequently apologetic about their roles to be a good housewife was conceived to be an end in itself rather than a means to a greater or more meaningful goal... The housewife was seen as serving the purely private ends of providing for the needs of those who lived in it and the housewife has no reason to rethink of herself vitally linked with the world outside the home. (Glenna, 1987, p.38)

This perception of a woman being just a housewife was not only rooted in the social psyche of the American people but was also a characteristic of the political bipartisan rhetoric

and discourse in Washington D.C. This led American historian and sociologist Glenna Matthews to reiterate this previously mentioned argument in a chapter called “The Hand That Rocks the Cradle 1920-1976,” reviewing both Democratic and Republican parties’ policies regarding their perspectives and positions on women. Glenna then came to the conclusion that:

As women modes of political participation and social roles expanded over time we might have expected that it would lead Republicans to focus on women as mothers in the context of family values and traditional gender roles and Democrats to focus on women as liberated individual seeking career goals and self-fulfillment. But both parties continue to view women through the lens of motherhood in presidential politics. (Glenna, 1987, p.11)

In her apparent disappointment at the status of women and not just presidential politics, and the talking points used by the would-be commanders-in-chief, but also deep down to the American individuals and their social norms. Matthew stated that:

This reflects the enduring belief in American political culture (a political culture that is dominated by men) that women regardless of the expansion of their roles in society continue to be thought of first and foremost as mothers. (Glenna, 1987, p.12)

Despite the fierce opposition and the disdain that many critics (mainly feminists) had directed at this perception of society on this perception of gender roles and the restriction of housework to the housewife, that was propagated on the American people by the conservative

wave that hit the American homeland after the end of the second world war, there were many positive correlations to this perception of motherhood mainly divorce and fertility rates, as we have seen earlier.

1-8-Conclusion

The first chapter aimed at establishing a solid foundation and a historical background for social restructuring in America. In particular social engineering aimed at defining gender relations in the economic and political spheres. Based on the literature and the historical data collected regarding the institutional interventions in shaping the relationship between marriage and the labor market, and also the relationship within the household i.e., house labor division, several interesting findings had been established.

This chapter concluded that in the period prior to the 1960s there were several attempts by the US government to assign or to maintain the assignment of certain gender roles that further exacerbated gender disparities socioeconomically, but led to an economic and military “boom,” and an unprecedented stability in marriage and fertility. These findings will set the stage in the following chapters for the evaluation and the assessment of change, when the variables that contributed to this notable boom will be subject to change in post 1960 America.

**CHAPTER TWO: Laying
Down the Framework: The
Origins of Discontent**

2-1-Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to lay down the theoretical framework upon which the general argument of this research work will be based. Concepts such as feminism, liberalism and the social contract theory, which are seldom thrown around randomly into academic conversations with little or no clear definitions, will be dealt with in detail.

This chapter will focus on the development of the feminist theory and the ever evolving demands and grievances regarding the socioeconomic and political status of women in post 1960 America. The feminists' demands and grievances are a subtle critique and a revisiting of a famous paper published by British sociologist Catherine Hakim.

This chapter will also deal with several key historical social events that characterized the post 1960s era as revolutionary, especially those concerning the family and contraceptive patterns. The main question that this chapter will attempt to answer is related to the origins and the root causes behind the social and political push to achieve absolute gender equality and how did that translate in the legal and legislative domains.

This chapter will be divided into four different sections that will tackle the theoretical background of the feminist movement and the capitalistic and free market tendencies of the American society, while also focusing on and dealing with the social and political revolutions that took place in the period under study.

2-2-The Evolution of the Social Contract Theory: Thomas Hobbes and the Unbearable State of Nature.

Since the dawn of the recorded history of man, and even prior to that according to archaeological evidence, all groups of humans gather to form a societal structure based on a hierarchical order (Newey, 2008). These hierarchies and structures varied in shapes and sizes but most importantly there was a notable variation cross-culturally. These different variations, however, shared a common characteristic, which is that most powers of regulatory and executive nature were pretty much concentrated in one individual and in some rare cases in a very small group of individuals.

These individuals and the reasons behind their accession to this position of power also varied, but the spectrum of differences were within the realm of what is considered normal qualities of leadership, such as strength both physical and financial, conscience, and the ability to mobilize people. And in order to add some legitimacy to that leadership's establishment to continue its supremacy and sustain its rule and its institutions, whether they were sophisticated and complex or more simplistic and primitive, they adopted a set of cultural and ideological foundational principles that were usually shared with the people they ruled over.

These set of principles were either explicitly stated in the form of scripture or verbatim or implicitly agreed upon. These arrangements have been called many names throughout history, for example in the Arab Islamic civilization and within the context of the relationship between the people and their rulers, these arrangements were called *Al-Baya'a*. In some contemporary regions it is labeled as the "Pledge of Allegiance." Where adherents of this pledge or *Al-Baya'a* or whatever the naming might be, agree to surrender or give up certain rights in exchange for safety, security, and certain degree of the rule of law. This concept was

articulated in a masterpiece of political philosophy by a composer from Geneva called Jean-Jack Rousso, and it was called “*On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Rights*,” or as it was initially referred to in French the language of its original scripture “*Du Contrat Social; Ou Principes du Droit Politique*.” In this book Rousseau laid the foundation of a theory that would prove to be one of the most influential works on what became to be known as “The Age of Enlightenment in Europe.” His theory, labeled as the social contract theory, stated that the foundation of a society is where:

Individuals have consented explicitly or tacitly to surrender some of their freedoms and submit to the authority of the ruler or magistrate (or the decision of the majority) in exchange for the protection of their remaining rights. (Welch, 2012, p.37)

This structural framework for a normally functioning and most importantly sustainable society and the underlying philosophical “envisioning” behind it laid down by the Swiss sociologist Jean-Jacques Rousseau came to avoid and ultimately replace what will be labeled in this research as the default society. The idea of a default society or as it was originally labeled by another famous sociologist, this time of a British descent Thomas Hobbes, as a state of nature (Rustighi, 2018).

A state of nature has a simple semantic as it is suggested by the literal meaning of the term. The basic definition of a state of nature as Thomas Hobbes termed it is: “The absence of any political order where individual actions are bound only by their personal power and conscience.” (Karpowicz, & Julian, 2010, p.36) In “layman terms” what this actually means is that individuals of such a system and order, in other words the lack of thereof, are entitled to everything and everyone’s personal, private, and “public” properties. The latter of course does not exist for the obvious reasons. Under these extremely harsh and probably unlivable

conditions, people, mostly powerful men decided to do the unthinkable, which is to compromise. But before delving into the minutiae and the details of what this unthinkable actually is, one needs to look back to those dire conditions. Extreme circumstances require extreme measures, and the state of nature as defined by Thomas Hobbes was the “mother-load” of extreme circumstances. In 1651 in his famous book *Leviathan*, Hobbes stated:

In a state of nature human life would be solitary, poor, wasteful, brutish, and short. Therefore individuals in any given Society historically have decided to give up some of their freedoms and rights ameliorate the symptoms of the brutish and lonely state of nature. (Cited in Newey, 2008, p.13)

This act of quid pro quo was called a social contract.

2-2-1-The Social Contract Theory between Liberalism and Feminism

Liberalism and feminism are probably going to be the most recurring concepts in this research work in terms of the large-scale ideological and political influence they exerted, not just on the American society and politics, but also its economic structures. Therefore, these terms need to be properly defined and eloquently put in a context avoid the often misleading definitions propagated for partisan or ideological purposes coming from either the left or the right of the ideology spectrum.

2-2-1-1-Revisiting Liberalism

According to the *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* website the word liberalism is “associated with non authoritarianism, rule of law, constitutional government with limited powers and the guarantee of civil and political liberties.” (“Liberalism”, 2019) Though this lexical and highly technical definition of the term sheds an important light on the “surroundings” so to speak, but rather fails to address the central and essential meaning of it.

At its core, liberalism as a political and originally as a philosophical doctrine is built on principles of protecting and ameliorating the freedoms and rights of individuals in a particular society. An even more accurate description of what liberalism actually is attributed to its presumed founder, an English philosopher by the name of John Locke (1632-1704).

In his famous publication “*Two Treaties of Governments*,” where he attacked vehemently some of the dominant features of the political and social structures of Europe at the time, like patriarchy, monarchy, and feudalism, he brought about the concept of liberalism without actually naming it, but through providing a basis for what it is. He said that: “people have rights such as the right to life, liberty, and property that have a foundation independent with the laws of any particular society.” (Cited in Karpowicz, & Julian, 2010, p.29)

He elaborated these notions in great details using the findings of his predecessors. Mainly the claim that men are naturally born free and equal and he used this claim to justify that understanding the legitimacy of governments as political entities comes from, or as a result of a social contract, through which people surrender willingly some of their rights to the government in exchange for a comfortable and safe everyday life (Karpowicz, & Julian, 2010). Therefore the occurrence and reoccurrence of the term liberalism throughout this research work will be within the semantic framework of what has just been laid out.

2-2-1-2-Revisiting Feminism

For the sake of consistency previous source that provided the initial definition of liberalism will be consulted with the term feminism as well. The term is traced back to the late 19th century in the French language “*feminisme*,” which basically means the advocacy of women’s rights on the ground of the equality of the sexes (“Feminism”, 2019). These rights revolve mainly around three axes; social, economic, and more importantly political. The Oxford website also tracks the origin of the term even though the underlying concepts of

gender relations and women's rights far predate the French originating term. In the West particularly in the US, UK, and France the issues related to feminism came to the forefront of political and public debate in different periods of time.

For the French and the Americans these issues became prominent during their respective revolutions in the late 18th century, while it took the British another century to catch up with the emergence of the suffragette movement in the late 19th century (Frye, 1983). In the more technical perspective of the word, feminism is, according to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary: "The theory of the political, economic, and social equality of the sexes, and it is also an organized activity on behalf of women's rights and interests." ("Feminism", 2019)

Therefore the occurrence and reoccurrence of the term feminism throughout this research work will be within the semantic framework of what has just been laid out. Each of these two theoretical frameworks laid out there versions of a new social contract to structure societies, redefining the boundaries of two key principles of any social contract. These two principles are "Rights" and "Freedoms." These two terms are frequently thrown around in debates and conversations especially those centered on politics and economics.

Though their semantic meanings are somewhat clear, but their types and especially boundaries and borders can be nebulous and foggy to say the least. Many of the liberal social contract theorists, in the process of creating a hypothetical ideal social structure they start with the previously mentioned state of nature brought by Thomas Hobbes where all people, mainly men are completely free and equal, and move forward on the premise that this situation is not sustainable (Elshaiin, 1981a). Therefore they pursue the next logical ultimate phase, which is that:

Men cannot live together harmoniously without limitations on their freedom and they continue to propose a variety of civil arrangements necessary for regulating peaceful interactions between people, which culminated in some form of authority, typically a state. (Welch, 2012, p.3)

These arrangements and their necessity are agreed upon among the individuals of a particular society to ensure the sustainability of public welfare. So they provide protections in exchange for giving up certain freedoms. These protections are provided through and by various forms of “legitimate but coercive institutions” such as governments (Welch, 2012). Usually terms like freedom and coercion do not coincide but within the structure of a social contract *they do* to create a functioning and most importantly sustainable society. They do not only coincide but rather they form a symbiotic relationship.

This account of coercion and freedom includes many types of freedoms, whether it is economic, political, or social and they are all equally valid accounts of freedoms that are regulated by the state. However, modern liberal social contract theorists highlight the importance of one type of freedom, which is political freedom (Welch, 2012). This is the point or at least one of the points that feminist and liberal theorists part ways in terms of which type is causing the inequality or even oppression that undermines the necessary framework that ensures gender equality, which is social in nature.

2-2-2-Social Freedom Detached from the Political Freedom

The first abstract idea that comes to any rational mind when defining and contextualizing the notion of freedom in a societal structure lies in the dichotomy of consent and obligation. Logically speaking the simple manifestation of a freedom according to this context is that if a person has the ability to consent to or refuses a certain proposal whether it

is personal or transactional he or she is considered free. Of course this is true in the opposite direction as well. If a person is obliged and mandated by a “pressuring external force” to accept or refuse a certain proposal whether it is abstract or concrete, he or she or even they are considered not free. This dichotomy is agreed upon by liberal and feminist theorists alike, or any rational person for that matter. However, the area where they part ways and where there is rigorous and contentious debate especially in the US is the previously mentioned pressuring force.

There are some theorists especially in the larger liberal camp, who believed that the feminist ideology rejects the relation and dichotomy of consent/obligation when it comes to freedom (Karpowicz & Julian, 2010) among others. Karpowicz argued that the minute details of consent description are lost for the liberal philosophers. In one of his main arguments he stated that:

The view social freedom misses the extent to which systemic oppression is institutional has evolved over time transforming from explicit policies and accepted public opinion to unconsciously embedded social norms and individual habit.

(Karpowicz, & Julian, 2010, p.6)

The theorists (2010) went on to cite many examples of what they labeled as “systemic institutional and unintentional restraints on women’s freedom.” some of these examples varied along lines of race, gender, and a mixture of both. One of the first examples that they used, which is pertaining to the topic of this research work is related to the participation of women into the labor force. They argued that channeling women into low paying jobs is a product of the restraint highlighted above. They stated that:

... The devaluation of women's labor is not necessarily a direct constraint imposed by another person; however the social expectations for care by women constrain women's free activities and interactions while the social devaluation secures their subordinate place in most social structures. (Karpowicz, & Julian, 2010, p.6)

This is obviously an attempt to justify the socioeconomic status that a lot of feminist perceive as inferior to that of men. There was also a purely social attempt to negate the liberal perception of consent, which is a mixture of sexuality and race. He reiterated his criticism by stating that:

One example of systemic, institutional and unintentional restraint on women's freedom, when someone uses the slogan "chocolate love" which stems from the association of black skin with chocolate, even though this association is embraced by some black women, this association objectifies black women as hyper sexual. And sexual objectification is one of the most commonly cited causes of women's social unfreedom. (Welch, 2012, p.9)

The literature of both liberal and feminist theoretical camps is large and goes on and on with providing examples and scenarios to construe evidence on the authenticity and validity of their arguments. But to avoid going through all of these arguments and the unnecessary deconstruction of their examples, their arguments and examples can be summarized and molded into two models. Basically, the liberal social freedom model is based on the traditional toleration relation, while the feminist social freedom model of consent is

based on a friendship relation (Welch, 2012). These two models will take center stage in the definition of consent when examining the relevant historical events and policy structure and formulation pertaining to the topic of this work, which is the unintended consequences of government policy and legislation pursuing absolute gender equality in the United States of America and other related States, not for research purposes, but rather for the purpose of argument and drawing parallels.

2-3-The Feminist Grievances

One of the most important driving forces for the feminist movement, all three waves with them, if not the most important was the perceived notion of overwhelming oppression leveraged historically and systematically against women. Keeping them down and disenfranchised in a way that is even comparable to black and Native Americans. Of course for the sake of clarity and consistency, with the rest of the terms that have already been defined in this research work, the term “oppression” has to receive the same treatment.

Again, it has to go through the same first filter, which is the literal meaning of the word in the Oxford Online Dictionary. Under the entry of “oppression” the origin of the word stands out as being obviously like most words ending with “sion” as French (“Oppression”, 2019). It is defined as “prolonged cruel or unjust treatment or exercise of authority (“Oppression”, 2019). These are the literal semantic boundaries of this highly contentious word. The contextual meaning employed by many feminist philosophers and theorists on the other hand is multi-layered. One example of that is made by Marilyn Frye (1983) in a tirade against “the oppression of gendered social sexuality.” she stated that:

Systemic oppression is unintentional because it does not require that any one individual hold or exercise oppressive acts and beliefs towards others. Yet it is intentional in so far as

oppressive structures are allowed to exist for the purpose of maintaining a system of privileges for some. (Frye, 1983, p.35)

She continued to sum up her assessment: “as a result, systemic privilege creates a system of burdens for others” (Frye, 1983, p.35). Unlike the literal meaning of the word oppression that was provided by the Oxford Online Dictionary, which involves a willful and premeditated exercise of unjust treatment against individuals or groups, the feminists perception of oppression, highlighted here by Marilyn Frye, goes beyond that to a definition that often seems unintentional and benign. She involved a notion that is often employed by racial minorities, which is the notion of a “privilege.” She concluded by stating that: “...As a result systemic privilege creates a system of burden for others” (Frye, 1983, p.35).

Whether the argument that systemic privileges enjoyed by men are the reason for systemic oppression is accurate or not is beside the point in the social context. Because it represents some form of ‘feeling’ that is shared by all feminists and many women in the US. The intensity of this feeling varies in shape and form among the feminist camp, and it often manifests itself in the shape of policy demands. Of course since these feelings of all shapes and forms represent a concern for a big chunk of society, they have to be addressed in this research work. These concerns have been dismissed as “myths” by many scholars, notably British sociologist Catherine Hakim in her article entitled, literally “*Feminist Myths and Magic Medicine: Flawed Thinking behind Calls for further Equality Legislation.*” (2006)

In this work Hakim went on to cite what she labeled as “feminist myths” regarding social, economic, and political problems facing women in Europe, particularly in Britain. She constructed in a sophisticated manner, twelve “feminist myths” and started “debunking” them one at the time with various degrees of accuracy. It is not academically fair to approach the twelve “myths” either as myths and dismiss them in their entirety, nor is it wise to adopt them

as completely legitimate concerns that need policy interference. Of course there is always a nuanced ground, not the middle ground that is based on centrist position politically, but rather a vigorous academic approach driven by rigorous empirical examination. Therefore these “myths” will be labeled as grievances and they will be dealt with individually and separately.

2-3-1- Grievance Number One: Equality is not enough!

The feminist Theory implies certain notions of equality that need to be implemented by some form of powerful structure, for example a state. The implementation and enforcement of such measures to attain equality did happen in many historical instances in the West (Europe and North America). In 1920 for instance after a long struggle by multiple parties including the feminist movement, the United States government with the needed 37 States ratified and adopted the 19th Amendment to the US Constitution, which stated that:

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any other state on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. (Chavez, 1987)

Even though this amendment was proposed and introduced to the legislative chambers of Congress about 40 years prior to its ultimate passage in 1920 by Senator Aaron A. Sargent in 1878, it did not pass despite being reintroduced every year since then until of course 1920 (Chavez, 1987). Many more equality legislation followed suit in the years to come, reducing the gender gap in many social and economic spheres. Obvious scenery of the reduction in gender disparities can be clearly observed in the access to education, access to higher-paying managerial jobs, which had a measurable effect on the ultimate reduction of the sex-based pay gap. That gap was reduced by a significant margin in the US but that margin was even more

significant in Europe. In the US the gender pay gap had declined from a whopping 40% in 1962 to between 20% and 30% in the beginning years of the new millennium (Goldin, 1990).

That percentage was even more diminished in Europe, just beneath the threshold of 17 percentage points (Goldin, 1990). Of course, there are many underlying causes and variables to be considered when trying to understand the evolution of the wage gap between the sexes, especially post 1960. These variables vary from the economic, to the social, to the legal and to even the political. However, many of the grievances that the feminist movement holds against the efforts to address the issue of gender equality, especially on how to deal with them is focused primarily on the fact that change requires more structural intervention.

In addition, they cite the relationship, regardless of whether it is correlational or causal, between the dramatic and real shrinking of sex-based discrepancies that took place in the last 50 years, and the heavy governmental intervention that took place in favor of legislation sponsored and lobbied for by feminist activism (Plantenga, & Remery, 2006). Many scholars, including Phillips Plantenga (2006) lay out examples of such calls for governmental solutions by the feminist movement and they argue that despite what has been achieved, these activists are still not satisfied. They stated that:

However, some feminists are still disappointed with this progress (equal rights Revolutions). They insisted that equal outcomes and symmetrical roles for men and women in all aspects of family life and employment can and should be achieved. (Plantenga, & Remery, 2006, p.15)

The methodological approach of this research will attempt to lay out the grievances as they are in terms of fact recitation in this second chapter for the sake of objectivity. However,

they will be subject to rigorous analysis in the third chapter where they will be dealt with separately.

2-3-2- Grievance Number Two: The US should be more like Europe!

Another grievance that shares many characteristics with the first one is related to the central unit of society, the family, or to be more precise the balance of work and life that has been built on the division of labor. This arrangement involved assigning roles to each spouse. Where, one spouse will do home-bound activities such as, child-rearing, cooking, and cleaning. The sex of this spouse is usually female. And men will play the role of the providers. However, this formula that defined family units throughout the recorded history of human existence and across most cultures and traditions was subjected to many changes. These changes varied from the intentional i.e. the changes were forced through legislative and political means by different governments.

But these changes also happen due to unintentional and natural processes as well, that was heavily dependent on technological advancements, which will be dealt with in the third chapter in consistency with the rationale put forward to the analysis postponement of the first grievance.

The feminist movement however, likes to stop and magnify the first type of change and diminish and even deny the impact that the technological discoveries and inventions had on the changes that affected the family structure in socio-economic terms. This focus is built on two main arguments and one peculiar assumption that again will not be dealt with in this chapter.

The pursuit of the feminist activists is to replicate the policies and the legislation passed in the European Union in order to address sex-based disparities especially concerning family paid leave. This pursuit is founded on the fact that occupational segregation is a key

reason in earning differences between the sexes and this segregation also restricts people's choices of career especially in the crucial early years of adulthood (Hakim, 2011). These two arguments are built on an underlying premise that many consider to be inaccurate (see (Catherine Hakim, 2006) and Claudia Goldin, 1990).

This premise or this assumption is that all gender differences are the result of learned roles and sex stereotypes, not choice so they can and should be eliminated by social engineering (Hakim, 2011). They, the feminists, cite European experiences of such social restructuring with government involvement and oversight.

The favorite example of such European experience that is often cited as the success story of government intervention in favor of feminist activism is usually Sweden. This relatively small Scandinavian country appointed what they labeled as the first feminist government. In a statement published in their official government website entitled "Gender Equality in Sweden" stated that:

Sweden believes that women and men "should" have equal power to shape society and their own lives. Often considered a gender equality role model, Sweden has come a long way. Still there is room for improvement. (Cited in Albrecht, Björklund, & Vroman, 2003, p.155)

The Swedish government actually took it upon itself to pursue feminist policies throughout all of its branches even its foreign policy (Albrecht, Björklund, & Vroman, 2003). Of course this research work is mainly focused on the American context, but again certain numbers from the Swedish example that American feminist like to cite actually do not serve their cause. These numbers will be dealt with in details in the third chapter.

2-3-3- Grievance Number Three: Occupational Segregation is the Root of all evil

There needs to be a clear definition of what is meant by sex-based occupational segregation. According to a very influential author in this work, Glenna Mathews “Occupational segregation is the distribution of workers across and within occupations based upon demographic characteristics most often gender.” (Glenna, 1987, p.36) However, when it gets really technical, and when it comes to the nuts and bolts of this complex term in the world of labor economics the definition is much deeper and nuanced. Categorically stating, there are two types of occupational segregation. The first is called horizontal occupational segregation, which basically means when men and women choose different careers, an example of that would be when men “opt” for a career in engineering while women “opt” for an occupation in teaching (Goldin, 1990).

The second type is called consequently vertical occupational segregation, which means when men dominate higher grade and higher paid occupations and women are concentrated in lower-grade and lower paid occupations in the same area of activity (Goldin, 1990). An example of that is when women opt to be secretaries, while men go for managing roles such as chief executive officers. The fact that occupational segregation exists is indisputable. The area of vigorous debate is centered on the underlying causes and motivation for such segregation. And it revolves around the dichotomy previously discussed in the first part of this chapter, between freedom and compulsion.

The feminist side of this particular debate is obviously expected. They believe that the segregation whether in its horizontal or vertical terms is not only perpetuated on women, but it is systematically designed to keep women in lower echelon occupations and positions. The remedy that the feminists suggest in the face of such “systematic design” is a magic medicine called quotas. Like what happened during affirmative action the Civil Rights era of the 1960s,

the feminists are pushing for something more drastic. They are “insisting on 50/50 quotas of men and women in all occupations” (Hakim, 2011, p.12) Again this point will be left for analysis in the third chapter as a policy procedure in this research work.

2-3-4- Grievance Number Four: Scandinavia is the Utopia of Gender Equality!

In the previous grievance I have mentioned a peculiar example of a Scandinavian country applying feminist-friendly policies. That country of course was Sweden. The perception that is often had by feminist ideologues and many social scientists, see (Goldin, 1990) and (Glenna, 1987), who tend to agree with them is centered around the notion that Scandinavia is the “beacon” that all the Western world should look up to when it comes to gender equality issues, mainly the ever stubborn gender-based occupational segregation.

The issue with this large far fetching statement was a study conducted by the I.L.O in the year 2000. This study was so comprehensive and vast; it took 20 years to finish from 1970 to 1990, and utilized detailed data of a myriad of occupations from 41 different countries and 460 separate jobs (Anker, 1998). The study was entitled; *Gender and Jobs: Sex Segregation of Occupations in the World* .The results of this comprehensive report were very shocking, at least to the feminist ideologues. The findings (1998) were that:

This report showed that sex equality when it comes to Nordic labor markets is equal to that of Angola, Senegal, and Bahrain, but it showed that Nordic countries to have the highest level of job segregation in the O.E.C.D group, while Italy and the US had the lowest level. (Cited in Hakim, 2011)

What is to be understood from this report and these staggering numbers concerning occupational segregation based on sex, and the dispersion of men and women throughout the labor market is really revealing. Especially when there is a comparison between the pro

feminist policies adopted by Sweden and what is sometimes labeled as hostile and even anti-feminist policies adopted by the US. Again this comparison and what might be deducted from it in terms of social structuring and engineering will not be dealt with in this chapter but rather in the following one.

2-3-5- Grievance Number Five: The Better the Economy is the Better Gender Equality will be!

One of the most “obvious” things to believe is that the assumption that a better economy would automatically necessitate better opportunities for all is true. The rich will obviously get richer, the middle class will expand to include some of the poorer working-class. This is economics “101” or simple and easy economics. However, better opportunities do not necessarily mean more equality or at least not the equality that the feminist want, which will be dealt with in the following chapter.


When it comes to occupational segregation or the gender pay gap the names of the best countries in the eyes of the feminists are not the best in any economic metric by any stretch of the imagination. When it comes to the gender pay gap or the differences in wages between men and women generally the countries where the disparities are the smallest are Swaziland and Sri Lanka (Anker, 1998). The economy that possesses the lowest disparity when it comes to occupational segregation is a developed economy but is not in the least a democracy, which is china (Anker, 1998).

2-3-6- Grievance Number Six: The More (Female Employed) the Merrier (Better Numbers of Gender Equality)

The entry of large women into paid labor markets would presumably according to some feminists (Goldin & Lawrence, 2002), is to put a lot of women into top managerial and leadership positions. Hypothetically, this would reduce the historically and economically

stubborn sex-based pay disparities. Because women will automatically add a significant amount to their collective income compared to that of men. There is an interesting study or a statistic that would pave the way for the discussion of this particular grievance in the following chapter. This study involves a peculiar transition from one particular form of government to another completely different one. What is interesting for this research work, however, was something that happened to the gender pay gap. After the reunification of the two Germanys; east and west, female labor participation went down dramatically and that was surprisingly accompanied by a shrinking of the gender pay gap by 10 percentage points from 26% to only 16% (European Commission, 2007).

Figure Two: Household hours worked and female labor force participation, 1950–90



Source: Greenwood, J. & Guner N. (2009). Marriage and Divorce since World War II. Illinois: University of Chicago Press.

Figure two tells a very interesting story about the convergence that happened between married and single women working hours. It also showcases the skyrocketing numbers of married women entering the labor market after the 1960s.

2-3-7- Grievance Number Seven: Higher Education, Higher Pay, And Low Gender Pay Gap!

Higher education unquestionably and undeniably would advance any person's career. And normally advancements in careers mean higher pay. There are two important observations that need to be laid out prior to the dissemination of this particular grievance in the ensuing chapter. The first one is presented by Catherine Hakim with regards two men's and women's attitudes regarding higher education received and their career choice patterns. She stated that:

Women in high-power jobs reduce or eliminate work-life balance problems by remaining childless in about half of all cases or by low fertility as illustrated by the nominal one child family or by subcontracting child care and domestic work to other women. (Hakim, 2011, p.15)

This is when it comes to women. The story of men is entirely different. Hakim went on to claim that: "in contrast all their male colleagues are married with several children but also with wives who typically remain full-time mothers and homemakers." (Hakim, 2011, p.15) These disparities and central differences will play a key role in the general argument of this research work.

2-3-8 - Grievance Number Eight: Men and Women Basically Want the Same Thing!

One of the most defining features of capitalistic societies, when it comes to high or low income is the ability and the will to negotiate. In a landmark study conducted by economists by the names of Babcock and Laschever, entitled; *Women Don't Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide*, (2003) found that disparities based on sex in wages start being clear just as soon as young men and women enter the labor market (Babcock & Laschever, 2003).

This is due to one simple reason; According to the same study, the main reason for these discrepancies is because “young men routinely negotiate higher starting pay, while most young women failed to do so.” (Babcock & Laschever, 2003, p.7)

Starting the gender pay race late would make it difficult for women to catch up even though some of them do. This particular grievance will establish upon its discussion in the following chapter a very important point, which is that men’s and women’s desires and choices can be major factors in explaining discrepancies, not just in the labor market but more broadly into the social and political levels as well.

2-3-9- Grievance Number Nine: All Women want to be Independent from Men!

Historically and cross-culturally there has been a realization that a marriage is not just matrimony of emotional and conjugal rights between men and women, but also that it is the central socioeconomic unit of society at large. Having stated that, there has been major changes in modern times regarding the notion of marriage.

These changes will be dealt with in detail in the second half of this chapter. However, it is important to allude to the fact that this economic unit was generally and historically built on the understanding that, in order for a household to function in a sustainable manner there must be some form of labor division. This led to the assumption and conclusion of the previously mentioned scholar, Catherine Hakim that:

It is thus not surprising that wives generally earn less than their husbands, and that most couples rationally decide that it makes sense for her to take on the larger share of child care and use most of or all the parental leave allowance. (Hakim, 2011, p.24)

In this grievance there is an assertion on the consensual nature of labor division. This will lead to the tenth grievance.

2-3-10- Grievance Number Ten: Family-Friendly Measures will Bridge the Gap!

Back in grievance number four, Scandinavia, and Sweden in particular were heralded as the utopia of gender equality. One reason for that were the family-friendly policies they offer to their female labor force. However, according to the previously mentioned comprehensive report done by the International Labor Organization (ILO) (1998), the Anglo-Saxon countries provide better chances for their female workers to reach top managerial positions. This report also provided a very telling statistics regarding the ability to achieve top managerial positions for females. They also highlighted one important fact along the way concerning the use or lack thereof of family-friendly policies. This report stated that:

Women are more likely to achieve senior management jobs in the US than in Sweden; 15% versus 11% respectively in 1980... In Sweden, where they have a generous maternity leave have created a larger glass ceiling problem than exists in the US where there is a general lack of such policies. (As cited in Hakim, 2011, p.25)

These last family-friendly policies have a bigger claim surrounding them, which is that they are not only beneficial to the women or to the family, but to the whole economy. This will lead us to grievance number eleven.

2-3-11 - Grievance Number Eleven: Family Leave is even good for Employers

Family-friendly policies are defined as giving employees some benefits to accommodate their family duties. These can range from paid maternity leave, pregnancy and

child labor. These policies require financial and monetary flexibility that not all employers can afford. According to British sociologist Catherine Hakim only few companies can sustain this effort, when she stated that:

In reality it is more likely that the only companies that are already large successful and profitable can't afford to bear the costs of generous family-friendly policies such as long as maternity leaves, paid special leave, nurseries to attract and support their female workforce. (Hakim, 2011, p. 28)

The “generalizability” of family-friendly policies to encourage more female workers to join the workforce across the entire economy would pose a greater challenge especially for small and medium companies. This point will be discussed in details in the upcoming chapter.

2-3-12-Grievance Number Twelve: It would be better with Female Leadership!

There was a study conducted by a sociologist by the name of Wajcman between 1996 and 1998, entitled; “*Managing like a Man: Women and Men in Corporate Management,*” in which he had a controversial proposition. In this Study Wajcman (1998) claimed that companies with females as their top managerial administrators functioned much better than those with men. They stated their ability and “nature” to collaborate and cooperate with the lower ranks employees under their management (Wajcman, 1998).

Catherine Hakim went on to dispute this fact by stating that: “Female managers differ from male managers in their personal characteristics and family lives but not in the way that they do the job.” (Wajcman, 1998) Of course between these two widely different views, there is a nuanced observation or question that needs to be asked not to validate either perspectives but rather the mechanisms through which more women will be part of those leadership

positions. This point in particular will be dealt with in details in both the third and fourth and final chapters.

2-4-Revisiting the Social Revolutions

Prior to the 1960s there were so many “shackles” that impeded the entry of women into high paying jobs or careers, that would have put them ever more closer to achieving the feminist dream, which is absolute equality between the sexes. These “shackles” or barriers varied from the direct to the indirect and from the discrete to the plain. As it has been established in the previous chapter and the majority of this one, the barriers that were put in front of women, whether real or virtual actually made plenty of women feel suffocated and held back. And with pent-up energy that they held for a very long time and other events that were taking place in synchronicity with these emotions, an “explosion” was inevitable. Explosion might be a strong word, however, what happened to gender relations and the status of women compared to men in post 1960 America can only be described as a “revolution.”

But to put them all under one banner and one revolution will be a mischaracterization of what actually took place at that time. The more appropriate term to use is the same, but in the plural form, revolutions. Because there were many happening at the same time, and even the studies that were conducted about them labeled them in different ways, as it is about to be shown.

2-4-1-Revisiting the Not-so-quiet Revolution:

In a previous research work the quiet revolution, which was originally a title for a National Bureau of Economic Research paper, written by Claudia Golding, a Harvard professor, was modified as the Not-so-quiet Revolution (Bennaa, 2016). The reason I did that was to highlight the “noisy” political activism and momentum of the Civil Rights Movement utilized by feminists at that time. However, there is a deeper glance that needs to be taken in

order to really capture the magnitude of what took place in the era of post 1960s. That endeavor will be dealt with by focusing on seven different factors that witnessed big transformation for women, which earned it the name of the Quiet Revolution.

First, it all started with a concept or a question that teachers and adults ask little children all the time: What do you want to be when you grow up? The essence and the value of this question are not just to receive the cliché answer of; I want to be a pilot, because there is no correct answer. However, it is to set the mindset for the child that whatever he or she wants to grow up to be in the future requires upfront investments. These investments may take different shapes and forms but there is one important and central element that they should be based on in order for them to materialize, which is expectation. Women prior to the 1960s had very low expectations regarding their future in so many areas of their lives. Those previously mentioned prohibitions like the marriage bars did not just stop them directly from working but also impeded their ability to compete in the labor market through various means. According to Goldin(2009):

The expectations of young women regarding what they planned to do when they were 35 years old were more in line with what older women were currently doing then with what the younger women would actually be doing in 15 to 20 years. (p.2)

This meant that young women who were born in the era of prohibition are expected to be just like their mothers when they grow up. They suffered greatly especially when they had to enter the labor force later on. But the expectations regarding the labor force of young women in particular and women in general started to transform drastically in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The numbers tell two entirely different stories. In the year 1968 regardless of the woman's age, 30% of women anticipated and predicted that by the time they would be 35

years old they would start working but only 7 years later in 1975 a whopping 65% made that previous statement (Goldin, 2009).

Women in the 1970s started to expect a lot more than just entering the labor force but they started to expect that they would be competing in that market. The best way to compete in the labor market would be through training and education, which will bring us to the second factor; college majors. Going back again to the era of marriage prohibitions when companies started implementing those policies regarding retaining and hiring married women they targeted fields predominantly occupied by women (see chapter one), like nursing and kindergarten teachers.

This had continued to affect women's choices when majoring in college in the early 1960s. The data shows that in 1966 about three-quarters of women who spent four years in college and graduated were doing that in the fields defined as "female intensive" and only one-tenth of them were doing so in male intensive domains (Goldin, 2009). The data provide the details on definitions of these terminologies.

The disparities between men and women in their choices in college and the majors they used to choose were amazing. Even more amazing is how fast and quick that changed. In 1960, more than one third to be precise 40% of women graduates were in fields revolving around or centered on education and 17% were either in literature, foreign languages, or English majors (Goldin, 2009). When one compares these statistics with those of men a stark difference is observed. In the year 1966, half of the men that entered college, that is 50% of all men were in disciplines that included engineering, business and management, and science, the latter included Mathematics and Technology (Goldin, 2009).

Obviously, these majors that men opted for are usually the most profitable in wages and prosperous as careers. This is also the point that the National Bureau of Economic

Research highlighted, which is that men want majors that lead to more investments and better careers, whereas women tend to choose majors that reflect “jobs” and “consumptions” (Goldin, 2009). But these tendencies were about to change dramatically, particularly for women in the next two decades. The sex segregation index, which was designed to establish if jobs or fields of study or any domain are dominated by one sex over the other was very high in 1966 almost 0.54 but in 1998 was only about 0.27 (Anker, 1998).

This can be clearly seen, and it was translated in the evolution of the actual numbers of women in certain male-dominated and female sectors. For example the percentage of women who received a bachelor degree in education in the year 1966 was 40% that number started to fall dramatically reaching 20% in 1980 and only 12% in the year 1998 (Anker, 1998). These stats are concerned with a historically female-dominated field, which is education.

Business and management (B&M) was historically a male-dominated major. However, the percentage of women who graduated from a B&M major was a meager 2% in 1966, while that number reached a whopping 22% in 1988 (Goldin, 2009).. The psychology major was almost gender neutral in 1966 about 46.5% women, however, in 1998 the percentage of psychology majors were 78% women (Goldin, 2009).

Psychology is a very important major and professional field; this will lead us to tackle the next two factors, which are undergraduate degrees and professional degrees. Every single factor that will be tackled and discussed regarding the transformation that occurred to women’s expectation in education and employment will be related to that of men in order to create a context for the general argument for both this chapter and the overall research work.

The same goes for the expectations and the numbers of women in undergraduate degrees. In the previous chapter I highlighted that women entered the labor market in unprecedented numbers during the Second World War. This led the cohort of women born in

the period between 1941 and 1951 to invest heavily in higher and undergraduate education (Goldin, 2009). This obviously happened in order to fill the void in the labor force that was left by men due to the war effort, draft, and deployment as previously discussed (see chapter one). The momentum continued even after the war had ended.

This led to significant decrease in men's enrollment in colleges and higher education which led the US government, headed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 78th Congress to intervene through the popular "GI Bill"(see chapter one). According to Goldin the "G.I Bill" helped men recover lost space in the education, job training, and labor markets through what she labeled as the "catch-up phenomenon." (Goldin, 2009, p.7) This point will be a central focal point in the initial argument that this paper will make on behalf of the feminists, that there must be another "catch-up" act but in the opposite direction.

The same trend that happened to undergraduate degrees also affected professional degrees. Professional degrees are defined here as degrees from law school, medical school, business school, and dentistry. These four fields have historically been dominated by men in the US prior to the 1960s, but after the late 1960s and early 1970s this also changed dramatically in favor of women (Goldin, 2009).

Labor force participation and the choice of this participation i.e. the type of occupation that women chose, also saw similar dramatic transformations. For example, women born in 1950s who turned 20 in 1970s saw their participation rates rise to a staggering 86% (Goldin, 2009). The pattern of these occupations is somewhat mixed, especially that it involved a decrease and then an increase in certain occupations simultaneously.

There was a decrease in the percentage of women entering traditional female oriented occupations like K12 grade teachers, nurses, and social workers, while the opposite is true for traditional male-oriented occupations such as doctors, lawyers, college professors and

managers (Goldin, 2009). The paper came up with two pertinent remarks at the conclusion. The first was that the speed and synchronicity of these changes were striking (Goldin, 2009). This meant that all the previously mentioned transformation was happening very fast and at the same time. The second conclusion was that:

The only reason that we are able today to speak about the significant group of women who are leaders and who are at the top or should be at the top is because of the educational changes that took place beginning late 1960s to early 1970s. (Goldin, 2009, p.11)

Claudia Goldin attributed the progress in today's women status and the overall status of gender relations to the quiet revolutions that took place between 1960s and 1970s. However, one curious remark will be taken from this conclusion, which is that these revolutions stopped, or at least did not continue with the same vigor post 1980. This observation will be a key factor to the counter argument that this research work will make against the feminist talking points.

But, prior to closing this enlightening report there is one key factor that would pave the way for the discussion of the next revolution. This factor is the demographic changes that took place during and just before the 1960s. This specific demographic factor is the age of the first marriage for young women. This would reveal a new trend that women in general were following in order to make future investments to advance their careers.

The age of first marriage for young women also saw the same evolutionary transformation of the other six factors. The age for first marriage for women born in 1949 was 23 years old that number was 25.5 for those born in 1957 (Goldin & Lawrence, 2002). That is an increase of 2.5 years within just eight years. This increase continued for those born in 1965

to reach 29 years old for the first marriage (Goldin & Lawrence, 2002). That is a delay of a whopping six years for an entire generation in just 16 years. However, this change and the aforementioned one could not have happened without, or at least, were significantly influenced by the invention that is the predicate of the next part of the revolutions.

2-4-2-Revisiting the Contraceptive Revolution

If there is something that both feminists and those who vehemently oppose feminism agree upon, of course with varying degrees of influence, is the effect that technology had on the advancement of women in the public space. This can be clearly seen, for example in the works of Canadian professor of psychology Jordan Peterson, especially in his bestseller *12 rules for life* (2018). Even though for the most part, he was perceived by feminist author in *The New York Times*, bowels as “a custodian of the patriarchy” (Bowels, 2018).

It can also be seen in the works of many feminists, the admission and acceptance that technology had a tremendous effect on various public and private domains in the lives of women (Goldin, 2001) and (Berkin et al, 2011). The build-up to the contraceptive revolution part was initiated by stating several facts about the delay of women’s first marriages to their late twenties. The introduction of this part is about the technological breakthroughs that helped advance the status of women in society by removing certain obstacles that impeded that in the past.

These technologies enabled women, for example to enter firefighting and police departments that were restricted solely to men, by eliminating some physical requirements (Goldin, 2001). These technology breakthroughs were the likes of fire hoses and electrical escalators (Goldin, 2001). But the most influential technological invention and the most relevant to this part of the research is called “the pill.” Of course the word “pill” is the popularized term of this “miraculous” medical and pharmaceutical innovation. A brief history

of the drug would be useful for the upcoming analysis. That history started back in 1952 when:

...The breakthrough came in a laboratory, when a group of researchers headed by chemist Frank Colton built on the discoveries of his predecessors that Progesterone can deter the process of ovulation. This led him to develop a chemical synthetic hormone, which can be swallowed directly. And after a series of testing and developments the drug was finally ready and it was ultimately approved by the Food and Drug Administration (F.D.A) in 1960. (Bennaa, 2016, p.30)

The pill or Enovid, its scientific and commercial name, had a tremendous effect on women's lives. Many studies (Goldin & Lawrence, 2002), (Greenwood, & Guner, 2009) have tried to capture the extent to which this orally used drug-affected not just their reproductive choices but its influence on careers, education, lifestyle, labor force participation, among other variables. However, one journalist managed to encapsulate the magnitude of influence that this drug had on, not just women but gender relations overall. In an *Economist* article the author stated: "... There is one invention that historians a thousand of years in the future will look back on and say, that defined the twentieth century."("The Pill", 1999)

After its final approval by the F.D.A "the pill" traveled so quickly all over the country. This is proven by an amazing statistic published in a report of the National Bureau of Economic Research in 2002. Only five years after the inaugural of the official distribution, 41% of all married women under 30 years old were under the contraceptive of Enovid (Goldin & Lawrence, 2002). However, what is more relevant to this research work is a much younger and out of wedlock demographic. Of course, this demographic is young and unmarried

women. (For relevant statistics regarding contraceptive methods and their use among married and unmarried women visit Appendices 5, 6, 7 &8).

Moreover, this market was not so easy to access for the makers and sellers of this form of contraception because of social and legal constraints. The social constraints impeded the promotion and advertisement of the bill because of an ancient law called “The Comstock law” (Goldin & Lawrence, 2002). This law was made when the US society was very conservative. It was advocated and heralded and ultimately named after an American politician called Anthony Comstock, and it basically banned “the trade-in and circulation of obscene literature and articles of immoral use.”(Cited in Benna, 2016, p.35)

Promoting contraception to single women is akin to impossible in an era where the word “pregnant” got bleeped on TV (CNN Editors, 2007). The legal constraints included a variety of different laws at the time especially those related to age. These of course were removed by the introduction of the 26th Amendment to the US Constitution on March 1971, which lowered the age of maturity to 18 (“26thAmendment”, n.d).

Though its wording was specifically targeting voting-age but women, and young single women particularly thought that; if at 18 a girl is entrusted with heavy duties such as choosing presidents, senators, representatives, and mayors, she should be entrusted with her own reproductive choices. Well they have not actually reiterated this but one can presume they were thinking it. The Amendments actually stated that: “The rights of citizens of the United States who are eighteen years of age or older to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age.” (“26thAmendment”, n.d)

However, there was a more targeted effort in the realm of policy making and legal matters. It was called “the Mature-Minor Doctrine.” It stated that:

Any of the following persons may consent either orally or otherwise to any surgical or medical treatment or procedure not prohibited by the law that is suggested, recommended, prescribed, or directed by a licensed Physicians (and one of these persons was)... any female regardless of age or marital status, for herself given in connection with pregnancy or childbirth, except the unnatural interruption of pregnancy.
(Goldin, 2009, p.36)

This had been utilized to determine a historical injustice that had taken place in the history of gender equality. However, the context has changed and the purpose of its utility has to cope with that change. The pill's argument in particular and contraception in general was laid out as a predicate for the general thesis, which was the inequality that women suffered from in decades of mal treatment under the US law. Even though, the US constitution is built on secular principles not religious ones.

But within this framework, the argument of the pill's success is going to be just that, it was successful as a factor in reducing inequality in so many ways that might overshadow other variables. The pill and what it represents, which is technologies in general. This contraceptive drug helped women, especially in their careers, in two major ways. According to Claudia Goldin: "A young college girl in the mid-1960s who was considering whether or not to enter a program involving a considerable investment in her time had to factor into this decision its impact on her personal life." (Goldin, 2009, p.13)

This meant that a girl prior to this form of contraception might not engage in long-term investment in training or education if she thought that a pregnancy would occur. The second way was somewhat indirect. The "pill" increased the age of first marriages by

removing and eliminating the main cause for unplanned and speedy first marriage, which is unplanned pregnancy (Goldin, 2009).

This allowed women in the 1960s and 1970s onward to move forward with their education and their careers better than their mothers and grandmothers would have dreamt of. Prior to closing this chapter and moving on to the next, there are two factors that need to be looked at before going to the third. These two factors are essential and pivotal to achieving the main purpose of this research work, they are fertility and divorce.

2-5- Fertility and Divorce: The Reality

While so many arguably “positive” changes were taking place with the quiet and the not-so-quiet revolutions during the 1960s and 1970s, there were as it had been always the case with social and political disruption some collateral damage. Of course it is outside the realm of scientific research and empiricism to argue about values and what is right or wrong, or their archetypes good and evil, however, there are other concepts that can be argued for and can be verified.

These concepts are exogenous variables, such as demographics, sustainability, and socio-economic stability. These, however, will be dealt with in details in the following chapters, where discussions and recommendations will take place. This last part of the second chapter will deal with this supposed collateral damage. Disclaimer: At this level of the work any negative remark or the perceived negativity or the pejorative nature of any remark made regarding the results of the revolutions will not be made with a direct causal link. At this level of the “maturity” of this research they will be perceived as mere correlations.

The discussion here is of course about an uptick in divorce rates and a fall in fertility rates that both correlate with the previously mentioned quiet and not-so-quiet revolutions, which affected vast and comprehensive surfaces of women’s lives at the social, economic, and

political levels; individually and collectively. The way that can really put the importance of keeping a married household intact is to perceive the consequences not just on raising children, which is important enough, but also on the economy.

This point will be stressed in the discussions that will follow this chapter. But certain facts need to be laid out first, to establish that there was really an uptick in divorce rates in America in the period under study, which is in the post 1960s. According to a report done by the National Bureau of Economic Research, where a team headed by Maria Shim and Claudia Goldin, both from the University of Harvard found that homes or households with a married couple living in them had decreased from 78% in 1960 to 61% in 1983 (Goldin & Shim, 2004).

That is a whopping 17 percentage points in a span of just 23 years. Another important statistic that needs close attention was also found in this report. The number of homes or households with the head or provider as a woman more than doubled in the same period under study (Goldin & Shim, 2004).

The causes for this phenomenon are wide-ranging and multi-layered. However, when analysis is done at a larger scale, with an interdisciplinary approach applied, one could start to see some recurring themes and patterns. For example, in a study conducted in 2006 and published in the *Demography* Journal found that:

The origins of our modern divorce patterns lay in the invention of the same values that eventually elevated the marital relationship above all other personal and family commitments... For any particular couple today the immediate causes of divorce may range from factors as diverse as the personal psychological characteristics of one or both spouses to the stresses of

economic hardship and community disintegration. (Schneider, & Hastings, 2015, p.1895)


This study basically stated that what led to an increase of divorce and the breakdown of the institution of marriage is the pressure of putting too much expectation on the prospect of happiness that matrimony ought to bring. The comprehensive explanation of the root causes of modern trends in divorce in the US is beyond the intention and the means of this research work, however, there is going to be an attempt to establish causal link between the revolutions that took place and precisely those that were incentivized by government interventions in forms of legislation and the uptick in divorce rates.

The other central element that will be subject to the same process is the fertility rates in post 1960 America. This process enjoys similar complexities in analysis and breakdown. To grasp an initial understanding of the variables at play one needs to look at a study published by the University of Chicago in 1992 in a volume entitled conveniently; “*Strategic Factors in Nineteenth Century American Economic History*.” Richard H. Steckel, who was one of the authors, stated that:

The secular decline in fertility in the United States and its East-West gradient, have intrigued several generations of economist, historians, and demographers... A prominent model emphasizes land availability while alternative yet complimentary explanations rely on changes in education, wealth, occupational structure, ethnic composition, saving behavior, family limitation techniques, and child wages. (Stekel, 1992, p.351)

As it can be clearly deduced from this quote, there are multiple and multilayered variables at play to formulate an explanatory model regarding fertility in the US.


Figure Three: Rates of marriage and divorce, 1950–2000



Source: Greenwood, J. & Guner N. (2009). *Marriage and Divorce since World War II*. Illinois: University of Chicago Press. P.233

Both Figure Three and Figure Four tell quite a similar story concerning the status of marriage and its declining nature in the mindset of the American family. This nature is related to declining rates in the number of marriages and the rising rates of divorce cases. The nuanced glance that can be observed from Figure Four is that the number or the amount of time spent in the institution of marriage is declining rapidly and consistently since the 1960s.

Figure Four: Marriage 1950-2000




Source: Greenwood, J. & Guner N. (2009). *Marriage and Divorce since World War II*. Illinois: University of Chicago Press.

There were also similar observations but over a long span of time in the chronology of the American history of marriage and divorce. To be precise this span of time was from 1860 to 2005, where a significant chunk of data was analyzed and transformed into this highly intriguing graph.

As it can be clearly observed in both graphs of Figure Four, the institution of marriage received a severe blow in the period between 1960 and 1990. The percentage of married women in America decreased from about 83 percent in 1960 to just about 65 percent in 1990. And the fraction of adulthood spent in the confines of marriage also saw a similar trajectory. The observations in Figure Five are complementary to both Figures Three and Four in terms of verifying marriage patterns. The additional extrapolations are regarding the soaring numbers of divorce cases in that same era.

Figure Five: Marriage and Divorces per Thousand People 1860-2005



Source: Stevenson, Betsey, and Justin Wolfers. 2007. “Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving Forces.” *PSC Working Paper Series* PSC 07-04.

This widely accepted study published as a National Bureau of Economic Research paper established two things; first that fertility rates are actually in decline. This can be corroborated by several studies (Goldin & Lawrence, 2002). And second that there are a myriad of variables that need examination prior to finding the root causes that actually explain

this decline in fertility in the United States. In this paper the evolution of fertility rates saw a boom in the post World War Two era and generation, hence the name baby boomers. But the post 1960s era saw a completely different momentum and pattern of evolution.

In a study published in the widespread academic Journal *Demography* entitled “Socioeconomic Variation in the Effect of Economic Conditions on Marriage and Non-marital Fertility in the United States: Evidence from the Great Recession,” (2015) the authors rang the alarm bells on the fertility rates in the US. With a selected total sample of 805445 women aged between 19 and 44 years old this study found that: “low-socioeconomic status women do moderate their fertility in the face of sudden economic disruption.” (Schneider, & Hastings, 2015, p.1911) This important remark will add to the general argument of this work, which is that there are multiple impediments that “urge” women to not have children and one of them is economic uncertainty.

However, the argument of this paper establishes a link between this ‘urge’ and the availability of certain pharmaceutical and surgical procedures made available by the US government in post 1960. One of these procedures was the previously mentioned introduction of oral contraception known as the pill. The second surgical procedure is equally, if not more influential. But a certain staggering statistic published on Child Trends. Org found that: “the 2017 US fertility rate at 60.3 births per 1,000 women is the lowest since these data have been recorded.” (As cited in Goldin, 2016, p.33) The surgical procedure is abortion. Unlike the pill, abortion had a much different history in the sense that it required an intervention from the highest court in the US to allow for it to be in use.

It is only proper to provide the history of this particular medical procedure from the source that actually performs this particular medical procedure, which will be the subject of vigorous debate in the last two chapters. This institution is of course Planned Parenthood.

There are of course many medical facilities that perform abortion but Planned Parenthood is the largest by far (Planned Parenthood, 2017). Their official website provided the history, which made the work of providing reproductive Health Care Services much easier. they stated:

On January 22, 1973, the US Supreme Court announced its decision in *Roe v Wade*, a challenge to a Texas statute that made it a crime to perform an abortion unless a woman's life was at stake. The case had been filed by "Jane Roe" an unmarried woman who wanted to safely and legally end her pregnancy. Siding with Roe, the court struck down the Texas law. In its ruling the court recognized for the first time that the constitutional right to privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."

(Planned Parenthood, 2014)

Liberty, privacy, and First Amendment rights all sacred concepts to Americans, and by 1973 when the verdict was finally announced they could add termination of pregnancy or abortion to that list. The abortion rates after the ruling of *Roe v Wade* were 16.9 abortion per 1,000 women in 1973, that number skyrocketed only 7 years later to 29.3 in 1980 and was stable in and around that rate until the early 1990s (Atrash, & Hogue, 1990).

The impact of abortion on future reproductive health is arguably very minimal in the sense that having an abortion would not have a devastating impact on future fertility for the women. This is according to a study published in the US National Library of Medicine and National Institute of Health entitled: *The Effects of Pregnancy Termination on Future Reproduction*. In it (1990) Atrash and Hogue stated that:

In conclusion, except for the association between pregnancies following dilatation and evacuation procedures and premature delivery and low birth weight, no significantly increased risk of adverse reproductive health has been observed following induced abortion. (p.400)

Despite these safe conclusions another study published by the same institution found that:

Even in countries with high rates of legal induced abortion, contraceptive use and marital patterns nearly always have a greater impact on fertility levels than does abortion. However, they conceded that, extremely high rates of abortion, three or more abortions per woman of childbearing age during the reproductive years, are required for the fertility inhibiting effect of abortion to rival that of contraceptive use. (Atrash, & Hogue, 1990, p.398)

These two important studies and their telling conclusions will make it to the compounding evidence in the case built on the future of fertility in the US, and how there is a link between that and the political activism of feminism.

2-6-Countries with Population-Control Policies

Many countries around the world have attempted with varying degrees of failure and success to control the expansion or shrinking, in some instances, of their own populations. According to a study conducted in 2007 by Wolfers and Betsey:

In 1976, for example, the 40 countries that had explicit policies to limit fertility covered nearly one-third of East Asian

countries, a quarter of Latin American and Caribbean countries and nearly two-thirds of South Asian countries. By contrast, only one-fifth of countries in North Africa, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa had a fertility reduction policy in 1976. (Betsey & Wolfers, p.8)

This previously mentioned group of countries was in the 1976 observation; the 1996 sample witnessed more staggering numbers. According to that same study:

By 1996, 82 countries had a fertility reduction policy in place (by this time, some of them had reached their fertility reduction targets and changed to policies of maintaining fertility rates) including half of the countries in East Asia and Latin America, and more than two-thirds of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. (Betsey & Wolfers, p.8)

The generalizability of these important pieces of information will come in handy when a certain level of comparison is required in both the third and the fourth chapters. However, one eye-catching statistic will provide for a springboard for the upcoming discussion regarding the unintended repercussions of social restructuring. This statistic stated that:

These countries represent 70 percent of the world's population. In 1976, 95 governments were providing direct support for family planning. (Support for family planning was not always associated to an explicitly stated goal of reducing fertility.) The number of countries with state support for family planning has continued to rise steadily. (Betsey & Wolfers, p.9)

Therefore more than two thirds, or to be precise a whopping seventy percent of the world’s population were living in states and countries, where the governments were administering some form of fertility control/stimulus. (See Tables Two and Three)

Table Two: Number of Countries with Government Goals for Fertility Policy

Number of countries with government goals for fertility policy					
Year	Lower fertility	Maintain fertility	No intervention	Raise fertility	Nr. of Observations
1976	40	19	78	13	150
1986	54	16	75	19	164
1996	82	19	65	27	193
2005	78	31	47	38	194
2013	84	33	26	54	197

Notes: The table shows the number of countries by type of policy adopted towards fertility. The data is obtained from the U.N. World Population Policies database and begins in 1976. Countries are categorized according to whether they had a policy to lower, maintain or raise fertility or if they had no intervention to change fertility.

Source: Tiloka, D., & Tenreyro, S. (2017). Population Policies and Fertility Convergence. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. 31 (4), 205-228. P.8

The following table also provides data concerning the other façade of social restructuring besides the previously mentioned fertility policies. Table three showcases the number of governments that provided support for family planning. By 2013 almost 180 country around the world provided direct (160) and indirect support (20).

Table Three: Number of Countries by Government Support for Family Planning

Number of countries by government support for family planning					
Year	Direct support	Indirect support	No support	Limit/Not permitted	Nr. of Observations
1976	95	17	28	10	150
1986	117	22	18	7	164
1996	143	18	26	2	193
2005	143	35	15	1	194
2013	160	20	16	1	197

Notes: The table shows the number of countries by the type of support extended by the state for family planning services. The data is obtained from the UN World Population Policies database and begins from 1976. Countries are categorized by whether their governments directly supported, indirectly supported or did not support family planning as well as if the government limited family planning services or did not permit family planning in the country.

Source: Tiloka, D., & Tenreyro, S. (2017). Population Policies and Fertility Convergence. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. 31 (4), 205-228. P.9

These two relevant and pertinent tables were taken from the overarching study conducted by Stevenson Betsey, and Justin Wolfers in 2007. This study represented one of the most authoritative documentations in this research work. They revealed a key aspect, which how easily susceptible fertility is to government intervention.

2-7-Conclusion

This chapter aimed to lay down the theoretical framework for this research, and to identify the origins of discontent behind the push for absolute gender equality. Based on the deductions taken from the laid out analysis of the historical events and parallels drawn from the social contract theory and the principles of liberalism and feminism, it can be concluded that the social activism led by the feminists against certain restrictions regarding marriage, divorce and reproductive rights made its way to the hallways of the Supreme Court, Congress and other federal institutions, such as the FDA.

This led to the passage and the “knocking down” of several laws that used to prescribe marriage and fertility and gender relations in general. Laws like “Roe v. Wade” and the approval of “the contraceptive pill” led to massive changes in the structure of marriages and the behavior of couples. The results clearly confirmed the initial hypothesis, which stated that the passage of those key measures led to a substantial change in the predictor variables under study (fertility and divorce).

Maintaining that that correlation, between the legal changes on the one hand, and the rates of fertility and divorce changes on the other, continued to persist throughout the post 1960s era. However, there were no causal links established between the revolutionary changes concerning education and employment for women, and the rise in divorce number in the period under study. This last conclusion in particular would help to set the stage for analysis of the kind of impact that these legal and social changes had on fertility and divorce in the following chapter.

**CHAPTER THREE: The
Intended Economic Social
and Legal Models for
Gender Equality for America**

3-1-Introduction

The third chapter will deal with the intended consequences or “the well intentioned” ulterior motives and objectives behind the pursuit of absolute gender equality policies. This will include highlighting several foreign nations’ economic, political, and social models, where comparable policies had been implemented. The focus will be on the dissection and the dissemination of the previously stated feminist grievances and arguments that led to the initial implementation of the policies under analysis in the specific countries under study.

Dealing with these particular pro-feminists models, grievances, and most importantly arguments will help structure and shape the counter argument in the ensuing part of this research work. It will also provide a continuous analysis of the post 1960s era in America, and highlight the results of the social and political revolutions that were dealt with in the previous chapter. The aim of this chapter is to revisit the socioeconomic status of women compared to that of men in the 1970s and 1980s, and the status of the American families in relation to the variables under study, which are fertility and divorce.

This aim is within the context of answering the underlying question: what was the impact of the social revolutions that was accompanied by an “avalanche” of legal and legislative interventions on fertility and divorce rates in America? To answer this question, the overview of this chapter will highlight three major central elements, which revolve around European and Japanese social restructuring and engineering strategies, the roots of feminist discontent, and finally the manifestation of discontent resolution in the feminist camp.

3-2- A European Model for America: European Gender Equality Strategies

With these words that set out a very ambitious and comprehensive goal, The Gender Equality Council, which is a part of the Council of Europe put forth its 2014 strategy for achieving absolute equality between men and women:

A strong commitment to de facto equality between women and men at all levels and in all areas alongside women's empowerment and the elimination of sexism and gender stereotypes will benefit future generations and society as a whole. Moving towards substantive gender equality also requires a change in the roles both women and men including equal sharing of household and care responsibilities. (Council of Europe, 2014, p.12)

This relatively new and bold strategy involved definitions and redefinitions of certain old and new concepts. It included concerns, grievances, and demands of several types and shapes. But most importantly it contained several policy proposals and recommendations to governmental, academic, and business institutions both in the public and private sectors.

However, sometimes these were not mere recommendations, most of the time they were obligations since not following them was designed to be met with repercussions. In this part of the research work, this strategy and the model they lay down will be discussed in details since there are multiple voices in the feminist academic circles in the United States, which are very vocal and they are trying to get a European-like model to take place in the United States gender scenery (Albrecht, Björklund, & Vroman, 2003). The European Council's view of gender equality reality was built on two basic principles. The first was the prospect of what gender equality would look like and the second is that the status quo of

gender relations, even though they admit is far better than it was in the past, it is still unacceptable. The European Council definition stated that:

Gender equality entails equal rights for women and men, girls and boys as well as the same visibility, empowerment, responsibility and participation in all spheres of public and private life. It also implies equal access to and distribution of resources between men and women. (Council of Europe, 2014, p.5)

In a shallow glance this definition seems fair and just as an objective to seek after and pursue. However, the nuts and bolts of the content of it, outside the realm of simple linguistic semantics can be somewhat complex to say the least. Because it requires technicalities that are just too broad and too comprehensive to foresee let alone apply. The document that highlighted the aforementioned definition was published with a set of observations of the situation of gender relations back then in the member states of the European Union. The document highlighted the fact that there was actual progress, however, many things remain to be done. They stated that:

Even if progress is visible and legal status of women in Europe has undoubtedly improved during recent decades effective equality between men and women is far from being a reality. Gender gaps and structural barriers persist in many areas, which limit women and men to their traditional roles and constrain women's opportunities to benefit from their fundamental rights. (Council of Europe, 2014, p.5)

The status of women in all aspects of their lives has indeed improved. And these improvements are quite visible as it will be demonstrated, when this research work will deal with and discuss the twelve grievances previously highlighted in chapter two. The areas that this visible progress can be seen are in the sheer size and number of women entering the labor force, changes in family and parental leave policies, and the access to higher-paying positions to name a few. These changes allowed women to occupy positions in the social, economic, and political spheres that they did not have access to them before, as a collective social group.

Women have been throughout history and across different cultures at varying levels of hierarchy including at the top. But the purpose of the European Council strategy is not only to open those high echelon positions and new horizons for women, but it seems rather more comprehensive and drastic. The vague approach that this report put forward on how to actually achieve its goals raises more questions than it actually answers. In the strategy report on this issue of including women, the authors stated that the means to do that is by:

The establishment of social and economic conditions for the exercise of equal rights by women and men including by the wider involvement in the economy and developing opportunities for them to raise their economic independence. (Council of Europe, 2014, p.6)

The generic nature of this statement does not include any specifics regarding the tools and mechanisms of achieving the general stated objective, which is not only full gender equality but it is actually more targeted and with a particular time frame, it even has its own slogan “planet 50/50 by 2030” (Council of Europe, 2014, p.28). There are of course noble desires behind these attempts to achieve full gender equality, such as getting rid of hateful speech that follows women in society, both in their daily activities or online. This includes

negative stereotypes and discrimination based on sex, also known as sexism. However, there are unintended consequences of pursuing such drastic and radical policies that aim at not only changing the socioeconomic status of women but also digging deeper to even social norms and belief systems.

These unintended consequences and repercussions will be dealt with in the fourth and final chapter of this research work. Despite lacking in the specifics the strategy actually focused on separation between two different Latin terms. These terms are *de facto* and *de jure*. Of course the strategy “manifesto” was not a lesson in Romantic languages but wanted to make clear that these *de jure* gender equality, meaning the laws that are enforcing this notion are no longer acceptable, but the desired outcome is *de facto* gender equality, where no laws are needed and “preferences” should dictate that (Council of Europe, 2014).

The second part of the dual approach adopted by the European Council of Gender Equality was a process that involved a new concept. That was articulated in the sixth page of the report highlighting the term:

The promotion, monitoring, coordination, and evaluation of the process of gender mainstreaming in all policies and programs, whereby gender mainstreaming refers to the reorganization, improvement, development, and evaluation of policy processes so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages by the actors normally involved in policy-making. (Council of Europe, 2014, p.6)

This relatively new concept of gender mainstreaming involves, as it has been mentioned above, putting a “spin” on any future public or private endeavor or initiative whether it is at the economic, social, political, academic, or educational levels or any other

level for that matter. This “spin” is a gender perspective and what that means is re-evaluating every single policy initiative and regulation while taking into consideration how it will affect gender equality. Of course if this particular policy, initiative, or regulation was helping to achieve the goal of “Planet 50/50 by 2030,” it would receive encouragement, and most importantly funding.

Theoretically speaking the approach or the concept of gender mainstreaming seems something to look for and seek after. Women in particular and gender equality in general should receive an important amount or share of the discussion to be had surrounding critical issues in the politics of certain country, its economy and how its society should be structured in terms of sanctions and rewards.

But the detailed version of objectives and how to actually achieve them would raise some eyebrows if looked upon with a nuanced perspective. But prior to that, a closer look needs to be paid at the objectives and goals of a proceeding strategy report to assess the level of probable success of the ones under application.

3-2-1-Repeating Past Mistakes: The New European Strategy

Prior to the 2018-2023 gender equality ambitious strategy the European Council set out a strategy that was thought previously to be as equally ambitious given the circumstances. The time frame for its implementation was relatively shorter than the ensuing one since it was laid to be from 2014 until 2017. The gender equality strategy that the European Council published in that report set out five main priority points.

First they made it essential to combat what the authors of the plan labeled as “gender stereotypes and sexism” (Council of Europe, 2014). Women, in the eyes of the authors, experience many forms of discrimination based on prejudices predicated on their sex, which require government and non-governmental organizations to intervene in order to stop them.

The second main point is preventing and combating a practice that is a degree higher in the echelon of viciousness, which is violence against women (Council of Europe, 2014).

This policy would get unanimous support among members of any society. The third main point is somewhat ambiguous. The strategy stressed that women should be guaranteed equal access to justice (Council of Europe, 2014). The reason why it was understood to be ambiguous is that the authors had to explain what they meant by that in the detailed section of the report. They highlighted that women are not litigious enough and that there are social and economic barriers that many women find in their way to an accessible justice system (Council of Europe, 2014).

The fourth main priority set by the European Council to achieve full and absolute gender equality is achieving the previously defined gender mainstreaming, or adding a gender perspective in all policies and measures (Council of Europe, 2014). And the fifth and final priority set by the report (2014) which is the most relevant to this research work is achieving a balanced participation of women and men in political and public decision-making. With all these ambitious plans, one would expect greater rewards and results for gender equality in the European continent.

However, there was a certain “backlash,” although this word might be a little over the edge, but there were certain problems that rose up or as the authors of the second gender equality strategy called it “new challenges.” Among these challenges were several related to how some elements of society reacted to the social policies that targeted the status of gender equality in Europe. On second thoughts, the word “backlash” is not such a harsh word anymore, because that was the exact term that the new strategy report used in their 2018 - 2023 version. They admitted that there was a backlash against the human rights of women, the existence of threats to women’s rights defenders, and most importantly the rise and the

explosion of sexism and discrimination against women, including sexist hate speech online and offline (Council of Europe, 2018). Of course, these are serious concerns that most reasonable people, whether influencers in society or political figures should be worried about. There are, however, unreasonable domains that this strategy wanted to take the fight of achieving gender equality to. Unreasonable again might seem like an improper term to use here, and then again so is the domain they want to take the fight to. They stated that:

Violent and degrading online content, including in pornography, normalization of sexual violence including rape, reinforce the idea of women's submissive role and contribute to treating women as subordinate members of the family and society.

(Council of Europe, 2018, p.16)

Though this seems ludicrous and preposterous to even mention except for rape, which is a vital issue and must be dealt with decisively and immediately, this goes to show just how radical, comprehensive, and serious an approach the European Council is taking to achieve absolute and full gender equality.

They decided to let no stone unturned, and no issue uncovered, in order to find the root causes for gender-based disparities. The philosophical premise on which these concerns were built upon is clear in the eyes of the authors of both strategies, which is that the “perp.” behind the gender stereotypes of both women and also men as well, is something called “toxic masculinity” (Council of Europe, 2018).

They indicated that it does not only affect women, but also sets a negative role model that is impossible for young men and boys to follow. The way they articulated this idea, however, is somewhat diplomatic and seemingly sympathetic towards men, even though the target is to make it easier for women. They stated that:

Hegemonic masculinities are a contributing factor to maintaining and reinforcing gender stereotypes, which in turn contribute to sexist hate speech and prejudice against men and boys who deviate from the predominant concepts of masculinity.

(Council of Europe, 2018, p.17)

Having identified the “perp,” -which is short for perpetrator in the criminal terminology- and the social ideology and construct, which is hegemonic masculinity, what is left of course is to develop means and tools to take it and its symptoms down. Doing that is of course not evident as it might seem, because it requires a definition of what exactly to take down from the generic term of hegemonic masculinity.

This term may include many concepts that are not necessarily bad or negative, such as virility, competitiveness, and vigor. This might be one reason for the social backlash against those policies in Europe. That is also why the authors of the 2018 strategy report stressed that they should:

Identify, compile and disseminate good practices to eradicate gender stereotypes for girls and boys, women and men in the education system, the labor market, family life including equal sharing of household and care responsibilities between men and women- leave schemes and all areas in which women and men are underrepresented. (Council of Europe, 2018, p.26)

The ulterior motive is that there is a domination of men of the political and decision-making scenery despite all efforts to balance-out these discrepancies. The authors of the report actually articulated this notion, that basically political culture and political priorities continues to be set and structured according and around what they labeled as “male behavior

and life experience” (Council of Europe, 2018, p.28). But one of the measures that the strategy highlighted and pushed for to fix perceived problems such as the gender pay gap and the unbalanced lack of political representation of women in particular and gender inequality in general, is what raised the flag for many academics.

And what drew the use of the European model as an example to dissect, disseminate, and ultimately analyze as a model for the American experience with gender inequality, is the policy called “the adoption of effective quota laws and involuntary party quotas” (Council of Europe, 2014, p.28).

What this suggests is that the previous “light-weight” strategy failed miserably and by “lightweight” I mean regulations and recommendations that did not involve directly putting women in economic and political positions or quotas to reach that “50/50” mark set for 2030. This last particular policy, which would definitely mean that not putting the best people for the job in the top echelon of positions, simply because of the fact that merit and competence are not the most important criteria for selection but rather equal representation of women and men.

This equal representation is not only in top positions of certain fields, meaning vertically but rather horizontally as well i.e. across different fields that women usually were not present quantitatively, whether by preference and choice or by the fact that they opted out for other social, economic, and political and lifestyle-related choices. The results for the application of both strategies on the scenery of gender relations in Europe have been a mixed story of “absolute successes” and “absolute failures.”

I put both of these observation between inverted commas due to the controversial nature regarding what is considered a success or a failure, depending on which side of the ideological spectrum one is standing. The unintended consequences in Europe is a mirror of

what would happen if these policies are brought and implemented in the US, that would be discussed in the finding section of the fourth and final chapter of this research work. The results of what happened in Europe, however were studied and analyzed by several scholars and institutions, but one reading of the now famous Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development study stands out.

In a popular three-hour long YouTube podcast known as the Joe Rogan show, Jordan Peterson, a Canadian professor of psychology and a prominent intellectual, disseminated the results of gender equality policies in the last 40 years (Rogan, 2018).

Peterson started by citing some unequivocally mind-boggling statistics. What was amazing about them was not just how large-scale they were but relatively how quickly they took place. He stated that in the last forty years far more women than men have entered the workforce not only that but they have actually dominated the universities and the healthcare fields to state a few (Rogan, 2018). He even added that one of the best predictors of the probability of economic development in developing countries is their attitude towards equal rights for women, and that it seemed causal (Rogan, 2018).

Jordan Peterson is an absolute opponent of what he labeled as “the equality of outcome that is being propagated to the world by the Neo-Marxist, social justice feminist ideologues” (Rogan, 2018). This group of people is defined as a social and political group that has views in the extreme left of the ideology spectrum. But he went on to provide a counterintuitive conclusion of the study that shows how different are really men and women in their choices, which will provide this research work with the logical “springboard” to move to the following section of this chapter.

The next section of the chapter is the discussion of the feminist grievances dealt with in the previous chapter. And the “springboard” is the finding that “the more egalitarian and

richer societies are the more different men and women become” (Rogan, 2018). He provided an example of why there are actually more men, as mathematicians in high and sophisticated academic chairs than women. And the reason was originally a variable differentiation in the verbal skills of young boys and girls; and how the superiority of girls’ verbal skills gives them the opportunity to opt out of a career in math, unlike boys who are only good in math (Rogan, 2018).

There are several logical explanations that have basics in scientific empirical data that account for the variations of women and men’s outcomes in the political, social, and most importantly economic fields, like the one previously mentioned rationalization by Peterson. This would lead to an important segment of the second chapter, which he is the dissemination of the twelve points discussed and laid out in chapter two.

3-3-The Dissemination of the Twelve Feminist Grievances

In the inauguration of the discussion around the feminists’ perceived notion of oppression that highlighted the overwhelming majority, if not all of their strife for gender equality, a literal and contextual definition of the term oppression was laid out. In the midst of providing the linguistic and philosophical framework to pursue a legitimately objective analysis of what the feminists perceive as the historical injustices against women and what the anti-feminist element of academia, like Catherine Hakim and Jordan Peterson see as “Myths,” the label that was chosen in this research work for the myth/injustice duality is grievance.

Then there was a laying down of a dozen of these grievances that vary from the criticism, promotion and the call for certain economic, social, and economic policies and initiatives. Along the line of layout of these grievances and within the discussion, there was the promise or the prospect of discerning them in this particular chapter. In this part of the research work these twelve notions of controversial nature will be dealt with.

3-3-1 - Not Enough Equality!? It is Complicated.

In the first grievance discussed, there was an inclination in the feminist camp to believe or hold a belief system that has two structural elements. The premise that reckons that the equal opportunities revolutions of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s were an absolute and clear success, in bringing gender equality between men and women in all spheres of life.

And they provide a series of these successes including the Equal Pay Act of 1964 and the older and much more influential legal step of allowing women to vote in 1920, which is the Nineteenth Amendment. This is concerning the first element of the structure of the feminist's belief system, which is the premise.

The other element is the conclusions they make off of that premise. In this context the manifestations of the conclusions stressed the necessity and validity of successful and effective policies that have proven to work on a large scale in similar environments and comparable time periods. That would be a completely logical conclusion if the premise was also completely valid and accurate.

The practical premise of the feminist movement is to advance the belief that the equality between the sexes in all aspects of family life that stretches to even the economic and financial compensations of child-rearing and caring is the optimal path to undertake for a better and more inclusive social order, as it has been discussed in the first grievance. However, despite the importance of splitting and dividing house related labor, academics like British sociologist Catherine Hakim raise a particular "red flag." She argues that:

Presenting shared parental leave as the cure-all magic medicine for gender equality displays dogmatism and myth making at its worst. Raising children takes over 20 years, as long as many careers, not only a few months after birth. Parental leave should

be open to either parent to allow parents a free choice in their domestic arrangements. But [it] does not automatically change family roles and the popularly understood benefits of some routine division of labor in households. (Hakim, C. 2011, p.9)

Despite the strong and highly empirical view of the respected British academic against what the feminists' and the European Commission adopted stance on enforced or at least highly encouraged family-care leave, there is a nuanced empirical case to be made, not exactly in the favor of the previously mentioned belligerents, but more of a compromise that is determined by the consensual will of the parties involved, which does not involve the intervention of different third parties with legislative or regulating powers.

3-3-2- The US should be more like Europe! It is More of a Preference than Discrimination

After discussing the first grievance that is centered on division of labor that historically and cross-culturally meant that women or housewives should be preoccupied with the work in the house, hence the name housewife. The occurrence of the compound house-husband or house-man has not been created or at least has not been popularized just yet. But all joking aside, as we have seen with both strategies of the European Council on gender equality, the policy makers in Europe, which is the model that enjoys great popularity with the feminist camp, are hell-bent on changing the family/work lifestyle structures.

Because they have identified that the choices that are made in the job or the infamous occupational segregation that is driving the gender gap are determined according to life choices made in the home. However, the gender gap and occupational segregation between men and women, which are considered as manifestations of discriminatory practices that have affected and impeded women's advancement throughout history, have remained stable

(OECD, 2017). This is despite an avalanche of social policy targeted specifically at them, as we have seen with the strategy reports published in 2014 and then in 2018. But this avalanche of policies is not driven by empirical data, but rather is driven by ideology, claims Catherine Hakim, when she articulated that:

The alternative is that the analysis is incorrect and the goals are unrealistic, which is why the key indicators leveled off over a decade ago. Despite the current emphasis on evidence-based policy in the UK and the rest of Europe, research evidence is ignored when the picture it paints challenges political ideologies. (Hakim, 2011, p.10)

In this particular instance the grievance that has been put forward by the feminist camp that the European model's forceful attempt to end occupational segregation is working or has worked is actually disproven by several studies including the landmark and large-scale one conducted by the ILO in 1998 (Anker, 1998).

This goes to show that policies that are driven and backed by ideology instead of correct analysis and empiricism might not only work but also be disruptive and have negative consequences as it will be laid out in the final chapter of this research work. (For Further details about preferences and the Preference Theory see Appendices 14 &15).

3-3-3-Occupational Segregation is the Root of all Evil! It might be, but what is the Proper Action?

Observed data (Anker, 1998) show indeed a discrepancy when comparing the presence of women and men across the labor force in Europe and the market is definitely segregated. In the previous chapter I highlighted the existence of two particular types of occupational

segregation, which are horizontal occupational segregation and vertical occupational segregation (see discussions in chapter two). I also provided examples of each particular type.

Horizontal occupational segregation is where women and men choose different careers, like men will opt for a career in plumbing and women opt for a career in healthcare. Vertical occupational segregation on the other hand is where men control the top hierarchical positions that often or always encompass higher pay and higher grade, and women occupy lower echelon positions that always involve lesser pay and lower grade. An example of vertical occupational segregation would be within a given organizational structure like a company where women are secretaries and men are executives.

In the leading to the dissemination and discussion of the third grievance of the feminist ideologues I have laid out in the recommendations and the objectives of the two strategies published by the European Council on gender equality the pursuit of a 50/50 balance between men and women in all aspects of life. Of course the arguments logical structure that includes a premise and the conclusion go something like this: men and women basically are the same and they want the same thing, therefore since they are not represented at the exactly 50/50 rate some form of discrimination and the hands of the governmental and non-governmental institutions should intervene.

As usual with the dissection of each grievance a counter argument must be presented. In the case of this particular grievance there is a multi-layered set of variables that requires the merge of certain disciplinary approaches namely sociology and economics. This endeavor is taken by the author of the highly influential paper on this research work, Catherine Hakim. She articulated that by stating:

Analysis of statistical data on the workforce cannot tell us anything at all about the social processes going on within

companies are among young people choosing careers. We cannot assume that a low percentage of women in higher grade jobs is due primarily to sex discrimination. Dozens of other factors are known to play a part the question is whether they fully explain observed outcomes. (Hakim, 2011, p.12)

This is in agreement with the dismissal of the argument of a forced 50/50 balance in the labor market laid out in the disentanglement of the false premise and the inevitable inaccuracy of its following conclusion. The ultimate explanation of why that is, will be laid out in details in a monolithic argument in the fourth and final chapter of this research work.

3-3-4- Scandinavia is the Utopia of Gender Equality! Not according to what the Feminists want

In the layout of this particular grievance in the previous chapter there was the presentation or the assumption mostly from the feminist camp that Scandinavia's enforced and strong gender equality policies are very effective in ending the stubborn gender-based occupational segregation, which is the main driver of the also ever stubborn gender-based wage gap. Also there was the use of the word "beacon" in the context that the entire West should follow Scandinavian countries in this regard. There was also a laying out of certain staggering statistics and comparisons with countries that saying that they do not share European tendencies or the sense of urgency when it comes to gender equality will be an understatement. Those countries were of course Bahrain, Angola, and Senegal, which all had equal levels of job segregation based on sex with Nordic countries, and these latter had the highest levels of occupational segregation in the Western World, or as the study called them OECD countries, which is an organization of almost 54 countries (OECD, 2017). These numbers led to the counter argument of Catherine Hakim to be:

Sex segregation of occupations does not decline with social economic development. Social, historical and cultural factors are the main determinants of how work is divided between men and women. Europe is not ahead of the game and Sweden does not offer a model of best practice among the developed world. (Hakim, 2011, p.25)

Even though Hakim has a point when it comes to some of these statistics and how there are indeed other factors at play, like the historical and cultural factors, the premise of this particular grievance might not be entirely mistaken, if another nuanced approach is applied. Scandinavia cannot be a model for nations as large and complex as the United States but certain malleability at the social level allows for the application of a policy of encouragement rather than enforcement.

3-3-5-The Better the Economy is the better Gender Equality will be. The Opposite might be true.

During the layout of this particular grievance in the previous chapter there was a mention of a simple economics phenomenon. This was that the assumption that the better the economy is the automatic necessity of better opportunities for people of all different background and sexes would be. Another logical leap was made too, that the rich will obviously get more wealth and the middle class would expand to accommodate the chunk of the poor and working-class elevated by the betterment and the enhancement of the economic conditions.

I also presented an interesting statistic found in the ILO study which highlighted that the countries where there is the lowest levels of pay disparities between men and women also known as the stubborn gender pay Gap, are Sri Lanka and Swaziland, which can barely be

labeled as rich or advanced countries (Anker, 1998). The other equally disturbing problem for the feminists found in this particular grievance is occupational segregation.

Again Scandinavia does not lead in the lowest levels of this perceived problem as well, this time around an economic behemoth, but can barely be called a democracy, which is China (Anker, 1998). Therefore the two central themes of this premise are proven to be false. A combination of democratic intervention and a developed economy do not necessitate, cause, or even correlate with better gender equality. What can at least be said or stated is that there was some form of correlation between these two phenomena, “the more egalitarian and richer societies are the more different men and women become.” (Rogan, 2018)

3-3-6- The More (Female Employed) the Merrier (Better Gender Equality)! Not at the Top.

The Logical argument that the feminist laid down in this particular grievance is based again on a shady economic belief. The presumption behind the premise is that “enough,” and by enough they mean a very large chunk of women, in the case of the European Council three quarters to be precise of women in the labor market (Albrecht et al., 2003). That is more than 70% of all women. The conclusion would be the reduction of gender disparities by raising women’s collective wages compared to those of men. Again the conclusion is not entirely mistaken, because more women in the labor market would definitely mean a rise in female wages. However, there is another variable to be taken into consideration, which is what type of jobs women select or are drawn into in the labor market? The counter-argument that dismisses this premise was presented in a study conducted in 1990 that included several European countries to analyze the status of occupational segregation and pay levels for women. A commentator on that particular study stated that:

A study in 1990 in the UK, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Portugal concluded that gender equality norms facilitate the integration of women into professional and managerial occupations, but high levels of female employment are associated with greater segregation of women into female-dominated service-sector occupations, which are rarely high-status jobs. This is the result of women with lower levels of education and less careerist attitudes being pulled into the workforce. (Hakim, 2011, p.27)

But there is a nuanced point that can be made against this particular dismissal. Indeed the influx of the large numbers of women into the labor markets in a relatively short historical period did not guarantee their access to higher paying jobs in the Western world. But they were channeled through and into low-paying jobs like secretaries, nurses and kindergarten teachers due to several factors; chief among them is the lack of investments in training and education (Goldin & Lawrence, 2002).

But a more multi-layered and multifaceted approach would indeed put more women, at least, in top paying positions like what the European Council is doing through its strategies. However, there is a cost to pay, and this cost will be at the center of discussion in the fourth and final chapter.

Table Four: Women on large company boards in Europe 2010

	% of boards with women directors	% of director positions held by women	Number in sample
Austria	71	11	7
Belgium	70	12	10
Denmark	71	14	7
Finland	100	29	7
France	79	12	57
Germany	83	9	36
Greece	50	10	6
Italy	50	5	18
Luxembourg	50	6	6
Netherlands	76	15	21
Norway	100	32	6
Portugal	67	4	6
Ireland	67	11	9
Spain	86	10	21
Sweden	100	29	20
Switzerland	70	8	30
UK	86	13	73
All	79	12	340

Note: The survey covers the largest companies, those with market capitalisation of more than 4 billion Euros. Where a country had fewer than 6 such companies, the next largest were added to make a base of at least 6 firms per country. All data was supplied by Boardex in July 2010.

Source: Greenwood, J. & Guner N. (2009). *Marriage and Divorce since World War II*. Illinois: University of Chicago Press.

3-3-7- Higher Education, Higher Pay, Low Gender Pay Gap! It is Mostly about Choice.

In the previous chapter there was an admission by all parties around this central issue of the importance of education in advancing the careers of women. This advancement will put them in top socio-economic positions, which will naturally earn them a far better salary. There is a correlation between higher education levels and higher salaries and wages. However, the counter-argument disagrees with this particular notion, especially when it comes to gender pay gap or occupational segregation, and it vehemently oppose it if the word “correlational” is replaced with the word “causal.” The counter argument goes something like this:

Sex differentials in the professions are due primarily to substantively different work orientations and career choices among men and women, even among university graduates, even

among people of exceptionally high intellectual ability and hence to very different career paths. (Goldin & Lawrence, 2002)

Therefore the premise this time around is correct, in the sense that the variables laid out previously, which are higher education, high pay and lower gender gap do correlate and even have causal relationships, but there are other more important variables at play and at times more influential ones, like men's and women's preferences when it comes to the labor market. (See Table Five) This will lead us to the discussion of the next grievance. (For further details see Appendix 12). Catherine's model when applied to the advanced European economies reveals a recurring theme.

Table Five: National Distributions of Lifestyle Preferences among Women and Men

		Family centred	Adaptive	Work centred
UK	All women aged 16+	17	69	14
	Women in FT work	14	62	24
	Women in PT work	8	84	8
	All men aged 16+	?	<48	52
	Men in FT work	?	<50	50
	Men in PT work	?	<66	34
Spain	All women aged 18+	17	70	13
	Women in FT work	4	63	33
	Women in PT work	7	79	14
	All men aged 18+	?	<60	40
	Men in full-time work	?	<56	44
Belgium-Flanders	All women	10	75	15
	Women with partners	12	75	13
	All men	2	23	75
	Men with partners	1	22	77
Germany	Women	14	65	21
	Men	33	67	
Czech Republic	All women aged 20-40	17	70	13
	Employed women	14	69	17
	Wives aged 20-40	14	75	11
Sweden	Women born in 1955	4	64	32

Sources: Data for UK and Spain, 1999, extracted from Tables 3.14 and 3.15 in Hakim (2003: 85, 87). Data for Belgium-Flanders extracted from Corijn and Hakim (2006) based on a 2002/3 survey. Data for Germany extracted from Bertram et al (2005). Data for Czech Republic from Rabusic and Manea (2009), based on a 2005 survey. Data for Sweden extracted from Huang et al (2007) reporting analysis of a longitudinal dataset that understated those in the family-centred group. Data shows actual lifestyle choices by age 43 (1998).

Source: Hakim, C. (2011). Feminist myths and magic medicine: The flawed thinking behind calls for further equality legislation. London, UK: Centre for Policy Studies.

The recurring theme is centered on the adaptive nature of women and the choices they made to balance life and work preferences. The number for women in Sweden who opted exclusively for a family centered lifestyle was the lowest among their European counterparts.

3-3-8- Men and Women Basically Want the Same Thing! But Men are Better Negotiators.

During the process of analyzing the manifestation of this particular feminist grievance in the preceding chapter, an important determinant of higher pay especially in the Western capitalistic societies, which was the ability to negotiate well. This ability to negotiate is developed through time but it is vital at the starting point of the beginning of careers. This notion is irrelevant in more “socialistic” societies, where salary structures and pedigrees are already established. The negotiation becomes important when factors such as performance and competence are at play. I cited a particular study entitled “*Women Don’t Ask*,” where the author concluded that the main reason why there is a discrepancy in salaries that maximizes during the lifetime of men and women’s careers is that: “young men routinely negotiate higher starting pay while most young women fail to do so.” (Babcock & Laschever, 2003, p.25) The counter-argument vehemently and if I may say, correctly negates the premise that women and men have the same abilities to argue and bargain. The feminist can claim discrimination and social pressure and societal expectations but there is no escaping this reality that is expressed in Babcock’s study as follows:

This sex difference in bargaining and negotiation over promotion, responsibilities and pay develops over time into a cumulatively sizeable earnings gap in adult life... Even among people who attended the same universities and have the same qualifications including MBA graduates... Men ask for more

money, women ask for shorter hours. (Babcock & Laschever, 2003, p.25)

Table six reveals the evolution of full time employment among men and women in Europe between 1997 and 2007. The pattern that can be clearly deduced was the plateau of maximum increase that most Scandinavian countries have hit. This will be of monumental importance in discussing “the convergence model” proposed by Goldin at the end of this chapter

Table Six: FTE employment,* 1997† and 2007 (as% of population aged 16-64 years)

	Men		Women	
	1997	2007	1997	2007
Finland	69	71	61	64
Estonia	64	72	56	64
Denmark	77	76	62	63
Latvia	61	72	52	63
Lithuania	62	69	57	62
Sweden	70	74	60	62
Slovenia	66	72	57	60
Cyprus	79	80	50	60
Portugal	77	73	57	58
Bulgaria	–	65	–	57
Czech Rep.	73	74	54	56
Romania	71	65	57	52
Slovakia	63	68	50	52
France	69	67	49	52
UK	74	73	50	51
Ireland	76	77	45	51
Austria	76	75	51	51
Hungary	64	65	49	50
Poland	59	63	47	49
Spain	70	75	38	49
Croatia	–	63	–	49
Spain	70	75	38	49
Germany	71	71	46	48
Belgium	71	69	44	47
Greece	72	75	41	46
Luxembourg	76	74	45	45
Netherlands	75	74	41	44
Italy	67	70	37	42
Malta	77	73	32	33
EU-15	71	72	45	49
EU-25	70	71	47	50

* FTE employment is total hours worked in both main jobs and second jobs divided by the average annual number of hours worked in full-time jobs.

† Or nearest year, typically 1998 or 2000.

Source: Hakim, C. (2011). *Feminist myths and magic medicine: The flawed thinking behind calls for further equality legislation*. London, UK: Centre for Policy Studies.

3-3-9 - All Women Want to Be Independent from Men! Many Women Would Disagree.

In the second chapter's mention of this highly controversial grievance, there was one important truth highlighted or at least, a common wisdom that is widely accepted. And this piece of information was that marriage across cultures and throughout history did not just represent the conjugal matrimony of men and women, but also represented the central unit for not just society but the economy as well.

Therefore any plan that attempts to restructure or even influence the entire society or the entire economy has to work its way through this central unit. And the popular organizing plan throughout history was that men were providers and women were the hearth keepers or housewives. This planning concept saw several evolutionary changes but remained somewhat intact.

However, the feminists (Elshian, 1981a & Becker, 1974) with the premise of this particular grievance insist that women are subjugated in this kind of arrangement. But this cannot be further from the truth since, "women use marriage as an alternative or supplement to their careers in employment." (Corijn & Hakim, 2006) This is in accordance with the Preference Theory that established three types of preference model, in which women balance their work in family lives (Hakim, 2000).

3-3-10- Family-Friendly Measures will Bridge the Gap. The Gap does not need a Bridge it needs a Hammer.

The use of the word hammer is a reference to something that needs breaking rather than bridging. Back in the layout of this particular grievance in chapter two there was a logical argument put forth by the feminist camp that goes something like, if women are provided with more access to family-friendly policies at work like family leave and filial and

parental care they would easily achieve top economic hierarchical positions and that would bridge the gap or break the glass ceiling.

The glass ceiling is of course a reference to a hypothetical and metaphorical barrier that is placed on women, which is keeping them from climbing the socioeconomic ladder (Bennaa, 2016).

There was the introduction of a highly interesting statistic concerning which place women could reach top or senior positions rather rapidly and more frequently. The two places that were chosen were Sweden, where they have generous family leave policies, and the US where they do not have them generally.

The rates in which women achieve “senior management jobs” in both Sweden and the US are 11% and 15% respectively (Iqbal, 2015). The counter argument this time around is so empirical and convincing. It states first that these policies were beneficial but not quite what the feminist want them to be. Hakim stated that:

There is no doubt that family-friendly policies are beneficial for the health and well-being of mothers and infants, and they helped women to combine paid jobs with family work. [However] the Millennium cohort study in the UK found that one-third of mothers do not work at all up to a child’s third birthday, one-third works intermittently, and one-third works continuously typically part time. (Hakim, 2011, p.65)

Therefore, the conclusion is not only they do not help women reach top managerial positions but rather they are irrelevant to that particular process. (For further details about disparities in high paying jobs, and access to professional degrees between men and women see Appendices 10 & 13).

3-3-11- Family Leave is even good for Employers! That is not what Employers Say.

In the presentation of this highly debatable and easily dismissible grievance by the feminists, there was one important notion. This notion is the ability of small and medium sized companies and enterprises to handle spending this extra large amount of monetary compensations to accommodate or to attract the large pool of trained employees, which happen to be women.

The only group of companies that can afford this large accommodation by adding generous family-friendly policies to the way they function are companies which are already large, the likes of Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft (Wajcman, 1998). Such luxuries include but are not limited to: Nurseries, long maternity leave, and paid special leave. (For international Comparisons see Appendix 4).

3-3-12- It would be better with Female Leadership! It is more of the same.

This particular grievance is probably the simplest one of the twelve to actually have an agreement with the feminists about, at least about the initial and basic premise, which is equality. In this narrow space the actual differences between men and women are very minimal. Some have even argued that they are exactly the same and stated that: “Female managers differ from male managers in their personal characteristics and family lives but not in the way they do the job.” (Hakim, 2011, p.30)

This is a clear dismissal of an earlier study between the years 1996 and 1998, where it claimed that women’s managerial skills are superior to those of men because they have “a different, cooperative managerial Style.” (Wajcman, 1998)

3-4- An Economic Case for the further Pursue of Gender Equality

Outside the realm of the vicious debate surrounding the thorny social issues that precedes achieving absolute and total gender equality in all fields and at all levels, like declining fertility rates, the regulation of reproductive rights for women, and the dichotomy of marriage and divorce, there is actually a purely economic and mutually and reciprocally beneficial case that can be made for it.

This case involves a multi-layered interdisciplinary approach to first remove certain legal barriers that impede women's progress and integration into the labor market. And second a package or a set of incentives to attract these "perceived" marginalized and historically discriminated against group, which are women. In an article published in the website of the highly influential organization the World Bank, there was a laying out of an extremely and highly convincing case for removing all and every single law that prohibits and intimidates or in any way shape or form stops the advancement, promotion, or entry of women in the lucrative world of paid work.

In the midst of laying down the argument published and written by lawyer and business specialist Nisha Aricapudi (2014) a "bright" vision for the future not just of the United States but the entire globe was presented. The untapped wealth and opportunities for growth and development of the world seemed mouth-watering and the figures were unheard of. The evident nature of pursuing policies, legislation and laws that promotes, defends, and protects women in particular and gender equality in general is stressed in the words of the author. She stated that: "It is no secret that gender equality is smart economics." (Areakapudi, 2014) And she was not just being cheeky or partisan; there were actually statistics and data behind this remark. She pondered at the prospects of women playing a more integral part of the world economy and how that would be reflected in the GDP numbers of the entire globe.

The author proclaimed that: “If women play the same role in labor markets as men, as much as 28 trillion dollars could be added to Global GDP by 2025,” (Arekapudi, 2014) a very ambitious goal and even a legitimate objective to pursue and seek after. She did not stop there of course. She went on to cite other important studies that encapsulated the magnitude of possibilities if there were actual will behind efforts to touch the untapped territory of further equality and protections for women. She articulated that:

Worldwide women own or operate 25 to 33 percent of businesses and they grow faster than those owned by men. It should be obvious that when governments cultivate a business environment that benefits women entrepreneurs and workers economic productivity is enhanced and development outcomes improve. (Arekapudi, 2014)

These statistics that build the positive side of the case for absolute gender equality are very convincing, to say the least. If those were not enough motivation for world governments to eliminate sex-based legal and legislative barriers that impedes women’s economic advancement, Nisha Arekapudi provided an intimidating scenario and a scary prospect if those governments decided to dismiss that road. But prior to that she diagnosed the status quo in many regions around the world, she begrudgingly contended that:

Unfortunately social discrimination, lack of incentives, and traditional gender roles only compounded the difficulties women already face in entering the workforce. Rather than business regulations, it is often discriminatory provisions in family codes, labor codes, constitutions, property laws and domestic violence

laws that suppress women's labor-force participation.

(Arekapudi, 2014)

(For further information regarding the decline in manufacturing jobs - men's territory- and the rise in non-manufacturing jobs- usually accommodating to women-, see Appendix 9).

One of the elements listed above in this particular quote, which had not received proper or even enough attention and focus throughout this research work or at least up until now, is domestic violence against women. The angle and the lens, through which the author looked at domestic violence against women was somewhat unique.

Not the usual social perspective that involves obvious moral and ethical condemnation of the practice but rather an innovative way that involved a different dimension. This different dimension is the fact that not only domestic violence had direct negative repercussions on the women, the children, and the family in general, but those negative consequences are extended to the entire economy, and the way she argued about that was as follows. But prior to providing the argument's basic structure and relevant statistics, a closer look is needed at the general methodology of the report published in the World Bank's website.

This particular report was entitled "*Women Business and the law 2016: Getting to equal,*" and it dealt with and provided an extensive analysis of over than 173 different countries' legal and legislative systems and how they pertain to gender equality in the sense that, whether they provide optimal or not so optimal conditions for the thriving of their female workforce. (Iqbal, 2015) The 2015 report was the fourth installment of a series of similar reports published by the World Bank research centers, but what was of extreme relevancy to this particular research work are the findings related to the United States of America.

The report found that the economic cost of domestic violence in one of the richest and most powerful countries in the world to be very staggering. The report stated that: "In the

United States alone eight million days of paid work are lost each year to domestic violence costing approximately eight point three billion dollars in annual expenses.” (Iqbal, 2015, p.26) These are not as they might seem to the untrained eyes as exaggerated statistics or overblown data for the purpose of achieving ideological or political objectives, but they rather make a lot of sense if the breaking down of this phenomenon is observed. The dissemination of this argument is a bit complex, but it is very logical and it is as follows:

Often abusers will try and prevent victims from getting to work, causing them to be late or to have to miss work. Abusers Also may excessively call, email or text victims while they are at work, come into the workplace, or stalk the victim. (Canadian Labour Congress, 2019)

The Canadian Labour Congress went on to detail how exactly and precisely domestic violence against women affects the performances in the workplace by stating that:

Over 80% of domestic violence victims report that their work performance was negatively affected. Absenteeism and poor work performance can leave victims vulnerable to discipline and some even lose their jobs. (Canadian Labour Congress, 2019)

This is when it comes to domestic violence and how this abhorrent practice can lead to dire consequences not just on the physical and psychological well-being of women, children, and family units, but also to the entire labor market and subsequently the entire economy. There are certain variables that the report highlighted concerning the impediments that women face in their objective to full participation in the workforce that this research work will not deal with for one simple reason. This reason is due to the fact that they do not have parallels or equivalents in the United States’ legal, social, or economic structures. An example

of those variables would be the fact that women in the Democratic Republic of Congo cannot have a certain business idea, fund it, be legally eligible to work in it, and sign its necessary paperwork in her name. (Iqbal, 2015)

The prospect of seeing this scenario for women taking place in the United States in the modern times is not only unfathomable but also laughable and ludicrous. For this simple reason the option of not pursuing an analysis of certain conditions that are simply non-existing in the United States. However, there are other variables and impediments that cannot be simply overlooked, even if they are in a far place such as in Japan. First of all, the laying down of this particular issue has been dealt with in the twelve grievances before but there was a certain twist in this report that required revisiting. The report said:

Studies indicate that some of the main barriers to women's economic inclusion is the lack of childcare and the inability to balance both work and household responsibilities. For instance over 44,000 children in Japan are on waiting list to join daycare centers. (Iqbal, 2015, p.57)

And we come to the conclusion laid in this previously articulated premise. The report concluded that:

Government-supported child care and primary education create opportunities for women to seek paid work or continue working after child birth... Indeed the percentage of women in formal employment in countries like Japan that provide public childcare is more than double that in countries that do not. (Iqbal, 2015, p.58)

The curious reason why I decided to mention an example that contains a country from far East-Asia like Japan is to serve as a bridge between the conclusion of this report, that highlights a positive aspect for women's rapid inclusion in the socio-economic scenery in Japan and a dim glance at another important aspect, and a central one to this research work, which is the alarming decline in fertility that this nation is experiencing.

3-5- The Driving Forces behind Japan's Fertility Decline, and how the US could be next.

Prior to delving into the minutiae of the world of fertility and its importance to a myriad of different fields and domains, such as the social, economic, and even the political and national security levels, there is a curiously odd trend in the argumentative adaptation of the feminist camp, concerning the declining fertility rates in the US and the Western World in general, that needs to be put to the test. In the era of post 1980s or when the upheaval of the social revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s came to an abrupt end, a social concern had risen about what they actually brought to the American society.

The social revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s "gave birth" to several anti-reproductive measures and means. Those measures and means included, but were not limited to, the oral contraceptive Enovid, also known by the commercial name "the pill." This was approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1960 as previously mentioned in both, chapter two and the discussion of grievances in chapter three (Bennaa, 2016). They also included the landmark decision of the US Supreme Court in *Roe v Wade*, which expanded the rights of personal privacy to include the right to terminate a pregnancy prematurely which is the procedure known as abortion (Goldin, & Lawrence, 2002).

The first feminist reaction or attitude was to deny that there was even an actual decline in fertility rates in the US, let alone establish a causal or even correlational link between that presumed decline at the previously mentioned medical and pharmaceutical tools (Tower,

2002). The second adopted feminist stance was an attitude that can only be labeled as a “so what?” attitude. This was echoed in the words of prominent Economist and feminist-leaning author, Claudia Goldin, especially in one of her works that was entitled “How Japan and the US can reduce the Stress of Aging.”

In the build-up to providing what she perceived as the solution to a decline in fertility in the US and Japan, which meant that she implicitly admitted that that particular reality is upon the American society, she cited a few reasons why a declining fertility is not that big of a deal. The first fact that she stated is somewhat true, but can be a little misleading. The dissection of this highly important and relevant “fact” to this research work will be left to the fourth and final chapter.

The fact that Goldin stated was that: “The poorest most underdeveloped nations are the youngest. What then is the concern about aging?” (Goldin, 2016, p.1) Then she went on to acknowledge that the only concern that might rise up from a declining fertility is just “a tiny weenie” problem that is called the economic well-being of the entire society.

She did not state this verbatim but there was a statistical economics term that was utilized and it was called the Dependency Ratio (D.R.) (Goldin, 2016). This particular economic metric is designed to basically calculate a ratio of the individuals who are labeled in the economics jargon as “economically inactive individuals” to the other group that supports them with financially or otherwise, who are called the “economically active group” (Goldin, 2016). The differentiation between the economically active or inactive groups is not dependent on gender, race, or national origins but rather on age and the way to calculate it is as follows: The ratio of the young (G1) (those who are in the age category between 0 and 14 years old) plus (+) the old (G2) (who are in the age category of 64 and above) (Goldin, 2016). The common thing between these two particular groups is the fact that both of them are

dependent for their entire livelihood on the next group, which is the previously mentioned “economically active group”. This particular group’s age category is between 15 and 64, or the working age (G3). So the equation is like this: $D.R = [(G1 (0-14) + G2 (65<)] / G3 (15-65)$.

The actual concern that most people would have, and rightly so according to the argument of this research work, is that this ratio would be in a not so favorable condition. And according to Claudia Goldin’s own research work, the concern is:

With aging, therefore, is that the number of non-economically active individuals is growing relative to the economically active, and therefore the non-economically active will have a decreased standard of living and fewer to care for them. (Goldin, 2016, p.2)

This will leave many people vulnerable and the economy very fragile. A manifestation of this might be seen in the Japanese labor market, where old people are still hassling in the labor force even after they have reached their 70s and even sometimes 80s (Goldin, 2016). This might cause a severe problem in the long run, especially since they are running out of options. Because according to the author of this US National Bureau of Economic Research paper:

The Japanese have been great at expanding the longevity of their population. They are the best in the world especially for women. But they haven’t been as good at increasing fertility, and immigration has been very low until recently. (Goldin, 2016, p.45)

So the problem for Japan is threefold that of any other “normal” developed country. Since they have improved the longevity of their people, this means that now people in Japan

are living to their late 80s, 90s, and even passed the century mark. Add to that their alarmingly declining fertility, which has many root causes (Goldin, 2016). Add to that, strict policies for admitting immigrants into the country.

If one adds all these figures and put them in the previously mentioned equations of the dependency ratio, the picture would emerge very gloomy for Japan's economic status quo and future. But Goldin claims that even if the US shares many characteristics with the Japanese when it comes to the fertility rate outlook, what is happening in Japan in terms of demographic stress will not reach the soil of America because of one simple reason, which is articulated in this following quote:

...These dire consequences may not occur in an open economy with sufficient savings, and "guest workers" (or perhaps robots). Sufficient savings in an open economy will ensure resources in older age and "guest workers or robots" will close the care giving gap. (Goldin, 2016, p.1)

The model that these remarks and observations lead towards is going to help tremendously in the final analysis of the major findings in the fourth and final chapter of this research work. But prior to reaching that point in the argument, the model that Goldin had established in her work about the declining fertility rates in Japan is two folds. The first is related to the types of occupation and how that relates to the fertility rates, this was put forth in this wording:

As clerical and professional employment expand relative to manufacturing and agriculture jobs, and as education levels rise, women's employment increases. Because social norms have not yet changed, women are also expected to take care of the home

and their children because men do little in household production. Fertility, in consequence, falls to lower levels as women do a “double shift.” (Goldin, 2014, p.7)

If one is suspecting that Claudia Goldin is alluding to the idea of “switching” gender roles to balance women’s participation in the workforce and help fertility rates recover, well that one person should not be suspecting, because he or she is proven correct by the second fold of this particular argument. Goldin continued her; now controversial, argument by stating that:

The bottom line is that women’s labor force participation and fertility respond to social norms and traditions that enable and encourage men to contribute more and possibly even equally to the care of children and the maintenance of the household.
(Goldin, 2014, p.9)

Perhaps it would not be so bad if the Japanese model comes to the US. Maybe it would not be so bad if fertility rates of the US, which is now at a concerning level of 1.9, would further fall to Japanese levels of 1.4 (Goldin, 2016). Perhaps it would not be so bad if the US median age, which is at a healthy 31 years old would rise up further to Japanese levels of horrifying 44 years old median (Goldin, 2016).

These observations and pondering remarks and questions will be dealt with decisively in the fourth and final chapter of this research work. But before closing this particular chapter and moving to the next, there is one proposed solution by the feminists to put the final nail in the presumed coffin of gender inequality, or as one feminist articulately put it, the last chapter of a grand gender convergence.

3-6- The Evolution of the Grand Gender Convergence: Cause, Cost, and Future

Throughout this research work there was a focus on the fact that in this past century an evolution of gender relations was taking shape in favor of one particular gender. This particular gender is female. The revolutions whether they were social, economic, or legal that took place simultaneously and in synchronicity in the era between 1960 and 1980 managed to accelerate the quest that had been traced to start in the 1920s.

According to the influential American Economist and academic, Professor Claudia Goldin (2014) there was basically three different phases in this “Grand Gender Convergence”, where women are almost equal to men at every level and in every field. Whether these claims are true or inaccurate is completely beside the point, what is relevant though is the culmination, or rather for accuracy sake, the future trajectory of this convergence. The first of the three metaphorical chapters of the grand gender convergence in gender differences occurred in the 1950s and 1960s when unprecedented numbers of women decided to be part of the US Labor market (Goldin, 2014).

The sheer size of female force participation constituted a major impact in narrowing gender differences and particularly the gender pay gap. The second of the metaphorical chapters was the accumulated on-the-job experience garnered by women after spending a substantial amount of time in their occupation (Goldin, 2014). This allowed them not only to stay in the job market much longer than they used to, but this stay gave them more access to experience-related monetary compensations, which in turn managed to further shrink the ever stubborn gender pay gap. The third metaphorical chapter of the Goldin presented model is the tremendous and highly observable rise in the number of years of education that women possessed starting in the mid-1950s and reaching an unprecedented status compared to those

of men (Goldin, 2014). This last particular chapter saw more than just a mere convergence between men and women, but as Claudia Goldin best put it:

A narrowing has occurred between men and women in the labor force participation, paid hours of work, hours of work at home, lifetime labor force experience, occupations, college majors and education where there has been an overtaking by females.

(Goldin, 2014, p.1092)

However, all of this conceivably positive change that happened in this last century apparently was not even enough for the feminists. Therefore they demand more “reforms” and institutionalized changes. But before delving in the dissemination of what the feminists actually want now, a closer look needs to be paid to the rationalization of why the status quo of the United States labor market, which is highly hospitable of female workers, is actually unacceptable. Indeed there are discrepancies when it comes to wages, incomes, and pay of those belonging to men and women, or what is famously known as the gender pay gap. This sex-based disparity in pay between males and females can be explained by a myriad of different reasons. According to Goldin:

The explained portion of the gender wage gap decreased over time as human capital investments between men and women converged. Differences in years of education in the content of college and in accumulated labor market experience narrowed.

In consequence the residual portion of the gap rose relative to the explained portion. (Goldin, 2014, p.1092)

So, there are indeed explained and unexplained reasons for the gap in pay between men and women. The explained part of the wage gap gathers a significantly large consensus

or agreement in the academic world. What receives contentious debate and frivolous disagreement is the unexplained portion of the gap. These contentious explanations vary from the conclusion that women have very low bargaining skills and that they tend not to have strong desires to compete in the labor market with men or with other women (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). Others believe that these discrepancies are due to the fact that men tend to stay far more in the workforce compared to women (Farrell, 2005).

What Goldin and the overwhelming majority of the feminist camp argue as the reason for this unexplained gap is well, you guessed it, sex-based discrimination (Ginn et al., 1996). The issue that arises from providing a cause or rationale or basically identifying the problem is that that process will determine the way one solves that particular problem. However, if the diagnosis is mistaken, needless to say that the prospect of a positive outcome is highly unlikely.

If the approach to solve the gender pay gap is built on the first diagnosis, which is that the cause of the problem is mainly due to the lack or the inadequacy of women's bargaining skills and desires for competition in the labor market, the solution would focus on the improvement and the elevation of those skills; a clearly defined solution for a clearly defined problem.

And if the same can be said about the hypothetical approach to "fix" the gap, if the latter is determined to be mainly the result women's lesser time and experience spent in the labor market, where one would have to engineer a framework to solve that, again; a clear problem and a clear solution. However, if one determines that the root causes for this particular economic problem is something as vague and ambiguous as sex-based discrimination, then the solution would inevitably be "all over the place."

The solution proposed by Claudia Goldin seems very practical and detailed, but the philosophy behind it is very flawed and counterproductive and might even be detrimental to the larger economic picture, as it will be demonstrated in the last chapter. The detailed plan to fix the stubborn gender pay gap proposed by Claudia Goldin revolves around four main points. In the conclusion of her paper and lecture, which were both entitled “the last chapter of gender convergence,” Goldin stated that first:

The last chapter must be concerned with how workers’ time is allocated, used and remunerated and it must involve a reduction in the dependence of remuneration on particular segments of time. (Goldin, 2014, p.1118)

By remuneration, she meant monetary compensation for certain work. In here the object of this remuneration is the allocation of time. The second point that this last chapter must include, according to the American professor is that: “it must involve greater independence and autonomy for certain types of workers and the ability of workers to substitute seamlessly for each other” (Goldin, 2014, p.1118). This means that workers should be able to have similar qualifications and performances at the same particular job targeted by this policy. The implications of this will be left to the analysis of the findings in the following chapter.

The third point is more of a conceptual change of labor force culture, especially when it comes to giving value to certain work arrangements. Goldin said that: “Flexibility at work has become a prized benefit but flexibility is of less value if it comes at a high price in terms of earnings” (Goldin, 2014, p.1118).

The fourth and final point that the last chapter of gender convergence must have is related to the previously mentioned concept of work flexibility. In this last point, Goldin

(2014) stressed the importance of “the various types of temporal flexibility require changes in the structure of work so that their cost is reduced.”(p.1118)

This four-point strategy for closing the last chapter of the grand gender convergence is built on the assumption that all or most occupations can be divided or split into portions or time chunks, however, this is obviously not the case, whether empirically or observably. This point and others will be dealt with in the culmination of this research work, which is the fourth and final chapter.

3-7-Conclusion

This chapter sought to revisit the intended and targeted results or the “dream scenario” behind the calls for and the pursuit of further absolute gender equality legislation. This chapter also aimed at answering the important question regarding the impact of the feminists’ legal and legislative “successes” on the fertility and divorce rates in post 1960 America.

The intended results were to push more and more women into the American labor force, through encouraging and improving their education and removing certain social and legal barriers that impede their accession to profitable and high-paying jobs. These results were achieved in a spectacular fashion: more women entered the labor force, and previously male-dominated educational and professional degrees achieved gender parity and in some instances female dominance.

However, these results correlated with a severe decline in fertility rates and a significant rise in divorce rates in the late 1970s onward. The argument of this chapter was guided by drawing parallels with the United States from other countries’ social and economic trends, mainly Japan and the European Union.

Especially in areas that have already been targeted by the feminists in those particular countries. This argument would raise an important issue; in fact the most important issue in this research work, which is regarding the unintended consequences of those particular policies if they were to be applied in the context of America.

**CHAPTER FOUR: The
Unintended Consequences: A
Scenario for the Future of
Gender Equality in the US**

4-1-Introduction

The fourth and the discussion chapter will serve as both the culmination of this research work and as a “counter” argument for the previously discussed feminist talking points. This chapter will constitute the main thesis of this work by answering the initially laid out main research question, which was, what are the unintended consequences of pursuing absolute gender equality in the United States of America?

It will undergo that feat through the establishment of an important dichotomy of protections versus restrictions, and how eliminating one would bring some unintended repercussions. These repercussions will vary in size and scope, expanding from marriage balance and the simple division of house labor to the more complex notions such as national security. It will track the evolution of the government’s efforts and pursuits of gender equality and it will ultimately present a scenario for the future in that regard.

4-2--The Subtle Dichotomy of Protections versus Restrictions

In the discussions of Thomas Hobbes' theory of the social contract in chapter two and his unbearable perception of a "state of nature," there was the mention or the layout of the theme "absolute freedom" and what would that entail for the individuals in that particular "community." The term community, however, is not really descriptive or accurate when it comes to labeling the gathering or lack of thereof in that particular state.

When there is a revision of the conceptual framework of a "state of nature" otherwise known as "the law of the jungle," where all are entitled to all, the weakest links are the subjects of cruel and unusual treatment. These weakest links are not just women and children but also some men as well. This latter group, as a whole, had better chances, and were better equipped, to dominate the hierarchies at that time.

However, the determinants of climbing those hierarchies were not based particularly on any social contract for that matter, but rather as previously mentioned on raw and simple characteristics like brute power and wicked consciousness. But as I highlighted in the second chapter, that state was not just unbearable, but most importantly unsustainable, which led eventually, to its demise and the evolution of more acceptable and more negotiable social arrangements.

These arrangements necessitated giving up certain rights and freedoms as previously mentioned, like strong and powerful men controlling access to all precious resources such as wealth, leadership and most relevant to this research work the social status of gender i.e. their relationship with women. Of course a negotiated social arrangement requires a certain presence of a magic word called compromise. And that consequently involves giving up certain freedoms and rights and most importantly the sharing of responsibilities. And these responsibilities vary from the social to the economic and eventually lead up to the political.

But during this transitioning process a dichotomy that would prove to be of great controversy later on had emerged from the rubbles of the “state of nature” that went irrevocably into the annals of history.

This dichotomy is of two conflicting but mutually reciprocal concepts, which are restriction versus protection. An example of that would be first to provide certain protective measures, but at the same time take certain freedoms and leisure away from those who receive protections to keep these latter that might cost certain investments from the part of those who provide them. A practical example would be, cross-culturally, to keep groups and individuals from going to certain places at certain times.

This is obviously a restriction, but the reward would be to keep these individuals or groups out of harm’s way. The issue here is not about the quid- pro-quo but rather about the consensual nature of this process. This means whether the parties involved in this pact or social arrangement, that means the protected and the protector, are doing so consensually and without external pressure. Not only that, but also free from the consequences and penalties that would ensue from breaking or renegotiating those social arrangements.

These perceptions and restrictions are intertwined and almost symbiotic in nature, that is; the more protections there are the more restriction there will be and vice versa. Again using the same example cited earlier, which was about providing safe spaces and intervals or both. If one would remove the restrictions for certain individuals, like women traveling alone at night in certain areas, two possible scenarios will unfold.

The first would be that the benefits that the restriction-tied protections brought will disappear as soon as their causes are removed. The other scenario is that these protections are kept regardless of the removal of those restrictions. Both of these scenarios will have two different repercussions. The obvious one pertaining to the first scenario is that the subject at

the receiving end of both restrictions and protections will suffer not from the lifting of the restrictions per se, but rather from the removal of the protections that are associated with them.

A simplistic example of that would be at the social level if parents or a restrictive society did lift night curfew on children. Of course, these children would be able to enjoy or at least spend times at night but the other bad side to it is they can no longer be protected from the perils of night life, like kidnapping and robberies. The other scenario which is unfolding in the previously mentioned Scandinavian countries and spreading rapidly throughout the world and knocking on the door steps of the United States' social and economic fabric can be described as the best of both worlds, at least for some.

Of course this is referring to the act of removing the restrictions while at the same time maintaining protections. This would translate according to the previous simplistic example always, to letting children out at night and assign for that protection some form of security apparatus, such as police officers or a security detail. Obviously that would mean a stretching of resources and requires heavy investments in logistics and personnel.

But there is one caveat here. And this Latin word means, according to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary: “a modifying or cautionary detail to be considered when evaluating interpreting or doing something” (“Caveat”, 2019). And the caveat here is that caution is indeed urged when interpreting what these previously mentioned logical scenarios actually entail. They do not in the least mean that they (restrictions and protections) are right or wrong, as previously highlighted regarding the adoption of moral or immoral stands against or in favor of certain policies or measures. That is not the purpose here. What the purpose is or what the rationale behind those examples and the underlying themes they highlight is to

design a framework or a logical premise that would define and design the discussions and conclusions of this research work based on the findings of the previous three chapters.

One part or pillar of this framework is, as previously highlighted in chapter three, that a system of privileges for some will create a system of burdens for others. But this time around is not used in the context of feminism but rather against their claims. The other part of this framework which will constitute the largest segment of the larger argument as a whole is a more generalizable notion.

The first part established the effects that a system of privileges and preferences for a particular group would have on another group i.e. that it would create a system of burdens and boundaries for another group. But the second element that would be central to that argument is the fact that these privileges would ultimately create burdens and negative consequences not just for the previously mentioned burdened group but rather for all members of that particular social structure even those who are initially privileged and preferred. Within this particular framework and upon these two premises, the logical argument that will disseminate the findings of this research work will be built.

This will involve dealing with the duality of restrictions versus protections for the perceived “shackles” that were shattered by the social revolutions of the post 1960s period. These “shackles” were surrounding and revolving around issues like marriage, divorce, sexuality, fertility, and reproductive rights, which have been dealt with extensively in the previous chapters.

4-3--Tampering with the Historical Marriage Balance

As I have highlighted in both chapter one and two, marriage as a social and economic institution in the United States witnessed several evolutionary and revolutionary changes. By evolutionary I mean changes that did not require governmental intervention and just happen

due to natural advancements in certain technological fields that enabled married spouses to simultaneously enter the labor force.

This in turn divided the household income that used solely to belong to the husband historically. And by “revolutionary” I mean changes that required both, technological breakthroughs especially in the fields of healthcare, and social activism that led to governmental intervention through either policies or legislation. In this research work the initial points of analysis in the geographical and historical context were pre-1960 America and its social and economic view of marriage and marriage structure.

What have been dealt with according to this context were the institutionalization and later on the abolishment of the marriage prohibitions and what that led to in terms of the large disparities in labor force participations. The initial pattern that was perceived was the simultaneous and synchronic nature of the entry of young men into the labor force and the removal of women from the labor market.

This phenomenon was due to a myriad of different reasons as it has been established in this research work (See discussion in chapter one). The first reason was due to the return of millions of World War II soldiers and the efforts of the government to assimilate and integrate them successfully back in the social and economic fabric of America. The second cause or reason was to create job vacancies for them by removing those who replaced them during the war times; of course those were the women. I have dealt with several tools and mechanisms that enabled this process to take shape. Some of these tools and mechanisms were the marriage prohibitions represented in the hire and retain bars, which specifically targeted married women across several occupational fields and in multiple States.

The other tools and mechanisms that I have highlighted included a measure at the federal governmental level, which also targeted married women, of course this was Federal

Order 213.¹ This pattern had intended and unintended consequences and manifestations. These consequences and manifestations varied across multiple levels that included the social, the economic, and even those pertaining to the national security.

Indirect causal link had been established between several of the measures taken and some of the manifestations that took place in the post-war American society and economy. These direct causal links include but are not limited to the link between the marriage bars and the increase in time spent within the virtual walls and boundaries of marriage (see chapter one, “The effects of World War II on the Family”).

The logical interpretation and dissemination of that was that women saw a safe haven for economic, societal, and emotional security and stability in the institution of marriage, after the near impossibility of joining the labor force that prohibitions and federal orders caused. The other part of this interpretation was the view of the male population regarding what these prohibitions that were disproportionately directed at the female population brought to them.

The men saw in these prohibitions, as social group, a tremendous opportunity at two different layers. The first obviously is the opening of several job opportunities in a booming post-war economy. The second is the plummeting of the virtual “wife market” with women, who had as their ultimate wish after being blocked from entering into the workforce the finding of a suitable husband and a suitable home. Add to that other economic measures which were taken by the government for the betterment of the returning soldiers financial and educational situations, like the “G.I. Bill.”

The equation after the end of World War II was a recipe for a “boom” of a positive kind. Young, educated, home owning, and working war heroes coupled with what can be labeled as the marginalization of women at least from the labor market. Add to that the

¹ for further details about these measures see chapter one

cultivation of “The Cult of Domesticity” culture (an example of that would be a show TV like I Love Lucy) all of this gave men and women alike a sense of purpose and duty to start a family, get married and stay married, and most importantly bring many children to the world.

Because staying along within the “golden cage” of marriage while being out of work would necessarily provide couples, at least the women with a sense of urgency to fill the void that would inevitably ensue from a childless and jobless marriage, hence the baby boom of the post Second World War. The other noticeable phenomenon that took place was also the drop in divorce rates as well.

Unlike the issue of marriage this research work upon the examination of the relevant literature found no causal link between this significant drop and stagnation in divorce rates and the previously mentioned social and economic measures. The ensuing pattern saw dramatic and drastic changes taking place in the United States concerning marriage and divorce, particularly in the period under study, which started in 1960.

But prior to laying down the patterns of divorce and marriage, a closer look needs to be paid at the findings regarding labor force participation patterns already established so far in this research work. After the abolishment and the termination of the institutionalized marriage prohibitions just before the 1960s, more than a decade after the Second World War had ended a reversal of the previously mentioned trends or patterns of male and female participation rates in the labor market had occurred.

As highlighted in chapter two, in the parts about the revolutions that took place in the 1960s and 1970s, whether these revolutions were quiet or otherwise, women started to occupy a larger share of the economic, social, and educational maps. Women started to enter the labor market, universities, and on-the-job training in droves due to a myriad of different reasons (See discussions in chapter two, the revolutions and the family).

There was even an overtaking of women of men's position in certain fields, especially in the fields of education and professional college degrees in particular (See discussion chapter three, the evolution of the grand gender convergence). Of course this was not without consequences especially in the previously mentioned criteria in what was labeled in this research work as the "boom equation" that involved youth, education, professional work, and a culture that appreciates masculinity and promotes a docile version of femininity.

The consequences highlighted here were very surprising to say the least. What was surprising about these repercussions that took place as a direct and indirect result of the previously mentioned revolutions was not only how they happened, but also how quickly and simultaneously they took place. Concerning the first element of the "boom equation," which is "youth" I am of course referring to the relatively young age that first marriages used to take place at. That age increased dramatically to reach 29 years old; in many instances, as an average for women in the 1970s and 1980s (See discussions in chapters one & two, The Revolutions and the family).

The second element of the previously mentioned "boom equation" was education. It has been established in chapters two and three, in Europe as well as in the US, which is the most relevant to this research work, that there was a convergence between men's and women's educational levels in the post 1960s era. In some fields there was even an overtaking by female students, like the Humanities and even in fields that were historically dominated by men. Many examples have been provided concerning these educational fields (See chapter two), but it will not hurt to cite certain particular fields of education, because they would serve as a springboard for the third element of the "boom equation," which is professional working. The fields of education or rather college majors are the likes of Law and Medical Sciences.

One of the most important aspects of these fields or at least one of the most valued aspects of them socially and economically is that they serve as a quick route to a prestigious, well-remunerating occupation that put the people concerned well within the middle and upper-middle class of socioeconomic status. By the late 1980s and early 1990s as it has been discussed in the dissemination of Claudia Goldin's arguments regarding her perceived "grand gender convergence," these fields of professional education and training have either reached gender parity or female majority (See discussions in chapter three, grand gender convergence).

The third element as stated earlier is professional work or just work in general. The pattern and the trend in this element also echoed the two previously mentioned ones, in the sense that women also reached parity with men when it comes to labor force participation in the entire US economy (See discussions in chapter one and three). Regardless of the gender pay gap, which also had narrowed dramatically due to, at least in part, those variables, this trend raised the socio-economic of women significantly.

The fourth and final element of the "boom equation" is the change of the cultural dichotomy. The old dichotomy was appreciating and encouraging masculinity and virility, due of course partly to the sentiments of pride and triumph that accompanied the returning male soldiers of World War II and the promotion of The Cult of Domesticity for women, as the ultimate figure of femininity. The newly emerged cultural dichotomy was a stark difference from the first. In fact it is one hundred and eighty degrees different. Virility and the hegemonic male qualities in general started to be labeled as toxic masculinity and the docile image of women or the figurative perception of the "Damsel in Distress," changed to the famous cartoon figure of a woman flexing her biceps.

These drastic cultural shifts resulted from wave after wave of social activism demanding equality between men and women in all fields and at all levels otherwise known as feminism (See discussions in chapter two, feminism). With these new elements and variables a new equation emerged. Since the formerly mentioned equation was named the “boom equation” and since this particular equation is almost entirely opposite in direction and trend, it is only fitting to label it as “the Doom Equation.” However what took place in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s from the fight and plight to achieve certain rights for women in the fields of education, labor market and healthcare cannot be labeled and restricted under such a gloomy term.

Having stated that, there are consequences of these revolutions’ consequences that can be fittingly and accurately named the “doom equation”, especially if they were to happen simultaneously. These elements pertain to changes in certain beliefs about key social concepts that historically, even in the US, have stayed relatively stable and immune to cultural influence. The even more “concerning” aspect of these belief changes at the social level is the possibility that they would translate into political and legislative conceptual changes. These social concepts are divorce and fertility.

The former, which is divorce, had been historically looked upon with disgust by the American family and society at large. That is why as previously laid out in chapter two, the reasons or underlying causes of why couples, especially women would seek the termination of a marriage had to be drastic and serious, such as infidelity, abuse, or abandonment. But during and after the social revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s there was a significant change in the legal status of divorce. As it has been laid out in chapter three, there was a liberalization of divorce laws and the emergence of the no-fault divorce concept, which meant that women no longer needed an excuse as drastic as the formerly mentioned ones or even any excuse for that matter to get separated (See discussions in chapter two, liberalization of divorce).

Prior to laying down the findings of why divorce would put a stressful burden on not just families and children but also the entire economy, there is a need to establish a legitimate base of why people resort to such a drastic measure. Indeed sometimes life can get to be unbearable inside an unhappy marriage and even becomes toxic for both spouses without the existence of extreme behaviors such as cheating or domestic violence.

After the coming of age of the no-fault divorce in the 1970s and the rise of a redefined notion of matrimony, which is a romantic marriage, there was a new perspective emerging regarding the social perception of modern-day divorce and the stigma around it (Harkness, 2008). This perspective coincided with the release of a groundbreaking book written by a physician and a computer scientist, who both had their own painful experiences with separation, this book was entitled *Sacred Cows: The Truth about Divorce and Marriage* (Larson, 2017).

A summary about the content of this best-selling book was provided by an article written in the *Huffington Post* that was telling of a larger cultural shift that contained an implicit and an aggressive pushback against the old cultural norms, in which the author stated that:

Their book presents the false cultural assumptions about divorce as sacred cows illustrated as, well, cows, and if you have been divorced or are contemplating it you have likely heard what the cows spew as truth. (Larson, 2017, p.23)

In the arguments of this book there were several “cows” when it came to divorce. And by “cow,” the authors meant myths or legends that surround the process of getting a divorce whether prior, during, or post the termination of the holy matrimony. There are seven cows or

what the rest of us label as excuses to stay married, which are: holy cow, expert cow, selfish cow, defective cow, innocent victim cow, and finally the other cow. (Larson, 2017)

That is indeed a lot of cows. However, the authors also provided explanations for each and every one of them. The first and second cows or myths are the belief that marriage is always good and divorce is always bad and that all problems that occur within the institution of marriage can be resolved (Larson, 2017). The Narrative here suggests a nuanced dig at marriage and a nuanced promotion of divorce disguised as socially acceptable statements.

This seemingly paranoid deduction is confirmed by the next three cows or assumptions. The authors refused to accept that people who actually end up getting a divorce are selfish or defective or consequently with their separation they would destroy the lives of their children (Teller & Teller, 2014). These would consequently and logically result in diminishing the cultural stimulus to stay married and remove certain cultural and social barriers from the reluctant couples to commit themselves on getting a divorce.

The last two cows highlighted in both the book and the article, are “the one true cow” and “the other cow,” which are related to the romantic sides of marital relationships (Teller & Teller, 2014). These are not centrally or even remotely relevant to the main arguments of this research work but they add a layer to the easing of leaving marriages that occurred in the post 1970s era. But what is most relevant and central is the conclusion that the authors of the book and the commentator in the article reached regarding how divorce should be perceived. They stated that:

If they [couples] go through the process of asking whether marriage is working for them without the fear and shame that the sacred cows produce, they’ll still probably have some soul-searching to do and maybe a lot of pain to go through, but it

would be less than it would be otherwise and they'll probably end up in a happier place if they can make that decision free of that fear. (Teller & Teller, 2014, p.101)

As it has been established in the discussions in chapters two and three, divorce has a negative impact on society and the economy, and the main reason as to why is simply because children caught between separated parents will grow up generally poorer, and consequently with less access to job opportunities than children with married parents (see discussions in chapter two, the liberalization of divorce).

Therefore more divorce cases would amplify this effect and put a significant stress on the US economy, which happened short after the liberalization of divorce in the 1970s (Hakim, 2009). Always within the popular culture's preference to use the cow metaphor, another "theory" presents itself when it comes to certain variables of the institution of marriage. This time is regarding the sexual conjugal rights that used to be accessible historically prior to the advent of contraception only through getting married. The famous "theory" is labeled popularly as the "Cow and Milk Theory." Even though it is not scientifically based, and more of a proverbial statement, it is important to note the validity of the argument it presents.

The "cow" here stands for marriage and the "milk" stands for conjugal rights. What is relevant to this research work from this seemingly offensive proverbial statement of popular culture is the connection to one of the most important consequences of the revolutions discussed in chapters two and three. These two revolutions are the Contraceptive Revolution and the Sexual Liberalization Revolution that happened simultaneously and had reciprocal influence on each other. This connection is that, because and as a result of these two revolutions couples, especially young men no longer needed to get married, or according to

the proverbial terms, buy the “cow” to get the “milk.” It also played a catalyst for young females to pursue a life independent of what was perceived as the “social restraints of marriage” without having to give up or pay the penalties of foregoing most of what marriages used to offer.

4-4-The Unintended Consequences of the “Pill” and “Roe v Wade”

The previously mentioned statements were some of the unintended consequences of the widespread distribution of contraceptives and the liberalization of sexual relationships in America that started well in the beginning of the 20th century. We have seen what the intended consequences were of the Food and Drug Administration’s approval of the oral contraceptive for example, and how much “good” actually it brought to women in terms of removing perceived obstacles to the advancement of their education, training, and ultimately careers, which is the risk of unplanned pregnancies.

But when unwanted and unplanned pregnancies did occur there was an even more drastic and draconian government sanctioned measure to solve the situation. This measure was approved by the United States Supreme Court in 1973, known as *Roe v Wade* (See discussion in chapter three). This measure and healthcare procedure was abortion or premature termination of pregnancy.

Abortion has a similar effect on the trajectory of women’s participation in the labor force and entry to educational and training institutions as the previously mentioned oral and other forms of contraception. However, it had a much deeper and most importantly unintended scenario for not just fertility patterns, but gender relations in general and also certain moral decisions when it comes to born and unborn children.

An unlikely source provided a clear picture for a manifestation of giving women the absolute exclusivity in deciding the fate of the unborn babies, which is what the *Roe v Wade*

case provided for them. This source is an artist and a comedian by the name of Dave Chappelle. Dave Chappelle is a two-time Emmy Awards and Grammy Awards winner, and in 2006 he was labeled as “the comic genius” of America by the famous American men’s magazine “Esquire,” so he is more of a philosopher than just the comedian (“Dave Chappelle”, n.d).

In one of his most controversial pieces of comedy, or what is called in the comedy world as a stand-up, which was streamed on Netflix, he stated with his usual vulgar style, which will obviously be censored here, that:

The right to choose is their [women] unequivocal right. Not only I believe they have the right to choose. I believe that they should not have to consult anybody. Except for a physician about how they exercise that right. Gentleman that is fair! And ladies to be fair to us if you decide to have the baby I should not have to pay. (Netflix Is a Joke, 2019)

He went on to deliver the punch line, even though was vulgar it provided the moral dilemma that abortion had brought forward. He continued to state that: “If you can kill this bleep [baby] I can at least abandon him. My money my choice, [then he threw a caveat at the end] and if I am wrong then perhaps we’re wrong.” (Netflix Is a Joke, 2019) This point was articulated by a more serious academic voice, when John Baker in an article entitled “Philosophy and the Morality of Abortion,” (1985) highlighted that making abortion or the decision to choose whether the baby lives or dies the exclusive right of women, would make the decision to care and provide for the child the moral choice of men (Baker, 1985). This would create a multiplied and intertwined social and political effect concerning the fertility patterns and divorce rates, which are central to the ultimate objective of this research work

regarding their unintended targeting by seemingly benign and justified social and political actions by the US government.

“Multiplied” in the sense that each of the previously mentioned changes concerning legal and social status of, for example contraception and then abortion would add to each other’s impact on fertility rates decline. And “intertwined” means that each of these changes has an open “internal” impact on each other; an example of that would be the fact that the rise in the age of first marriage was caused, at least in part, by the availability and easy access to contraceptive tools and abortion (See discussions in chapter three).

And this rise enabled women’s investment in ambitious career goals that led to the conscious decisions of not having any children or even getting married without having to pay a heavy price at the social level (See discussions in chapter two regarding the attitudes towards marriage). These findings are related to intended consequences of pursuing absolute gender equality in the social sphere. There is another equally important sphere that was impacted unintentionally by this government intervention to achieve the objective of total equality between the sexes, which is the economic sphere.

4-5-Fertility, Divorce, and Economic Stress

As it had been laid out at the ending of chapter three, there were two particularly interesting stories unfolding in the American social and especially the demographic landscapes in the following decades after the 1960s. The United States had always advanced and promoted the version of itself especially in the literary world as an exceptional nation. Leaving aside the fact that they imply a superior notion of the term, rather than using it to mean unique, the US is indeed different in terms of the historical demographic composition of its society. And they admit the fact they are a nation of immigrants in all their manifestations

of identity in holidays and the national traditions. Their subjective self perception of their own uniqueness is besides the point of argument of this research work.

What are of vital importance are the objective facts regarding the demographic structure and composition of their society, which is related to the fertility rates and immigration deficit. At the end of chapter three amid a comprehensive layout of the historical journey of gender relations in America by the highly admired economic scientist Claudia Goldin whose works were very influential on this thesis, there was the mention of the last part or to be precise, the last chapter of gender convergence. And by “convergence,” Goldin meant that in females were about to reach parity and equality in pretty much all spheres of life, and in particular their socioeconomic status (see discussions in chapter three).

However, she noted that there is still one chapter to go in order to fully realize that. And she insisted that this chapter will not come without drastic artificial intervention that includes but is not limited to the changing of how we value work, and she implicitly called for the equation of hard and long work with easy and short work, or replacing that disparity in duration and difficulty with other elements, like robots and foreign guest workers (see discussions in chapter three regarding the grand gender convergence).

But prior to reaching that conclusion, she diminished the importance of one single fact, which is that an aging nation with a declining fertility rate is a big problem in so many levels. And that the policies and proposed solutions to this supposedly “small” problem are going to make things worse at the social, economic and national security levels. For objectivity sake I will tackle the consequences of each of these elements separately in a certain amount of detail according to the major findings and arguments of the previous chapters and the initially laid out dichotomy of protections and restrictions.

First of all, the philosophy underlying Goldin's proposal, which was promoted through the official governmental channel of the National Bureau of Economic Research website that calls for equating the wages of people who work extra hours or choose to work in difficult environments with those who choose more flexibility and comfort has Marxist and Communist principles written all over it.

Because it is clearly guaranteeing equality of outcome not free competition or the famous and popular Western concept of equality of opportunity. That would have devastating consequences on one particular dimension, which is highly valued by the American public. This dimension is the free enterprise and entrepreneurial competences and competitiveness. And that would create a recipe of failure, mediocrity, and lack of quality.

There is one important point that needs to be conceded before moving on to the dissemination of the next finding, which is that the fact that these papers and publications are published on the databases and official website of the National Bureau of Economic Research does not reflect the official stance of the federal government policies regarding the issues in the content of those Publications (NBER, 2019).

The other point that Goldin raised is that an aging nation is not that big of a deal and that the richest countries are those which have a somewhat high age median (Goldin, 2014). That might be true in the immediate and short-term but in the medium and long-term it would create havoc on the economy and society if left unsolved and unchecked.

In the previous chapter I have laid out an example of an aging population in Japan, which has an educated population with a G7 economy status and notably a sophisticated healthcare system that enables its population to live much longer than the rest of the world (Goldin, 2016). The maths regarding the relationship between fertility rates and economic stress is very simple, the lowest the number that is derived from dividing the ratio of

dependents against those who provide for them i.e. workers or those in the working age, the less the economic stress would be. And as it has been established in the case of Japan the stress on the economy through the rise in the number of retirees and their longevity coupled with low birth rates and consequently low numbers of young workers, caused the entire population to shrink (see discussions in chapter three).

What is different, however, in the case of the United States which shares the first portion of this observation with Japan (the rise in the numbers of retirees' longevity and numbers that coincided with declining fertility rates), is the fact that the United States is very open to immigration.

This important factor helps in bridging some of the workers gap that declining fertility rates bring to the society and the economy. However, it is not enough and even has unintended consequences that will be dealt with in the following segments of this chapter. The other point which had raised some eyebrows, especially in the beginning of this research work upon examining the literature of Goldin was related to "robots."

As a science fiction movies fan the idea of robot workers replacing human beings or at least cooperating with human beings to close the workers gap created by low fertility rates raised both feelings of awe and anxiety. But as the research progressed in the last couple of years, add to that the scientific breakthroughs that took place in the fields of automation and artificial intelligence my sense of bewilderment had vanished and was replaced with a more pragmatic skepticism regarding the feasibility and viability of such a scenario, where machines could fill the care giving and laboring gap for a large economy such as that of the United States.

Those doubts are not just related to the capacity of modern-day technologies or even those in the foreseeable future to deliver such a scenario, but also to the timeframe in which

these capabilities will be made available. Because economic stress and the negative repercussions that accompany it do not wait or cooperate with measures of damage containment policies that the government might take to alleviate or diminish such as a stress. Simply put, the science that will bring Goldin's solutions to fruition is just not here yet. The other solution proposed by Professor Claudia Goldin to bridge the fertility decline related care gap is to bring what she labeled as guest workers.

Guest workers means literally workers who are guests i.e. they come and go or they migrate to settle permanently, in that case they will not be considered guests but rather permanent residents or even citizens. Setting the legal status aside, the social and political aspects to bringing large amounts of so-called guest workers are too broad and too important to dismiss. In an ever expanding and developing world economy it is increasingly difficult to lure and attract talented and qualified workers.

The US is without a single doubt one of the largest centers in this expanding global economy, in fact it is the largest in terms of gross domestic product or GDP terms. Not only that, it is also one of the most open and diverse economies and most notably societies due to a long historical tradition of multi-ethnic and multinational migration and immigration. But in the last few decades there was a significant rise in competition in those exact criteria: GDP and talent attraction. Especially in places that used to be themselves pools of recruitment of middle and upper middle class and sophisticated class jobs and positions like Central Asian and Far East Asian countries.

Now the likes of Japan, China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, and South Korea are all part of the G20 countries, most of them are even in the top 10 and even top five such as China, India, and Japan ("G20", n.d.). Having said that, the US has not lost its ability to attract talent of various qualities and levels; however there is also a different problem that

arises from bringing people of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds to the mixture of one's society. These problems stem mainly from the difficulties and issues of assimilation and integration into the dominant public cultural and social sphere. These dominant social and cultural spheres had admittedly gone through several accounts or processes of change throughout its history with varying degrees of success.

But sometimes those processes amount to utter catastrophes and by catastrophes I am referring to gulag or Auschwitz-type of catastrophes. Examples of this kind of foreign workers treatment include but are not limited to how the Chinese imported workers were allegedly put in dire conditions to finish up the Transcontinental Railway system that enabled the US to link the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific Ocean, according to an article published on *the History Channel* website:

The Chinese toiled through backbreaking labor during both frigid winters and blazing summers. Hundreds died from explosions, landslides, accidents and disease. And even though they made major contributions to the construction of the Transcontinental Railroad these 15000 to 20,000 Chinese immigrants have been largely ignored by history. (History.com Editors, September 11, 2017)

The idea of hiring Chinese even though it was all the way back in 1848, but the concept set is very relevant to the context of the solution under discussion, which was proposed by Professor Goldin. The concept of course is trying to bridge or fill the working gap left by insufficient or unwanting local population. Back then it was the latter of course, according to Gordon Chang, history professor at the University of Stanford:

White workers, whom the company wanted, did not sign on in numbers anything to what was needed... [The company] objected at first because of prejudice but then relented as they had few other options... They [Chinese] had the most difficult and dangerous work including tunneling and the use of explosives. There is also evidence that they faced physical abuse at times from some supervisors. (History.com Editors, September 11, 2017)

The Chinese guest workers were very badly treated and have been put through hellish conditions without being able to receive proper and fair treatment. They even saw their own validity questioned when most US courts decided that their testimony is not acceptable mainly and merely because they were Chinese (History.com Editors, May 7, 2019). Despite all those inhumane treatments that the Chinese guest workers received, it is seen as a walk in the park compared with a different group of other “imported workers.”

This concept is referring here to African Americans who were treated as a subhuman species by their enslavers to justify owning them as animals and property. There is another group, which will serve as a springboard to the final point of the fourth and final chapter of this research work. This group will serve also as a showcase to a different element, which is the loyalty to the nation and the people of these brought “guest workers.”

In this case, the group under study and discussion is the Japanese. Prior to World War II and the infamous incident that officially got the US involved directly in the midst of battle, which is Pearl Harbor, there was a significant Japanese diaspora living inside America. This significant group of people also was put through one of the most atrocious crimes in recent

history according to a historical document entailing the gruesome details of this crime, dressed as a legal precaution and protective measure:

Japanese internment camps were established during World War II by President Franklin Roosevelt through his executive order 9066. From 1942 to 1945 it was the policy of the United States government that people of Japanese descent would be entered in isolated camps. Enacted in reaction to Pearl Harbor and the ensuing war, the Japanese internment camps are now considered one of the most atrocious violations of American civil rights in the 20th century. (History.com Editors, October 17, 2019)

These three important historical precedents of treating foreign guest workers shed the light on several key obstacles and hurdles that impede the smooth integration of that process of filling the gap. But they also have a more important point to illustrate, which is central to this entire research work. This important point pertains to the unintended consequences of trying to fill the workers gap resulting from the initial point, which is aspiring to reach absolute gender equality through government policies.

4-6- Challenges Regarding the Future of National Security

The build-up to this fourth and final pillar of the unintended consequences of pursuing the achievement of absolute gender equality at the governmental and social levels started in the first chapter. The initial layout of the premise involved describing a set of circumstances coupled with governmental intervention and the existence of a cultural pot, which was supportive of certain social behaviors and structures. Circumstances involved a myriad of demographic variables that impacted the economy and the national security apparatus in so many different ways. This is referring to the Second World War and what accompanied it

during and after, in terms of the gender composition of both soldiers and the workers who replaced them temporarily during the war effort. The governmental intervention on the other hand is referring to the policies designed by the US legislative and executive branches to accommodate these rapid and vast changes.

These policies included but were not limited to marriage prohibitions that impeded the hiring of married women and the retaining of single women if they decided to get married (see discussions in chapter one regarding marriage prohibitions). This is concerning the perceived discriminatory governmental intervention; however, there were many positive interventions by the US government to help in achieving the betterment of the society in general and the returning soldiers' lives in particular.

These involved measures not just to integrate them back into a normal social life but make sure that the immediate future of the post-war American society and the economy and even political system all revolved around their experience, discipline, and virility. This political will translated into legislation and executive orders like the "G.I. Bill" also known formally as the Servicemen Readjustment Act of 1944. The bill was so comprehensive to the extent that it involved everything from education, vocational training, home ownership, and other healthcare related bonuses. The practical means and tools utilized to implement the articles of the bill were through loans and other financial means (See discussions in chapter one).

As it had been laid out, this was the primary reason for a baby boom that lasted almost two decades and created the largest and most prosperous generation in US history at least up to the 1990s (see discussions in chapter one and two regarding the implications of the Baby Boomers on the US economy). One of the main tools of analysis in this research work is done through basic logical structures like using premises and their conclusions to determine

whether an argument can withstand empirical scrutiny. This was applied particularly to analyze the validity of the twelve feminist grievances laid out in both chapters one and two. It can also be applied in this context as well. The premise of this logical argument, which is the adopted official stance of this thesis, is that the incentives and sanctions put in place regarding issues like divorce, marriage, access or lack of thereof to reproductive procedures and tools, and the general culture surrounding these factors will determine two completely different and even opposite outcomes to the national security, society and economy of the US.

The initial pattern was laid out in the background chapter of this research work. The second pattern had been laid out in this chapter and had covered the economic and social aspects. Now, it will deal with the national security aspect, which is equally if not more important in terms of the impact suffered especially from declining fertility rates.

In any sophisticated military or any military for that matter, the essential and vital component is the availability of eligible and qualified manpower. Not just the military and its branches but also other components of the security apparatus like the police force and national guards. One of the most direct impacts of declining fertility rates is the decline in available young population, which is the main pool of recruitment for those previously mentioned forces. This would pose many challenges during peaceful times and during conflict.

The previously mentioned solution for filling the care and working gap left by declining fertility rates in the social and economic spheres might not be viable or tangible in the immediate term or short term; however that same solution can be applicable in the defense and national security spheres. Of course this is referring to the second element of Claudia Goldin's proposal, which is the robots or machines' replacement of some elements of human activities. This can be clearly seen in the scientific breakthroughs concerning the military and civilian use of robotics and automation, notably the proliferation of drones, such as unmanned

aerial vehicles (U.A.Vs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (U.U.Vs). These equipments helped in not just reducing the cost of use, but also helped in the reduction of human reliance especially in missions like border and coastal patrolling. Having stated that, the need for human presence and “print” is still vitally and crucially needed, and this cannot be resolved through the other elements of the Goldin proposed solution, which are guest workers.

Due to obvious reasons one can outsource and entrust welding and plumbing jobs to foreigners but for the national security of the entire nation, that feat can be problematic to state the least. An example of why that would be problematic is that it would exhaust the process of properly vetting immigrants in order to accept and admit them in the ranks of a nation’s armed forces. This is just one element of how urgent it is to look for real solutions quickly, to the critical and even existential issue of fertility decline and how symbolic it can be for a nation.

4-7-Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to provide a clear understanding about the unintended consequences of the US government’s pursuit of absolute gender equality. The hypothesis was built on the premise of the “Boom Equation” laid out in the previous chapters. This equation was predicated on and formulated with criterion and predictor variables that enabled this research work to correctly establish a correlational link between the variables highlighted in the first chapter and the “boom” in fertility; economy; and the military that the United States witnessed in the pre 1960s period.

The prediction that this chapter had made in answering the question laid here is that the unintended consequences of government policy to pursue absolute gender equality will create what was labeled here as “the Doom Equation,” which will manifest itself in an economic stress, social unrest, and even national security concerns. Despite what is

commonly believed, or what is usually spewed in media and pseudo academic circles that breakthroughs in robotics and automation technologies or a more open immigration policies will help fix the demographic stress resulting from a rapidly declining national fertility rate in the US, there is actually no alternative for a healthy replacement-rate fertility ratio.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

General Conclusion

Based on the literature and the historical data collected regarding the institutional interventions in shaping the relationship between marriage and the labor market, and also the relationship within the household i.e., house labor division, several interesting findings had been established. In the period prior to the 1960s there were several attempts by the US government to assign certain gender roles that further exacerbated gender disparities socioeconomically, but led to an economic and military “boom,” and an unprecedented stability in marriage and fertility.

According to the deductions taken from the laid out analysis of the historical events and parallels drawn from the social contract theory and the principles of liberalism and feminism, it can be concluded that the social activism led by the feminists against certain restrictions regarding marriage, divorce and reproductive rights made its way to the hallways of the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress and other federal institutions.

This led to the passage and the “knocking down” of several laws that used to prescribe marriage and fertility and gender relations in general, laws like “Roe v. Wade” and the approval of “the contraceptive pill.” The results clearly confirmed the initial hypothesis, which stated that the passage of those key measures led to a substantial change in the predictor variables under study (fertility and divorce).

Maintaining that the correlation, between the legal changes on the one hand, and the rates of fertility and divorce changes on the other, continued to persist throughout the post 1960s era. However, there were no causal links established between the revolutionary changes concerning education and employment for women, and the rise in divorce numbers in the period under study. This last conclusion in particular would help to set the stage for analysis of the kind of impact that these legal and social changes had on fertility and divorce in the following chapter.

The intended results were to push more and more women into the American labor force, through encouraging and improving their education and removing certain social and legal barriers that impede their accession to profitable and high-paying jobs. These results were achieved in a spectacular fashion: more women entered the labor force, and previously male-dominated educational and professional degrees achieved gender parity and in some instances female dominance.

However, these results correlated with a severe decline in fertility rates and a significant rise in divorce rates in the late 1970s onward. The hypothesis was built on the premise of the “Boom Equation” laid out in the previous chapters. The “Boom Equation” was predicated on and formulated with criterion and predictor variables that enabled this research work to correctly establish a correlational link between the variables highlighted in the first chapter and the “boom” in fertility, economy, and the military that the United States witnessed in the pre 1960s period.

The unintended consequences of government policy to pursue absolute gender equality will create what was labeled here as “the Doom Equation,” which will manifest itself in an economic stress, social unrest, and even national security concerns. Despite what is commonly believed, or what is usually spewed in media and pseudo academic circles that breakthroughs in robotics and automation technologies or a more open immigration policy will help fix the demographic stress resulting from a rapidly declining national fertility rate in the US, there is actually no alternative for a healthy replacement-rate fertility ratio.

Based on these conclusions, researchers should consider establishing a causal link between the change in women’s roles in society, and the declining fertility rates that might have dire consequences on future generations. To better understand the implications of these results, future studies could address the relationship between how poorer countries have higher fertility rates than those which are wealthier. Although this research work has achieved

all the set out goals, it still needs further consolidation, due to this being an interdisciplinary attempt to understand highly nuanced and complex human historical experiences, within a relatively new discipline, which is American Studies.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX -01-

Marriage Bars among School Boards, 1928 to 1951 and Firms Hiring Office Workers, 1931 and 1940

Do Not Retain			Do Not Hire		
Single Women When Married			Married Women		
Year	Weighted	Not Weighted	Weighted	Not Weighted	
Teachers					
1928	47.3%	52.2%		61.9%	61.0%
1930/31	52.2	62.9		72.2	76.6
1942	58.4	70.0		77.7	87.0
1950/51	9.4	10.0		19.5	18.0
Clerical Workers					
(Policy)			(Policy)		
1931(178)	25.0%	12.0%		36.0%	29.2%
Phila. (44)	26.4	14.3		40.4	31.8
1940					
Phila. (106)	26.6	23.6		41.1	50.9
Kansas					
City (83)	28.4	15.7		41.7	31.3
Los Angeles(139)	9.4	8.6		24.4	15.8
(Policy & Discretionary)			(Policy & Discretionary)		
1931	34.7%	27.3%		51.7%	52.8%
Philadelphia	36.9	35.7		60.7	59.1
1940					
Philadelphia	34.5	34.9		58.5	60.4
Kansa City	46.0	30.1		57.8	43.4
Los Angeles	25.1	15.7		38.8	26.6

Source: Goldin, C.(1988). Marriage Bars: Discrimination against Married Women Workers 1920's to 1950's." N.B.E.R. working paper No. 2747.

APPENDIX -02-

Marriage Bars

Marriage Bars by Sector and Size of Firm. Clerical Sector

Size of Firm (number of female clerical employees) :								
1931								
Policy			Policy and Discretionary					
Do Not Hire		Do Not Retain	Do Not Hire		Do Not Retain		Distributions by	
							Firms	Female Employees
11 - 20	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	0.0%		1.1%	0.1%
21 - 50	25.9	10.9		46.7	21.0		27.5	3.3
51 - 100	40.4	8.4		63.5	28.9		24.2	6.0
101 - 200	17.4	3.5		41.8	26.0		18.5	9.4
201 - 400	31.0	22.2		59.5	47.5		11.8	11.3
401 - 700	39.0	32.2		89.8	45.7		5.1	8.6
701 +	39.5	30.4		45.6	33.5		11.8	61.3
No. of Obs.							178	51597
1940 (Kansas City and Philadelphia)								
11 - 20	41.0%	17.9%		43.6%	25.6%		24.2%	3.7%
21 - 50	43.6	18.2		49.1	25.5		34.2	11.2
51 - 100	46.9	25.0		65.6	56.3		19.9	15.7
101 - 200	50.0	25.0		75.0	43.8		9.9	13.8
201 - 400	62.5	50.0		62.5	62.5		5.0	12.0
401 +	27.3	18.2		54.5	27.3		6.8	43.6
No. of Obs.							161	25358
Sector:								
1931							Number of Firms	
Insurance	61.1%	45.7%		73.21%	59.5%		58	
Publishing	37.0	34.7		56.1	36.0		34	
Banking	35.4	21.2		41.9	30.2		27	
Pub. Util.	32.9	13.5		93.9	42.9		13	
Investment	11.3	1.4		26.6	9.8		27	
Advertising	11.1	0.0		28.2	0.0		13	
1940 (Kansas City and Philadelphia)								
Insurance	50.0%	42.3%		53.8%	53.8%		26	
Publishing	33.3	13.3		46.7	33.3		15	
Banking	54.5	9.1		72.7	45.4		11	
Pub. Util.	50.0	33.3		66.7	50.0		6	
Investment	16.7	16.7		50.0	16.7		6	
Manufact.	57.6	22.0		67.8	37.3		59	
Sales	17.2	10.3		24.1	13.8		29	

Source: Goldin, C.(1988). Marriage Bars: Discrimination against Married Women Workers 1920's to 1950's." N.B.E.R. working paper No. 2747.

APPENDIX -03-

Marriage and Divorce

	Born 1940-45		Born 1950-55					
	By Cohort		By Gender		By Race		By Education	
	All	All	Men	Women	Black	White	College grads	<College grads
%Ever married	93.1%	89.5%	88.2%	90.7%	77.6%	91.0%	89.5%	89.5%
<i>Among those ever married:</i>								
Average Age at First Marriage	22.6	23.6	24.7	22.6	24.7	23.3	24.9	22.8
%Still in first marriage	64.5%	56.6%	59.1%	54.3%	52.7%	56.1%	63.3%	52.6%
% of first marriages ending in divorce	32.7%	40.8%	39.4%	42.0%	42.9%	41.5%	34.8%	44.3%
<i>Among those who divorced</i>								
Average duration of marriage (yrs)	10.3	9.0	8.7	9.3	9.7	8.9	9.0	9.1
%Remarrying	70.5%	68.9%	71.3%	66.8%	56.8%	70.6%	67.8%	69.4%
<i>Among those remarrying after divorce</i>								
Average time to remarriage (yrs)	3.9	4.2	3.9	4.5	4.7	4.2	4.2	4.2
%Still in 2 nd marriage	70.7%	62.5%	64.1%	61.0%	58.6%	63.0%	70.2%	59.0%
% of 2 nd marriages ending in divorce	26.5%	35.7%	35.3%	36.2%	36.1%	35.7%	28.7%	39.0%
<i>Among those whose 2nd marriage ends in divorce</i>								
Average duration of 2 nd marriage (yrs)	6.7	6.0	6.1	5.9	6.4	6.0	5.7	6.1
%Remarrying	49.2%	53.0%	55.8%	50.5%	49.1%	54.1%	49.9%	54.1%

Source: Stevenson, Betsey, and Justin Wolfers. 2007. "Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving Forces." *PSC Working Paper Series* PSC 07-04.

APPENDIX -04-


International Comparisons

	U.S.	Canada	UK	France	Germany	Italy	Sweden
Marriage							
Annual marriages per thousand people	7.4	4.7	5.1	4.3	4.8	4.3	4.8
Annual marriages per thousand unmarried adults	18.1	13.0	11.4	9.4	12.1	10.8	8.8
% of adult population currently married	59.6%	62.9%	55.1%	54.3%	60.4%	60.0%	45.2%
% of adult population ever married	76.9%	75.5%	72.0%	69.5%	75.9%	72.8%	64.3%
Remarriage (% of marriages in which the bride was previously married)	28.4%	--	28.9%	17.6%	28.3%	6.3%	23.7%
% of 2002 marriages in which the bride was 35 years old or over	31%	28%	30%	28%	-	15%	33%
Divorce							
Annual divorces per thousand people	3.6	2.2	2.8	2.1	2.6	0.8	2.2
Annual divorces per thousand married people	8.5	4.6	6.9	5.1	5.7	1.3	6.8
% of adult population currently divorced	10.2%	4.9%	8.3%	6.7%	6.3%	9.6%	11.3%
Cohabitation							
% of adult population in non-marital cohabitation	4.7%	10.7%	11.6%	10.8%	7.1%	3.9%	11.7%
Fertility							
Annual births per thousand people	14.0	10.4	11.7	12.7	8.6	9.5	11.1
Completed fertility: 1961 birth cohort	1.96	--	1.95	2.10	1.63	1.63	2.03
Mean age at childbirth	27.3	29.0	28.8	29.5	29.1	30.3	30.3
Non-marital births (% of all births)	34.6%	36.2%	42.3%	45.2%	28.0%	14.9%	55.4%
Attitudes: % Agree that...							
Marriage is an out-dated institution	10.1%	22.3%	25.9%	36.3%	18.4%	17.0%	20.4%
People who want children ought to get married	65.3%	48.9%	52.4%	41.2%	52.9%	60.9%	31.0%
Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can't seem to work out their marriage problems	43.0%	78.0%	61.1%	61.0%	74.8%	65.0%	54.6%

Source: Stevenson, Betsey, and Justin Wolfers. 2007. "Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving Forces." *PSC Working Paper Series* PSC 07-04.

APPENDIX -05-

Method of Contraception Used by Women




*Estimated. See Alan Guttmacher Institute. 1991.

Source: Jones, EF and JD Forrest. 1992. Contraceptive Failure Rates Based on the 1988 NSFG. Family Planning Perspectives 24(1):12-19.

Source: Schneider, D., & Hastings, O. P. (2015). Socioeconomic Variation in the Effect of Economic Conditions on Marriage and Nonmarital Fertility in the United States: Evidence From the Great Recession. *Demography*, 52(6), 1893-1915.

APPENDIX -06-

Percentage of Unintended Pregnancies




*1991 data.

Sources: Council of Europe. *Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 1993*. Council of Europe Press, 1994; Statistics and Information Department, Ministry of Health and Welfare. *Vital Statistics of Japan, 1992*; Central Agency for Austrian Statistics. *Demographic yearbook, Austria, 1992*; Belle M. McQuillan K. *Births Outside of Marriage: A Growing Alternative*, Canadian Social Trends, Summer 1994. Statistics Canada.

Source: Schneider, D., & Hastings, O. P. (2015). Socioeconomic Variation in the Effect of Economic Conditions on Marriage and Nonmarital Fertility in the United States: Evidence From the Great Recession. *Demography*, 52(6), 1893-1915.

APPENDIX -07-

Percentage of Unintended Pregnancies




Source: Forrest J.D. 1994. Epidemiology of Unintended Pregnancy and Contract Use *American Journal of Obstetric Gynecology* 170: 1485-1488.

Source: Schneider, D., & Hastings, O. P. (2015). Socioeconomic Variation in the Effect of Economic Conditions on Marriage and Nonmarital Fertility in the United States: Evidence From the Great Recession. *Demography*, 52(6), 1893-1915.

APPENDIX -08-

Percentage of Unplanned Pregnancies among Married and Unmarried Couples




Source: Ventura et al. 1995. Trends in Pregnancies and Pregnancy Rates: Estimates for the United States, 1980-92. *Monthly Vital Statistics Report*, 43(11). Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics.

Source: Schneider, D., & Hastings, O. P. (2015). Socioeconomic Variation in the Effect of Economic Conditions on Marriage and Nonmarital Fertility in the United States: Evidence From the Great Recession. *Demography*, 52(6), 1893-1915.


APPENDIX -09-

Productivity and Labor Input

<Productivity (1980 = 100)>



<Labor Input (1980 = 100)>




Source: Schneider, D., & Hastings, O. P. (2015). Socioeconomic Variation in the Effect of Economic Conditions on Marriage and Nonmarital Fertility in the United States: Evidence From the Great Recession. *Demography*, 52(6), 1893-1915.

APPENDIX -10-

Gender Pay Gap in High-Paying Jobs

The pay gap in high-earning occupations

Average hourly earnings by gender



Source: ONS, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings




Source: Fisher, Stephen. 2018. "Political Sociology Lectures: Gender." PSC Working Paper Series PSC 07-04. <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~nuff0084/polsoc>

APPENDIX -11-

Views on Women's Roles 1984-2018

Declining Patriarchy? Attar Taylor & Scott (BSA, 2018)



Source: Fisher, Stephen. 2018. "Political Sociology Lectures: Gender." PSC Working Paper Series PSC 07-04. <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~nuff0084/polsoc>

APPENDIX -12-


Female Employment by Personal Attitude, Cohabiting, Children and Country Attitude

	Not Employed	Employed	<i>N</i>
<i>Personal attitude</i>			11903
Home-centered	43.4	56.6	1503
Adaptive	30.3	69.7	9373
Work-centered	23.8	76.2	1027
<i>Cohabiting</i>			12013
Yes	33.3	66.7	8744
No	27.1	72.9	3269
<i>Children</i>			12031
Yes	40.1	59.9	4461
No	26.5	73.5	7570
<i>Country attitude</i>			12045
Traditional	32.4	67.6	10663
Liberal	25.6	74.4	1382

Source: Hakim, C. (2003) *Models of the Family in Modern Societies: Ideals and Realities*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

APPENDIX -13-

Employment by Education: Women aged 20-59



Source: Hakim, C. (2003) *Models of the Family in Modern Societies: Ideals and Realities*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

APPENDIX -14-

The Four Central Tenets of Preference Theory

1. Five separate historical changes in society and in the labour market which started in the late 20th century are producing a qualitatively different and new scenario of options and opportunities for women. The five changes do not necessarily occur in all modern societies, and do not always occur together. Their effects are cumulative. The five causes of a new scenario are:

- the contraceptive revolution which, from about 1965 onwards, gave sexually active women reliable control over their own fertility for the first time in history;
- the equal opportunities revolution, which ensured that for the first time in history women had equal right to access to all positions, occupations and careers in the labour market. In some countries, legislation prohibiting sex discrimination went further, to give women equal access to housing, financial services, public services, and public posts;
- the expansion of white-collar occupations, which are far more attractive to women than most blue-collar occupations;
- the creation of jobs for secondary earners, people who do not want to give priority to paid work at the expense of other life interests; and
- the increasing importance of attitudes, values and personal preferences in the lifestyle choices of affluent modern societies.

2. Women are heterogeneous in their preferences and priorities on the conflict between family and employment. In the new scenario they are therefore heterogeneous also in their employment patterns and work histories. These preferences are set out, as ideal types, in Table 2. The size of the three groups varies in rich modern societies because public policies usually favour one or another group.

3. The heterogeneity of women's preferences and priorities creates conflicting interests between groups of women: sometimes between home-centred women and work-centred women, sometimes between the middle group of adaptive women and women who have one firm priority (whether for family work or employment). The conflicting interests of women have given a great advantage to men, whose interests are comparatively homogeneous; this is one cause of patriarchy and its disproportionate success.

4. Women's heterogeneity is the main cause of women's variable responses to social engineering policies in the new scenario of modern societies. This variability of response has been less evident in the past, but it has still impeded attempts to predict women's fertility and employment patterns. Policy research and future predictions of women's choices will be more successful in future if they adopt the preference theory perspective and first establish the distribution of preferences between family work and employment in each society.

Source: Hakim C (2006) 'Women, careers, and work-life preferences', *British Journal of Guidance and Counselling*, special issue edited by Amal Al- Sawad and Laurie Cohen, 34: 279- 294.

APPENDIX -15-

Classification of Women's Work-Lifestyle Preferences in the 21st Century

Home-centred 20% of women varies 10–30%	Adaptive 60% of women varies 40–80%	Work-centred 20% of women varies 10–30%
Family life and children are the main priorities throughout life.	This group is most diverse and includes women who want to combine work and family, plus drifters and unplanned careers.	Childless women are concentrated here. Main priority in life is employment or equivalent activities in the public arena: politics, sport, art, etc.
Prefer <i>not</i> to work.	Want to work, but <i>not</i> totally committed to work career.	Committed to work or equivalent activities.
Qualifications obtained as cultural capital.	Qualifications obtained with the intention of working.	Large investment in qualifications/training for cultural capital employment/ other activities.
Number of children is affected by government social policy, family wealth, etc. Not responsive to employment policy.	This group is <i>very responsive</i> to government social policy, employment policy, equal opportunities policy/ propaganda, economic cycle/ recession/growth, etc., including: income tax and social welfare benefits, educational policies, school timetables, child care services, public attitude towards working women, legislation promoting female employment, trade union attitudes to working women, availability of part-time work and similar work flexibility, economic growth and prosperity, and institutional factors generally.	Responsive to economic opportunity, political opportunity, artistic opportunity, etc. Not responsive to social/ family policy.
<i>Family values:</i> caring, sharing, non-competitive, communal, focus on cohesion	<i>Compromise between two</i> conflicting sets of values	<i>Marketplace values:</i> competitive rivalry, achievement orientation, individualism, excellence

Source: Hakim C (2006) 'Women, careers, and work-life preferences', British Journal of Guidance and Counselling, special issue edited by Amal Al- Sawad and Laurie Cohen, 34: 279- 294.

ملخص

غالبًا ما تركز الأدبيات حول موضوع النوع الاجتماعي على فكرة أن تحقيق المساواة بين الجنسين يسبق الاعتبارات الأخرى المتعلقة بالقضايا الاجتماعية والسياسية والاقتصادية. يبحث هذا العمل البحثي في شرعية هذا الرأي والتطور التاريخي للتدخلات الاجتماعية والقانونية لتحقيق أجندتها. الهدف هو استكشاف التغييرات التاريخية للعلاقات بين الجنسين على المستويات الاجتماعية والاقتصادية والسياسية التي حثتها الحكومات الأمريكية والأجنبية (اليابان والاتحاد الأوروبي) لمعالجة قضية عدم المساواة بين الجنسين. سيستخدم هذا العمل مزيجًا من أساليب البحث الإثنوغرافية والارتباطية للمساعدة في تحقيق هدفه ، وهو إجراء تنبؤ بشأن النتائج غير المقصودة للسعي لتحقيق المساواة المطلقة بين الجنسين في الولايات المتحدة. هذا البحث يقترح ان المعادلة التي ادت الى ازدهار اقتصادي وعسكري في الولايات المتحدة بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية شهدت تغيرًا جذريًا. تؤكد هذه الأطروحة أن هذا التغيير الجذري في متغيرات "معادلة الازدهار" سيؤدي إلى ظهور "معادلة الهلاك" التي تتأثر وتؤثر على معدلات الخصوبة والطلاق.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الجنس ، المساواة ، الطلاق ، الخصوبة ، النسوية.

Summary

The literature around the topic of gender is often focused on the notion that achieving gender equity precedes other considerations regarding social, political, and economic issues. This research work examines the legitimacy of this view and the historical evolution of the social and legal interventions to achieve its agenda. The aim is to explore the historical changes of gender relations at the social, economic and political levels that were instigated by U.S and foreign governments (Japan and the EU) to address the issue of gender inequality. A combination of ethnographic and correlational research methods were used to help achieve this aim, which is to make a prediction regarding the unintended consequences of pursuing absolute gender equality in the U.S. The findings of this research suggest that the equation that led to a military and economic “boom” in the U.S after the Second World War witnessed a drastic change. This drastic change in the variables of the “boom equation” will lead to the emergence of a “doom equation” affected by and affecting fertility and divorce rates.

Key Words: Gender, Equality, Divorce, Fertility, Feminism.

Resumé

La littérature sur le thème du genre se concentre souvent sur l'idée que la réalisation de l'équité entre les sexes précède d'autres considérations concernant les questions sociales, politiques et économiques. Ce travail de recherche examine la légitimité de cette vision et l'évolution historique des interventions sociales et juridiques pour réaliser son agenda. Le but de cette thèse est d'explorer les changements historiques des relations de genre aux niveaux social, économique et politique qui ont été incités par les gouvernements Américains et étrangers (Japon et UE) pour aborder la question de l'inégalité entre les sexes. Ce travail utilisera une combinaison de méthodes de recherche ethnographiques et corrélationnelles pour aider à atteindre son objectif, qui est de faire une prédiction concernant les conséquences imprévues de la poursuite de l'égalité absolue entre les sexes aux États-Unis. Ce travail suggère que l'équation qui a conduit à un 'Boom' politique, militaire et économique aux États-Unis après la Seconde Guerre mondiale a connu un changement radical. Cette thèse soutient que ce changement radical des variables de 'l'équation du Boom' conduira à l'émergence d'une 'équation de Doom' affectée et affectant les taux de fertilité et de divorce.

Mots Clés: Genre, Egalité, Divorce, Fertilité, Féminisme.